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LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON AND THE 
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON 
CIVIL DISORDERS (THE KERNER COMMISSION):
A STUDY OF THE JOHNSON POLICY MAKING SYSTEM
PREFACE
This study seeks to accomplish four g o a ls :  to desc r ibe  the
p o l i t i c a l  uses of ad hoc advisory groups in the  advisory  systems c rea ted  
by tw en t ie th  cen tury  American p res iden ts ;^  to  d e ta i l  the  unique c o n t r i -
The phrase "p res iden t ia l  adv iso ry  system" as used throughout 
th i s  study connotes the network o f  in d iv id u a l s ,  boards ,  commissions, 
committees and ta sk  forces  o f f i c i a l l y  appointed by the p re s iden t  and 
serving him as channels o f  informat ion about public  po l icy  m at te rs ,  
the a d m in i s t r a t io n  of which he i s  charged by s t a t u t e ,  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  
t r a d i t i o n  and/o r  in which he has developed an i n t e r e s t  out of personal 
concern o r  p o l i t i c a l  necess i ty .  While t h i s  study deals  with ad hoc 
advisory groups,  th e  phrase " p re s id e n t i a l  adv iso ry  system" is  meant 
to inc lude  the  cab ine t  o f f i c e r s ,  a l l  sen ior  members o f  the  Executive 
Office o f  the  Pres iden t  and those persons,  in and o u ts id e  the national 
government to  whom a p a r t i c u l a r  p r e s id e n t  may r e g u la r ly  tu rn  fo r  
policy adv ice .  Obviously the c o n s t i t u e n t  p a r t s  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  
advisory system a r e  a d m in i s t r a t io n - s p e c i f i c  and vary over time with in  
a p a r t i c u l a r  ad m in is t ra t io n .  "Ad hoc" c a r r i e s  i t s  d ic t io n a ry  
d e f i n i t i o n  throughout t h i s  work: " fo r  t h i s  spec ia l  purpose."  The 
word "system" i s  being used here as a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  device ra th e r  than 
as a th e o r e t i c a l  framework. I t  i s  meant to desc r ibe  an arena of 
p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n ,  a concrete  s e t t i n g  in which a p o l i t i c a l  process can 
be in v e s t ig a t e d .  This use of  the concept "system" i s  indebted to 
Lawrence K. P e t t i t .  See his The Policy Making Process in  Congress: 
Passing the  Higher Education Academic F a c i l i t y  Act of 1963. (Ph.D. 
d i s s e r t a t i o n ,  Univers ity  o f  Wisconsin,  1965. Ann Arbor: Michigan
Unive rs i ty  Microfilms, 1966.)
butions  o f  P res iden t  Lyndon Baines Johnson to t h i s  p a t t e r n  of  p o l i t i c a l  
behavio r ;  to advance an o r ig in a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of the  work o f  one 
o f  Johnson 's  most important advisory  groups, the National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders ( the  Kerner Commission); to draw conclusions 
useful  in enhancing the t h e o r e t i c a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  the p r a c t i c e  of  
American p re s id en t i a l  p o l i t i c s .
B) The P res id en t ia l  Advisory Commission
Information i s  the  c a p i t a l  of modern p o l i t i c s .  I t s  a c q u i s i t i o n
and use i s  a major source o f  p o l i t i c a l  power. American p res iden ts
have been p a r t i c u l a r l y  adept information en t rep ren eu rs ,  a c q u i r in g ,
in v e s t in g  and monopolizing the information necessary fo r  the c r e a t io n
2
and execution of  na tional po l icy .  Development and p e r f e c t i o n  of an 
e l a b o r a te  system of  advisors  and advisory groups fo llowing World War II
p
Gene M. Lyons, "The Pres iden t  and His Exper ts ,"  The Annuals 
o f  the  American Academy of P o l i t i c a l  and Social Science 394 (March 
1971 ): 36:38:
has been a p r in c ip a l  means by which t h i s  monopoly has been 
achieved.
P r e s id e n t i a l  advisory  commissions a re  both a product of  and a 
tool in the development o f  the p re s id e n t i a l  advisory  system. The 
p r e s id e n t i a l  adv isory  commission i s  unique among the  public po licy  
mechanisms used by p re s id e n t s .  As Frank Popper has sa id :
. . .n o n e  of th e se  (o ther )  advisory  mechanisms a re  ( s ic )  r e a l l y  
comparable to the  P res id en t ia l  Commission. None are  ( s i c )  so 
p r e s t i g i o u s ,  none evolve such massive e f f o r t ,  none deal with 
such broad problems, and none so p u b l i c ly  advise  the p r e s i ­
dent.  Indeed, no o the r  advisory mechanism of the  American 
government can be considered a t ru e  a l t e r n a t i v e  to the 
p r e s id e n t i a l  commission.
I t  i s  important a t  t h i s  point  to have in mind four c h a r a c t e r i s ­
t i c s  of p r e s id e n t i a l  advisory commissions which mark them as unique, 
s i g n i f i c a n t  to o l s  in  the evo lu tion o f  p r e s id e n t i a l  dominance of 
na t iona l  po l icy  making in the United S t a t e s .  F i r s t ,  the c re a t io n  of 
an advisory  commission i s  not dependent on the  ex is tence  of a major 
p o l i t i c a l  c r i s i s .  P res iden ts  more o f ten  c r e a t e  commissions to head o f f  
perceived t h r e a t s  than as a response to an actua l  c r i s i s .  The d i s t i n c ­
t i o n  here i s  im por tan t  f o r  i t  is  the a b i l i t y  of  p res iden ts  to a n t i c i p a t e  a 
c r i s i s  and quick ly  meet i t  with an agency o f  executive  power t h a t  has 
been a key weapon in  the p res idency 's  winning of  the  intra-governmental  
war which has come to  c h a r a c te r i z e  pos t  World War I I  na tiona l p o l i t i c s
2
Frank Popper, Pr e s i d e n t ' s  Commissions, (New York: Twentieth
Century Fund, 1970), p. 5.
in  the  United S t a t e s .  Second, the  c r e a t io n  of  a commission by th e  
p re s id e n t  is  a common, almost r o u t i n e ,  pa r t  of  the p o l i t i c a l  management
5
o f  complicated and c o n t ro v e r s i a l  po l icy  i s su e s .  Thomas R. Wolanin 
has summarized the number of commissions,  commissioners and the dura t ion  
o f  t h e i r  s e r v ice  f o r  the  a d m in i s t r a t io n s  of  Pres iden ts  Truman, 
Eisenhower,  Kennedy and Johnson. The p a t t e rn  r e f l e c t e d  in his  work 
confirms the observat ion  t h a t  p r e s id e n t s  more and more ro u t in e ly  tu rn  
t o  these  ad hoc groups f o r  sp ec ia l  help in times o f  p o l i t i c a l  t r o u b l e .
TABLE 1: Frequency of  Commissions by Adminis tra tion

































See Thomas R. Wolanin, " P r e s id e n t i a l  Advisory Commissions: 
1945-1968" (Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n .  Harvard Univers i ty ,  1971), p. 6 f o r  
a s im i l a r  development of  t h i s  p o in t .  Wolanin's d i s s e r t a t i o n  has been 
publi shed as P re s id e n t i a l  Advisory Commissions: Truman to Nixon.
(Madison; Univers i ty  o f  Wisconsin P ress ,  1975).
See Michael Lipsky and David Olson, MSS, I I I ,  p. 1. The manuscript  
was furnished to the  author by Professors  Lipsky and Olson. The published 
vers ion  of the  manuscript  i s  Commission P o l i t i c s :  The Processing of
Racial C r i s i s  in America (New Brunswick, N .J . :  Transaction Books, 1979).
5
TABLE 3: Duration o f  Commissions in Months, by Adm in is t ra t ion
HST DDE JFK LBJ OVERALL
Mean 8 .7 7.1 12.5 15.1 11.9
Median 8 5 • 11 14.5 10.5
Source: Wolanin, "P r e s id e n t i a l Advisory Commission," p. 259G
Third ,  p r e s i d e n t i a l  adv iso ry  commissions a r e  in tended to have a v a r i e t y  
o f  p o s i t i v e  impacts on the  var ious  e l i t e  l e a d e r s h ip  groups to whom the 
p re s id e n t s  th in k  they must turn  to  enab le  them to secu re  policy  suppor t ;  
they  a r e  n o t  appo in ted ,  as o f te n  p i c t u r e d ,  j u s t  to  enable  a p re s id en t  to 
avoid  doing anyth ing  about a c r i t i c a l  po l icy  i s s u e ,  o r  to confuse the  pub­
l i c ,  the  c o n g re s s  o r  o th e r  p o l i t i c a l  e l i t e s  about the  na tu re  of the  pro­
blem.^ Wolanin 's  work has shown t h a t  p r e s i d e n t i a l  adv isory  commissions 
have had s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  on p r e s i d e n t s ,  ex ec u t iv e  agenc ies ,  e l i t e  
pub l ic s  and,  o v e r a l l ,  have had marked, i f  m arg ina l ,  impact on the
Since  th e s e  da ta  only  r e p r e s e n t  p r e s i d e n t i a l  advisory  commissions, 
i t  i s  no t  s u r p r i s i n g  to  l e a r n  t h a t  du r ing  h i s  f i r s t  y e a r  in o f f i c e  
P r e s id e n t  Richard M. Nixon's  s t a f f  found one-hundred and s ix ty - n in e  d i s ­
t i n c t  a d v i so r y  bodies in the  f e d e ra l  government,  some o f  whose o r ig i n s  
could be t r a c e d  as f a r  back as th e  Truman and Eisenhower a d m in i s t r a t i o n s .  
(Jack Rosen tha l ,  "Study Panels  in th e  C a p i t a l , "  New York Times December, 
12,  1969)
^Obviously,  some p re s id e n t s  have appoin ted  adv isory  commissions 
f o r  t h e s e  purposes and some commissions have accomplished these  ends 
r e g a r d l e s s  o f  the  purpose o f  the  appo in t ing  p r e s i d e n t .  The poin t 
here  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  much more p o l i t i c a l  and po l icy  making i n t e n t  
and outcome to  the  appointment and work o f  p r e s i d e n t i a l  advisory  
commissions than th e  conventional  wisdom allows us to  b e l i e v e .  For 
the  t r a d i t i o n a l  po in t  o f  view, see  Andrew Kopkin, "White on Black: The
Riot  Commission and the  Rhetor ic  o f  Reform," Hard Times 44 (September 
15-22, 1969);  George T. Su lzne r ,  t h e  "United S ta te s  Commission on Civi l  
Righ ts :  A Study in  Incremental  ism in Po l icy  Making," (Ph.D. d i s s e r t a ­
t i o n ,  U n iv e r s i t y  o f  Michigan, 1967);  Carl Marcy, P r e s id e n t i a l  Commissions 
(New York: Kings Court  P r e s s ,  1945).
development of  national policy .
My research  and ana lys i s  i n d ic a te  t h a t  con tra ry  to the 
conventional wisdom, commission repor ts  and recommendations 
a re  responded to by governmental o f f i c i a l s ,  in  p a r t i c u l a r  
the  P res iden t ,  and they do have an important impact in 
o th e r  a reas ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  as  educators  of  the general 
public  and spec ia l ized  segments of  i t .  The impact t h a t  
commissions do have compares q u i t e  favorably with reasonable  
expecta tions  of what impact they ought to h a v e . . . o v e r a l l ,  
commissions have had s i g n i f i c a n t  marginal impact on the 
course of  public policy in the per iod 1945-1969. That i s ,  
i f  no commissions had been c rea ted  in th i s  pe r iod ,  the 
general  course o f  public  p o l ic y  probably would not have 
been a l t e r e d  in any major way, but would have been a l t e r e d  
in innumerable l e s s e r  ways. This i s  not an inconsequentia l  
im pac t . . .
F in a l ly ,  as the substance of  the following chapters  wil l  confirm, 
advisory commissions have been s k i l l f u l l y  used by the p re s id en t s  o f  
the twent ie th  century as a gatekeeping device to thwart access by 
p r e s i d e n t i a l l y  defined "non-represen ta t ive"  i n t e r e s t  groups to the 
policy making councils of the  p res idency .  Analysis of  t h i s  use of  ad 
hoc advisory  groups to a f f e c t  na t iona l  policy making by enhancing some 
i n t e r e s t  groups and in h ib i t i n g  o th e r s ,  by granting and withholding 
access to  the inner-counc i ls  o f  the p re s iden t ia l  advisory system i s  
a major theme running through the  following chap te rs .
C) The Johnson Advisory System
The analys is  of  the uses of task  forces and commissions in the  
domestic policy making system o f  the  Johnson a d m in is t r a t io n  undertaken 
in t h i s  work has a th r e e - fo ld  purpose: 1) to demonstrate the major
c on t r ibu t ions  made by the Johnson adm in is t ra t ion  to the development
g
Wolanin, P res iden t ia l  Advisory Commissions: Truman to_ Nixon, pp. 
1-2 and p. 13.
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of  the  dominance of the  presidency in the  i n i t i a t i o n  and implementation 
o f  na t iona l  domestic pol icy  making; 2) to  analyze c r i t i c a l l y  the  use 
o f  t a sk  fo rces  and commissions in the  Johnson domestic policy  making 
system and thereby provide a frame of  re fe rence  fo r  the  case  study 
o f  the  Kerner Commission; 3) to s u b s t a n t i a t e  the propos i t ion  d iscussed  
in P a r t  IV t h a t  hegemonic ru le  by e l i t e s  is  a va l id  concept to use in 
desc r ib ing  the p o l i t i c s  o f  the American p re s id en t i a l  advisory system.
Lyndon Johnson brought to the presidency t h i r t y  years  of 
Washington p o l i t i c a l  experience during which he took his  unique p o l i t i c a l  
background of  New Deal l ib e ra l i s m  and west  Texas h i l l  country populism 
and c rea ted  an unsurpassed record o f  l i b e r a l  l e g i s l a t i v e  accomplish-
9
ments. The major consequences of t h i s  blend fo r  Johnson needs to be 
i d e n t i f i e d  i f  his development and use o f  of ad hoc advisory  groups in 
his  domestic pol icy making system i s  to be understood.
F i r s t  i s  the importance o f  the  n a t i o n ' s  c ap i t a l  as a r e f e r ­
e n t i a l  symbol in the  p o l i t i c a l  pe rcept ion  o f  Johnson and the o th e r  
i n h e r i t o r s  of  the  Roosevelt  New Deal.^^ Washington was the  locus of  
n a t iona l  p o l i t i c s  and policy  making leadersh ip  f o r  New Deal l i b e r a l s  
s ince  Roosevelt  f i r s t  mobilized i t s  l a t e n t  resources fo r  his a t t a c k  
on the  economic depress ion of the  1930 's  and then fo r  the a l l i e d  
e f f o r t  aga in s t  the  Axis powers in World War II .  Johnson and his
A v a r i e ty  of schola rs  have i s o l a t e d  these two f a c to r s  in 
developing p o r t r a i t s  of Johnson the man and the p o l i t i c i a n .  The 
most important fo r  t h i s  study i s  t h a t  o f  Doris Kearns, Lyndon 
Johnson and the American Dream, (New York: Harper and Row,
T976T
^^J. Murray Edleman, Symbolic Uses of  P o l i t i c s  (Urbana;
Univers i ty  of I l l i n o i s  P r e s s , 1964), p. 6.
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genera t ion  o f  Washington New Deal Democrats saw American p o l i t i c a l  
l ead e rsh ip  as  Washington based, nat ional  in c h a r a c t e r ,  and consequently 
in  e s s e n t i a l  control  of what they came to  regard as the l e s s e r  
p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e s  of the  country .  They held the presidency fo r  a l l  
bu t  the  e i g h t  years  of  the  Eisenhower a d m in is t r a t io n  and co n t ro l l e d  
the  congress f o r  a l l  but four  years  s ince  the f i r s t  e l e c t i o n  of FDR; 
they  c rea ted  the New Deal-Fa ir  Deal-New F ro n t ie r  reforms and prose­
cuted two major wars; they had good reason, t h e r e f o r e ,  to assume t h a t  
the  public po l icy  consensuses reached in Washington on major issues  
were by d e f i n i t i o n  r e p r e s e n ta t i v e  of the bes t  i n t e r e s t s  of  the people .  
All the  major i n t e r e s t s  of  the  nation delegated to o f f i c i a l  Washington's 
in h a b i t a n t s  the r i g h t  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to advocate ,  b a rga in ,  com­
promise and reach le g i t im a te  and binding agreements on po l icy  matters  
o f  common concern.  At the  apex of  th i s  pyramid of  popular r e p r e s e n ta ­
t io n  was t h e  p re s id en t ,  the  one person vested with a na t iona l  mandate 
to  govern; the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  ta sk  was to draw to g e th e r  the  d ive rgen t  
public  po l icy  i n t e r e s t s ,  and lead the congress in p a r t i c u l a r  and the
na t ion  in g e n e r a l . Being, a t  l e a s t  in p a r t ,  what McPherson c a l l s  a
12Washington p r o v in c ia l ,  Johnson throughout was a f irm b e l i e v e r  in t h i s  
convent ional  wisdom of  the  New Deal e s tab l i shm ent .  He en tered  the  
pres idency determined to s trengthen i t  as the policy  making c en te r  
and to l e av e  a t  l e a s t  as g re a t  a personal imprin t  on the o f f i c e  as 
did his  p o l i t i c a l  pa tron and model, FDR.
Harry McPherson, A P o l i t i c a l  Education (Boston; L i t t l e ,  Brown 
and Co., 1972), p. 176 - 178. Johnson l ived out his whole p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  
in the cauldron o f  na t iona l  p o l i t i c s .
A .-najor i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  Johnson 's  d e d ic a t io n  to the expansion 
o f  the power o f  the  p re s idency  can be seen in the  a d d i t i o n s  ne made 
to tne Executive  O ff i ce  o f  the  P r e s id e n t  (EGP). Created by FDR in 
1935 as a means fo r  o v e rsee in g  and c o n t r o l l i n g  the  New Deal programs 
and ag enc ie s ,  the  EOF grew under succeeding p re s id e n t s  u n t i l  in 1963, 
when Johnson became th e  c h i e f  e x ecu t iv e ,  i t  had t n e  form re p re se n te d  
below.
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iOurce; General Se rv ices  A dm in is t ra t io n ,  O f f i ce  o f  Fecerai 
R e g i s t e r ,  National Archives and Records S e rv ic e ,  P . 5, 
Government Organiza t ion  Manual -  1963 , p. o37.
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To t h i s  Johnson added s ix  major o f f i c e s :  Off ice  of  Economic Opportunity-
1965, O f f i ce  o f  Emergency Preparedness-1965, National Council on 
Marine Resources and Energy Development-19.66, Council on Environmental 
Qual i ty-1969, Council on Urban Affa i rs -1969 ,  Off ice  o f  In te rgovern­
mental Rela t ions-1969.  Each was crea ted  to a id  the p re s id en t  in 
developing and guid ing through congress domestic p o l i c i e s  regarded as 
c r i t i c a l  a reas  f a c in g  the na t ion  in the immediate f u tu r e .  These add i­
t i o n s  to  the  EOF r e f l e c t e d  not only Johnson 's  sense of  the  p r i o r i t i e s
fo r  the  nation  bu t  a lso  h is  concern f o r  p r e s id e n t i a l  contro l  over the
12development of  po l icy  making and i t s  a d m in i s t r a t io n .  The e s t a b l i s h ­
ment of these  o f f i c e s  a l so  gives evidence of congress iona l agreement, 
o r  a t  l e a s t  acquiescence ,  in the judgments of the  p re s id en t .
There was a l so  a common cu l tu ra l  dimension which Johnson shared 
with o th e r  New Deal l i b e r a l s  which must be d e l in ea ted  before  the fu l l
p o l i t i c a l  import  o f  ad hoc advisory bodies in the  Johnson adm in is t ra t ion
13can be a p p re c i a t e d .  Johnson and the o the r  leade rs  of " o f f i c i a l "
1 2I t  is  i n t e r e s t i n g  to note t h a t  the  c r e a t io n  of  a Domestic 
Council w ith in  th e  EOF, with du t ies  p a r a l l e l  to those o f  the National 
Secu r i ty  Counci l ,  was c a r r i e d  out by the Nixon a d m in i s t r a t io n .  In the 
Johnson a d m in i s t r a t io n  a l l  s en io r  members of  the execu t ive  branch were 
expected to  f u r t h e r  the  Great Society goals  and l e g i s l a t i v e  program as 
p a r t  o f  t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  Johnson 's  sen ior  White House s t a f f ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  those  r e l a t e d  to  the  work o f  the  task  f o r c e s ,  served as an 
u n o f f i c i a l  domestic co u n c i l .  Joseph C al i fano ,  in r e t r o s p e c t ,  however, 
saw the  need f o r  the  Johnson ad m in is t r a t io n  to fo rmal ly  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e  
i t s  de fac to  domestic co u n c i l .  (See h i s  comments on t h i s ,  LBJ Library ora l  
h i s to r y  tape  and the  t r a n s c r i p t  of the  "Conference on P r e s id e n t i a l  Ad­
vis ing  in the United S t a t e s , "  in the possess ion o f  the P o l i t i c s  Depart­
ment o f  P r ince ton  U nive rs i ty .  Notes taken from C a l i f a n o 's  remarks a t  
the Pr inceton Conference a re  the possession of the a u th o r . )
1 3The in s i g h t s  developed in the fol lowing paragraphs a re  pr im ari ly  
drawn from Kearns,  Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream.
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Washington developed t h e i r  leadersh ip  s ty le  and per fec ted  t h e i r  a b i l i ­
t i e s  in the  period  immediately following World War II  - the decade of 
the 1950s. The s t y l e  depended upon a mutual, in t imate  in t e rp la y  
o f  persons and groups who not only knew one another but who shared 
p o l i t i c a l  and c u l tu r a l  va lues .  Though the o f f i c i a l  bureaucracy was 
swollen by World War I I ,  never to re tu rn  to i t s  pre-war s i z e ,  o f f i c i a l  
p o l i t i c a l  Washington was composed of  a r e l a t i v e l y  small group of 
persons.  The values  they shared were shaped by t h e i r  common e x p e r i ­
ence of  the  two world wars and the economic depression of  the 1930s.^^ 
They developed what they defined as a r e a l i s t i c  (der ived  from the 
work of Hans Morganthau and George Kennan) view o f  in te rn a t io n a l  
p o l i t i c s  upon which they developed po l ic ies  designed to use American 
economic and m i l i t a r y  power to conta in  and control  what they per­
ceived to be the  expans ion is t  designs  of the  communist powers in the 
1950s as they  had those  o f  European fascism and Japanese imperialism 
in the 1940s. They a lso  drew upon a personal a p p rec ia t io n  of the 
impact o f  a na t iona l  economic co l lapse  on persons and soc ia l  i n s t i t u ­
t i o n s .  For Johnson, in p a r t i c u l a r ,  the Depression wa^ a normative event. 
His commitment to h is  Great Socie ty  programs was grounded on his 
personal exper ience  with the p r iva t ion  o f  the  Depression and the
They obvious ly  d i f f e r e d  on sp ec i f ic  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  and formed 
in to  var ious  s h i f t i n g  p o l i t i c a l  blocks accordingly ,  but th e re  was no 
disagreement about the  value o f  the  Depression and World Wars I and II 
to the p o l i t i c a l  world in which they now l iv e d .  Each was able  to call  
upon r e g i o n a l l y  and personally  spec i f ic  events which shaped individual  
va lues ;  bu t  the  po in t  to be emphasized here  is th a t  a l l  shared these  th ree  
events in common, a phenomenon which would separa te  them from those 
who would c o n te s t  them fo r  na t iona l  leadersh ip  in the  1960s and 1970s.
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personal and p o l i t i c a l  responses to  i t  developed by h is  family and 
neighbors in the a rea  of  Texas in which he was r a i s ed .  These two 
events condit ioned the  ways in which the products of the  New Deal saw 
the world,  the  lenses  through which p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y  was re f rac ted  
fo r  them.
The post-World War IT c u l t u r a l - p o l i t i c a l  con tex t  has been ably
15analyzed in  d e t a i l  by, among o th e r s ,  Daniel Bell and Richard Neustead. 
They saw the p o l i t i c a l  c u l tu r e  of  the  1950s as one in  which the 
p o l i t i c a l - i d e o l o g i c a l  s t rugg le s  of  the 1930s and the 1940s had 
given way to p o l i t i c a l  b a t t l e s  over very co n c re te ,  t a n g ib le  p o l i t i c a l  
goals and g o o d s . T h e  basic  values of the  soc ie ty  were assumed, 
not con tes ted .  A d iscuss ion  of the  question o f  whether or not 
the re  were rea l  va lue  c o n f l i c t s  going on in the  so c ie ty  during 
the period of  the  1950s i s  beyond the scope o f  th i s  study; what i s  
r e lev an t  to  t h i s  d i s cu s s io n ,  however, is  the  f a c t  t h a t  the p o l i t i c a l
1 IZ
Daniel B e l l ,  The End of Ideology (New York; The Free Press ,  
1960). Richard E. Neustadt,  Pres iden t ia l  Power: The P o l i t i c s  of
Leadership (New York: Wiley Press ,  1960).
^^In terms r e c e n t ly  developed by James MacGregor Burns, the 
l eade rsh ip  s t y l e  pe r fec ted  by the i n h e r i to r s  of  the New Deal was 
t r a n s a c t i o n a l ,  an exchange of valued things in which "Each party to the 
bargain i s  conscious of the  power resources and a t t i t u d e s  of the o the r .  
Each person recognizes  the  o ther  as a person . Their  purposes are 
r e l a t e d  a t  l e a s t  to the  e x ten t  t h a t  the purposes stand within the 
bargaining process and can be advanced by mainta in ing the  process.
But beyond t h i s  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  does not go. The bargainers  have 
no enduring purpose t h a t  holds them toge ther ;  hence they go th e i r  
separa te  ways. A le ad e rsh ip  ac t  took p lace ,  but i t  was not one th a t  
binds leader  and fo llower  toge the r  in a mutual and continuing pursu i t  
o f  a higher purpose."  (Emphasis in  the o r i g i n a l )  James fiacGergor 
Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 19-20.
13
l e ade rsh ip  and the  major academic observers  of the  time understood 
these  s truggles  to be over and ac ted  and wrote accord ingly .
Consequently, Johnson and h is  p o l i t i c a l  contempories j u s t i f i e d  
t h e i r  pos it ions  and power by po in t ing  to t h e i r  successful  exper ience 
in conducting the necessary  t r a n s a c t io n s  to d e l iv e r  the payoffs of 
th e  p o l i t i c a l  system to  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n t s  and the nation as a whole 
over  a period o f  th ree  decades o f  war and peace. I f  they would not 
o r  could not d e l i v e r ,  they expected to be rep laced by someone who 
would and could. Theirs  was a government of  c i r c u l a t i n g  e l i t e s ;  c i t i z e n  
p a r t i c ip a t io n  in  the national p o l icy  making process was l im i ted  to 
voting fo r  those  persons who would be a p a r t  of governmental Washington 
and membership in groups whose leade rs  were recognized as being p a r t  
o f  the non-governmental e s tab l ishm ent .  In t h i s  scheme, votes fo r  or 
a g a in s t  a p a r t i c u l a r  candida te  o r  the  decis ion  to take membership in 
groups with p o l i t i c a l  influence was based on two c r i t e r i a ;  1) pas t  
a b i l i t y  to d e l i v e r  or ob ta in  p o l i t i c a l  b en e f i t s  fo r  c o n s t i t u e n t s  or  
members, and 2) confidence in the  view of the p o l i t i c a l  fu tu r e  genera­
ted  by the p o l i t i c i a n  or the i n t e r e s t  group. P o l i t i c s  fo r  Johnson and 
h is  peers,  then ,  was a con tes t  w i th in  and between groups of  p o l i t i c a l  
e l i t e s  who s t rugg led  over who would d i s t r i b u t e  the p o l i t i c a l  goods o f  
th e  society ;  the  s e l e c t io n  of the  n a t i o n ' s  p o l i t i c a l  leade rsh ip  from 
among the competing e l i t e s  was the  essence of the democratic process .  
Fur ther ,  and most important fo r  t h i s  study, Johnson saw the  p re s id en t  
as  the person who determined the  c h a rac te r  and the boundaries of  the  
c o n te s t .
In th i s  scheme the major i n t e r e s t s  and the groups rep re sen t ing
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them with in  the na t ion  were seen to be f ix e d .  Innovative i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  
o f  those i n t e r e s t s  o r  challenges  to i n t e r e s t  group leadersh ip  were to 
be c a r r i e d  ou t  "with in  the system" ( i . e .  w i th in  and between the  e s t a b l i s h e d  
groups themselves) .  In theory ,  the  evo lu t ion  o f  new groups rep re sen t ing  
novel express ions  o f  the  major i n t e r e s t s  was t o l e r a t e d  and sys tem ica l ly  
absorbed,  but i t  was assumed th a t  no cha l lenge  to the  values underlying 
the system would be t o l e r a t e d .  All such cha l lenges  were by d e f i n i t i o n  
subvers ive .
The conventional flew Deal wisdom f a l t e r e d  and eventua l ly  broke 
in the Johnson a d m in i s t r a t io n  under the p re s su re  of two issues which 
refused to be resolved by the  p o l i t i c a l  and a d m in i s t r a t iv e  methods 
o f  the 1950s: Vietnam and the domestic r a c i a l  tu rm oi l .  Johnson
fi rmly  be l ieved  t h a t  his  a b i l i t y  to advance his  domestic programs 
through the  congress  with the support  of  a m a jo r i ty  o f  the major 
i n t e r e s t s  of  the na t ion  depended on his and the  n a t i o n ' s  a b i l i t y  to 
be "tough" on what he def ined  as communist aggress ion  abroad. He 
thought t h a t  any h in t  o f  "so f tness"  toward Russian and Chinese 
ex p an s io n is t i c  designs  not only endangered the  country ,  but eroded the 
p o l i t i c a l  support  he needed to enact  and implement l e g i s l a t i o n  aimed 
a t  domestic so c ia l  c h a n g e . T h u s  the convent ional  wisdom which 
d i c t a t e d  Johnson 's  ac t ions  allowed debate and d i f f e r e n c e  on domestic 
policy as long as a firm hand was held on the  accepted general l in e s  
o f  fo re ign  p o l icy .  As long as s i g n i f i c a n t  numbers of persons in the
^^McPherson, A P o l i t i c a l  Education,  p. 19.
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na t ion  accepted the  conventional wisdom and i t s  ru le s  fo r  the  p o l i t i c a l  
game Johnson could and did a ttempt to provide  "guns and b u t t e r . "  When, 
however, the cha l lenge  came from re p re se n ta t iv e s  of  emerging domestic 
i n t e r e s t s  in the s o c i e ty  who attacked the  goals  (v ic to ry  in Vietnam 
and an in teg ra ted  s o c i e ty  planned by the Washington l e ad e rsh ip )  and 
t h e  means (unlimited  use o f  American m i l i t a r y  and economic power and 
a d m in i s t r a t iv e ,  l e g i s l a t i v e  and court  d e c i s io n s )  used to achieve them, 
t h e  governing e l i t e  reac ted  by re fus ing admission o f  the new i n t e r e s t  
r e p re se n ta t iv e s  to the  management of the  p o l i t y  and by expunging those 
whose d i s s e n t  to o f f i c i a l  po l icy  went beyond the  l e v e l s  o f  t h e i r  t o l e r ­
ance.  When Johnson was unable to reso lve  t h i s  c o n f l i c t ,  r a t h e r  than 
f u r t h e r  th re a ten  the pres idency i t s e l f ,  he abd ica ted  his  option  to run 
f o r  a second term. Burns well  s t a t e s  Johnson 's  dilemma.
. . . i n  meeting to some degree the economic needs of  blacks and 
o the rs  he had unw i t t in g ly  aroused h igher  needs and values  tha t  
he could n e i th e r  comprehend f u l l y  nor g r a t i f y .  On the o ther  
hand, in not meeting the  demands o f  the anti -Vie tnam m i l i t a n t s  
he had generated new dimensions and i n t e n s i t i e s  of  c o n f l i c t ,  
thereby producing a whirlwind he could not c o n t r o l ,  -j^is 
" a b d i c a t i o n " . . .was a simple recogn i t ion  of the  f a c t .
I t  was in the  summer o f  1967 whi le  the  c i t y  of  D e t ro i t  was 
in  flames th a t  Johnson t h r u s t  the Kerner Commission in to  the  p o l i t i c a l  
mix developing around the  d i s o rd e r s .  Appointed to  the  t a sk  was 
a group o f  eleven persons each chosen because she /he  was a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  person in one or more of the  major i n t e r e s t  groups which 
th e  White House determined had a s i g n i f i c a n t  i n t e r e s t  in the  c iv i l
1 O
Burns,  Leadersh ip , p. 424.
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19d i s o r d e r s .
The ana lys is  o f  the Kerner Commission undertaken in t h i s  work 
has th r e e  ob jec t ives :  1) to provide evidence to support  the  th e s i s
t h a t  p r e s id e n t i a l  advisory  commissions are  e f f e c t i v e  too ls  fo r  gaining 
p r e s id e n t i a l  advantage over the  congress ,  the  executive  branch, and 
p a r t i c u l a r  n o n -e l i t e  groups in the  a cq u i s i t io n  and d is semination  of  
in format ion on contes ted public  po l icy  is sues ;  2) to r e in fo r ce  the 
con ten t ion  th a t  the  Johnson a d m in is t r a t io n  con t r ibu ted  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  to 
t h i s  p a t t e r n  of dominance; 3) to  provide a case study of the  a b i l i t y  o f  
non -es tab l i shed  e l i t e s  to ob ta in  access to the publ ic  po l icy  making 
system through p r e s i d e n t i a l l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  p o l i t i c a l  channels .
D) Resources and Methodology
This study i s  unique in two ways. F i r s t ,  the previous work done on 
the  Kerner Commission r e f l e c t s  the  poin t of view of  the commission's 
s en io r  executive  s t a f f  members and the White House s t a f f  members whose 
work assignments d i r e c t l y  involved them in the work of the commission. 
This a n a ly s i s  adds a new p e r s p e c t i v e - - t h a t  of  the  commissioners, the 
commission's  senior executive  s t a f f  members and the White House s t a f f  
members whose work assignments d i r e c t l y  involved them in the  work of the
Chairman, Otto Kerner, Governor of I l l i n o i s ;  Vice Chairman, John
V. Lindsay, Mayor of New York C i ty ;  Fred R. H arr i s ,  United S ta t e  Senator,  
Oklahoma; Edward W. Brooke, United S ta tes  Senator,  Massachuset ts ;  James 
C. Corman, United S ta te s  Represen ta t ive ,  22nd D i s t r i c t  of C a l i fo rn ia ;  
William M. McCulloch, United S ta t e s  Representa t ive ,  4th D i s t r i c t  of Ohio; 
I.W. Abel, P res iden t ,  United Steelworkers o f  American (AFL-CIO); Charles 
B. Thornton, Chairman of  the Board and Chief Executive O f f i c e r ,  L i t ton 
I n d u s t r i e s ,  In c . ;  Roy Wilkins ,  Executive D irec to r ,  National Associa tion 
fo r  the  Advancement o f  Colored People; Katherine Graham Peden, Commis­
s io n e r  o f  Commerce, S ta te  of Kentucky (1963-67); Herbert  J en k in s ,  Chief 
o f  P o l i c e ,  A t lan ta ,  Georgia.
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commission. The Incorpora tion of  t h i s  pe rspec t ive  into e x i s t i n g  s tu d ie s
20of  the  commission completes the  s c h o la r ly  treatment o f  i t s  work.
Second, the  work o f  Lipsky and Olson, the  be s t  of the s tud ie s  done on 
the  commission to d a te ,  concludes in  p a r t  t h a t  the nation  as a whole 
r eac ted  more favorably  to the r e p o r t  of the commission than did the  
o f f i c i a l s  in the executive and congress ional branches of the government. 
The method of  an a ly s i s  used in t h i s  study i s  s imi la r  to t h e i r s ,  but 
developed independently o f  them. The t e x t  to follow reveals  co n s i ­
d e rab ly  more p o s i t i v e  response from the Washington p o l i t i c a l  e s t a b l i s h ­
ment then t h e i r s  o r  any o th e r  of  the  s tud ies  on the commission c a r r i e d  
o u t  to d a te .  The find ings  of  t h i s  study p resen t  students with a more 
comprehensive p ic tu re  of the  p o l i t i c a l  importance of the commission 
in the con tex t  o f  the Johnson ad m in is t r a t io n  and provides the bas is  
f o r  drawing more comprehensive t h e o r e t i c a l  in fe rences .
P a r t  I con ta ins  a review of the  published l i t e r a t u r e  on p r e s i ­
d en t ia l  advisory  commissions. In i t  a lso  wi l l  be found re ference  to 
p rev ious ly  unpublished materia l  ob ta ined  from the Hoover, Truman, 
Eisenhower and Johnson p r e s id e n t i a l  l i b r a r i e s .  An addendum gives 
a t t e n t i o n  to the development and use of s t a t e  and local r i o t  commissions- 
a unique genre o f  American adv isory  commissions, the understanding of 
which i s  necessary  fo r  complete comprehension of  p res iden t ia l  advisory 
commissions.  Pa r t  I I  d e t a i l s  how Johnson used his ad hoc advisory  
system to contro l  the flow of pub l ic  policy making information in the
20 A major work overlooked by o th e r  s tuden ts  of the Kerner Commis­
s ion i s  Robert Shallow, "Social S c i e n t i s t s  and Social Action from Within 
the  Es tabli shment ,"  Journal of  Social  Issues 26 (Winter, 1970).
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nationa l government. Part  I I I  contains a case s tudy  of the p o l i t i c a l  
ro le  played by the  Kerner Commission in the Johnson Adminis tra tion.
Part  IV con ta ins  concluding observations  and sugges t ions  fo r  fu tu re  
study.
All the  papers open to scholars p e r ta in in g  to the Kerner Commis­
sion on d epos i t  with the National Archives in Washington, D.C. and in 
the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library in Austin ,  Texas,  were examined 
fo r  t h i s  study. In te rv iews with a l l  members of the  commission and
i t s  s en io r  s t a f f  were s o l i c i t e d  and were conducted with those w i l l in g
21to be interviewed and whose schedules permitted i t .  Fred R. H arr i s ,
then ju n io r  Sena to r  from Oklahoma, and a member o f  the commission,
introduced the  au thor  to members of the commission s t a f f  who in turn
were helpful in g e t t i n g  interviews with o the rs .  The interview
schedule was d i c t a t e d  by the research funds a v a i l a b l e  and the
schedules of the  p o te n t i a l  in terviewees .  The methodology of  the
indiv idual in te rv iew s  followed, in general ,  t h a t  of Dexter Lewis with
personal m od if ica t ions  based on a number of year s  exper ience in
22
verbatim recording of counseling in te rv iews. Each of these  in terv iew 
sess ions  was s t r u c tu r e d  as a casual conversa t ion .  Key ques t ions ,  
constructed  during the  i n i t i a l  research period a t  the  National 
Archives,  were held in  mind and in se r ted  in the conversa t ion  when i t  
seemed a p p ro p r i a t e .  No at tempt was made to make, any notes while the
21 See b ib l iog raphy  fo r  l i s t  of in te rv iewees .
22 Lewis A. Dexter ,  E l i t e  and Specialized Inte rv iewing C Evanston,
111.: Northwestern Univers i ty  Press,  1970).
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conversa tion was tak ing  place .  Immediately following the  in te rv iew ,  
however, th e  conversa t ion  was recorded in as n e a r ly  a verbatim manner 
as p o s s ib le ,  keeping in mind the re sponden t ' s  comments on the su b jec t  
matter of  the key ques t ions .  Those comments were recorded s ep a ra te ly  
and in the  con tex t  of  the place they occurred in the t o t a l  in te rv iew. 
Each in te rv iewee requested  t h a t  he not be quoted d i r e c t l y .
P r e s id e n t i a l  a rchival research and e l i t e  in te rv iewing c o n s t i t u t e  
an exceedingly  dangerous data base upon which to develop a s cho la r ly  
explanation o f  a major p o l i t i c a l  event.  A v a r i e t y  of problems plagues 
the  r e sea rcher  who must use such m a te r ia l s  and methods: the  p o s s i b i l i t y
o f  missing documents, copies of which wil l  probably be found by some 
e n te r p r i s in g  h i s t o r i a n  in the  f u tu r e ;  the  f r u s t r a t i o n  o f  f inding f i l e s  
closed by what appears  to be a cap r ic io u s  and s e l f - s e r v i n g  decis ion made 
by members of the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  family or one o f  the agencies of h is  
a d m in is t r a t io n ;  the  haunting fe a r  t h a t  d e s p i t e  weeks of  reading f i l e s ,  
some impor tant s e t  has been overlooked; the  equa l ly  haunting f e e l in g  
t h a t  fol lows the  recu r r ing  thought t h a t  i f  the  " r ig h t"  question 
had been asked a t  the  r i g h t  time new information might have been 
forthcoming; and th e  more r e a l i s t i c  thought t h a t  the interviewees  had 
working a t  the time of  the in te rv iew th a t  s e l e c t i v e  memory process 
which seems to  be an inna te  component of  the  psychological  make-up of 
American p o l i t i c i a n s .  V e r i f i c a t io n  o f  th e  data  gathered f o r  th i s  
study was done by the  s tandard means of checking in te rv iew data and 
documentary evidence a g a in s t  one another  and the two a g a in s t  the work 
of  o the r  scho la rs  and observers .  Where the l a t t e r  was not a v a i l ab le  
logical  in ferences  were made from th e  two primary sources .  Follow-up
20
i n t e r r o g a t i o n s  of s e lec ted  in te rv iewees were conducted.  In the end, 
a l a s ,  one must make those educated guesses which seem to make the most 
sense given the mater ia l  a t  hand and accept with equanimity t h a t  th e  
h i s t o r i a n  wil l  have the  f ina l  say on these  m a t t e r s .
One f in a l  word o f  caut ion i s  necessary .  This study i s  not 
a study o f  the c i v i l  d iso rders  o f  1967 ( i . e .  with the  ways in which 
they were handled by the various  governmental bodies and the degrees 
to which the  f ind ings  of  the Kerner Commission were accu ra te  r e f l e c t i o n s  
o f  the systemic problems of the c i t i e s  in which th e  d iso rde rs  occu r red ) .  
Rather ,  to  r epea t  what has been sa id  above, i t  aims a t  expla ining the 
place o f  the  Kerner Commission in the  pol icy  making p o l i t i c s  of  the 
Johnson a d m in i s t r a t io n ,  exploring the im pl ica t ions  t h a t  ro le  may have 
had on the  c r i s i s  of  public o rder  which e v en tu a l ly  forced the P res iden t  
to s tep  down, and expla ining the  development of th e  uses of p r e s i ­
d en t ia l  advisory  commissions to  expand the  power and influence  of the 
pres idency.
PART I
POLITICAL USES OF THE AD HOC ADVISORY GROUP IN THE PRESIDENTIAL 
ADVISORY SYSTEM: AN OVERVIEW
CHAPTER r
THE AD HOC ADVISORY GROUP IN THE PRESIDENTIAL 
ADVISORY SYSTEM
A) Major Con t r ibu to rs :  A Short  His tory
The d i scuss ion  which follows t r a c e s  the  development o f  ad hoc 
groups w i th in  the p r e s id e n t i a l  advisory  system and l inks  t h a t  develop­
ment to  th e  expansion of  p re s id e n t i a l  power. Because the use of such 
groups i s  r e l a t i v e l y  new and every a d m in is t r a t io n  i s  i d io s y n c ra t i c  by 
d e f i n i t i o n ,  th e r e  i s  a g rea t  v a r i e ty  and unevenness in the s to ry .  The 
choice of  a s e l e c t i v e  chronological  approach to  t h i s  d i scuss ion ,  t h e r e ­
f o r e ,  has been d i c t a t e d  both by the da ta  and a d e s i r e  to  d isp lay  the 
major c o n t r ib u t io n s  of  p a r t i c u l a r  a d m in is t r a t io n s  to  the evolu tion of  
the  p r e s i d e n t i a l  advisory commission.^
An important caut ion must be observed before proceeding. The word 
commission as used by var ious p r e s i d e n t s ,  and in the scho la r ly  l i t e r a t u r e  
p r io r  to  Carl Marcy's P res id en t ia l  Commissions, was not p re c i se ly  defined.  
I t  u sua l ly  meant any ad hoc group chosen by a p re s iden t  to  advise him on 
a p a r t i c u l a r  po l icy  mat te r .  During the  Truman adm in is t ra t ion  the term 
began to be used more c a r e fu l ly  as w i l l  be demonstrated in the t e x t  which 
fo llows. A p re c i se  d e f in i t i o n  f o r  t h i s  s tudy i s  presented on page 52.
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In arguing before  the congress on b e h a l f  o f  the  establishment o f  
the United S ta tes  Commission on Civil Rights ,  then Attorney General 
Tom Clark descr ibed  governmental advisory bodies as a natural develop­
ment accompanying the complex expansion o f  the  presidency:
The es tab l ishment  o f  an advisory commission or  board to  advise  and 
a s s i s t  the P res iden t  i s ,  of course ,  not an unusual ac t ion .  With 
the growth of the Nation and the inc reases  in the  complexities 
of l i f e  and c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  i t  has become in c re a s in g ly  necessary 
to make a va i l ab le  exper t  agencies to handle the  highly technica l  
and involved programs n a tu r a l l y  r e s u l t i n g . . .  Advisory commissions 
and boards not charged with the adm in is t ra t io n  o f  a s t a t u t e  have 
also been c re a te d ,  serving the P re s id e n t ,  the Congress and the  
Nation in the formation of p o l i c i e s  and p rogram s . . .2
The beginning of t h i s  pa t te rn  o f  development, which some have
3
called "government by commission", can be t r a c ed  to the adm in is t ra t ion  
of George Washington. Alexander Hamilton's  use of s tudies  of the  manu­
fac tu r ing  capacity  and p o ten t ia l  of the  new na t ion^  and the P r e s id e n t ' s  
appointment of  a commission to  advise him on ways to  s e t t l e  the  Whiskey 
Rebellion of  1794^ are perhaps the e a r l i e s t  examples we have of  the  
use of such advisory bodies by a p re s id en t .  But,  these  e a r l i e s t  
ins tances are i s o l a t e d  ones.  We must look to  the e a r ly  years of the 
twentie th century fo r  the beginning o f  the p a t t e r n s  to  which we
^Sulzner ,  "The U.S. Commission on Civi l  R igh ts ,"  p. 9-10.
3
For in s tances  see  George B. Galloway, "P res iden t ia l  Commissions," 
Ed i to r ia l  Research Reports 20 (May 1931) and Daniel Bel l ,  "Government 
by Commission," The Public I n t e r e s t  3 (Spring 1966).
4James Macgregor Burns, P res iden t ia l  Leadersh ip : The Crucible of
Lea d e r sh ip , (Boston: Houghton M if f l i n ,  1965),  p. lO.
^Lipsky and Olson, MSS, I I I ,  1.
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have become accustomed.^
Vigorous development o f  the  p re s id e n t i a l  adv iso ry  system as a 
major tool in the  expansion o f  p r e s i d e n t i a l  power began wi th  P r e s id e n t  
Theodore R ooseve l t .^  As p a r t  o f  h i s  d e s i r e  to make the  p re s id en cy  a 
s teward  of  the  n a t i o n ' s  p o l i t i c a l  power and na tu ra l  r e s o u r c e s ,  Roosevelt  
appoin ted ten commission- type adv iso ry  bodies between 1901-1909 to  a id  
him in developing an adequate  d a ta  base which he planned to  use in 
he lp ing  him secure  suppor t  f o r  the  pub l ic  p o l i c i e s  in which he had 
s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t . ^  Roosevelt  wanted sp e c ia l i z e d  in fo rm at ion  to  s t reng then  
h i s  appeals f o r  su p p o r t  from the e l i t e s  with p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t s  in 
h i s  conserva t ion  and p e t  p o l i t i c a l  p r o j e c t s .  The p o s se s s io n  o f  s p e c i a l ­
i zed  informat ion put him in a commanding p o s i t io n  in  th e  compet i t ion  
with  congress f o r  l e a d e r s h ip  in these  a reas  of publ ic  p o l i c y .  T a f t  and 
Wilson a c c e le r a te d  t h i s  development.  Taf t  appointed s i x t y - t h r e e  boards ,
The Civ il  S e rv ice  Commission (1887) and the  I n t e r s t a t e  Commerce 
Commission (1887) were the  f i r s t  o f  many s t a t i o n a r y  commissions e s t a b ­
l i s h e d  by the  fe d e ra l  government f o r  the  purpose o f  p o l i c y  making, r e g ­
u l a t i o n  and l im i t e d  a d ju d ic a t io n  o f  l e g a l l y  def ined  d i s p u t e s .  The o ld e s t  
appoin ted adv iso ry  commission s t i l l  functioning  i s  the  Board V i s i t o r s  
r f  the  Bureau n f  S tan d a rd s ,  e s t a b l i s h e d  by Congress in 19*01. (Dames A. 
Coutu re ,  "Public  Advisory Boards in  the  Executive Branch o f  Government" 
(M.A. t h e s i s ,  American U n i v e r s i t y ,  1953)) .  During the f i r s t  t h i r t y  years 
o f  the  tw en t ie th  c en tu ry  (Roosevelt  through the Coolidge a d m in i s t r a t i o n s )  
f i v e  hundred fed e ra l  e x ec u t iv e  agency advisory  commissions were appoin ted 
(Galloway, " P r e s i d e n t i a l  Commissions," p .  353),  a s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t  to  add 
t o  the ca ta logue  documenting the  expansion of the f e d e ra l  government in 
American p o l i t i c s  and the r i s e  of the  p o l i t i c a l  dominance o f  the  execu t ive  
b ranch.
^Couture ,  "Public  Advisory Boards," p. 25 and Wolanin,  " P r e s id e n t i a l  
Advisory Commissions," pp. 6-7 .
8
Galloway, " P r e s i d e n t i a l  Commissions," p.  352.
g
Couture ,  "Publ ic  Advisory Boards," p. 25.
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commissions and committees and Wilson kept pace by naming s i x t y - f o u r  in 
h is  f i r s t  a d m in i s t r a t io n .  Close to  o n e - f i f t h  of a l l  the  commission-type 
bodies appoin ted  during the 1901-1929 period ( n in e ty - s ix )  were named by 
Wilson during h is  term in o f f i c e . A n  examination o f  P res id en t  Herber t  
Hoover's imaginative  use o f  advisory bodies provides evidence support ing 
Gordon Hoxie 's  observa t ion  t h a t  " . . . t h e  Hoover pres idency marks the t r a n s i t i o n  
from the  o ld  pres idency to  the  new." However, as o f ten  happens with p o l ­
i t i c a l  in n o v a to r s ,  the  r e s u l t s  of his e f f o r t s  were q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  from 
h is  i n t e n t .
Important to t h i s  s tudy ,  but not a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  use o f  com­
missions by the Hoover ad m in is t ra t io n ,  was the  c r e a t io n  o f  the  National 
Commission on Law Observation and Enforcement ( the  Wickers ham Commission). 
Es tab l i shed  in the context  of the Proh ib i t ion  p e r io d ,  t h i s  commission 
was c re a te d  to focus a u th o r i t y  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  developing 
na t iona l  p o l i c y ,  c o n s i s t e n t  with the Eighteenth Amendment to  the Con­
s t i t u t i o n ,  in  the executive  branch o f  the  na t iona l  government. The 
commission was success fu l  in r e a l i z in g  t h i s  goa l .  I t  f ixed  the  locus
The Wilson adm in is t ra t ion  a lso  made a s i g n i f i c a n t  co n t r ibu t ion  
to the development o f  the s t a t u t o r y  commission by sponsoring the passage 
of l e g i s l a t i o n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  the  Federal Trade Commission, the Federal 
Reserve Board and the U.S. T a r i f f  Commission. (Galloway, "P res iden t ia l  
Commissions," p.  352.)
Gordon R. Hoxie, "The Presidency in the  1970' s " ,  Proceedings of  
the  1971 Montauk Symposium on the Office of the  P res id en t  of the  United" 
S t a t e s , edl Gordon R. Hoxie (New York: Center f o r  the  Study o f  the Pre- 
s idency ,  1971),  p. 1.  Hereaf te r  c i t e d  as the Montauk Symposium, 1971.
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of au th o r i ty  and policy-making in matters  p e r t a in in g  to nat ional  
law enforcement in  th e  executive  Branch.
More r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  the Hoover s t y l e  was the  Research Com­
mission on Social Trends headed by Wesley G. Mitchel l  which produced 
numerous so c ia l  and po l icy  s tu d ie s  designed to  a id  the nation in 
deal ing with the  Depress ion.  The commission and i t s  r e p o r t s  were har­
bingers of  the  po l icy  research  and development advisory  system which 
was more f u l l y  developed by his successo rs ;  in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  many of the 
New Deal soc ia l  p o l i c y  innovations  were indebted to the method and p r o ­
duct of M i t c h e l l ' s  work. Thé commission was composed o f  exper ts  from 
business and the academy, f r e e l y  giving o f  t h e i r  s k i l l  and time fo r  the  
common good, as P res id en t  Hoover might express  i t .
The development o f  the P r e s id e n t ' s  Emergency Committee on 
Employment (PECE) and the  P r e s id e n t ' s  Organizat ion on Unemployment 
Rel ie f  (POUR) were most re p re se n ta t iv e  o f  the  kind o f  adv isory  body 
with which Mr. Hoover f e l t  comfortable and mark h is  major con t r ib u t io n  
to the development o f  the use of  p r e s id e n t i a l  ad hoc advisory commissions, 
Hoover wanted the pres idency to f a c i l i t a t e  a t r u l y  na t iona l  e f f o r t  aimed 
at  developing a wide range o f  socio-economic p o l i c i e s  t o  confront  the 
Depression.  By combining, through PECE and POUR, th e  resources of the  
p r iv a te  s e c t o r  o f  the  economic and voluntary  socia l  s e rv ice  organiza­
t i o n s ,  Hoover expected a plan and a proposed procedure to be produced 
to s t a b l i z e  the  economy and build  a bas is  fo r  recovery from the ravages 
of the Depression.  Each advisory group was composed o f  la rge numbers 
of p r e s i d e n t i a l l y  appointed persons r e p r e s e n ta t i v e  of  the major na tiona l
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i n t e r e s t  groups,  loose ly  coordinated by a small na t iona l  s t a f f ,  and
charged with making po l icy  recommendations to  themselves which would
be f a c i l i t a t e d ,  but not regula ted  and ad m in is te r ed ,  by the f e d e r a l ,
12s t a t e  and local  governments.
Hoover 's  PECE/POUR model f o r  dea l ing  w i th  c r i t i c a l  domestic po l icy  
i s sues  was supposed to  move the locus o f  a u t h o r i t y  and r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  
fo r  such mat te rs  from Washington. What th e se  groups did was to  focus 
a t t e n t i o n  on the  p re s id e n t  as the  i n i t i a t o r  o f  such e f f o r t s  to deal with 
those kinds of  problems; the  e f f o r t  produced l i t t l e  in the way of  achiev- 
ment of  i t s  goals regarding the Depression ,  but con t r ibu ted  to a public  
and congress iona l demand th a t  the  p re s id e n t  do more than provide f a c i l i ­
t a t i o n  and ad m in i s t r a t io n .  Regulation and co o rd ina t ion  were demanded.
Frankl in  D. Roosevelt  continued the p o l i c y  o f  Hoover of  naming 
commissions and o th e r  advisory groups to a i d  him in dealing with thorny
1 O
domestic i s su es  a r i s i n g  in  both war and peace .  But, he a lso used them 
to s t reng then  h is  presidency as the cen te r  o f  p o l i t i c a l - p o l i c y  ac t ion  
in the n a t io n .  Rooseve l t ' s  development o f  the  p re s id e n t i a l  advisory 
system was c en t r a l  to  his development of  p r e s i d e n t i a l  power. "He sought 
to maximize the  o f f i c e  as a vehic le  fo r  him. His i n t e r e s t  lay in
12L is t s  of the  members of POUR, i t s  s t a f f ,  s ta tements  of purpose,  
minutes of  meetings and adopted po l icy  r e s o l u t i o n s  can be found in the 
Herber t  Hoover Library  PACE/POUR pape rs ,  Appendix I ,  #40-47.
13By 1940 over 100 boards and commissions had been e s ta b l i sh e d  by 
the p r e s i d e n t ,  c ab in e t  members and congress ,  (See Marcy, P res id en t ia l  
Commissions, p.  4 ) .
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s t reng then ing  h i s  hold over p o l i c y . N e u s t a d t  i d e n t i f i e s  four  p r i n c i ­
p les  underly ing FDR's a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s t y l e  as p r e s i d e n t .  F i r s t ,  he was 
" . . . co n c e rn e d  f o r  h i s  p o s i t i o n  as the man in the  White House". The 
second p r i n c i p l e  was c lo s e ly  r e l a t e d .  He assumed persons  around him to 
be ambitious and under c o n s t a n t  p re ssu re  to  "go i n t o  bus iness  fo r  themselves ."  
He saw t h i s  tempta t ion  becoming p a r t i c u l a r l y  s t rong  when th e  p r e s id e n t i a l  
a id e  th in k s ,  o r  knows, t h a t  he i s  deal ing  r e g u l a r l y  with  business  
the  p re s id en t  f e e l s  to  be " h i s " .  Third,  Roosevelt  saw th e  need fo r  
many a d v i s e r s ,  m u l t ip l e  an tennae ,  as Neustadt de f ined  them. Fourth,
FDR could f in d  no p lace  in th e  White House f o r  a s t rong  c h i e f  of s t a f f  
such as Sherman Adams or H. R. Haldeman. He c o n s t a n t l y  s h i f t e d  
appointments and ass ignments  to  minimize the  t em p ta t ion  inh e ren t  in
the  second p r i n c i p l e  and to  provide  himself  with c o n s t a n t l y  changing
15sources  of  in fo rm at ion .  N e u s ta d t ' s  four  p r i n c i p l e s  provide va luab le  
i n s ig h t s  in to  how Roosevelt  main ta ined contro l  over h i s  a d m in i s t r a t io n  
and the in t r a -A d m in i s t r a t i o n  p o l i t i c s  of h is  t enu re  of  o f f i c e  and moved 
the  pres idency to a p o s i t i o n  o f  dominance in n a t io n a l  policy-making.
Advisory groups were a c e n t r a l  f a c t o r  in t h a t  development.  A good 
example of h is  use of adv iso ry  commissions,  taken from h is  f i r s t  admin­
i s t r a t i o n ,  was the P r e s i d e n t ' s  Committee on A d m in is t r a t iv e  Management 
( the  Brownlow Committee), 1939.^^ This committee recommended and Roosevelt
14
Richard C. Neustadt,  "Approaches to S t a f f in g  the  Presidency,"
The P re s id e n t i a l  Advisory System, ed. Thomas £. Cronin and Sanford D. 
Greenberg,  (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 18.
' ^ I b i d . , pp. 12-16.
^°See W olan in ,"P res iden t ia l 'A r iv iso rv  Commissions" . . .
pp. 5-7, and Neustadt,  "Approaches to  S ta f f in g  t.he P res idency ,"  p. 12 
fo r  s im i la r  d i s cu s s io n  of the  Brownlow Committee.
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approved a reo rg an iza t io n  o f  the White House s t a f f  I t  provided
fo r  s u b s t a n t i a l  s t a f f i n g  f o r  the p re s id e n t ,  d i s t i n c t  from the  o ther
18pa r ts  of the  execu t ive  e s tab l i shm ent .  A major product of the  Brown­
low Commission work was the es tab li shment of th e  Baruch Commission 
which s tud ied  and repor ted  on the supply and s t r a t e g i c  importance of 
rubber in World War I I .  Baruch's group f i rm ly  e s ta b l i sh e d  in  the 
p u b l i c ' s  mind and t h a t  o f  the r e s t  o f  the  government t h a t  the  pres idency 
had command of the  problems of supply and demand of  rubber and was 
j u s t i f i e d  in  the  demands i t  was making on the pub l ic  and p r iv a te  s e c to r  
of the  economy concerning i t s  conserva t ion ,  production and use.
Harry Truman con tr ibu ted  most to the p a t t e r n  of  expanding the 
policy-making power of  the Office of the P r e s id e n t  by rev is ing  and 
enlarg ing  the  p r e s i d e n t i a l  advisory system, p a r t i c u l a r l y  the use of 
advisory commissions. He d i s t in g u ish ed  between agency committees, 
p r iv a te  in te r -agency  task  forces  and pub l ic  p r e s i d e n t i a l  advisory 
commissions. The t i t l e ,  advisory commission, was reserved f o r  those 
bodies charged with cons ide ra t ion  of h ighly  v i s i b l e ,  complex policy 
is sues  in which Truman had a personal i n t e r e s t .  During the Truman 
pe r iod ,  p r e s i d e n t i a l  advisory commissions were instrumental  in the 
p r e s i d e n t ' s  a t tempts  to achieve two basic  p o l i c y  goa ls :  secure the 
domestic advances of the Roosevelt New Deal through implementation 
of the  Fa i r  Deal program and secure the  o f f i c e  of  the p re s iden t  from 
encroachments ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  from Congress) upon h i s  pos i t ion  of p o l i t i c a l
^Neustadt says t h a t  the committee wrote  and FDR ed i ted  the  r e p o r t .  
See his  "Approaches to  S ta f f in g  the P res idency ,"  p. 12
T^lbid.
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dominance in  the i n i t i a t i o n  and implementation of p u b l ic  p o l i c y .  In the
Cold War p o l i t i c a l  e thos  in which the Truman Adminis t ra t ion  e x i s t e d ,
defense and r e l a t e d  m at te rs  provided the g r e a t e s t  cha l lenge  to  the
19p r e s i d e n t ' s  a c t u a l i z a t i o n  o f  the  l a t t e r  goal.
Truman used adv isory  bodies to a id  him and h i s  c ab in e t  on those 
matters  he saw to be of  s e r io u s  import to the s e c u r i t y  o f  the  na t ion ,  
and the economy and the  so c ia l  well -being of  the  popu la t ion .  The ways in 
which he balanced the  p o l i t i c a l  demands i m p l i c i t  in these  goals can be 
seen in his approach to  the  development of na t iona l  po l icy  regarding 
women in  the  post-World War I l - e a r l y  Cold War p e r io d .  Truman's support  
of c i v i l  r ig h t s  i s  well  known and documented. His concern f o r  the  r ig h t s
of women in p a r t i c u l a r  i s  not as well recorded. The p re s id e n t  and his
advisors  re a l iz e d  t h a t  i f  the nation was to mobil ize  l a rg e  numbers of
troops fo r  the Korean War and genera lly  to implement the  p o l i c i e s  im p l i c i t
in the Cold War containment  p o l i c y ,  s i g n i f i c a n t  numbers o f  women would 
have to  be re - in t roduced  to  the  armed forces  and the  defense industry  
l abor  fo rce .  The Labor Department was d i r e c ted  to appo in t  a Women's 
Advisory Committee on Defense Manpower and a spec ia l  c o n su l t an t  to the
20Secre ta ry  of Labor f o r  the rec ru i tm ent  of  women in to  the defense labor f o r c e .
Examples of  Commissions designed to achieve both goals  were the 
P r e s i d e n t ' s  Advisory Commission on Universal T ra in ing  (1946-47),  the 
P r e s i d e n t ' s  Committee on C iv i l  Rights (1946-47),  the  P r e s i d e n t ' s  Committee 
on Equal i ty  of Treatment and Opportunity in the  Armed Serv ices  (1949-50),  
the  P r e s id e n t ' s  Commission on Migratory Labor (1950-51),  the P r e s id e n t ' s  
Commission on In te rn a l  S e c u r i ty  and Individual Rights (1951),  the P r e s id e n t ' s  
Commission on the Health Needs o f  the Nation (1951-52) ,  and the  P res id e n t ' s  
Commission on Immigration and N a tu ra l iza t ion  (1952-53).
PO
See "Mrs. Norton Takes Post  as Tobin Aide ,"  New York Times,
March 20, 1951 , found in O f f i c i a l  F i l e ,  151, Harry S. Truman L i b ra r y .
31
Fu r th e r ,  the  Defense Department was d i r e c t e d  to e s t a b l i s h  the  Defense
21Advisory Committee on Women in the Armed Se rv ices .  These two bodies 
informed the execu t ive  branch of the va r ious 'p rob lem s encountered when 
la rge  numbers o f  women were re - in t roduced to  the  defense in d u s t r i e s  and 
the armed f o r c e s .  They a lso  were useful in  developing a public  concern 
f o r  spec ia l  problems of women and thereby c r e a t in g  some s e n s i t i v i t y  to  
women's problems in genera l .
Truman's e f f o r t s  to  p ro tec t  the p res idency from encroachment by 
the congress can be seen in the l i f e  and work o f  the  P r e s id e n t ' s  
Commission on In te rn a l  Securi ty  and Ind iv idual  Rights ( the  Nimitz 
Commission) in 1951. This commission's e f f o r t s  to educate the  publ ic  
and congress about the  charac te r  of the  c o n t ro v e r s i e s  over lo y a l ty  
oaths raging in 1950-1951 and t h e i r  impact on domestic p o l i t i c s  i s  
well known. However, documentation o f  the  i n t e n t  o f  the  p re s id en t  
in appoin t ing  the  commission and his seeming re fu sa l  to  back i t ,  thus 
fo rc ing  the re s ig n a t io n  of  i t s  membership, has been hard to come by.
The pub l ic  m a te r i a l s  appearing to  date  have been p red ic tab ly  s e l f -
22se rv ing .  The records o f  the commission a v a i l a b l e  a t  the Truman Library
23shed some l i g h t  on the p re s id e n t i a l  i n t e n t  in  appoin t ing  i t .  The p r e s id e n t
^^See O f f i c i a l  F i le  1285-FF, Defense Advisory Committee on 
Women in the  Armed S e rv ices ,  Harry S. Truman Library .
22e . g .  Harry S. Truman, Memoirs of  Harry S. Truman, 2 V ols . ,  (New 
York: Doubleday, 1956), 11:283-285. Truman f a i l s  to  note t h a t  in the face 
of mounting p re s su re  on him and the members of his commision he agreed to 
amend Executive Order 9835 in a way th a t  made i t  e a s i e r  to dismiss c i v i l  
s e r v i c e  employees fo r  lo y a l ty  reasons.
23The f i l e  Minutes of  the P r e s id e n t ' s  Commission on In te rna l  
S e c u r i ty  and Indiv idual Rights (The Nimitz Commission) 1951 conta ins  the 
most he lp fu l  in format ion .
32
appointed the commission as an a id  to  him in his s t ru g g le  with the  congress
24over the  in te rna l  s e c u r i ty  program. The McCarren Act which provided 
f o r  a federal  employees' l o y a l ty  oa th ,  had been passed over a p r e s i d ­
e n t i a l  veto.  The House Committee on Un-American A c t iv i t i e s  and the  
Senate Committees on Appropr ia tions  and the Jud ica ry ,  to g e th e r  with  
the Loyalty Review Board of the C iv i l  Service Commission, were demanding 
the removal from o f f i c e  of  "subvers ive"  employees o f  the  various 
agencies of the executive  branch. The Nimitz Commission was an a t tempt 
to put a p re s t ig io u s  group o f  c i t i z e n s  in to  t h i s  s t ru g g le  to  pursue 
p re s id en t i a l  concerns over the  c i v i l  r ig h t s  of  government employees 
and to help him p ro te c t  his branch o f  the government from encroachment 
by the l e g i s l a t u r e .  Truman, on his  au th o r i ty  as c h i e f  execu t ive ,  gave 
the commission d i r e c t  access to the  s e c u r i ty  f i l e s  of the a t to rn e y  
genera l ,  the Federal Bureau o f  I n v e s t ig a t io n  and the various  execut ive  
department lo y a l ty  boards.  In doing th i s  he provided the commission with 
access to information committees of  both houses o f  congress des i red  and 
to which they had been denied access by the White House. Truman ordered 
the Bureau of the Budget to give the commission a thorough b r i e f i n g  on 
the background of  the McCarren Act and the reasons fo r  the p r e s id e n t i a l
p c
veto of i t .  The exchange of  l e t t e r s  between Admiral Nimitz and Senator 
McCarren reveals  the  ex ten t  of  th e  s t ru g g le  and how a commission can
^^Internal Secur i ty  Act o f  1951, PL 81-831, 50 USCA 781.
OC
See Minutes of Nimitz Commission, February 13, 1951. Also see 
Truman, Memoirs, 11:284 fo r  the p r e s i d e n t ' s  explanation o f  his ve to .
He maintained t h a t  his i n t e l l i g e n c e  agencies recommended a g a in s t  s ign ing  
the b i l l ,  saying i t s  enforcement would complicate t h e i r  work.
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stand between the  p re s id en t  and his opponents and, i f  nothing e l s e ,  
buy time fo r  the  p re s id en t  to  f ind  another way of approaching the 
problem. McCarren wanted to see the execut ive  department s e c u r i ty
pc
f i l e s  to  which the commission had access .  The commission re fu sed ,
standing on the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  ground o f  s ep a ra t io n  o f  powers. In
r e t a l i a t i o n  McCarren blocked a reques t  by the  commission to have c o n f l i c t
of i n t e r e s t  regu la t ions  waived fo r  the members of the  commission and the
27sen io r  members of  i t s  s t a f f .  Faced with a c o n f l i c t  which they had no 
chance of winning and find ing  a decreasing  amount of room ava i lab le  to them 
in which to work, the members of the Commission res igned  en masse. While 
the Nimitz Commission was unable to accomplish a l l  the  p re s id en t  wanted 
from i t ,  i t  did make a st rong attempt to  mainta in  the  p rerogat ives  of  the
executive  branch and did provide the p r e s i d e n t  with t ime to develop a
28s t r a te g y  fo r  engaging congress on t h i s  i s sue  on d i f f e r e n t  grounds.
Pres ident Eisenhower developed an advisory  system which usea fewer
29commissions than any o th e r  of  the post-World War II  p re s id en ts .  The 
commissions he did appoint were fa r - r ea c h in g  and ins trumental  in focusing 
a t t e n t io n  on the White House as the  place where a l l  determinations  are 
made in national policy making. A good example i s  the  Commission on 
Governmental Organiza tion .  I t  was appointed to  enhance the au th o r i ty
Ib id .  Le t te r s  o f  February 15 and 21, 1951 between McCarren and
Nimitz.
01
" A p r iv i l eg e  granted e a r l i e r  by congress  to  th e  s t a f f s  and members 
of  the Kefauver and Hoover Commissions.
See Truman, Memoirs, 11:288-290.
See Table 1,  p. 4.
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and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of the p res idency .  Eisenhower's f i r s t  o b je c t iv e  fo r  
the commission, s e t  out in his mandate to i t ,  s t a t e d  t h i s  i n t e n t io n  
firmly: "S trengthen(ing) the  execu t ive  au th o r i ty  o f  the p r e s id e n t  and
of the  heads of  the  Departments and Agencies (in o rde r  to )  f a c i l i t a t e  
adm in is t ra t ion  w i th in  the execu t ive  branch.
Eisenhower, l i k e  Roosevelt  before  him, was conscious o f  the temp­
t a t i o n  o f  cab ine t  o f f i c e r s  and o the rs  to use advisory bodies to  t h e i r  
p o l i t i c a l  advantage ,  which was not n e c e s sa r i ly  to h i s .  In February 
1955 he had the Sec re ta ry  o f  the  Cabinet ,  Maxwell M. Rabb, send a note 
to th ree  cabinet o f f i c e r s  (Douglas McKay o f  I n t e r i o r ,  S i n c l a i r  Weeks o f  
Commerce, Arthur Flemming o f  the  O f f i ce  o f  Defense M o b i l iz a t io n ) ,  with 
copies to  a l l  members of  the  c a b i n e t ,  informing them t h a t  a l l  advisory 
groups e s t a b l i s h e d  to study matters  which had a c l e a r  in te r -depar tm enta l  
concern (e .g .  w a te r ,  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  telecommunications and energy) were
to be re f e r r e d  to  in the fu tu re  as "P re s id en t ia l  Advisory Committees"
31ra th e r  than the previous  t i t l e  "Cabinet Committees." Such a change 
in name fo r  these  "in-house" groups allowed the p re s id e n t  to  secure 
c r e d i t  f o r  t h e i r  works by making them public  whenever i t  was to  his 
advantage to do so and to f r ee  members of such groups from parochial  
departmental  concerns by aff i rming a personal i n t e r e s t  in t h e i r  work; 
by Eisenhower's a c t i o n  they became instruments  o f  p r e s i d e n t i a l  purpose.
Accession Document, P r e s i d e n t ' s  Advisory Commission on Govern­
mental Organ iza t ions :  Records, 1953-61, p. 2.  Dwight David Eisenhower 
Library .
31 Rabb memo to  the above c ab ine t  o f f i c e r s ,  February 5 ,  1955. 
Found in James Mitchel l  papers ,  1954 White House, Misc . ,  Dwight David 
Eisenhower Library .
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Eisenhower commented on his  s t y l e  o f  ga ther ing  advice  from
non-governmental persons in a l e t t e r  to the then Senate Major ity
Leader Lyndon B. Johnson during the  controversy  which developed over
the Gaither  Commission Report:
. . .  from time to  time the P res id en t  i n v i t e s  groups of s p e c i f i c a l l y  
q u a l i f i e d  c i t i z e n s  to advise  him on complex problems. These groups 
give t h i s  advice a f t e r  in t e n s iv e  s tudy ,  with the unders tanding  th a t  
t h e i r  advice w i l l  be kept  c o n f i d e n t i a l .  Only by p rese rv ing  the  con­
f i d e n t i a l  na tu re  o f  such advice i s  i t  poss ib le  to assemble such 
groups or  fo r  the P res iden t  to a v a i l  h imself  of such a d v i c e . 32
A more d e t a i l e d  c r i t i q u e  of  va lues  and handicaps o f  s e c r e t  ta sk
force  repo r ts  can be found in Chapter 5.  At t h i s  po in t  i t  i s  important
to note t h a t  the Gai ther  Committee was an important tool f o r  Pres iden t
Eisenhower in maintaining his  p o s i t io n  o f  dominance in the i n t r a -
governmental s t rugg le  over defense p o l ic y .  Halperin s u c c i n c t l y  described
the r e s u l t  of the s t ru g g le  when he noted t h a t  the  Gai ther  Committee
. . .  f u l f i l l e d  i t s  primary purpose o f  providing an a d d i t io n a l  source 
o f  informat ion fo r  the P re s id e n t  unencumbered by f u t u r e  and p a s t  
po l icy  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  The opera t ing  agencies can only view such 
committees as t h r e a t s  to  t h e i r  p r e r o g a t iv e s .  But t o  a s t r o n g ,  vigo­
rous P res id en t  they could prove to  be a powerful tool f o r  overcoming 
bu reauc ra t ic  and p o l i t i c a l  oppos i t ion  to  the implementation o f  v i t a l l y  
needed programs.33
Like h is  p redecesso r ,  but more l i k e  the pa t te rn  which w i l l  be 
seen in the  Johnson A dm in is t ra t ion ,  P res id en t  Kennedy r e l i e d  heav i ly  
upon p r iva te  task  f o r ce s .  This was a p a t t e rn  he had developed whi le
32L e t t e r ,  the  P re s id e n t  to  Sena to r  Lyndon B. Johnson, January 21, 1958. 
O ff i c ia l  F i l e ,  133R, Dwight David Eisenhower Library .
33Morton H. H a lper in ,  “The G a i the r  Committee and the Poli cy  Process,"  
The P re s id e n t ia l  Advisory System , eds .  Thomas E. Cromin and Sanford D. 
Greenberg,  (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p .  208.
36
in the  S e n a t e . H e ,  l i k e  many o th e r  S e n a to r s ,  had informal groups
of a d v i so r s  funne l ing  p o l i c y  sugges t ions  to  him which he and h is  s e n i o r
s t a f f  would e v a lu a t e  in terms of p o l i t i c a l  and l e g i s l a t i v e  p o t e n t i a l .
He e s t a b l i s h e d  twenty-n ine  such ta sk  fo rce s  to  func t ion  between the
time of  h i s  e l e c t i o n  and in au g u ra t io n  as  p r e s i d e n t .  He continued t h i s
35use o f  t a s k  f o r c e s  th roughout his  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  Because of  the  
c lo se  connec t ion  between t h i s  modus operandi and t h a t  of the  Johnson 
A d m in i s t r a t i o n ,  c a r e fu l  examination of  the  system will  be saved f o r  
Chapter 5. S u f f i c e  i t  to  say a t  t h i s  p o in t  t h a t  the  members o f  the  
Kennedy A d m in is t r a t io n  were not ign o ran t  of the  va lue  of a c a r e f u l l y  
expanded a d v i so r y  system in  the s t r en g th en in g  of t h e i r  p r e s i d e n t ' s  
o v e ra l l  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n .
^^Char les  L. Capp, Montauk Symposium, 1971, p.  80-83.
35 Lee C. White d e s c r ib e s  how the  Kennedy White House s t a f f  normally  
went about  t h i s  t a sk .  Theodore Sorensen had been named by the  p r e s i d e n t  
to  head an informal  White House domestic  p o l i c y  program group. The 
g ro u p ' s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  included th e  p r e p a ra t io n  of l e g i s l a t i o n ,  th e  
p r e p a ra t io n  of  sp ec ia l  messages f o r  congress  in  support  of  those  programs, 
to work w i th  the  cong ress iona l  l i a s i o n  o f f i c e  in the  movement of t h e s e  
p ieces  of l e g i s l a t i o n ,  to  concern themselves  with the pol icy  i s su e s  t h a t  
a rose  out o f  e x i s t i n g  programs as well as those  a r i s i n g  from the  proposed 
programs. This group never  grew l a r g e r  than fou r  persons.  Many o f  the  
programs dur ing  the  f i r s t  months of  the  a d m in i s t r a t io n  came from id eas  
gene ra ted  dur ing  the  campaign, e s p e c i a l l y  from th e  task  f o r c e s  s e t  up 
to  a d v ise  th e  c a n d id a te .  The Sorensen group served as the  f i l t e r  f o r  
the  v a r io u s  p o l i c y  recommendations coming from w i th in  and o u t s id e  th e  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  The group gave sp ec ia l  a t t e n t i o n  to  m at te rs  i n i t i a t e d  
by c o n g re s s .  The Sorensen group was commissioned to  make such pro­
posa ls  a p a r t  of  the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  program. I t  was t h i s  " f i l t e r i n g "  
process which became one o f  the  major p a r t s  o f  the  Kennedy a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  
e f f o r t s  to  m a in ta in  p r e s i d e n t i a l  dominance in po l icy  m a t t e r s .  The 
Montauk Symposium, pp. 69-70.
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The Nixon Adminis t ra t ion  was wed to  the t a sk  fo r c e  method of  
g e t t i n g  innova t ive  ideas i n to  i t s  p o l ic y  making p rocess .  Nixon, 
following th e  Kennedy model developed ten years  e a r l i e r ,  c re a te d  s i x t y -  
e ig h t  ta sk  fo rce s  to advise  him on major policy  i s su es  dur ing  the 
campaign. A f te r  assuming o f f i c e  Nixon used a v a r i a t i o n  o f  t h i s  scheme 
as a way o f  g a the r ing  da ta  f o r  his annual S ta te  o f  the  Union message.
In the p re p a ra t io n  of the 1979 message, fo r  i n s t a n c e ,  he appointed 
seventeen t a s k  fo r c e s  composed of 225 in d iv id u a ls  drawn from those  p a r t s  
of the "p r iv a te "  domestic s e c to r  to  which the a d m in i s t r a t i o n  in tended to 
d i r e c t  p a r t s  of  th e  message.  These groups were s e t  to  work in  the 
e a r ly  f a l l  and expected to  r e p o r t  by December T. They were eacn ass igned 
a small budget and a small group of  execu t ive  department personnel 
whose ta sk  i t  was to  provide  a d m in i s t r a t iv e  he lp ,  and to  inform members 
o f  the  t a sk  fo r c e  of e x i s t i n g  a d m in is t r a t io n  p o l i c i e s  and the  p re v a i l in g  
budgetary c o n s t r a i n t s  accepted by the  White House in th e  a r e a s  under 
c o n s id e r a t i o n .  Following the  p a t t e r n  developed in the  campaign, the  
names of t a sk  fo rce  members were made p u b l ic ,  but the  p a r t i c u l a r  work 
ass igned  to  in d iv id u a l s  was not. M inor ity  r e p o r t s  were encouraged by 
the  a d m in i s t r a t i o n .  Because the re  was no announced White House po l icy  
concerning r e p o r t s  "going public"  ( in  p r a c t i c e ,  t h i s  d e c i s io n  was a r r iv e d  
a t  through a bargain ing process between the members of th e  ta sk  fo r c e  
and a White House r e p r e s e n ta t i v e )  the  number of d i s s e n t i n g  opinions  
increased  when th e  work of the t a sk  fo rce  was made p u b l i c .  Many members 
f e l t  the need to f i l e  minor i ty  r e p o r t s  in publ ic  even though they were 
in the  m a jo r i ty  throughout  the p r i v a t e  d i s c u s s io n s ,  w r i t in g  and voting
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on the  document. The r e s u l t i n g  documentation was then processed through 
the White House to  become p a r t  of  the  da ta  inpu t  f o r  the  development of  
the speech.
A second and more important  i n t e n t io n  and consequence of  t h i s  
way of  s t r u c t u r i n g  the p r e s id e n t i a l  adv iso ry  system was t h a t  i t  became 
a v e h ic le  f o r  enabling the  White House and the major execu t ive  agencies 
to communicate e x i s t in g  and f u t u r e  a d m in i s t r a t iv e  p o l i c i e s  to  the 
i n t e r e s t e d  e l i t e  publ ics .  Given the t ime c o n s t r a i n t s  on th e se  S ta te  of 
the Unions t a sk  f o r ce s ,  the small budgets a l l o c a t e d  them, and t h e i r  
dependence on the  executive  department f o r  s t a f f  and v i t a l  in fo rm at ion ,  
i t  can reasonab ly  be concluded t h a t  the  Nixon a d m in i s t r a t io n  found 
t h i s  consequence of i t s  advisory  system to  be of g r e a t  va lue ;  the 
exposure o f  th e  r e p r e s e n ta t i v e s  of s i g n i f i c a n t  p r i v a t e  i n t e r e s t  groups 
to the  p r e s e n t  p o l i c i e s  and f u tu r e  plans  o f  the a d m in i s t r a t i o n  not only  
c rea ted  b e t t e r  l i n e s  of communication between the two, but a l s o  allowed 
the development of the p a t t e rn s  of  coopera t ion  and support  e s s e n t i a l  to  
the p r e s i d e n t ' s  a b i l i t y  to  main ta in  his primary r o l e  in p o l i c y  develop­
ment and implementation.
In summary, these  ad hoc adv isory  bodies with in  the  p r e s i d e n t i a l  
advisory  system f u l f i l l e d  the  major p o l i t i c a l  ta sk  f o r  which they were 
appoin ted; they  were successfu l  agents  in  the  a t tempt by p a r t i c u l a r  
p re s id en ts  to  e s t a b l i s h  the pres idency as  the  primary locus  o f  po l icy  
in fo rm at ion ,  e x p e r t i s e  and development f o r  the n a t io n .  Because o f  the
'^°Ib id .  , see  pp. 81-82 fo r  a general  d i scuss ion  of  the  Nixon method of 
using such adv is ing  groups.
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s t a t u r e  confe rred on them by v i r t u e  o f  p r e s id e n t i a l  appointment and 
enforcement and the degree to which they were perceived to  be r e p r e ­
s e n t a t i v e ,  th e se  advisory  bodies re in fo rce d  in  the minds o f  the  pub l ic  
and congress  the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  content ion th a t  he commanded not only lega l  
a u tho r i ty  but a l s o  the knowledge, e x p e r t i s e  and the necessary p o l i t i c a l  
s k i l l  to  cope with  the po l icy  problems fac ing  the n a t ion .  National 
policy making i s  then in the hands of  the  presidency a t  l e a s t  in p a r t  
because the White House has been success fu l  in  mastering the sources  
and flow of  in form at ion .  The ad hoc advisory  groups with in  the  p r e s ­
id e n t i a l  advisory  system have played a l a rge  p a r t  in the t o t a l  develop-
37ment of th i s  s i t u a t i o n .
B) C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of  P re s id e n t ia l  Advisory Groups
The d iscuss ion  which follows takes  the various c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
schemes developed in the  e x i s t in g  l i t e r a t u r e  on execut ive  branch 
advisory groups and harmonizes them in to  a typology which allows the  
d is t in g u ish in g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  advisory  commissions in the p r e ­
s id e n t i a l  adv isory  system to be seen.
Executive branch advisory bodies should be c l a s s i f i e d  f i r s t  by 
t h e i r  tenure  and a u t h o r i t y  fo r  e x i s t en ce - th ey  are e i t h e r  permanent
37The development o f  executive  government a t  the  expense o f  r e p r e ­
s en ta t iv e  pari  imentary bodies i s  a r e g u la r ly  repor ted  p o l i t i c a l  phenomenon. 
Karl Lowenstein 's  content ion th a t  in the  western c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  governments 
the d iv is ion  o f  s t a t e  power in to  e x ec u t iv e ,  l e g i s l a t i v e  and j u d i c i a l  
functions  has been rep laced  by th ree  phases o f  p o l i t i c a l  power-decision 
making, dec is ion  execut ing  and decis ion  c o n t r o l l i n g - i s  c o n s i s t e n t  with  
the pa t te rn  sketched above. See his  P o l i t i c a l  Power and Governmental 
Process (Chicago: Univers ity  of Chicago Press ,  Phoenix Book, 1965),  p.  390.
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or temporary,  appointed e i t h e r  on an ad hoc b a s i s  by th e  p re s id en t  o r  a 
department head on the a u th o r i ty  inhe ren t  in  t h e i r  re sp ec t iv e  o f f i c e s ,  
or by t h a t  gran ted  in a s p e c i f i c  s t a t u t e  —  and second,  by the com­
pos i t ion  of t h e i r  membership — the  membership o f  these  bodies i s  drawn 
e i t h e r  from governmental o r  p r iv a t e  sources or  by means of a mixture of 
the two.
In t h i s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  scheme, permanence connotes s t a b i l i t y ,  i . e .  
an a d m in i s t r a t iv e  d i r e c t i v e ,  an executive  o r d e r  o r  a s t a t u t e  brings  the 
group in to  e x i s t en ce  with a s t a f f  and budget adequate to  accomplish the 
mandated o b je c t iv e s  of the group. The Council o f  Economic Advisors and 
the National Secur i ty  Council are examples o f  permanent advisory bodies 
e s ta b l i sh e d  by s t a t u t e  and placed w ith in  th e  White House s t r u c t u r e .  The 
U.S. Commission on Civi l  Rights and the Federal Reserve Board a re  examples 
of permanent advisory b o d ie s ,  e s t a b l i s h e d  by s t a t u t e  to  e x i s t  o u t s id e  the 
White House and which have execut ive  as well  as advisory  fu n c t io n s .  Per­
manent advisory  bodies a re  de lega ted  policy  problems which a re  perceived  
to be of  some l a s t i n g  concern to the p o l i t y .
Temporary advisory groups,  on the o th e r  hand, are  appointed by an 
execut ive  branch agency, tend to have r e l a t i v e l y  small s t a f f s  and 
budgets and have a narrow f i e l d  of  focus ,  the  bounds o f  which are  very 
d i f f i c u l t  to ove rs tep .  L i t e r a l l y  hundreds of  these  kinds of  advisory  
bodies are  appointed each yea r  by the var ious  execu t ive  agencies of 
na tional government. The p re s id e n t i a l  advisory  commission i s  the  b e s t  
known of  t h i s  type of advisory  group.
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When advis ing bodies are  c l a s s i f i e d  by t h e i r  membership they are 
t i t l e d  e i t h e r  o f f i c i a l ,  p r iv a te  o r  mixed. O f f i c i a l  and p r i v a t e  advisory  
groups a r e ,  as the names imply,  made up e i t h e r  of  persons drawn exc lu ­
s i v e l y  from within or  o u ts ide  the government. Both groups are  usual ly  
concerned with  problems and d ispu tes  which are techn ica l  in na ture  to 
which persons of  recognized competence are  appointed to  address th e  is sue 
a t  hand. The dec is ion  of whether to  appo in t  government employees or 
persons from the p r iv a te  s e c to r  hinges on the i n t e n s i t y  o f  the  controversy 
and the degree o f  pub l ic  percept ion  o f  the problem; the  more con t rove rs ia l  
and the  more public  the problem the  more the  l i k l e ih o o d  o f  the  appointment 
of a p r iv a t e  advisory group.
Mixed advisory groups are  g e n e ra l ly  s u b jec t  to g r e a t e r  pub l ic  
s c ru t in y  and are concerned with b roader  po l icy  concerns .  The l a t t e r  i s  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  t ru e  when the group i s  appointed by the p r e s i d e n t .  I f  the 
e f f o r t  a t  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  ends h e re ,  se r io u s  a n a ly t i c a l  problems remain.
I s ,  f o r  in s t a n c e ,  the  membership of  the  advisory  group mixed i f  a l l  
the members who supposedly re p re se n t  the  p r iv a t e  s e c t o r  have had ex ten ­
s ive  p ro fess iona l  exper ience as employees o f  the  government in the 
su b jec t  a rea  in which the advisory body i s  to give i t s  a t t e n t i o n ?  A 
re c en t  example demonstrates the problem. The composition of  the com­
mission appointed by Pres iden t  Ford to  i n v e s t i g a t e  charges  t h a t  the CIA 
had v io la t e d  the law def in ing  i t s  work was mixed in t h a t  some o f  i t s  
members occupied government p o s i t io n s  when appointed and o the rs
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38were p r iv a te  c i t i z e n s .  But a l l  the  r e p r e s e n ta t i v e s  from the  "pr iva te"  
sec tor  had held  pub l ic  o f f ice  and some had held high executive  department
on
off ices  (some d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  to the CIA). I t  i s  well to mention a t
th i s  poin t  t h a t  the  membership of p r e s id e n t i a l  advisory  commissions
is always mixed and, as wil l  be seen,  genera l ly  i s  composed o f  persons
whose p ro fe s s io n a l  backgrounds make t h i s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  ambiguous, i f
i t  is  not r e f in e d  as i s  done in the fo llowing paragraphs.
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  and d e f in i t io n  by func t ions  y i e l d  more valuable
information.  Marcy has the l e a s t  complicated func t iona l  d e f i n i t i o n ;
governmental advisory  bodies are e i t h e r  f a c t  f ind ing  or  ad m in is t r a t iv e .^ ^
They secure informat ion or aid in the execut ion o f  p o l ic y .  Hoover's
Commission on Social  Trends i s  an example o f  the former and the  U.S.
Commission on Civ il  Rights an i l l u s t r a t i o n  of  the  l a t t e r .  This d e f i n i t i o n
is too broad f o r  the purpose of  t h i s  study and needs to be made more
s p e c i f i c .  Other s tuden ts  of the  p r e s id e n t i a l  adv isory  system have seven
more s p e c i f i c  c a te g o r i e s  or c l a s s i f y in g  the various  func tions  served by
'41executive department advisory bodies.
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Commission on CIA A c t iv i t i e s  in th e  United S ta tes  (The Rockfel ler 
Commission).
39The members of  the Rockfel ler Commission were;  Nelson A. Rockfe l ler ,  
John T. Conner, C. Douglas Di llon ,  Erwin S. Griswold,  Lane Kirkland, Lyman 
L. Lemnitzer, Ronald Reagan, Edgar Shannon, J r .
40Marcy, P r e s id e n t i a l  Commissions, p. 23.
^^See Galloway, "Pres iden t ia l  Commissions," pp. 351-353; Daniel Bel l ,  
"Government by Commission," p. 120; Lipsky and Olson, unpublished MSS, I I I ,  
p .5 ;  Wolanin, "P re s id en t ia l  Advisory Commissions," pp. 217-218.
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F i r s t  they  a re  f a c t  f i n d e r s ;  they g a th e r  in form at ion ,  analyze and 
i n t e r p r e t  i t  in the  ways d i r e c t e d  in t h e i r  mandates. Most of the 
adv isory  bodies mentioned thus  f a r  have had informat ion ga ther ing  as 
one of t h e i r  f u n c t io n s .  Since the  control  of the flow of informat ion 
i s  the  primary source  of p o l i t i c a l  po’wer, i t  i s  the most important  
reason why any execu t ive  o f f i c e r  or agency appoin ts  a commission, com­
m it tee  or board,  be i t  in -house  or composed of persons o u ts ide  govern­
ment s e r v i c e .  Su lzer  observes  t h a t  the process  of in v e s t ig a t io n  is  a t
42l e a s t  as im por tan t  as any recommendations produced by i t .  When the
evidence ga th e red  i s  made pub l ic  i t  is  u su a l ly  given c lo se  a t t e n t i o n
by concerned e l i t e s  in both the  p r iv a te  and public  s ec to r  i f  fo r  no
o th e r  reason  than t h a t  i t  was gathered and disseminated by a group appointed 
43by the p r e s i d e n t .  One type  of executive  department f a c t - f i n d i n g  
body which re -a p p ea r s  f r e q u e n t ly  in American p o l i t i c s  i s  the board or 
commission o f  in q u i ry  appoin ted to  in v e s t ig a t e  a m a t te r  of public  con­
cern  perceived  as having s e r io u s  p o l i t i c a l  consequences.  The Wickersham 
Commission (Hoover A d m in i s t r a t io n ) ,  the Roberts Commission (Roosevelt 
A dm in is t ra t io n ,  which s tud ied  the  Japanese a t t a c k  on Pearl  Harbor), the  
Warren Commission (Johnson Adminis t ra t ion ,  which in v e s t ig a te d  the 
a s s a s s i n a t i o n  of P r e s id e n t  Kennedy), the Scranton Commission (Nixon 
A d m in is t r a t io n ,  named fo llowing the  k i l l i n g s  a t  Kent S t a t e  U n iv e r s i ty ) ,  
and the more r e c e n t  R ocke fe l le r  Commission (Ford A dm inis t ra t ion ,  named 
to i n v e s t i g a t e  charges  of i l l e g a l  a c t i v i t y  in tne  Central  In t e l l i g e n c e
^^Sulzner ,"U .S .  Commission on Civil R igh ts , "  p. 17.
43%bid.
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Agency), are examples o f  the more dramatic types of  commissions of 
inqu i ry .  Each was a success fu l  a t tempt  by the  White House to head-off 
congress ional  i n v e s t ig a t io n s  and action by pre-empting access to  the 
re levan t  informat ion.  In doing so the p r e s i d e n t ,  to g e th e r  with the 
various  i n t e r e s t  groups represen ted  on the  adv isory  body, went a long 
way toward def in ing  the controversy  and the  terms o f  the ensuing debate .
The f a c t  th a t  the  advisory body i s  appointed by and repo r ts  to  the p re s id en t  
i s  the c r i t i c a l  p o l i t i c a l  po in t  to  be kept in  mind a t  t h i s  s tage  of the 
d i s c u s s io n .
Second, p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in the  development and execution o f  policy 
within  the confines  of the p r e s id e n t i a l  mandate i s  a funct ion o f  most p re ­
s id e n t i a l  advisory bodies .  Some are appointed s p e c i f i c a l l y  with very 
narrow policy func t ions  in mind.^^ Such are  u s u a l ly  appointed under the 
emergency powers of the p re s id e n t  and draw s t a t u t o r y  au tho r iza t ion  from
a 1933 law which au thor izes  the p re s id en t  to " . . .  e s t a b l i s h  such agencies
45. . .  as he may f ind  n e c e s s a r y . . . "  to car ry  out func t ions  he defines  as 
f a l l i n g  under h is  emergency powers. In most c a s e s ,  however, a p re s iden t  
e s ta b l i sh e s  an advisory  body to  .exercise what he regards  as execut ive 
functions  on l i t t l e  or no s t a t u t o r y  grounds. When a legal r a t i o n a l e  i s  
needed, pres idents  base t h e i r  ac t ions  on the in h e re n t  powers o f  the o f f i c e .  
The l im i t s  of  such power have not  been c l e a r l y  de f ined  in case or s t a t u t o r y  
law.^® Here, as in the  examination of the o th e r  f a c e t s  of  t h i s  functional
^^Marcy, P r e s id e n t i a l  Commissions, pp. 54-55.
4Sl5 USCA 702 (June 16, 1933).
^®See the discuss ion of the  legal bas is  f o r  p re s id e n t i a l  advisory  
commissions, pp. 66-69 below.
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typology, an examination of the  e x e rc i s e  o f  p r e s i d e n t i a l  power reveals  
i t s  scope, not i t s  l i m i t s .  The most common type of  commission given 
power to  car ry  out executive  func t ions  in the development of  policy  is  
the d ip lomatic  mission au tho r ized  by a p re s id en t  to  c a r ry  out tasks  
in his name. Theodore R ooseve l t ' s  Schurman and Taf t  commissions to the 
P h i l ip p in e s ,  fo llowing i t s  a c q u i s i t i o n  by the United S t a t e s  as a conse­
quence of  the Spanish-American War, the  commission s e n t  by P res iden t  
Hoover to superv ise  the e l e c t i o n s  in Nicarauga in 1929 and the  group 
Pres iden t  Johnson s e n t  to superv ise  and r e p o r t  to him on the e l e c t i o n  in  
South Vietnam, are o f  t h i s  ty p e .  The f i r s t  two had more c l e a r l y  defined 
policy making r o l e s ,  but the l a t t e r  was expected to  and did make general  
policy recommendations upon the  completion of i t s  more formal ta sk  of 
rep resen t ing  the c h i e f  execu t ive .  A commission whose r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
were more c l e a r ly  defined as po l icy  making was the Isthmian Canal Commission 
(1904-05) through which P res iden t  Roosevelt  was able to  c o n s t r u c t  the  
Panama Canal on his own a u t h o r i t y .  L a te r  the  Alaskan Engineering Company 
(1914) was used to c o n s t ru c t  r a i l r o a d s  in Alaska,  e s s e n t i a l l y  by execu­
t i v e  o r d e r . I n  these  l a t t e r  two i l l u s t r a t i o n s ,  an execu t ive  commission 
functioned as po l icy  maker and a d m in i s t r a to r  under the  a u t h o r i t y  of the  
p re s id e n t ;  each repo r ted  to him, was p ro tec ted  by him, and obviously 
served his p o l i t i c a l  purposes.  P res iden ts  have a l s o  used commissions 
in times of emergency, p a r t i c u l a r l y  war,  t o  car ry  out o th e r  types o f  
executive  po l icy  making f u n c t io n s .  The War In d u s t r i e s  Board (1917-18) 
was e s s e n t i a l l y  re sponsib le  f o r  developing na tional i n d u s t r i a l  policy
^^Marcy, P re s id e n t ia l  Advisory Commission, p. 62.
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during World War I .  The New Deal spawned a number of executive  agency 
pol icy  making groups during the Depression and World War I I .  The 
Executive Council and the National Emergency Council (1933) at tempted 
to deal with some o f  the  domestic problems of the  New Deal. The Off ice  
of  Emergency Management (1940) was a p r e s i d e n t i a l l y  appointed commission­
l ik e  group re sp o n s ib le  to him f o r  developing a d m in is t r a t io n  po l icy  fo r
48the na t ion  as i t  en te red  the war. The more re c en t  Wage and Pr ice  
S t a b i l i z a t i o n  Board i s  an example o f  a p r e s id e n t i a l  des ign ,  concurred 
in by congress ,  to develop economic po licy  through a body in which i s  
vested execu t ive  policy-making r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  In each case the p re s id e n t  
perceived the need f o r  an ad junc t  policy-making group, c rea ted  i t  and 
endowed i t  with a u t h o r i t y ,  o f ten  based on tenuous legal grounds, and 
e i t h e r  gained the  approval o r  the  acquiescence of the  congress in i t s  
c r e a t io n .
Th i rd ,  a l l  such executive  advisory bodies ev a lu a te  policy  and/or 
49procedural  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  Evaluation i s  the log ica l  r e s u l t  of the  
a c q u i s i t io n  of policy-making in format ion .  I t  i s  in t h i s  aspec t  of 
t h e i r  work t h a t  p r e s id e n t i a l  advisory commissions most th re a ten  o th e r  
p r e s id e n t i a l  agenc ie s .  By p e r i o d i c a l l y  r e c e iv in g  reasonably o b je c t iv e  
eva lua t ions  of the work of execut ive  depar tm ents /agenc ies ,  a p r e s id e n t  
and h i s  White House s t a f f  a re  able to  i d e n t i f y  those which are  s t r a y in g  
too f a r  from the  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  po l icy  p o s i t i o n s .  Such ac t ions  by 
the p re s id e n t  make i t  d i f f i c u l t  fo r  the depar tment /agencies  to  avoid
4 ^ I b i d . ,  p. 55.
^^Lipsky and Olson, MSS, I I I - 6 .
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the policy-making lead  of the White House.
Four th ,  and perhaps most obvious,  execu t ive  advisory  bodies are 
appointed to  provide adv ice ;  development and eva lua t ion  o f  p o l i c i e s  and 
procedures leads l o g i c a l l y  to recommendations.^^ Popper f e e l s  th a t  
the most common type  o f  advice given by governmental advisory bodies i s  
t e c h n i c a l . C o m m i s s i o n s  and task fo rce s  of s p e c i a l i s t s  are  f requen t ly  
ca l l ed  in  by a l l  execu t ive  agencies to  o f f e r  exper t  advice on d i f f i c u l t  
techn ica l  problems before  them. The techn ica l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e i r  work 
does not diminish t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  usefu lness  to t h e i r  a ppo in te r .
Marcy contends t h a t  mediation i s  a func t ion  p a r t i c u l a r l y  su i ted
52to p re s id e n t i a l  commissions. He notes  th a t  p re s iden ts  charge many 
commissions with the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  mediating a p o l i t i c a l  d ispute  
as a p a r t  o f  t h e i r  t o t a l  assignment.  They are  given problems which 
in ev i tab ly  involve c o n f l i c t  between p a r t s  of the  federal  government 
or between the f e d e r a l ,  s t a t e ,  and loca l  governments. The commission 
can then function  as a c o n c i l i a t o r ,  a r ran g e r  of compromise, a r b i t r a t o r  
and/or pub l ic  educa to r .  In the ro le  o f  mediator the commission has 
the choice of p re sen t in g  the fa c t s  i t  has gathered  in a way th a t  allows 
the p res iden t  and the  public  to  choose between the contending p a r t i e s ,  
present recommendations in  such a way th a t  pressure  is  brought to bear
CO
on one s e t  of  the  p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  o r ,  a f t e r  e f f o r t s  a t  q u i e t  mediation o f
5°Ib1d.
Cl
Popper,  P r e s i d e n t ' s  Commissions, pp. 9-11.
52 Marcy, P r e s id e n t i a l  Advisory Commission, p. 50.
53 Ib id .  As w i l l  be discussed below, the Kerner Commission played 
a mediating ro le  in the  controversy over whether or not th e re  was a com- 
s p i r a c y f n  the d i so rd e r s  o f  1967. See pp. 447-450.
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the  d i s p u te ,  lay the in form at ion  obta ined and i t s  considered judgement 
based on i t  before  th e  p r e s i d e n t  and the pub l ic  and allow i t s  argument 
to  be accepted ,  r e j e c t e d  or  modified on i t s  m e r i t s .
F i f t h ,  i t  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of such adv isory  bodies t h a t  they 
provide the  p re s id e n t  with a c o n s ta n t  flow of informat ion .  They seldom 
w a i t  u n t i l  t h e i r  r e p o r t  i s  due to  communicate t h e i r  f i n d i n g s ,  give 
advice  and recommend p o l ic y .  There a re  two ways p re s id e n t s  have guaranteed 
t h i s  co n s tan t  flow o f  in form at ion .  F i r s t ,  by appoin ting  "h is"  person to  
membership on the  adv iso ry  panel or by a rranging t o  have such a person 
named to  a key p o s i t i o n  on the  advisory  g roup 's  s t a f f ,  p r e f e ra b ly  as 
execu t ive  d i r e c t o r .  Some v a r i a t i o n  o f  t h i s  t a c t i c  has been commonly 
employed by p re s id en t s  when naming an advisory commission to  deal with 
h ighly  s e n s i t i v e  p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e s ;  t h i s  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  the  case when 
the  appearance o f  commission independence from th e  White House is  
p o l i t i c a l l y  necessary  f o r  the  sake o f  e s t a b l i s h in g  commission c r e d i b i l i t y .  
Being c e r t a i n  t h a t  t h e  " r ig h t "  person(s)  i s  on the  commission provides 
th e  p re s id e n t  with a means o f  ongoing communication with the appointed 
body. The second and more common way of main ta in ing  t h i s  flow of 
informat ion is  t o  appo in t  a member o f  the White House s t a f f  as l i a i s o n  
person with the commission. Such a person i s  usua l ly  r e sp o n s ib le  f o r
keeping the p re s id en t  or  one o f  h is  ch ie f  a s s i s t a n t s  informed of the
on-going work of  the commission. I f  these  means of  providing f o r  a 
cont inuous flow of in form at ion  between the White House and the commission 
break down, the s tage  i s  s e t  fo r  a s i t u a t i o n  which p re s id en ts  and White
House s t a f f  members want t o  avoid: being su rp r i s e d  by the  f in a l  r e p o r t
of t h e i r  appointed body. Such a c ircumstance puts  the p re s id e n t  in  a
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dependent,  and most o f ten  in a d e fe n s iv e  p o s i t io n  - a predicament which 
p re s id en ts  and White House a ides  w i l l  go to  g r e a t  lengths  to  avoid.
S i x t h ,  adv iso ry  bodies in the execu t ive  branch always f u l f i l l  a 
pub l ic  r e l a t i o n s  fu n c t io n .  They promote and s t im u la te  concern in the  
po l icy  i s s u e  on which they have been appoin ted to  work. P res id en ts  
can draw p u b l i c  a t t e n t i o n  to any p o l i c y  i s su e  by the appointment o f  an 
adv iso ry  group.
L a s t l y ,  such adv isory  bodies s e rv e  as pub l ic  educa tors .  The more 
pub l ic  the  proceedings  and the more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  the  membership o f  
the  adv iso ry  group i s  o f  key i n t e r e s t  g roups ,  the  l a r g e r  the  pub l ic  
education t a s k  i t  can accomplish with i t s  work; publ ic  hearings in 
Washington or e lsewhere ,  i n v e s t i g a t i v e  f i e l d  t r i p s ,  speeches by members 
of  the commission o r  i t s  s t a f f ,  in t e r im  r e p o r t s ,  normal press  r e l e a s e s ,  
planned " leaks ,"  the  f i n a l  r e p o r t  and the  cont inu ing  concern f o r  i t s  
work shown by members o f  the commission, i t s  s t a f f ,  the  White House 
s t a f f  and the  p re s id e n t  himself ,  a re  th e  common methods of pub l ic  
education used by th e se  advisory b od ies .  I t  i s  the  combination of t h i s  
fun c t io n  w i th  t h a t  o f  information g a th e r in g  t h a t  brings  the  American 
execu t ive  ad hoc adv isory  body n e a r e s t  to  the  B r i t i s h  Royal Commission 
and the  congress iona l  i n v e s t ig a t in g  committee;  each has as p a r t  of i t s  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  the educat ion of the  genera l  pub l ic  about evolving pu b l ic  
p o l i c y .
CHAPTER II
THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMISSION: A POLITICAL ANALYSIS
A) D ef in i t ion
The d iscu ss io n  to th i s  p o in t  demonstrates the  need fo r  a p r e c i s e
d e f in i t io n  o f  the term p r e s id e n t i a l  advisory commission; two reasons
stand out.  F i r s t ,  the too casual use o f  the words,  "boards,"  "committee,"
and "commission" by the White House and o th e r  execut ive  depar tments /
agencies and the  congress ,  has robbed each of  any unique meaning.
Second, the p o l i t i c a l  importance of the p r e s id e n t i a l  advisory commission
cannot be app rec ia ted  u n t i l  i t  can be d i s t in g u i s h ed  from these o ther
groups in the  p re s id e n t i a l  advisory system."' The following opera t iona l
2
d e f in i t io n  accomplishes th a t  goa l .
In p a r t i c u l a r  the independent r egu la to ry  commission and those 
o ther  commission-type advisory bodies in the  appointment of which con­
gress shares  ( e . g .  the U.S. Commission on Civ il  R ig h ts ) ,  White House, 
cabinet  and agency advisory groups and ta sk  fo r ce s .  Lyndon Johnson 's  use 
of task fo rces  i s  discussed in Chapter 5.
2
For s i m i l a r  e f f o r t s  see Wolanin, "P re s id en t ia l  Advisory Commission," 
pp. 57-62; Allan L. Dean, "Ad Hoc Commissions fo r  Policy Formulation," 
Thomas E. Cronin and Sanford D. Greenburg,  e d s . ,  The P r e s id e n t i a l  Advisory 
System (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 105; Popper, The P r e s i d e n t ' s  
Commissions, p. 10; Thomas Corcoran, Montauk Symposium, 1971, p .  163.
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A p r e s i d e n t i a l  advisory  commission i s  an ad hoc,  r e p r e s e n ta t i v e  
body of t e c h n i c a l l y  competent and h igh ly  p r e s t i g io u s  pe rsons ,  
the  m a jo r i t y  of whom are not a t  the t ime of  t h e i r  appointments 
governmental o f f i c i a l s ,  appointed and p u b l i c a l l y  charged by the 
p r e s id e n t  to  independently study and r e p o r t  on what she/he  perceives  
to  be a h igh ly  s e n s i t i v e  na tional p o l i t i c a l - p o l i c y  is sue  which 
cannot be managed by the regu la r  a d m in is t r a t iv e  devices  c rea ted  
f o r  t h a t  purpose by h i s /h e r  a d m in i s t r a t io n .
Other than the obvious need to be appointed by th e  p re s id e n t  th e r e  
are e i g h t  major components of t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n ;  each needs to  be 
e lab o ra te d .  F i r s t ,  members of p re s id e n t i a l  advisory commissions and t h e i r  
s t a f f s  must be t e c h n i c a l l y  competent to cons ider  the  m at te rs  given them 
to study by the  p r e s id e n t .  P res iden t ia l  appointment gives  the  commission 
leg i t im acy ,  but  i t s  c r e d i b i l i t y  i s  d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  to  the t echn ica l  
competence o f  i t s  members and s en io r  s t a f f  persons to  unders tand and 
recommend p o l ic y  fo r  the subjec t  matter ass igned them.
Technical  competence is in e x t r i c a b ly  t i e d  to  the  second component, 
the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  q u a l i t y  of the commissioners and t h e i r  s en io r  s t a f f .
To be r e p r e s e n ta t i v e  o f  an es tab l i shed  groupé and /o r  o f  a broad i n t e r e s t ^  
with a vested  concern in the m a t te r  under co n s id e ra t io n  i s ,  with few 
e x cep t io n s ,  f o r  p r e s id e n t i a l  purposes ,  to  be t e c h n i c a l l y  competent. But 
not j u s t  any r e p r e s e n ta t i v e  of an i n t e r e s t  wi l l  do to  be named a com­
missioner  o r  a s en io r  member o f  a commission s t a f f .  In add i t ion  to 
competence and r e p r e s e n ta t i v e n e s s ,  the person must have had r e l e v a n t  
p o l i t i c a l  exper ience^ .  This does not mean t h a t  a l l  appoin tees  wil l  have
"e .g .  NAACP, AFL-CIO, the National A ssoc ia t ion  o f  Manufacturers,  
^e .g .  Being b lack ,  a woman, and academic.
5
i . e .  The person must be able  to fu nc t ion  e f f e c t i v e l y  in  Washington
p o l i t i c s .
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to be p o l i t i c a l l y  acceptable  to  the appoin t ing  adm in is t ra t ion  in a narrow 
p a r t i s an  sen se ,  though the major i ty  o f  most commissions i s  made up of  
persons of  the same p o l i t i c a l  par ty  as the appoin ting  p re s id e n t .  I t  does 
mean, however, t h a t  the adm in is t ra t ion  has confidence in  the a p p o in te e ' s  
a b i l i t y  to behave in Washington in what i s  commonly regarded as a p o l i ­
t i c a l l y  accep tab le  way. Representa t iveness  i s  not  one-dimensional,  
only r e l a t i n g  the commissioners to t h e i r  spec ia l  i n t e r e s t s  or  groups; 
i t  c a t a l y t i c a l l y  c r e a te s  a multi -d imensional network of  r e l a t i o n s h ip s  
among the v a r i e ty  of  groups represen ted  on the commission,® among 
those groups and t h e i r  executive agency coun te rpa r t s  ass igned to monitor 
the  group 's  i n t e r e s t  in na tional government and among the  various  "chance" 
r e l a t i o n s h ip s  which develop. There fo re ,  commissioners and members o f  
t h e i r  s t a f f s  must be t e c h n ic a l ly  w ise ,  p o l i t i c a l l y  experienced and 
r e p re se n ta t i v e  of the  major i n t e r e s t s  concerned with the po l icy  i s sues  
under c o n s id e ra t io n .  Most former commission p a r t i c i p a n t s  and members 
of White House s t a f f s  concerned with the  work o f  p re s id en t i a l  advisory  
commissions agree t h a t  the f u l f i l l m e n t  of  these  q u a l i t i e s  by commissioners 
and s t a f f  members guarantees  the democratic ch a rac te r  o f  the  commission 
and thereby i s  convincing to a l l  who have a concern in the m a t te r  t h a t  
the  to ta l  pub l ic  i n t e r e s t  has been a n t i c i p a t e d  in the naming o f  the 
commission. As mentioned be fo re ,  and to be discussed l a t e r ,  i t  i s  t h i s  
claim o f  re p re se n ta t iv e n es s  by p r e s i d e n t i a l  advisory  commission p a r t i c i ­
pants which must be c lo se ly  examined i f  the p o l i t i c a l  importance of  
these bodies i s  to  be understood.
Heinz Eulau,  "The Informal Organization o f  Decision S t ru c tu re s  in 
Small L e g is la t iv e  Bodies," Midwest Journal of  P o l i t i c s  13 (August, 1969): 
344, has s i m i l a r  thoughts about these  r e l a t i o n s h ip s  in local  p o l i t i c a l  
government.
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Thi rd ,  commissioners must be p re s t ig io u s  pe rsons ,  a b l e  to  a t t r a c t  
the  a t t e n t i o n  of the  major p o l i t i c a l  a c to r s  on the  Washington s tage  ( p a r t i ­
c u l a r l y  members of c c n g r e s s ) ,  e l i t e s  o f  the p r iv a t e  s e c to r  ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  
those  whose i n t e r e s t s  and o r i e n t a t i o n  they share)  and the  n a t io n a l  media. 
A t t e n t io n  cannot be focused on the commission and i t s  work un less  i t s  
members are of such p r e s t i g e  (and techn ica l  competence, and p o l i t i c a l  
savvy) t h a t  they can command t h a t  audience.
V i s i b i l i t y ,  the  f o u r th  component, follows from the above. Being 
named by the  p re s id en t  and being p re s t i g io u s  persons in t h e i r  own r i g h t  
guaran tees  popular and p o l i t i c a l  v i s i b i l i t y .  I t  i s  im por tan t  to  no te ,  
however, t h a t  the p r e s id e n t  has t o t a l  control  over the  v i s i b i l i t y  of  a 
given commission a t  the  t ime o f  i t s  appointment;  the s p e c i f i c s  of th e  
mandate he gives them and the  amount o f  p u b l i c i t y  he a r ran g es  a t  the  time 
of  the  announcement of  the  appointment are s i g n i f i c a n t  measures of  the  
level of concern the  p r e s i d e n t  wants to  in v es t  in the  p o l i c y  i s su e  con­
signed to  the  p a r t i c u l a r  adv iso ry  body. During the  l i f e  o f  commissions 
dea l ing  with highly  c o n t r o v e r i s a l  m a t t e r s ,  however, the  high leve l  of  
p o l i t i c a l  s o p h i s t i c a t i o n  o f  the  commissioners and s t a f f  a l lows them 
to compete fo r  v i s i b i l i t y  on r e l a t i v e l y  equal terms with th e  White House 
and o th e r  Washington p o l i t i c a l  a c t o r s .
F i f t h ,  most persons  exper ienced in the c re a t io n  and work of p re ­
s i d e n t i a l  advisory  commissions have said  t h a t  a m a jo r i ty  of  th e  members 
of a commission and i t s  s t a f f  must be composed o f  p r iv a t e  c i t i z e n s ;  
government employees must not dominate a commission. Previous  govern­
ment se rv ice  and/or r e l e v a n t  p o l i t i c a l  exper ience ,  as noted above a re
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necessary q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  becoming a nominee, but most of the can­
d id a te s ,  a t  the t ime o f  nomination must be c l e a r l y  i d e n t i f i a b l e  as 
p r iva te  c i t i z e n s ;  t h i s .  White House s t a f f  members t h i n k ,  helps insure  
the o b j e c t i v i t y  and independence which are  the  s ix th  and poss ib ly  most 
con trovers ia l  s e t  o f  components of  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n .  P o l i t i c a l  observers  
and a c to r s  agree t h a t  p u b l ic ly  perceived o b j e c t i v i t y  and independence 
are e s s e n t i a l  to th e  des i red  serv ice  of  an advisory  commission. The 
real express ion of  t h i s  ideal  i s  not as e a s i l y  perceived .
Individual p r e s id e n t i a l  advisory commissions a r e ,  i n e v i t a b ly ,  
temporary p a r t i c ip a n t s  in the advisory system o f  a given a d m in is t r a t io n .^  
Their ad hoc q u a l i t y  i s  a function of  p re s id e n t i a l  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e n t .
Most p r e s id e n t i a l  goals  f o r  a commission can be achieved very q u ick ly .  
Fur ther ,  few volunta ry  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  even when assumed because o f  
a request  of the p re s id en t  of the United S t a t e s ,  can be expected to  
claim more than a year  of the  time o f  the kind of person s e le c te d  fo r  
commission membership.
F in a l ly ,  to  be c l a s s i f i e d  as a p r e s id e n t i a l  advisory  commission 
the group must have as the ob jec t  of i t s  d e l i b e r a t i o n s  a highly sen-
Wolanin, in measuring the frequency and d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  p r e s i d ­
en t ia l  advisory commissions, in the ad m in is t r a t io n s  o f  Truman, Eisenhower, 
Kennedy and Johnson, found a t o t a l  o f  s i x t y - s i x  with a mean t ime, in 
months, o f  11 .9 ,  and a median of 10 .5 .  Except fo r  a small lapse  in the 
Eisenhower a d m in i s t r a t io n ,  each succeeding a d m in is t r a t io n  appointed more 
commissions fo r  longer  periods of t ime.  (See Tables 1 through 3 pp. 4-5 
above) Wolanin's d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a p re s id e n t i a l  adv isory  commission i s  
somewhat broader than t h a t  presented here and he consequently includes  
more advisory  bodies in  h is  study.  However, the t rends  he d isp lays  in 
his work are va l id  and consequently should be noted .
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Ss i t i v e  na t iona l  p u b l ic  p o l i c y  i s su e , .  The meaning of  the  phrase 
"h ighly  s e n s i t i v e  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  i s sue"  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  r e l a t i v e  to the  
h i s t o r i c a l  c o n te x t ,  the  c h a r a c t e r ,  and the p o l i t i c a l  o b j e c t i v e s  of 
the  appoin t ing  a d m in i s t r a t i o n ,
B) P r e s id e n t i a l  Purpose in  Appointing Advisory Commissions
Why do p re s id e n t s  appo in t  commissions? The most a pp rop r ia te  means 
of  answering t h i s  ques t ion  fo r  t h i s  study i s  to draw in f e re n c e s  from an 
a n a ly s i s  o f  the uses to  which p r e s id e n t s  have put t h e i r  commissions.
The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  scheme which i s  developed here i s  based on the 
r e f l e c t i o n s  of White House s t a f f  members who were c lo se  to  the  com-
Q
mission process in t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s .
There are four (4) broad purposes fo r  appoin t ing  a commission 
which can be divined from p r e s i d e n t i a l  p r a c t i c e :
^ h i s  phase does not encompass managerial  or  a d m in is t r a t io n  p o l i c y  
concerns .  Those are  o r d i n a r i l y  ass igned  to  agency t a sk  f o r c e s ,  com­
missions or  committees r e g u l a r l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r  much purposes .
^See thé Montauk Symposium, 1971, the  records  o f  p r e s i d e n t i a l  
a ides  on d ep o s i t  in the  Truman, Eisenhower and Johnson L i b r a r i e s ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  the  ora l  h i s t o r y  t a p e s ,  and the secondary s c h o l a r l y  sources  
noted in the  b ib l io g rap h y .  Wolanin, the  b e s t  o f  the  secondary sources  
developed s ix  types o f  commissions which he ordered by the  frequency 
of  t h e i r  use in the  a d m in i s t r a t i o n s  he s tu d ie d ;  1) p o l i c y  a n a l y s t ,
2) window d r e s s i n g ,  3) to c a l l  a t t e n t i o n  to  a p a r t i c u l a r  p r e s i d e n t i a l  
po l icy  concern and to  frame t h a t  a rea  as a p r e s i d e n t i a l  p o l i c y  pre­
serve  and to  d i r e c t  th e  c o n te n t  of  the  pub l ic  debate  about i t ;  ) to  
meet a c r i s i s ;  5) to buy t im e ;  6) a ca tegory  o f  miscel laneous  rea­
sons and purposes .  His o rd e r  i s  useful but r e s t r i c t i n g  because of  
i t s  s p e c i f i c i t y .  The scheme p resen ted  here i s  designed to  f a c i l i t a t e  
the  p u r s u i t  o f  the i l l u s i v e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  purposes by c r e a t i n g  mors com­
prehensive c a t e g o r i e s .  See Wolanin, " P re s id en t i a l  Advisory Commission," 
pp. 23-44.
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1) To moderate the pace o f  the  policy-making p rocess .
2) To co n s t ru c t  a publ ic  po l icy  consensus,
3) To m i t ig a te  the systemic impact of a p o l i t i c a l  c r i s i s .
4) To s a t i s f y  p e r s i s t e n t  demands on the p r e s id e n t  by p a r t i ­
cu la r  i n t e r e s t  groups.
All p re s iden ts  and t h e i r  c l o s e s t  advisors  exper ience  the anx ie ty  
which comes with  the r e a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  they are  being overtaken by events 
and t h a t  the re  i s  a need fo r  them to  respond to  the  Washington v a r i a t io n  
on the  old  adage,  "Don't j u s t  keep doing something, s tan d  there !. '  
Commissions are  most o f ten  appointed by p re s id en ts  when th i s  s t a t e  o f  
a f f a i r s  i s  reached,  when the p a t t e rn s  of  policy  in i  t a t i o n ,  analys is  
and refinement which have proved usefu l  in  the pa s t  a r e  unable to  cope 
with a novel s e t  of  circumstances which the  White House views as 
developing too rap id ly  in a d i r e c t io n  not in i t s  i n t e r e s t s .  In s h o r t ,  
they f in d  themselves in possession o f  an inadequate  amount o f  the  in ­
formation necessary  to  deal with the m a t te r  a t  hand. An independent 
ga ther ing  and a n a ly s i s  of  fac ts  i s  thought to be needed and an ou ts ide  
group i s  deemed t e c h n i c a l ly  and p o l i t i c a l  able  to do the  jo b ;  a t  t h a t
po in t  the  commission appointing process  begins .
This at tempt by the White House to slow the pace of  events is
of ten  n e g a t iv e ly  c r i t i c i z e d  as an e f f o r t  to  buy time in  the hope th a t
A good d iscuss ion  of t h i s  p a t t e r n  of White House behavior can 
be found in U.S. Congress,  House, Committee on Governmental Opera t ions,  
P r e s id e n t i a l  Advisory Committees, P a r t s  1 and 2, Hearings before a sub­
committee o f  the  Committee on Governmental O pera t ions . 91st  Congress, 
2nd S e s s . ,  1970, P a r t  2,  test imony by Howard Schuman, p. 140.
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the problem w i l l  go awayJ"'
Such an exp lana t ion  i s  too s i m p l i s t i c .  No p re s id en t  has had the  
luxury  of e n t e r t a i n i n g  the  i l l u s i o n ,  f o r  very long,  t h a t  major problems 
w i l l  go away i f  delayed long enough. The dynamics of American i n t e r e s t -  
group p o l i t i c s  w i l l  a l low him to  d e f e r ,  but not avoid a problem. 
Postponement then is  a much more r e l i a b l e  explana tory  ca tegory .  P r e s id e n t s  
do d e f e r  t h e i r  con s id e ra t io n  of some major po l icy  dec i s ions  by r e f e r r i n g  
the  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of them to persons o u t s id e  the "normal" policy-making 
process  of t h e i r  a d m in i s t r a t io n .  In t h i s  way they aim to  r e d i r e c t  a 
p o t e n t i a l l y  damaging p o l i t i c a l  s t r u g g le  with Congress and/or  o th e r  p ro ­
t a g o n i s t s  w h i le  main ta in ing po l icy  i n i t i a t i v e  and contro l  with in  the  
White House. F u r the r  a commission in such an environment can provide 
t ime f o r  d isag reem ents  to  be a i r e d ,  compromises to  be reached and 
p o l i t i c a l  t e n s i o n s  to  be reduced. Buying time by the  c r e a t io n  o f  a 
commission, th e n ,  can be understood as a systemic  s t a b i l i z i n g  e f f o r t  
which, in t h e  minds o f  the  p r e s id e n t  and his  a d v i so r s ,  is  a r e s p o n s i b l e ,  
c r e a t i v e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a c t  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  t r a d i t i o n a l  p a t t e rn s  of 
incrementa l  decision-making and c l e a r l y  with in  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  s e l f  
i n t e r e s t .  I t  i s  an opt ion  taken when o th e r s  have f a i l e d  or are  
c l e a r l y  p e rc e iv e d  to have l im i ted  va lue  in coming to  g r ip s  with th e  
m a t t e r  a t  hand.
See E l izabe th  Drew, "On Giving Oneself  a Hotfoot:  Government
by Commission," A t l a n t i c  Monthly, May 1963, p. 45 fo r  an e x c e l l e n t  d i s ­
cuss ion  of t h i s  p o in t  of view.
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Second, each p r e s id e n t  must develop a m a jo r i ty  consensus around
his p o l ic ie s  i f  they are to  be adopted by the  congress and accepted
by the people.  The p r e s id e n t i a l  advisory commission i s  one of a v a r i e ty
of means a t  a p r e s i d e n t ' s  d isposa l  to achieve and main ta in  such a con-
12sensus.  As p rev ious ly  n o ted ,  p re s id en t i a l  ad hoc advisory  bodies 
perform an educational func t ion  broadly useful throughout the  p re ­
s id en t ia l  advisory system and the to ta l  p o l i t y .  Educating the various 
publics o f  the d e ta i l  and expected consequences o f  a given adminis­
t r a t i o n  policy  i s  cen t r a l  to  consensus bu i ld ing .  P re s id e n t ia l  advisory
commissions have a c l e a r  educational r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , the  sp ec i f ic s  of
13which are usua l ly  l a id  out in i t s  p re s iden t ia l  mandate.  In a d d i t io n ,  
the appointment p ro c e ss ,  the  publ ic  hear ings ,  the  p u b l ic a t io n  of the 
commission's r e p o r t  are  a l l  educational devices  useful in  achieving 
the goal of bu i ld ing  a broad consensus fo r  the  agreed-upon po l icy .  
Consensus bui ld ing as i t  i s  discussed here i s  not "window dressing"^^ 
nor n eces sa r i ly  a design f o r  maintenance of  the  s t a t u s  quo (as in the 
discussion above of  moderating the  pace of  th e  policy  p ro ce ss ) ,  i t  
is the  major in g re d ie n t  in a s t r a t e g y  fo r  changing p ub l ic  po l icy  in 
the d i re c t io n  des i red  by the  p re s id en t .  Commissions mandated to make 
proposals fo r  the r e v i s io n  of the executive depar tment 's  p rac t ice s  and
12 See above p. 49.
11 See Wolanin, "P re s id e n t i a l  Advisory Commissions," p. 28, and Drew, 
"Giving Oneself a H o t foo t , "  p. 48.
^ \ o l a n i n ,  " P r e s i d e n t i a l  Advisory Commissions,"  p. 28.
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s t ru c tu re  are  the b e s t  examples of t h i s  e f f o r t  a t  educat ion and build ing
15of consensus around a po licy  option decided upon by the p res iden t .
Another way commissions are used to  educate and develop consensus 
is  to appoint  them fo r  the purpose of  drawing a t t e n t i o n  to a policy or 
s e t  of policy  concerns to which the ad m in is t r a t io n  has a l ready  committed 
i t s e l f . A g a i n ,  the mandate given the commission always c l ea r ly  marks 
the  policy options  the  adminis t ra t ion  regards as d eb a tab le .  In doing 
so,  and gauging the response o f  the concerned e l i t e  groups to the 
c rea t ion  of the  commission, an adminis t ra t ion  le a r n s  quickly  the 
s t reng th  of the  e x i s t i n g  consensus; in a d d i t io n ,  the process  o f  d e t e r ­
mining the terms, agenda and substance o f  the subsequent debate ( in g r e ­
dients  necessary to  the  developing consensus) have been pre-empted by 
the action o f  the White House c rea t ing  the  c o m m i s s i o n . D a n i e l  B el l ,  
in wri t ing  about his  exper ience as a member of th e  Commission on
1 g
National Goals and the Future,  observed th a t  p r e s id e n t s  attempt to  
control the debate  by the appointment of a p re s tg ious  group o f  com­
missioners and f a i l i n g  th e r e ,  know th a t  the  ex i s t en ce  o f  the p re s id en t i a l
15e .g .  The Barlow and Hoover Commissions, each o f  which was discussed 
in Chapter 1.
'^Drew, "Given Oneself a Hotfoot," p. 45 c a l l s  t h i s  the "l ightn ing 
rod" func t ion .
^^Examples a re :  the Immigration and N a tu ra l i z a t io n  Commission,
1951; the National Commission on Higher Education (the Scranton Com­
mission),  1970, and the  P r e s id e n t ' s  Commission on the Accident at  
Three Mile I s l a n d ,  1979.
1R
B e l l ,  "Government by Commission," p. 120.
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group wil l  su re ly  focus public  d iscuss ions  on the  i s su es  in ways t h a t  
are useful and e x p lo i t a b le  in the context o f  the  overa l l  s t r a t e g y  
regarding the p o l ic y .
The t h i r d  p re s id e n t i a l  purpose in appoin t ing  a commission i s  to 
m i t ig a te  the impact o f  a domestic p o l i t i c a l  c r i s i s  by pre-empting 
ac t ion  by o th e r  p o l i t i c a l  a c t o r s ,  in p a r t i c u l a r  congress and the  gover­
nors o f  the s t a t e s ,  and consequently gaining contro l  o f  the d issemina t ion  
of information concerning the c r i s i s  J '
The appointment of a commission i s  an e f f e c t i v e  way o f  r e in f o r c in g
the conventional wisdom t h a t  the executive  branch o f  the American
na t iona l  government i s  the bes t  equipped p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  to
encounter and con ta in  domestic p o l i t i c a l  events  which have reached c r i s i s  
20p ropor t ions .  The v a l i d i t y  of  t h a t  assumption a s ide  fo r  the  p r e s e n t ,  i t  
is the a b i l i t y  o f  the  presidency to  respond quickly  to  domestic c r i s i s  
through a v a r i e t y  o f  means, inc luding  t h a t  o f  the  c rea t io n  of  an advisory 
commission, which i s  a major key to  unders tanding White House contro l
The phrase "domestic p o l i t i c a l  c r i s i s "  i s  in tended to  desc r ibe  
those kinds o f  events  which are  preceived by an ad m in is t ra t ion  to  t h r e a ­
ten the  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  s t a t u s  quo of  the government or  the na t ion .  For 
the purpose of  t h i s  a n a y l s i s ,  then ,  a p a r t i c u l a r  p o l i t i c a l  c r i s i s  which 
p r im ar i ly  involves  fo re ign  r e l a t i o n s  can be c l a s s i f i e d  as domestic i f  i s  
perceived to  pose se r ious  t h r e a t  to  domestic p o l i t i c a l  harmony, the 
Rockefe l le r  Commission charged with  the i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of  the  work o f  the  
CIA i s  an i l l u s t r a t i o n  of  a commission appointed to  m i t ig a te  the impact 
of a domestic p o l i t i c a l  c r i s i s  having i t s  o r ig i n s  in fo re ign  r e l a t i o n s ;  
domestic c i v i l  d i s o r d e r ,  p o l i t i c a l  a s s a s s i n a t i o n s ,  and crime are  r e c en t  
examples of  e x p l i c i t l y  domestic p o l i t i c a l  c r i s e s  which provoked the 
c re a t io n  of  a p r e s id e n t i a l  advisory  commission.
^^See pp. 1-5.
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21over domestic pol icy  im i ta t io n .  In a c t in g  q u ic k ly ,  with i t s  highly
c red ib le  and v i s i b l e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r e n g t h s ,  the  White House engages
22one of i t s  most p o te n t  r e f e r e n t i a l  symbolic re so u rce s ;  in a r ap id ly
evolving s e t  o f  p o l i t i c a l  circumstances t h e  p re s id en t  i s  o f ten  perceived
as the  necessary  a l t e r n a t i v e  to  h a s ty ,  i l l - t i m e d  and confused ac t ions  o f
congress and l e s s  c r e d i b l e  p o l i t i c a l  a c t o r s .
C r i s i s  commissions are c l e a r l y  in tended to f u l f i l l  a ro l e  as
educa to r  o f  th e  pub l ic  about what the  a d m in i s t r a t io n  th inks  to be
important and g e n e ra l ly  unknown dimensions o f  the problem p r e c i p i t a t i n g  
23the appointment.  A highly c r e d ib le  and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  group of  
persons appointed to  membership on the  commission g r e a t ly  eases  not 
only the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  and pub l ic  acceptance o f  such in fo rm at ion ,  but 
a lso  makes i t  very d i f f i c u l t  f o r  the i n t e r e s t  groups the  commissioners
21 The c o n ten t io n  here i s  not t h a t  c r i s i s  commissions are 
ins truments  i n  p r e s i d e n t i a l  a t tempts  to c o n t ro l  domestic po l icy  making 
by dominating Congress (as with Aaron Wildasky, "The Two P res idenc ie s " ,  
in Thomas E. Cronin and Sanford D. Greenburg, e d . , The P res iden t ia l  
Advisory System (New York: Harper and Row, 1969, p.  172-173) but r a t h e r ,  
t h a t  p r e s id e n t s  dominate the process of  p o l i c y  i n i t i t i o n ,  inc luding the  
forming and focus ing  of the debates on th e  i s s u e s ;  they  have not been 
able  to  dominate ,  to the  point o f  contro l  (as Wildasky contends),  i t s  
p o l i t i c a l  process in which the po l icy  ou tpu t  i s  determined.  The advisory 
commission is  a major tool in main ta in ing  the p re s id e n t i a l  pos i t ion  of  
pre-eminence in  p o l i c y  i n i t i a t i o n  and innova t ion .
2? Edelman, Symbolic Uses o f  P o l i t i c s , pp. 6-7.
23U.S. Congress ,  Senate,  Committee on the  J u d ic i a r y  Subcommittee 
on A dminis t ra t ive  P rac t ic e s  and Procedures ,  P r e s id e n t i a l  Commissions: 
Implementation o f  Recommendations o f  P r e s id e n t i a l  and National Commissions, 
92nd Congress ,  1s t  S e s s . ,  1971, p. 16. (H e rea f te r  c i t e d  as the  Kennedy 
h e a r i n g s ) .
62
r e p re se n t  to  quest ion  i t ,  i t s  source or the  recommendations based upon
F in a l ly ,  p re s id en ts  appoin t  p r e s id e n t i a l  advisory  commissions 
in  response to  p e r s i s t e n t  demands on them c rea ted  by the various  o ther  
a c to r s  who p a r t i c i p a t e  in the p re s id e n t i a l  advisory system. F i r s t ,  
every adm in is t ra t io n  d iscovers  a need to  review and s t im u la te  the  work 
o f  the  execut ive  agencies  o f  the  execut ive depar tment,  o r  to bu i ld  con­
f idence  in a depar tment/agency or  program t h a t  i s  under a t t a c k .  Though 
r a r e l y  cen tra l  , such review and s t im u la t io n  can be pos i ted  as one
pc
reason for  the  naming of  a commission. The Kappel Commission which 
in v e s t ig a te d  the  Post Off ice  Department and recommended the p resen t  
a d m in i s t r a t iv e  s t r u c t u r e  fo r  t h a t  agency i s  one example o f  a commission 
being given se r io u s  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  review as p a r t  o f  i t s  mandate. The 
appointment o f  the commission put the  department on no t ice  t h a t  the 
adm in is t ra t io n  and congress were s e r io u s ly  consider ing  adm in is t ra t ive  
changes. This allowed the  department some time to  make what changes 
i t  could o r  wanted t o ,  o r  to conso l ida te  i t s  i n t e r n a l  and ex te rna l  
resources  f o r  r e s i s t a n c e  in response .  Eisenhower's  Commission on 
National Goals or  the  commission concerned with the  fu tu re  uses o f  
technology about which Daniel Bell w r i te s  are  examples o f  commissions
See Drew, "Giving Oneself  a Hotfoot,"  p. 46,  f o r  a r e l a t e d  
d iscuss ion  o f  t h i s  p o i n t .
25Lyndon Johnson, his c l o s e s t  White House domestic a ides  and most 
of h is  cab ine t  o f f i c e r s  saw agency program review as the  major reason 
fo r  the appointment o f  o u ts id e  ta sk  fo rce s .  See the  d iscuss ion  of  
Johnson task  fo rces  in  Chapter 5 ,  below.
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one purpose of which was t o  s t im u la te  various  p a r t s  of th e  government 
26in to  a c t i o n .  Sy s e t t i n g  c e r t a in  goals f o r  a commission in i t s  man­
da te  a p re s id e n t  c l e a r l y  s ig n a l s  the  federa l  bureauracy t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  
types  o f  programs and i s su e s  are high on h is  planning agenda. Such 
s t im u la t ion  of the  bureaucracy can, of course ,  as e a s i l y  r e s u l t  in 
negat ive  r e s i s t a n c e  as p o s i t i v e  pol icy  support .  That i s  a r i s k  inhe ren t  
in the White House-executive  department/agency r e l a t i o n s h i p .  More impor­
t a n t  f o r  t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n ,  however, i s  t h a t  the  appointment of p r e s i d e n t i a l  
advisory commissions with a charge to  help the  p r e s i d e n t  develop new 
policy  d i r e c t i o n s  does aid the  White House in fu n c t io n in g  as pol icy  
i n i t i a t o r  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  overseer of p o l i c y  development within  the  
executive  branch o f  government.  While such o v e r s ig h t  i s  obviously pa r t  
of good management p r a c t i c e ,  i t  i s  a l s o  very usefu l  in e s t a b l i s h in g  in 
the minds of  the  gene ra l  and e l i t e  pub l ic ,  the  f e d e ra l  bureaucracy,  and 
the congress ,  the  White House view t h a t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  fo r  policy  
i n i t i a t i o n  belongs p r im a r i l y  to  the  p re s id e n t .  Here can be seen an 
example of how the  White House has e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r  i t s e l f  an advantaged 
p o s i t ion  in i t s  p e r s i s t e n t  s t rugg le  with the  congress  over a r e s p o n s i ­
b i l i t y  which in th e  s t r i c t  C ons t i tu t io n a l  s ense ,  belongs p r im ar i ly ,  i f  
not e x c lu s iv e ly  w i th  congress  -  ove rs igh t  and review of  the work of 
a d m in i s t r a t iv e  depar tm en t /agenc ies .
P re s id e n ts  have a v a r i e t y  of re sources  f o r  defending a o o s i t i c n  
or execut ive  i n s t i t u t i o n  which i s  undergoing a t t a c k  by p o l i t i c a l  
opponents. When th e  a t t a c k s  are perceived to ce very  se r ious  and when
2^“See B e l l ,  "Government by Commission.
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the p re s id en t  i s  convinced t h a t  some changes in the  department ' s
opera t ion  are  i n e v i t a b l e  a commission i s  o f te n  appointed to handle 
27the matter.
All major i n t e r e s t  groups place demands on p res iden ts  f o r  repre­
s en ta t io n  o f  t h e i r  concerns in the a d m in i s t r a t i o n ' s  policy  making 
process .  Appointment of rep resen t ives  o f  key i n t e r e s t  groups to  member­
ship on advisory commissions i s  a means used to  meet t h i s  demand.
There a re  two re c u r r in g  reasons fo r  making such appointments:  to
28reward f r iends  o f  the adm in is t ra t ion ,  and to  appoint the " r igh t"  people
29regard less  of  the  level  o f  t h e i r  support  o f  the ad m in is t ra t ion .
Most ad m in is t r a t io n s  have used commissions f o r  these  ends.  But those 
near the  process agree t h a t  the f i r s t  type  o f  appointment never i s  
made so le ly  fo r  t r a d i t i o n a l  patronage reasons .  The admin is t ra t ions  they 
knew had a t  t h e i r  disposa l a wide range o f  patronage options  from 
which t o  choose,  appointment to  a p r e s id e n t i a l  advisory  commission being 
a r e l a t i v e l y  minor one. When, however, a p re s id en t  did appoint  a 
person from a p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  group to  a commission as a "reward" 
he usually  had an u l t e r i o r  motive in mind: a de s i r e  to  "educate" the
i n t e r e s t  group through the commission member about the  a d m in i s t r a t io n ' s  
point  o f  view on the policy m at te r  under c o n s id e ra t io n .  Commissioners 
are always expected to  educate t h e i r  ind iv idual c o n s t i tu en c ie s  con-
? 7 The Rockefe l le r  Commission (see  p. 41-42, above) is  a good example,
o n
Supporters o f  the adm in is t ra t ion  who have i n t e r e s t  in  the  pub l ic  
policy issue under considera t ion  by the  commission.
29This type o f  appointment i s  an a ttempt to  shape content and 
d i rec t io n  o f  the commission's repor t  through the appointment process.
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cerning the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  p o s i t io n .  Such communication of  pol icy  
information i s  des igned ,  a t  the  minimum, to  p o l i t i c a l l y  n e u t r a l i z e  
the key i n t e r e s t  groups and a t  best  to gain t h e i r  commitment to  the 
policy pos it ion  the  adm in is t ra t ion  expects the commission to produce.
C) The Creation o f  Commissions
Pres id en t ia l  advisory  commissions are c rea ted  in one o f  two ways:
the formal process o f  an executive  o rder  o r  by the  simple ac t  o f  p re -
30s id e n t i a l  announcement.
The p o l i t i c a l  importance the p re s id en t  ass igns  to  the  problem
to which the proposed commission wil l  be d i r e c t e d ,  and the  a n t i c i p a t e d
response of the congress  to the  p re s id e n t i a l  i n i t i t i v e ,  determine the
0*1
method a p res iden t  w i l l  use in appointing the commission. I f  the 
problem is  perceived to be r e l a t i v e l y  minor, and/or c l e a r l y  w i th in  
the province of the  executive  branch of  the  government, the  informal 
method of announcement wil l  be used. I f ,  on the o th e r  hand, the  pro­
blem i s  p o l i t i c a l l y  s e n s i t i v e  and/or one in which s i g n i f i c a n t  members 
of congress have expressed a ser ious  i n t e r e s t ,  the  p r e s id e n t  i s  most
Marcy, P r e s id e n t i a l  Commissions, p. 21. Wolanin, "P re s id en t i a l  
Commission," p. 130 says t h a t  s ix ty  p re s id e n t i a l  advisory commissions 
have been created in  the post-World War II  per iod .  Of th e s e ,  57 percent  
have been created by announcement. He a lso  maintains t h a t  s ix  commissions 
were crea ted  by s t a t u t e ,  a content ion which is  d ispu ted  by Frank C.
Carlacci (U.S. Congress,  House, Federal Advisory Committee Standards  Act , 
Report No. 92-101F t o  accompany H.R. 4383, 92nd Congress,  2d S e s s . ,  p.  77.) 
He contends t h a t  t h e r e  was s t a t u t o r y  a u th o r iz a t io n s  f o r  f i f t e e n  commissions 
A d if fe rence  in d e f i n i t i o n  o f  what a p r e s id e n t i a l  advisory  commission i s  
accounts fo r  the d iscrepancy .  The d e f i n i t i o n  being used here i s  c lose  
enough to Wolanin‘s to  allow acceptance o f  his f i g u r e ,
31
Wolanin, " P r e s i d e n t i a l  Advisory Commission," p.  183.
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l i k e l y  to i s su e  an executive  o r d e r ,  thereby drawing on powers 
32ex c lu s iv e ly  h i s .
In h i s  power to  appoint a commission, t h e r e f o r e ,  the  p re s id en t  
i s  not s e r i o u s l y  cons t ra ined  by o th e r  p o l i t i c a l  a c t o r s .  When a p re ­
s id e n t  th inks  a problem ser ious  enough to  appoint a commission, he w i l l  
f ind  a way to do i t .
D) P r e s id e n t i a l  Authori ty  fo r  Appointing P res id en t ia l  Advisory Commissions 
Author i ty  fo r  the  issuance of an executive  order or pub l ic  announce­
ment o f  the  c r e a t io n  o f  a commission is  based on A r t i c l e  II  Section  3 
of  the  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  b u t t r e s se d  by appeals  to the t r a d i t i o n  o f  inh e ren t  
p r e s id e n t i a l  execu t ive  power, s t a t u t o r y  au tho r iza t ion  and cour t  d ec i s io n s .
Section 3 of  A r t i c l e  II has been t r a d i t i o n a l l y  invoked when the  
intended func t ion  o f  the  commission i s  to  ga ther  in format ion and/or 
to conduct i n v e s t i g a t i o n s :
He sh a l l  from time to time give  to the  Congress Information o f  
o f  the  S t a t e  o f  the  Union, and recommend to  t h e i r  Considera tion  
such Measures as he sha l l  judge necessary and e x p e d i e n t ; . . .  
he sh a l l  take care  t h a t  the Laws by f a i t h f u l l y  e x e c u t e d . . .
The c re a t io n  of an adv isory  commission by Executive o rder  i s
always grounded on expressed o r  implied s t a t u t o r y  a u th o r i t y .  As noted
32A major reason fo r  choosing the execut ive  o rd e r  i s  t h a t  the  
a u th o r i t y  fo r  i s su in g  i t  i s  based on s t a t u t o r y  law. The use of  t h i s
opt ion taken makes i t  more d i f f i c u l t  f o r  congress l e g a l l y  to  chal lenge
the appointment.  See the d i scuss ion  o f  the  legal l im i t s  to  a p r e s i d e n t ' s
a b i l i t y  to  appoint  a commission, pp. 66-75 below.
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in the  next sec t ion  of th i s  c h a p te r ,  congress has t r i e d  on severa l  
occasions to circumscribe  t h a t  a u th o r i t y  by use of i t s  power o f  the
O'?
purse ,  but without  notable  success .  " Use o f  the d o c t r in e  o f  inheren t  
executive  powers is  the device by which p re s iden ts  have u l t im a te ly  
thwarted a l l  at tempts by congress to  l i m i t  t h e i r  power and a u th o r i t y  to 
appoint advisory commissions. Wolanin found,  fo r  i n s t a n c e ,  "In the 
Executive Orders c rea t ing  tw en ty - th ree  o f  the  twenty-s ix  commissions 
c rea ted  by Executive Order,  the only a u t h o r i t y  c i t e d  was h is  as 
P re s id e n t .
The question of g ran t ing  subpoena powers to  advisory commissions 
is  more d i r e c t l y  dependent on congress than the a u th o r i ty  to appoin t.  
Commissions appointed on the so le  a u th o r i t y  o f  the p re s id en t  have no 
power to  subpoena wi tnesses  or  documentary informat ion un less  t h a t  power 
is  g ran ted  by the congress .  Marcy a rgues ,  however, t h a t  a P res iden t  
under h is  implied executive  powers, might be able to e s t a b l i s h  a 
commission with compulsory a u t h o r i t y . . .
33Other chal lenges  by congress to  t h i s  p r e s id e n t i a l  a u th o r i t y  and 
t h e i r  e q u a l ly  l im i ted  outcomes are worth n o t ing .  Tyler  was th e  f i r s t  
p r e s id e n t  to have to j u s t i f y  to  congress the  appointment o f  a commission. 
Congress challenged h i s  r i g h t  to have a commission re p o r t  d i r e c t l y  and 
e x c lu s iv e ly  to him. In rep ly  he s u c c e s s f u l l y  maintained t h a t  A r t i c l e  
II Sec t ion  3 of the C ons t i tu t io n  gave him t h i s  a u t h o r i t y .  In signing the 
Sundry Civ il  Act of  1909 (Section 8 ,  35 S t a t .  1027, 31 USC 673) Pres ident  
Roosevelt  sa id  t h a t  he did not fee l  bound by i t s  l i m i t a t i o n  on his 
a u th o r i t y  to  appoint commissions. His subsequent ac t ions  sus ta in ed  his 
c on ten t ion .  Marcy P r e s id e n t i a l  Commissions, pp. 7-9 and Wolanin "Pres ident ia l  
Advisory Commissions," p. 113.
3 4 l b i d . ,  p. 136.
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. . .  by following the reasoning o f  In re  Neagle [135 US 1(1890)] 
to the e f f e c t  t h a t  the  P r e s id e n t  i s  charged with the duty of  
f a i t h f u l l y  executing the  laws and pursuan t  to  t h a t  broad Con­
s t i t u t i o n a l  guarantee  he has an implied power to  give compulsive 
powers to  commissions which he may c r e a t e  in  the  course  o f  f a i t h ­
f u l ly  execu t ing  the l a w s . 35
The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y  o f  congress  to  g r a n t  compulsory powers
to  agencies  o f  the  execu t ive  branch has not been s e r i o u s l y  chal lenged
by the cour ts  when the  g r a n t  i s  to  an adv iso ry  commission.
P re s id e n t s  a lso  s k i l l f u l l y  used v o lu n ta ry  personnel and funds
to evade cong re ss io n a l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  and to  s t r e n g th en  t h e i r  i n h e r e n t
power to  app o in t  ad hoc adv isory  groups .  There i s ,  no reason to
q u a l i f y  Wolanin‘s argument t h a t  "The P r e s i d e n t ' s  a b i l i t y  to  use
voluntary  s e r v i c e s  f o r  adv iso ry  purposes has become a C o n s t i tu t io n a l
a cc re t io n  t h a t  supports  P re s id e n t  Theodore R o o se v e l t ' s  d ic tum, 'any
fu tu re  P r e s id e n t  can do as I have done and ask d i s i n t e r e s t e d  men who
d e s i r e  to se rv e  the  people to give  t h i s  s e r v i c e  f r e e  to  the  people
37through th e se  commissions '"
35Marcy, P r e s id e n t i a l  Commissions, p. 98.  He c a u t i o n s ,  howevd'r, 
t h a t  the  expansion of execu t ive  government had not proceeded to  the  
p o in t  where th e  cou r ts  would accep t  such re a so n in g .  There i s  no d e f in i ­
t i v e  supreme c o u r t  ru l i n g  on t h i s  i s s u e .  See a l so  Wolanin "Pres ident ia l  
Commissions," pp. 113-115, fo r  ano ther  d i s cu s s io n  o f  in h e ren t  executive 
power. His conclus ions  a re  e s s e n t i a l l y  the same as Marcy 's .  No pres iden t  
s ince  Marcy d id  h is  work has found i t  necessa ry  to invoke he d o c t r in e  
of  implied execu t ive  power in t h i s  way, as qongress  has granted most 
reques ts  f o r  subpoena power f o r  p r e s i d e n t i a l  adv iso ry  commissions.  (See 
the  d i scuss ion  o f  the  Nimitz Commission above pp. 31-33 f o r  a majo r  
exception to t h i s  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n . )
35See Marcy, P r e s id e n t i a l  Commissions, p .  98, fo r  a d iscuss ion  of 
what he b e l i e v e s  to be p o t e n t i a l  grounds f o r  q u a l i f y in g  such de legation 
of subpoena power. He appeals to  the  d i s s e n t i n g  opin ions  o f  J u s t i c e  
Cardozo in Jones v S e c u r i ty  and Exchance Commission, 298US 1 (1936) and 
t h a t  o f  J u s t i c e  Holmes in E l l i s  v The I n t e r s t a t e  Commerce Commission, 237 
US 434 (1915).
For a n o th e r  d i scuss ion  o f  t h i s  p o in t  see Marcy, P r e s i d e n t i a l  
Commissions, pp. 17-18.
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E) Financing P r e s i d e n t i a l  Advisory Commissions
The a u t h o r i t y  of  a p r e s id e n t i a l  adv isory  commission u l t im a te ly
r e s t s  on the  e x p l i c i t  and inhe ren t  a u th o r i t y  of the p re s id e n t  and his
38w i l l in g n e s s  to  suppor t  th e  commission and i t s  work. But h is  means 
of  f in a n c i a l  suppor t  a r e  seve re ly  l im i t ed .  Funds a v a i l a b l e  t o  him 
determine how th e  commission w i l l  come in to  e x i s t e n c e ,  the  number of 
such bodies e x i s t e n t  a t  any given t ime,  the  frequency of t h e i r  c re a t io n  
and the  natu re  of t h e  c o n g re s s io n a l - p r e s i d e n t i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  a t  the 
time of the  commission 's  c re a t io n  and during i t s  l i f e - s p a n .
Wolanin s u c c i n c t l y  l i s t s  fou r  options  open to  t h e  White House 
in funding the  l i f e  o f  a commission: 1) Comply with  or  r e i n t e r p r e t
congress ional r e s t r i c t i o n s  on the  funding of commissions,  2) use un­
r e s t r i c t e d  p r e s i d e n t i a l  funds ,  3) r e l y  on a u th o r i z a t i o n s  t h a t  allow
spending f o r  i n t e r a g en c y  commissions and c o n s u l t a n t s ,  o r  4} support
39commissions from p r i v a t e  sources .  The importance o f  the  means of 
funding to  the p o l i t i c a l  c h a r ac te r  and a u th o r i t y  of a p r e s id e n t i a l  
advisory commission d i c t a t e s  cons ide ra t ion  in some d e t a i l  of each of 
these  methods.
There a re  t h r e e  ope ra t iv e  p rov is ions  of law which r e f l e c t  
congress ional a t t i t u d e  concerning t h e  f inanc ing  of th e  work o f  p re s id -
00
See Sec t ion  d,  pp. 66-68.
^ ^ W o l a n i n , " P r e s i d e n t i a l  Advisory  Commissions," p. 151.
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e n t i a l  adv iso ry  commissions and o th e r  ad hoc advisory  bodies  w i th in  
the ex ecu t iv e  b ranch .
The f i r s t  a c t  was passed dur ing th e  T y le r  a d m in i s t r a t i o n  (1342) 
and provided t h a t  no expense of  a commission could be pa id  w i th o u t  a 
s p e c i f i c  a u t h o r i z a t i o n  by means o f  sp e c ia l  a p p r o p r i a t i o n .  An a t t o r n e y  
g e n e r a l ' s  op in ion  in  1843 def ined the  i n t e n t  of  congress f o r  t h i s  a c t  
to inc lude  " p r o h i b i t i o n  o f  payment of commissioners and agen ts  o f  
executive  depar tments  fo r  making i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  requ i red  fay Congress 
except from a p p ro p r ia t io n s  fo r  t h a t  p u rp o se . "^ ”'
The second was an admendment ( th e  Tawney Admendment) to  t h e  Sun­
dry Appropr ia t ions  Act o f  1909. I t  was in tended to s t r e n g th en  th e  hand 
of congress in the  c r e a t i o n  and a d m in i s t r a t i o n  o f  the  work o f  p r e s i d e n t i a l l y  
appointed commissions:
No p a r t  o f  the  p u b l i c  moneys, o r  o f  any ap p ro p r ia t io n  made 
by Congress ,  s h a l l  be used f o r  the  payment o f  compensation 
o r  expenses of  any commission, c o u n c i l ,  board ,  o r  o t h e r  
s i m i l a r  body, o r  any members t h e r e o f ,  o r  f o r  expenses in 
connection with any work o r  the  r e s u l t s  o f  any work o r  
ac t io n  o f  any commission, council  board o r  any s i m i l a r  
body, un less  the  c re a t io n  of the  same s h a l l  be au th o r i z ed  
by law; nor should  the re  be employed by d e t a i l ,  h e r e a f t e r  
o r  h e r e to f o r e  made o r  otherwise personal s e r v i c e  from any 
execu t ive  depar tment or o th e r  government e s tab l i shm en t  in 
connection with  any such commission, board o r  o t h e r  s i m i l a r  
body.42
The l a s t  major e f f o r t  by the congress to  l i m i t  the  a u t h o r i t y  o f  p r e s i d ­
ents  to  appo in t  and use commissions was an admendment by Sena tor  Richard
^^See 31 USCA 672, 673 and 679. Also see Wolanin, " P r e s id e n t i a l  
Advisory Commissions," pp. 133-143, Marcy, P re s id e n t ia l  •Commissions, ?. 5,  
Cean "Ad Hoc Commissions," p. 105 and Popper,  The P r e s i d e n t ' s  Commissions, 
pp. 6-7 .
*^1842, 4 Op. A t tn .  Gen., 106 in  31 USCA 572.
^Zgi USCA 673 .
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Russell to the 1945 Independent Off ices  Appropr ia tions  Act which 
e f f e c t i v e l y  l im i t ed  the l i f e  of  any p re s id e n t i a l  advisory commission 
to  one year  unless  the  congress s p e c i f i c a l l y  appropr ia ted  funds f o r  i t  
o r  au thorized expenditure  o f  p rev ious ly  appropr ia ted  public  funds by i t . ^ ^  
This p ro h ib i to ry  ac t  was aimed a t  a p r a c t i c e  of the  adm in is t ra t ion  o f  
Franklin Roosevelt  of e s t a b l i s h i n g  commissions by executive o rd e r  and 
financing them with  funds app ro p r ia ted  to  and au thor ized  fo r  use by p a r t i ­
cu la r  executive  agencies .
While p re s id e n t s  have not always f e l t  r e s t r a in e d  by them, these  
s t a t u to r y  p rov is ions  have l im i ted  p r e s id e n t i a l  ac t ion  in the app o in t ­
ment and use o f  commissions. These l e g i s l a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on the  use 
of commissions are not l e g a l ly  dead o r  p o l i t i c a l l y  impotent.  As r e c e n t ly  
as 1970, in congress ional hea r in g s ,  the  adm in is t ra t ion  was c a l l e d  upon 
to explain why these  p rov is ions  o f  the  law should not apply to i t s  
p ra c t ic e s  in appoin t ing  and f inanc ing  advisory commissions.^^
However, p re s id en t s  have not been without resources  fo r  c i r ­
cumventing these  s t a t u t e s .  A v a r i e ty  o f  means have been used with the 
r e s u l t  t h a t  congress has been able  to  q u a l i fy  but not control  the  autho­
r i t y  o f  p re s id en ts  to name and use commissions fo r  policy  ends they 
de s i r e  to pursue .  The most common way the  White House has avoided 
the  r e s t r i c t i o n  of the Tawney Admendment has been to  i n t e r p r e t  the  phrase 
"authorized  by law" broadly  enough to  permit  the appointment o f  a
a?
"^31 USCA 696 
44
Wolanin,  " P r e s i d e n t i a l  Advisory  Commissions," p. 151.
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commission under any execu t ive  func t ion  p rev ious ly  enacted by s t a t u t e .
45This p r a c t i c e  has been supported by a t  l e a s t  one a t to rney  general .
The more formidable r e s t r i c t i o n s  in the  Russell amendment, a c t i v e  
u n t i l  enactment of the Independent Appropr ia t ions  Act of 1946,^® 
were m it iga ted  by a process b e s t  desc r ibed  by Comptroller General Elmer 
S t a a t s :
As a p ra c t i c a l  m a t te r ,  i f  the  expenses o f  th e  (commission) are  
j u s t i f i e d  in the  budget p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  t h i s  i s  regarded as 
being adequate f o r  the purpose.  When they say  s p e c i f i c  
au th o r iza t io n  by Congress,  a u t h o r i z a t io n  by Congress i s  
u su a l ly  meant to be approval through the a pp rop r ia t ion  pro­
cess i f  not through the r e g u la r  l e g i s l a t i v e  au th o r iza t io n  
p rocess .  In o th e r  words,  i t  does not have to  Be s p e c i f i ­
c a l l y  au thorized by s e p a ra te  s t a t u t e .47
In recen t  years  congress has been w i l l i n g  to  pass l e g i s l a t i o n  a u th ­
o r i z in g  the  use o f  publ ic  money fo r  the  work of commissions. One
es t im a te  o f  the most r ecen t  average a p p r o p r i a t io n s  f o r  p re s id e n t i a l
48advisory  commissions i s  $10 m i l l i o n  a y e a r .
P res iden ts  have f u r t h e r  accomodated themselves to congressional 
r e s t r i c t i o n s  on the  use o f  pub l ic  money fo r  funding the  work o f  
commissions by using u n r e s t r i c t e d  funds a v a i l a b le  to them, through 
the Emergency Fund f o r  the P r e s i d e n t ,  the  budget fo r  the  executive  
o f f i c e  and various specia l  p r o j e c t  funds .  While the amount o f  money 
a v a i l a b l e  to p re s iden ts  through t h i s  source i s  l a rge  ($1 b i l l i o n
45
I b i d . ,  p. 142. See a l s o ,  1909, 27 Op. A t ty .  Gen. 459; 1909, 
27 Op A t ty .  Gen. 432; 1909, Op At ty .  Gen. 301, in  31 USCA 673.
46
31 USCA 691, 59 S t a t .  134, to  be d iscussed  below.
^^Wolanin, "P re s id en t ia l  Advisory Commissions," p. 143.
48 Popper,  The P r e s i d e n t ' s  Commissions, p. 7.
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in the  1974 budget) the  demands on i t  a re  a lso  g r e a t .  In 1946 the  
Congress gave the p re s id e n t  a u th o r i ty  to use execu t ive  department 
funds in a f l e x i b l e  manner in the  estab l ishment  and use o f  com­
missions:
Appropriations  of  the  executive  departments and independent 
es tabli shments  o f  the Government s h a l l  be a v a i l a b l e  f o r  the  
expenses o f  committees,  boards ,  o r  o th e r  in te ragency groups 
engaged in  au thor ized  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  common i n t e r e s t  t o  such 
departments and e s tab l i shm en ts  and composed in  whole o r  in 
pa r t  of r e p r e s e n ta t i v e s  th e r e o f  who receive no a d d i t io n a l  
compensation by v i r t u e  o f  such membership; provided, t h a t  
employees of such departments and es tab l ishments  render ing  
serv ices  fo r  such committees,  boards or  o th e r  groups,  o th e r  
than as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  s h a l l  rece ive  no add i t iona l  com­
pensation by v i r t u e  o f  such servi c e s . 49
This a c t ,  obviously ,  muted the e f f e c t  of  the  Russell Amendment. I t
has been i n t e r p r e t e d  by recen t  p re s id en ts  as al lowing them t o  pool
funds and personnel from a v a r i e ty  o f  execut ive agencies /depar tments
fo r  purposes unintended by congress when o r i g i n a l l y  au th o r i z in g  and
appropr ia t ing  the money. As w i l l  be seen below t h i s  was a f a m i l i a r
t a c t i c  o f  the  Johnson adm in is t ra t ion  to  provide funds fo r  a commission
u n t i l  a congress ional a pp rop r ia t ion  was made or  u n t i l  p r i v a t e  funds
became a v a i l a b le .
In 1966, responding to  the  leade rsh ip  of the  a d m in i s t r a t io n ,  the 
congress provided a f i rm  s t a t u t o r y  bas is  fo r  the t h i r d  method used to 
f inance commissions: r e l i a n c e  on au th o r iz a t io n s  t h a t  al low spending 
fo r  inte ragency commissions and c o n s u l t a n t s .  The a c t s  al lowed the 
White House to  pay commission expenses,  per diem f e e s ,  mileaae  and o th e r
4^31 USCA 691.
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t rave l  expenses ,  from funds appropr ia ted  fo r  expenses incurred  by 
executive  a g en c ie s ,  inc luding  the  White House, in h i r i n g  temporary 
exper ts  and c o n su l t an t s .^ ^
From th e  above i t  can be concluded t h a t  the congress ional 
r e s t r i c t i o n s  on p re s id e n t i a l  a b i l i t y  to  fund the  work of  commissions 
i s  su b s ta n t i a l  and respec ted  enough fay the  occupants o f  the White 
House to fo rce  them to  devise  a number o f  ways to q u a l i fy  congressional 
in t e n t .  I t  should be c l e a r  a lso  t h a t  the  s t ru g g le  over control  of 
funds fo r  commissions to a la rge  e x ten t  determines the  a u th o r i ty  o f  
those named; i f  a p r e s id en t  has d i f f i c u l t y  providing funds fo r  a com­
mission ,  or i f  he chooses to acquiesce  to  the  congressional r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  
the  a u th o r i t y  o f  the  commission i s  thereby l im i ted .  On the o th e r  hand 
when the White House aggress ive ly  seeks funds fo r  a commission, p a r t i ­
cu la r ly  when i t  d i r e c t l y  challenges  with  impunity the  i n t e n t  of  con­
g re s s ,  the p r e s t i g e  and a u th o r i ty  o f  the  advisory body i s  enhanced. Also, 
un t i l  the  e s tab l i sh m en t  of  u n r e s t r i c t e d  p re s id e n t i a l  funds the p re s iden t  
had no way to  fund what he regarded as l e g i t im a te  executive  f a c t - f in d in g  
func t ions .
The one way pres idents  can and have avoided d i r e c t  confron ta t ion  
with congress ional r e s t r i c t i o n s  on the  funding of commissions i s  to 
seek p r i v a t e  money. Pres iden t  Hoover was perhaps the  most dedicated 
user  of  t h i s  method. The Wickersham Commission was financed in th i s  
manner and i t  has been r e l i a b l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  Mr. Hoover ra i sed  in 
excess o f  $2 m i l l io n  in p r iv a te  money to  fund the var ious advisory
5O3I USCA 951-53.
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groups which he named during his  time in o f f i c e . R e c e n t  p re s iden ts
have used th i s  device to fund highly v i s i b l e  commissions designed
to s tudy and repor t  on very con t rove rs ia l  and highly complex m a t t e r s .
The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of  Violence (the
Eisenhower Commission) and , as wi l l  be seen ,  the Kerner Commission,
were funded in la rge  p a r t  by money secured from pr iva te  sources .  There
52are obvious advantages to  t h i s  method, as Wolanin points  ou t .  I t  i s  
a way o f  avoiding congressional  r e s t r i c t i o n s .  I t  allows the White 
House to  get  concerned i n t e r e s t  groups deeply involved in  s tudying  the  
problem under considera t ion  with mimimal cos t  to the government, whi le  
leav ing the adm in is t ra t ion  in a p o s i t io n  to reap any b en e f i t s  accru ing  
from the  endeavor. The f a c t  t h a t  such organizations  o f ten  lend s t a f f  
members to the commission in l i e u  of money con t r ibu t ions  can be b e n e f i ­
c i a l  to  a ll  concerned.
F) Commission Membership
In naming members to  a commission the p res iden t  intends to 
accomplish two major p o l i t i c a l  goals ;  the management o f  c o n f l i c t  in 
the contes ted  policy area and the c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  of policy-making 
i n i t a t i v e  and control of  the is sue  in the presidency. In the former.
Marcy, P res iden t ia l  Commissions, pp. 5 and 18 and Galloway 
"P res iden t ia l  Commissions," p. 359. Gal loway provides a char t  d e t a i l i n g  
the costs  of Hoover's commissions.
52Wolanin, "P res iden t ia l  Advisory Commissions" pp. 151-153.
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the p r e s i d e n t ' s  a c t ion  can be d e sc r ib e d  as an a c t  o f  " c i v i l  prudence'" 
in which he uses  the  i n h e r e n t  powers o f  the o f f i c e  t o  move in to  a
5-3
c r i t i c a l  p o l icy  a rea  in  a way designed to  reduce a d d i t i o n a l  c o n f l i c t .
The second goal i s  y e t  an o th e r  i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  the p r e s i d e n t i a l  use of
commissions t o  secure pre-eminence in  na t iona l  po l icy  making. As noted
above, the  naming o f  a commission has become almost a r e f l e x  ac t io n
by p r e s id e n t s  in t h e i r  c on t inu ing  a t tem p t  to  avoid d i f f u s i o n  o f  power
and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  in n a t io n a l  p o l i c y  making. The appointment of an
adv iso ry  commission i s  one way o f  avoid ing the g ran t ing  o f  c a r t e
blanch to p a r t i c u l a r  lo c a l  ves ted  i n t e r e s t s  which pol icy-making  de-
54c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  p rov ides .
Drew l i s t s  th r e e  b a s i c  c r i t e r i a  f o r  s e l e c t i n g  the membership o f  
a p r e s i d e n t i a l  adv isory  commission. Members must b e ,  1) n o n - c o n t r o v e r s i a l ,
2) b i - p a r t i s a n ,  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  and r e s p e c t a b l e ,  3) th e  cha irperson  
s e l e c t e d  must be ab le  and s a f e . ^ ^  In t h i s  con tex t  n o n -co n t ro v e rs ia l  
means a person whose pre-commission membership image and r e p u ta t io n  
w i l l  not d e t r a c t  from the work the  commission i s  given to  do. In 
p o s i t i v e  te rms ,  the  image and r e p u t a t i o n  o f  the  appoin tee  are in tended  
to enhance the  work o f  the  commission.
R epresen ta t ion  i s  i n h e r e n t ly  the  most d i f f i c u l t  o f  the c r i c e r i a  
to meet .  White House o f f i c i a l s  exp ress  p r ide  in  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to
C3
Michael H ar r ing ton ,  Toward a Democratic '.g f t , (New York;
Macmillan,  1968),  p. 305.
54Theodore Lowi, The End o f  L ibera li sm: Ideology,  Policy  and the
C r i s i s  of  Publ ic  O rde r , (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 268.
~^"Orew, "On Giving Oneself  a Hotfoot, "  p.  <17.
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"balance" the membership o f  advisory commissions. Age, s ex ,  reg ion ,  
p a r ty ,  occupa t ion ,  c l a s s ,  are the major v a r ia b le s  always considered 
when a commission i s  appointed.  Yet the  f e a t  of  ba lanc ing ,  when examined 
c l o s e l y ,  r evea ls  tha t  the membership o f  advisory commissions more c lo s e ly  
resembles the White House s t a f f  which appointed them than any v is ion  
of  American p lura l ism the p re s id e n t  and his  a ides  might have had when 
making the appointments.  The membership is  composed o f  persons the 
a d m in is t r a t io n  i s  used to working w i th ;  persons used to  having t h e i r  
advice sought by the White House, oersons  who a re  known and know t h e i r  way 
around W a s h i n g t o n . T h e y  are  members o f  what Wolanin c a l l s  "A com­
mission c l a s s " . A s  such they have p a r t i c u l a r  socio-economic c h a r a c t e r ­
i s t i c s  .
They a re  protected and deprived by so c ia l  p r i v i l e g e .
Moreover t h e i r  usual mode of  a n a ly s i s  i s  l e g a l i s t i c  and 
r a t i o n a l i s t i c .  Not i n t e l l e c t u a l s ,  they  are d ec is ion  makers 
i n t e r e s t e d  in p ro tec t ing  the  r e c o r d . . .There a re  p ra c t i c a l  
l im i t s  to  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  persuading any o f  them to  a 
novel p o s i t i o n . 58
In s h o r t ,  they are  in the main stream o f  the major well defined 
i n t e r e s t s  in American s o c i e t y ;  persons experienced in e s t a b l i s h e d  
p a t t e rn s  of problem solv ing; re form ers ,  not r e v o lu t io n a r i e s  in any 
but  the  most general  sense.  More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  they are  exper ts  in 
some aspec t  o f  the  problem a t  hand and experienced enough in Washington
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations,  
P r e s id e n t i a l  Advisory Committees, Par t  1 and 2, Hearings Before a Sub­
committee of  the Committee o f  Government O pera t ions . 91s t  Cong., 2d 
S e s s . ,  1970, testimony by Thomas D. Cronin,  pp. 187-190. See a lso  Popper, 
P r e s i d e n t ' s  Commissions, pp. 13-20.
57Wolanin,  "P res iden t ia l  Advisory Commissions," pp. 181-182.
^^Jerome H. Skolnick, The P o l i t i c s  o f  P r o t e s t , (New York: B a l l an t in e  
Books, 1969), p. 36.
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to be able t o  help the White House move the  bureaucracy and the re l e v a n t  
p r iv a te  i n t e r e s t  groups to get  things done the way th e  pres ident 
des i r e s .
I t  i s  a common White House poin t of  view th a t  each commissioner 
must rep resen t  a co ns t i tuency  with an e s t a b l i s h e d  concern with the 
problem which ca l l ed  the  commission in to  being. In t h i s  context ,
"to be known by the  White House" means t h a t  the  cons t i tuency  the 
p o ten t ia l  commissioner w il l  rep re sen t  has commanded s u f f i c i e n t  p o l i t i c a l  
a t t e n t i o n  in the  p a s t  fo r  i t  to  have become a c o n s i s t e n t ,  i f  not 
permanent , fac tor  in na t iona l  policy-making regard ing  the is sue  a t  hand. 
The re p re se n ta t io n  o f  novel inexperienced (and th e re fo re  unestabli shed)  
con s t i tu en c ie s  i s  no t  e n te r t a in ed  when making up the po ten t ia l  member­
ship of advisory  commissions by members o f  the  White House s t a f f  and the  
p res iden t  h im se l f .  Commissions are no t ,  however, packed by the White 
House with p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i s a n s . I f  they were,  t h e i r  work could be 
e a s i l y  and quickly  d iscoun ted .  Nor i s  there,  s i g n i f i c a n t  evidence th a t  
commissioners see  themselves as exclus ive  r e p re se n ta t iv e s  of  par ty  o r  
i n t e r e s t - g r o u p s . Rather ,  most see themselves as t r u s t e e s  in the 
Burkean sense o f  the term; they are  t e c h n i c a l l y  and p o l i t i c a l l y  
knowledgeable and experienced persons wi l l i ng  and able  to  serve the 
coimon good, as they see  i t .
The p o l i t i c a l  importance ascr ibed  to  the commission by the White 
House can be gauged by the presence o f  congresspersons in i t s  member­
ship .  Congresspersons would not accept and would not be se r ious ly
59 Popper, P r e s i d e n t ' s  Commission, p.  15.
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considered fo r  membership on a commission perceived to have average 
p o l i t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  Their  presence is  in tended to guarantee 
p o l i t i c a l  a t t e n t i o n  f o r  the commission's work. The ir  presence does 
l i t t l e  to guarantee  l e g i s l a t i v e  a t t e n t i o n  to  the  work o f  the  commission; 
l e g i s l a t i o n  subsequent to the work o f  a commission i s  more a function 
o f  p re s id e n t i a l  support  of  the  f ina l  r e p o r t  than congress ional r e p re ­
sen ta t ion .
A f a c t o r  in the  determination of the  proper balance o f  i n t e r e s t s
in commission membership i s  the  p o te n t i a l  f o r  commissioner and i n t e r e s t
group educa t ion .  Wolanin c i t e s  a candid comment by P res iden t  Hoover
regarding the  p a r t i c u l a r  educat ional  purposes underly ing many of  his
choices f o r  advisory commission membership:
There i s  no more dangerous c i t i z e n  than the person with 
a g i f t  of gab,  a crusading complex and a de termina t ion  to 
"pass a law" as the  an t ido te  f o r  a l l  human i l l s .  The most 
e f f e c t i v e  d ive rs ion  for such an indiv idual to c o n s t ru c t iv e  
action and the g re a te s t  s i l e n c e r  on e a r th  f o r  foo l i shness  
i s  to a s s o c ia te  him on a resea rch  committee with a few 
persons who have a passion f o r  t r u t h  - e s p e c i a l l y  i f  they 
pay t h e i r  own expenses.  I can now d is c lo se  the s e c r e t  t h a t  
I c rea ted  a dozen committees f o r  t h a t  p r e c i s e  p u r p o s e . 60
O f f i c i a l s  o f  more recen t  ad m in is t ra t ions  desc r ibe  t h e i r  motives with
le s s  elegance:
We rub t h e i r  noses into the  problem and bring them along 
with t h e  s o lu t io n s .  H e l l ,  some of them, have never seen 
slums before .  We take them in to  the ghe t tos  and they 
are amazed t h a t  such th ings  can e x i s t .  I t  i s  s u r p r i s in g  
how ra d ic a l  some of them become.61
^^Cited by Wolanin, "P res iden t ia l  Advisory Commissions," p. 2.
^^Norman C. Thomas and Harold L. Wolman, "Policy Formulation in 
the  I n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  Presidency: The Johnson Task Forces ,"  Thomas E. 
Cornin and Sanford D. Greenberg, ed. The P r e s id e n t i a l  Advisory Svstem, 
pp. 135-136.
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Nose rubbing seems not to  be conf ined to  Washington and p re s id e n t i a l  
advisory commissions. Lipsky and Olson record the  following comments 
by Winslow C h r i s t i a n ,  Executive A ss i s t a n t  to Governer Edmund Brown of 
C a l i fo rn ia ,  regard ing John McCone and the  commission (The Governor's 
Commission on the  Los Angeles Riots)  he headed which had the responsi ­
b i l i t y  for  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  the 1964 r i o t  in Watts:
What we needed was to rub the noses of the e s tab l i sh m en t  in 
some unpleasant  f a c t s  in o rde r  to  get  t h e i r  acquiescence in 
and understanding o f  the  changes t h a t  were needed to  deal 
r e a l i s t i c a l l y  with the problems. And the not ion  was t h a t  
McCone was p e rsona l ly  a r a t h e r  conservative  s o r t  o f  man, and 
we accepted t h a t . 62
The goal o f  educating the commissioners i s  best  summarized by Wolanin:
The education o f  commission members has severa l  important con­
sequences. Most obvious ly ,  i t  means t h a t  the  commission member 
who helps shape the findings and recommendations o f  the commis­
sion i s  o f t e n  not the  same man who received th e  c a l l  from the 
White House. ..The usual consequence of  commission education 
seems to be t h a t  more conserva t ive  commission members gain an 
apprec ia t ion  of the ser iousness  o f  the problem and become more 
w i l l ing  to  e n t e r t a i n  innovative p o l i c i e s  and more ex tens ive
governmental i n t e r v e n t io n  The education o f  the  commission
members thus accounts in p a r t  f o r  the  frequency with  which 
commission repo r ts  are unanimous o r  contain on ly  a few minority  
or d i s sen t in g  o p in io n s . . .As a r e s u l t  o f  t h e i r  educa t ion ,  com­
missions members o f ten  become s t ro n g ly  i n t e r e s t e d  in the  sub jec t  
o f - the  commission beyond the dura t ion  of the  commission. . .Thus, 
by educating the commission members, the commission serves  to 
mobilize e l i t e  i n t e r e s t  in the commission's problem and e l i t e  
support  fo r  p re s id en t i a l  sponsored action to  deal with the pro­
blem beyond what the  P res iden t  a t t a i n s  by having t h e i r  name on 
the commission r e p o r t . . . 63
No commission i s  appointed by a p res iden t  w i thou t  some provis ion 
for  rep re sen ta t ion  from the White House. This person i s  o f ten  ca l l ed
^ \ i p s k y  and Olson, MSS, 11-65, fn .  85.
go
"Wolanin,  " P r e s i d e n t i a l  Advisory  Commissions," pp. 20-21.
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"the p r e s i d e n t ' s  man"^^. She/he i s  most o f ten  a commission member, 
but sometimes i s  the execu t ive  head o f  the commission's s t a f f .  Regard­
less  of  the p o s i t i o n ,  the p r e s i d e n t ' s  person knows one o f  h i s /h e r  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  to  be to  keep the  p re s id en t  pe rsonal ly  informed o f  
the commission's a c t i o n s .  More o f ten  than not t h i s  i s  the only means 
by which the p re s id en t  can ga in  r e l i a b l e ,  pe rsona l ,  advance information 
of the c h a rac te r  and content o f  the commission's work and i t s  f i n a l  
r e p o r t .  To function  e f f e c t i v e l y  in t h i s  r o l e ,  the person must be 
able a l so  to serve the cons t i tu en cy  he/she  was o s ten s ib ly  appointed to 
re p re se n t .  I f  such a person begins to  feel  se r ious  s t r e s s  from being 
caught between the p r e s id e n t ,  the  commission and the i n t e r e s t  he /she 
was appointed to  r e p r e s e n t ,  h i s / h e r  value to the  p re s iden t  will  diminish 
accord ingly .  As with the a l l  members of  the commission, there i s  j u s t  
so much pressure  and arm t w i s t i n g  a p re s id en t  can do, even on a person 
who supposedly "belongs" to him. The p re s id en t  the re fo re  r e a l i s t i c a l l y  
expects l i t t l e  more than a flow o f  information from t h i s  person. The 
l im i ted  success of  t h i s  device  i l l u s t r a t e s  another reason why p re s id e n t s  
are cautious  in the appointment and use o f  p re s id e n t i a l  advisory com­
missions .
Why do persons accept appointments to membership on a p r e s id e n t i a l  
advisory commission? The t ime demands a re  g r e a t ,  there  i s  no money in i t .
^“̂ Wolanin, "P re s id e n t i a l  Advisory Commissions," p. 170 and Popper,  
P r e s id e n t ' s  Commissions, p. 21.
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and more often  than n o t ,  the repo r t  i s  not well received by the  
c o n s t i tu en c ie s  o f  th e  indiv idua l commissioners. The commissioners 
themselves give th ree  simple answers to the  ques t ion .  F i r s t ,  they 
feel t h a t  they can "make a d i f f e r en c e"  in the  way the  problem fac ing  
the p re s id e n t  can be reso lved .^^  Second, they r a t i o n a l i z e  t h e i r  a c t ion  
by a f f i rm ing  th a t  they  accepted appointment "to do a job fo r  the 
p re s id en t" .  F i n a l l y ,  the p re s t ig e  o f  the appointment is enough to  
secure most.  Few persons tu rn  down an appointment i f  for  no o th e r  
reason than t h a t  the  nomination i s  a c l e a r  i n d ic a t io n  to peers t h a t  
one has the a b i l i t y  to command the a t t e n t i o n  o f  the  White House. The 
p re s t ig e  of the appointment i s  p o s i t i v e l y  l inked by Wolanin with the 
a b i l i t y  of  the White House to  secure  the be s t  persons ava i lab le  (wi th in  
the l im i t s  s e t  by the  appoin tons ,  and the p o l i t i c a l  system with in  
which they work) f o r  the job .^^
Students of  commissions tend to def ine  commissioner ro le s  in  
terms of the  personal  h i s to ry  which each br ings  to  the task.®^
^^Popper, P r e s i d e n t ' s  Commission, p.  20.
^^Wolanin, "P re s id en t  Advisory Commissions," pp. 68-69.
^^See Lipsky and Olson, MSS, VI, p.  11-13 and Wolanin, "P re s id e n t i a l  
Advisory Commissions," p. 253 fo r  o th e r  commissioner ro le  t y p o lo g ie s .  Both 
are s i m i l a r  to Neil Reimer 's typology o f  l e g i s l a t o r s  in his book The 
Represen ta t ive :  Trustee?  Delegate? P a r i t i s a n ?  Po li t ico?  (Boston: D. C.
Heath,  1967).
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F i r s t ,  commissioners are p o l i t i c a l  persons and as  such a re  aware of  
the  primary i n t e r e s t ,  group o r  i n s t i t u t i o n ,  they are appoin ted to  
r e p r e s e n t .  In t h i s  sense they are c l a s s i c  d e leg a te s .  They re p o r t  
t h a t  they hones t ly  s t r i v e  to r ep re sen t  t h a t  i n t e r e s t  in th e  d e l i b e r a ­
t io n s  o f  the  commission. They know too t h a t  they  wil l  be expected to 
communicate to  t h e i r  cons t i tuency  the  i n t e r e s t s  o f  the p r e s id e n t  and 
those developed by the commission in i t s  d e l i b e r a t i o n s .  F u r th e r ,  
commissioners t r y  to  maintain t h a t  o b j e c t i v i t y  they th ink  worthy of  a 
person w i l l i n g  and able to  help the p re s id en t  "do a job" .  This 
ba lanc ing  a c t ,  the maintenance o f  a semblance o f  equ i l ib r ium  between 
p r iv a t e  and p r e s id e n t i a l  (or publ ic )  i n t e r e s t ,  i s  not d i f f e r e n t  from 
th a t  requ i red  of members o f  cong ress .  This l a t t e r  ro le  i s  b e s t  described 
as t h a t  of a t r u s t e e ,  a r o le  pa t te rn ed  a f t e r  t h a t  descr ibed  by Edmund 
Burke in h i s  L e t t e r  to the E lec to rs  o f  B r i s t o l . The White House in 
appoin t ing  a commission most d e s i r e s  to move commissioner’s from the 
former r o l e  to  the l a t t e r ;  persons o f  the  "commission c l a s s " ,  educated 
by the  White House usually  see the common good to  be t h a t  adhered to by 
the p r e s i d e n t  and become w i l l i n g  to defend i t  ag a in s t  the  narrow concepts 
of  p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  groups.
Second, they are persons possess ing  indiv idual e x p e r t i s e  in 
m at te rs  o f  concern to the p re s id en t  and know t h a t  i t s  e x p l o i t a t i o n  i s  
a major reason f o r  t h e i r  appointment to commission membership. Being 
exper ienced in  Washington p o l i t i c s  they value indiv idual s p e c i a l i z a t i o n .  
Here too  the White House aims a t  balance by naming people who have a
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v a r i e ty  of  claims on techn ica l  e x p e r t i s e .  The commissioner assumes t h a t  
h i s / h e r  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  will  be complimented by those of the  o ther  com­
m iss ioners .  S k i l l s  the  members of the commission do not have they expect 
to be able to ca l l  upon from the  resources of  the  executive  branch of  
the  federa l  government or from the p r i v a t e  s e c t o r ,  o ften  from the bus inesses  
o r  u n i v e r s i t i e s  from which the indiv idual commissioners come. This r e p r e ­
s e n t a t i o n  of  d ive rse  t a l e n t s  i s  a s trong cohesive  f a c to r  in the l i f e  o f  a l l  
success fu l  commissions. This f a c t  helps to  exp la in  why the  White House 
s t a f f  members express so much concern fo r  "balance" and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ­
ness in commission membership. I f  some major i n t e r e s t  o r  t a l e n t  neces­
sary  to unders tanding the su b jec t  mat te r  i s  omitted or  denied the com­
mission ,  the p r e s i d e n t ' s  d e s i r e  for a unamious r e p o r t ,  acceptable  to him, 
is  h ighly  p rob lem at ic .^^
The t h i r d  ro le  i s  t h a t  o f  having a cont inu ing  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  the  
work of the commission. Most commissioners w i l l i n g l y  accept a re spons i ­
b i l i t y  fo r  educa t ing ,  or shaping, the views o f  t h e i r  cons t i tuen ts  con­
cerning the i s sues  before  the commission. Such a ro le  comes very 
n a t u r a l l y  to the kind of person se lec ted  to  membership on advisory 
commissions. I f  such persons a re  to  r e t a i n  the  leade rsh ip  pos i t ions
Wolanin, "P res iden t ia l  Advisory Commissions," pp. 255-256, sees  
a v e r i t y  of  ta sk  leade rsh ip  functions  developing throughout the  l i f e  of 
the  commission. They f a l l  on d i f f e r e n t  members o f  the commission a t  
d i f f e r e n t  t imes depending on the commission's mandate,  the  p o l i t i c a l  con­
t e x t  in which the  commissions f ind themselves and the  t a l e n t s  av a i l ab le  
w i th in  the commission and i t s  s t a f f .
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which gave them the s t a t u r e  and p o l i t i c a l  v i s i b i l i t y  to  be s e l e c ted  
fo r  commission membership in the f i r s t  p la ce ,  they must p re sen t  them­
selves to t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n t s  as the persons bes t  informed about the  to ta l  
scope o f  the  pol icy  i s sue  considered fay the commission on which they 
served.
The four th  dimension Is more I n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  than the  o th e r s .
Lipsky and Olson note  t h a t  the ro le s  commissioners play a re  condi t ioned  
by t h e i r  previous exper iences  and observa t ions .  This I s  too obvious 
to be labor .  I t  I s  well  to note ,  however, t h a t  t h i s  is  another  major 
reason fo r  the  White House concern fo r  balance and I t s  d e s i r e  to 
"rub the  noses" o f  most the  commissioners in to  f a c t s  ou ts ide  those 
individual p a t te rn s  o f  experience and observation .
The p res iden t  names the chairperson  o f  most commissions a t  the  
time the  commission I s  appointed.  These leaders  play a s p e c i f i c ,  i f  
unspec tacu la r ,  ro le  on most commissions. The chairperson is  not always 
the most i l l u s t r i o u s  of  the members named by the p r e s id e n t ,  but is  
always one in whom the  p re s iden t  has g re a t  confidence,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
as a consensus b u i l d e r ,  socia l  and ta sk  leader .  The production of  the 
commission's r e p o r t ,  in ad d i t io n ,  i s  almost always the most s e r io u s  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  l a id  on the  chairperson .  He shares the  mechanical p a r t  
of t h i s  ta sk  with the  executive d i r e c t o r  of the s t a f f ,  but the  p o l i t i c a l  
ta sk  o f  holding the  commission to g e th e r  and g e t t in g  a unanimous repo r t  
favorable to the p re s id e n t  is  t h a t  o f  the  chairperson .  The p o l i t i c s  of  
producing such a r e p o r t  i s  h i s / h e r s .
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G) The Commission S t a f f
The s t a f f  members o f  most commissions are  organized on a simple th ree  
component adm in is t ra t ive  system: 1) the  executive  d i r e c t o r ,  and an
a s s o c i a t e  and a s s i s t a n t  d i r e c t o r ,  2) the  subord ina te  s t a f f  (p ro fess iona l  
and c l e r i c a l )^  3) ad hoc c o n s u l t a n t s . ^ ^  Of the  t h r e e ,  the  execut ive 
s t a f f  i s  the  most important.  Executive d i r e c t o r s  are u s u a l ly  secured 
by the chairperson  of the  commission with the concurrence o f  the o th e r  
members and with the approval o f  the  White H o u s e . T h e y  a re  h i red  more 
f o r  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  and a d m in i s t r a t iv e  e x p e r t i s e  than any technica l  
competence in the area under s tudy  by the commission. T h e i r  usual 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  include mediating between the members o f  the  commission 
and the  s t a f f ,  keeping the White House informed o f  the progress o f  the  
work o f  the commission, doing r o u t in e  executive  tasks  and shar ing  with  
the  cha i rper son  of the commission the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  fo r  th e  production 
o f  the  f i n a l  r e p o r t .  When th e re  i s  t ro u b le  with a commission the 
p re s id e n t  i f  most l i k e ly  to turn  to  the commissioner in  whom he has the 
g r e a t e s t  confidence; his White House s t a f f  w il l  most l i k e l y  turn  to the 
execu t ive  d i r e c t o r .
^^Popper, P r e s id e n t ' s  Commissions, p. 21-23.
^^Wolanin, in his "Pres iden t  Advisory Commissions," p. 23 p resen ts  
evidence of  the  White House tak ing  a v igorous ,  but hidden hand in  the  
s e l e c t i o n  o f  executive  d i r e c t o r s .  He repo r t s  t h a t  four teen  of the  execut ive  
d i r e c t o r s  o f  the  commissions he s tu d ie d  had very c lose  t i e s  to the White 
House p r i o r  to  t h e i r  appointments.
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The s i z e  of the  membership o f  the  commission w i l l  have l i t t l e  to
do with the s i z e  o f  the  s t a f f b u t  the s i z e  o f  the  s t a f f  o f  a
commission is  d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  to  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  importance.  P res iden ts
who make a l a rge  p o l i t i c a l  investment in a commission secure  the
means to  enable  i t  to  have an adequate  s t a f f .  A v a r i e t y  o f  devices
are  used to  accomplish t h i s ;  s t a t u t o r y  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s ,  as p o s s ib le
72and necessary w i l l  be secured;  execut ive depar tm ents /agenc ies  and 
p r iv a te  i n s t i t u t i o n s  with  an i n t e r e s t  in the  pol icy  i s su e  to  be s tud ied  
wi l l  be tapped fo r  commissioner and s t a f f  p e rsonne l ;  in d i r e c t  r a t i o  to 
the  p o l i t i c a l  importance of  the commission, the p re s id e n t  and his s t a f f  
wil l  secure  the  c o n t r ib u t io n  of  se rv ices  from those  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  p o l i ­
t i c a l  g e n e r a l i s t s  from Washington law firms who have c lo se  p o l i t i c a l  t i e s  
with  the  a d m in i s t r a t i o n .  Indiv idual members of the  commission always 
claim the r i g h t  to name members to  the s t a f f .  This in su re s  a balanced poli ­
t i c a l  c h a r a c te r  to the  commission’s s t a f f .  Despite a l a rg e  co n t r ib u t io n  to 
the c rea t ion  o f  the  s t a f f  o f  advisory  commissions t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  evidence
t h a t  the  various  a d m in i s t r a t i o n s  have t r i e d  to e x p l o i t  t h i s  p o l i t i c a l
73in f luence  as a way of  e x e r c i s in g  control  over  commissions.
The average commission has a small s t a f f ,  a s i t u a t i o n  d ic ta t e d  by 
lack  o f  money and time and the charac te r  o f  the work the  commission has 
to  do. Most commissions opera te  on very small budgets ,  are  given a 
very sho r t  per iod o f  t ime in  which to do t h e i r  work, and seldom know
'^Popper,  P r e s i d e n t ' s  Commissions, p. 21.
^^See Sec t ion  d ,  pp. 66-69.
73
Wolanin,  " P r e s i d e n t i a l  Advisory Commissions,"  p.  183.
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what kind o f  work w i l l  be required u n t i l  well a f t e r  the s t a f f  i s  secured.  
These f a c to r s  d i c t a t e  the f i l l i n g  o f  the  s t a f f  with  g e n e r a l i s t s ,  most 
often  law yers ,  who are  f l e x i b l e  in t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to  take on work on 
sh o r t  n o t i c e  in such an environment. F u r the r ,  because commissions i n e v i ­
t ab ly  come in to  be ing in the midst o f  some kind o f  perceived c r i s i s ,  
take  form and begin t h e i r  work very q u ic k ly ,  academic s p e c i a l i s t s ,  who 
are t i e d  by a c o n t r a c t  to  t h e i r  i n s t i t u t i o n  through a given academic y e a r ,  
a re  o f ten  precluded from a p lace  on the  s t a f f  except as ad hoc c o n su l t a n t s ,  
A s p e c i a l ,  a l b e i t  b r i e f ,  word needs to be added concerning soc ia l  
s c i e n t i s t s ,  a unique group of  ad hoc c o n su l t an t s  to  p re s id en t i a l  
advisory commissions whose presence and work has s t i r r e d  some con­
t ro v e rsy  w i th in  the academic c o m m u n i t y . W h i l e  the  problem as r e l a t e d  
to the  Kerner Commission wil l  be d e a l t  with  below, i t  i s  important to 
in d ic a te  the  general na ture  o f  the problem here:  Lipsky s t a t e s  i t  we l l :
. . . j u s t  as commissioners were s e l e c t e d  by the  p re s id en t ,  in 
p a r t  to  r e p re se n t  d ive rse  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s ,  so the presence of 
so c ia l  s c i e n t i s t s  on the s t a f f  provides  the  impression t h a t  
r e l e v a n t  p r o f e s s io n a l s  were consu l ted  and u t i l i z e d .  (The 
c o n t r ib u t io n s  o f  the  soc ia l  s c i e n c e s ) . . .  a re  reduced to 
th ree  modes: sy n th es iz in g  e x i s t i n g  re sea rch  and developing 
new theory  according to conven t iona l ,  p rofess ional  r a t e s  and 
methods o f  work; o r  conducting o r i g i n a l  resea rch  or developing 
new theory  with  compromises o r  work procedures  co n s i s ten t  with  
the  needs o f  commission schedu les .  Most commissions u t i l i z i n g  
soc ia l  resea rch  adopt the f i r s t  mode. . .  organize work around yr 
educa t ing  commissioners and a f f i rm ing  e x i s t i n g  data and th eo ry .
^^See pp. 369-376 below.
^^Michael Lipsky,  "Social S c i e n t i s t s  and the  Riot Commission," 
The Annals 394 (March 1971), p. 22.
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H) Commission Independence
How independent of the P res iden t  of the  United S ta te s  can 
p r e s i d e n t i a l  a d v iso ry  commission be? P a rad o x ica l ly ,  the  answer i s  
l e s s  than some commissioners,  many s t a f f  members and s tuden ts  of the 
problem would l i k e ,  but more than p res iden ts  and t h e i r  s t a f f  members 
d e s i r e .  The means of  p r e s i d e n t i a l  control  of the  work of a commission 
are few but e f f e c t i v e .  Commissioners, being exper ienced p o l i t i c a l  a c t o r s ,  
are very aware of th e  general  e f f e c t  on a l l  p a r t s  of the p re s id e n t i a l  
advisory  system of  h is  power and determination to  s e t  p o l icy  goals 
and be the i n i t i a t o r  o f  the various  means necessa ry  fo r  t h e i r  accomplish­
ment. Thus the  p o l i t i c a l  common sense of the  commissioners t e l l s  them 
t h a t  any e f f o r t s  a t  independent ac t ions  would be r e s i s t e d  by the White 
House. The p r e s id e n t  has ways of thwarting commission independence.
F i r s t ,  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  of commissioners i s  th e  major ing red ien t  in 
a p r e s i d e n t ' s  c o n t ro l  over th e  work of the  commission. A p res iden t  i s  
not l i k e l y  to a p p o in t  persons to  commissions who have what he perceives  
as records  of maverick  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n . W h i l e  a common s t ra tegy  in 
naming commissioners i s  to appoin t some who a re  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of 
known oppos i t ion  t o  p r e s i d e n t i a l  po licy  g o a l s ,  no p r e s id e n t  names a
Johnson 's  naming of soc ia l  and i n t e l l e c t u a l  maverick Eric Hoffer 
to the  Violence Commission i s  c o n s i s t e n t  with t h i s  hypothes is .  Hoffer,  
on the  i s su e  of  domest ic  v io lence  from the  p o l i t i c a l  l e f t ,  which the 
ad m in is t r a t io n  f e a r e d ,  was a maverick to Johnson 's  l i .keing.
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majori ty  o f  his opponents to a commission. More p o s i t i v e l y ,  al though
commissioners are s e l e c te d  for t h e i r  r e p r e s e n ta t i v e n e s s ,  p r e s t i g e ,  and
77e x p e r t i s e ,  and not t h e i r  m a l l e a b i l i t y ,  the  f a c t  t h a t  they are 
se le c ted  by the p re s id en t  fo r  purposes he des igns ,  s e t s  ser ious 
l im i t s  on t h e i r  independence.  More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  the  p res iden t  appoints  
the members o f  the  commission in a p a r t i c u l a r  public  p o l i t i c a l  contex t 
and gives them a mandate fo r  t h e i r  work. These ac t ions  obviously define 
the  boundaries o f  t h e i r  a c t i v i t y .  No p r e s id e n t i a l  commission f e e l s  f ree  
to  wander very f a r  from the problems def ined  fo r  i t  by the p res iden t  
in his mandate. Pres iden ts  are carefu l  in i s su ing  such mandates to 
de legate  only so much a u th o r i ty .  Mandates are always framed in i s su e -  
s p e c i f i c  terms and commissioners r e sp ec t  them fo r  what they are -  
the  l i m i t s  w ith in  which the p res iden t  expects them to  work. When they 
are  c as t  b road ly ,  as was the Kerner Commission's,  th e  White House 
expects some independence.
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Wolanin, "P res iden t ia l  Advisory Commissions," p.  158. I t  i s  worth 
noting here Marcy's contention th a t  independence i s  d i r e c t l y  c o r re la ted  
with the  p re s t i g e  o f  the commissioners; the  lower the  s t a t u re  of  the 
commissioners the  l e s s  independent the  commission [P re s iden t ia l  Commissions, 
p. 25).  P a radox ica l ly ,  the grea t  e f f o r t s  to  c rea te  balanced, r e p re se n ta t iv e  
commission membership, so prized by White House a id e s ,  may be counter­
productive  when weighed by the s tandard  o f  independence.  Cronin found, 
in studying advisory  educational counci l s  in  the  Department o f  Health 
Education and Welfare ,  the more broadly  r e p re se n ta t iv e  bodies to  be the more 
independent: " . . .  the  more p re s t ig ious  and e l i t i s t  a council i s  the more 
i t  is l i k e l y  to be an e f f e c t iv e  c r i t i c  and to  bring ex ternal  in f luence  to 
bear on agency p ro b le m s . . . "  (Committee on Governmental Operations,  P r e s id e n t i a l  
Advisory Committees, p. 195). This dual capac i ty  t o  focus informed pubTic 
opinion and e x p e r t i s e  on the problem under study by these advisory council s  
appears to  coun te r  Yehezkel Dror's c la im t h a t  rep resen ta t iveness  and e x p e r t ­
ness a re  incompatible  and counter -product ive  v i r t u e s  in policy-making bodies 
(Publ ic  Policy Reexamined [San Francisco: Chandler Publ ishing  Co.,  1968]p.irr
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Fu r th e r ,  as d i s cu s sed  in Sect ion D above, a commission i s  depend­
ent on the p r e s id e n t  f o r  funds ,  and often f o r  s t a f f  pe rsonnel .  The 
s k i l l f u l  manipu la t ion  o f  th e se  scarce  resources  can bring r e b e l l i o u s  
ad hoc advisory  groups to  hee l .  Commissioners do n o t  accep t  appointment 
with  the thought of a prolonged s t ru g g le  with the p r e s i d e n t  in mind.
Such a s t r u g g l e ,  i f  d e s i r e d ,  can be c a r r i e d  on b e t t e r  in ano ther  c o n tex t .  
In the  p r e s i d e n t i a l  adv iso ry  commission the o v e r r id in g  d e s i r e  i s  to  ge t  
on with the  job  a ss ig n ed  by the  p re s id e n t ,  pub l ish  th e  r e p o r t  and r e tu r n  
t o  the  "normal" work from which the  members have come. In s h o r t ,  the  
p o l i t i c a l  con tex t  which led to  the  c re a t io n  o f  the  commission and the  
s e l f - p e r c e p t i o n  of  the  t a sk  brought to i t  by the commissioners and the 
environment c r e a te d  by the p r e s id e n t  leave l i t t l e  room f o r  r a d i c a l  indep­
endence on the  p a r t  of  the  commissioners.
There i s  ev idence ,  however, of some commission independence.  Two
major recen t  examples c f  what th e  White House regarded  as "run-away"
commissions a re  th e  pornography and higher educa t ion  commissions.  In
each case the  commission followed the  path d i c t a t e d  by the  informat ion
i t  ga thered ,  and wrote a r e p o r t  which was p o l i t i c a l l y  unacceptable  to
the  a d m in is t r a t io n  re c e iv in g  i t .  In each case  the  a d m in i s t r a t io n
rece iv ing  th e  r e p o r t  ignored i t  because i t  did  no t  f i t  i n t o  the po l icy
78plans  being p ro je c ted  in the  a rea  of commission concern.
78 In the  case  o f  the  Pornography Commission th e  r e p o r t  was received  
by an a d m in is t r a t io n  which did not  appoin t i t  and which t r i e d  to  in f luence  
the  c h a rac te r  of i t s  r e p o r t  by adding to  the  commission's  membership 
before  i t s  p u b l i c a t i o n .  When the  Nixon White House f a i l e d  by these  
means to change th e  a n t i c i p a t e d  substance of  i t s  r e p o r t  i t  simply ignored 
the  commission and i t s  work.
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Most White House a ides  agree wi th  the  comment made to  Wolanin by 
one Johnson s t a f f  member, "When you e s t a b l i s h  a commission, th e re  i s  
l i t t l e  you can do but grin  and bear  i t , " Y e t  th e re  i s  a l eg i t im a te  
concern among a l l  p r e s id e n t i a l  adv iso rs  over the number o f  commissions
on
t h a t  "turn  around and b i t e  your ass . . . "  f o r  i t  is they  who fee l  
the wrath of  the  p re s id en t  who f e e l s  betrayed by a t r u l y  run-away 
commission.
Various f a c to r s  c o n t r ib u te  to the  a b i l i t y  o f  commissions t o  be
reasonably f r e e ,  i f  not run-away, from close  White House c o n t ro l .  In
g enera l ,  the commission members are  p o l i t i c a l l y  wise persons ,  highly
81motivated to  do well in such a p o l i t i c a l  e n v i r o n m e n t .  They know 
how to  touch a l l  the p o l i t i c a l  bases in  ga ther ing  support  fo r  t h e i r  
f indings  and recommendations. F u r th e r ,  they know how to  c rea te  a 
cl imate  conducive to  the adoption o f  a repor t  when they  know they are  
in the process o f  producing one which i s  a t  var iance  with  White House
op
d e s i r e s .  As descr ibed  above, they take  t h e i r  t o t a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
with g re a t  s e r i o u s n e s s ,  fee l ing  the in format ion they a re  ga ther ing 
is  important and needs to be fed i n to  the p r e s id e n t i a l  advisory system. 
Being exper ienced Washington p o l i t i c i a n s  they know t h a t  a c e r t a in  d i s ­
tance from the White House is  necessary  i f  t h e i r  job i s  to  be done
7 0
Wolanin, "P res iden t ia l  Advisory Commissions," p. 185. 
GOlbid. ,  p. 196.
^"*Marcy, P r e s id e n t i a l  Commissions, p. 25.
qo
Wolanin, "P res iden t ia l  Advisory Commissions," pp'. 364-366.
go
“■Popper, P r e s i d e n t ' s  Commissions, p.  16.
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well and received  in the  most favorable  p o l i t i c a l  l i g h t  throughout the 
government. Such exper ience  a l so  enables them to  recognize  and r e s i s t  
p o l i t i c a l  p ressu re  when i t  i s  app l ied .
Because they a re  a homogenous group, the commissioners on a p o l i ­
t i c a l l y  con troversa l  adv iso ry  body tend to  pull t o g e t h e r ,  transcending 
parochial  concerns to  suppor t  what they see to  be the  t r u t h  in the a rea  
under i n v e s t ig a t io n  and to  r a l l y  support  to  head o f f  excess ive  congres­
s ional or White House p re s s u r e .  Their  v i s i b i l i t y ,  p r e s t i g e  and, in 
gen e ra l ,  widespread publ ic  support  as an independent body deal ing  with 
a s e n s i t i v e  po l icy  i s su e  provide the p o l i t i c a l l y  t e n d e r  commissions 
with  a more than adequate  b u f f e r  ag a in s t  undue o r  unseemly in te r fe rence  
from the  White House.
There are in a d d i t i o n  a va r ie ty  o f  r easons ,  indigenous  to the
s t r u c t u r e  and work o f  White House p o l i t i c s ,  why the  White House cannot,
84even i f  i t  d e s i r e s  t o ,  con tro l  a commission.
F i r s t ,  in most cases  the  White House i s  not a t  a l l  c e r t a in  what 
kind o f  rep o r t  i t  wants from the commission. The appointment o f  a 
commission in tends  a t  l e a s t  to  preclude congress ional ac t ion  and pre ­
serve p re s id e n t i a l  i n i t i a t i v e .  Beyond t h a t ,  a s p e c i f i c a l l y  desired  
White House course of  a c t i o n  i s  s t a t e d  in  very general  te rms, a t  bes t .  
In t h i s  con tex t ,  most appointments are  s in ce re  e f f o r t s  by the  pres ident  
to  obta in  some help in  c h a r t in g  a new course of a c t i o n .
84The fo l low ing  i s  in d e b ted  to  Wolanin,  " P r e s i d e n t i a l  Advisory
Commissions,"  pp. 190-193,
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Second, i f  the  p re s iden t  i s  to get  t h a t  kind o f  d irec tion  or  
obta in any o f  the  goals s e t  out in  Section B, above, the  l i f e  and work 
of the  commission must have c r e d i b i l i t y  and i n t e g r i t y .  A Truman aide 
s t a t e d  i t  well in noting t h a t  n o n - in te r f e r en ce  " is  the best way to  
get  a s t rong  enough re p o r t  to be h e l p f u l . T h i r d ,  the  White House 
simply cannot t w i s t  enough arms to  s e r io u s ly  change the  d i rec t ion  a 
commission may be moving. F in a l ly ,  the  White House has ne i ther  the  
re so u rce s ,  the  i n c l i n a t i o n ,  nor the  need to  a ttempt to "fix" a commission. 
I f  they have appointed well there  is  no need. But i f  the commission i s  
c l e a r l y  a run-away and a t h r e a t  to  the  p re s id e n t  the purgatory o f  
Washington p o l i t i c s  wi l l  be i t s  f a t e  i t  and i t s  work will  be ignored.
The p r e s id e n t  w i l l  then tu rn  to o th e r  ways a v a i l a b le  to  him to accomplish 
his purposes ,  o r  to  o th e r  m a t te r s .
GSlb id . ,  p. 191.
CHAPTER I I I  
RIOT COMMISSIONS: A UNIQUE GENRE
A) In t roduct ion
Riots  are  f am i la r  s u b je c t  matter for the s tu d en t  o f  American 
urban hi s t o r y J  Common in t h e i r  frequency, varying in i n t e n s i t y  and
m u l t i - v a r i ab l e  in cause and e f f e c t ,  they have been c a r e f u l l y  chron-
2
ic led s ince  the period immediately preceding the re v o lu t io n .  To 
paraphrase H. Rap Brown's nov/ proverbial  s ta tement about  American 
v io lence,  urban r i o t i n g  is  as American as apple p ie .
Common with th e  urban r i o t s  of  the  tw ent ie th  cen tu ry  has been the 
equally common o f f i c i a l  response to them of appoin t ing  "blue ribbon"
For the purposes of the  d iscuss ion in t h i s  c h a p te r ,  " r io t "  is 
defined as spontaneous,  c o l l e c t i v e  v io lence,  c a r r i e d  out over a 
r e l a t i v e l y  sh o r t  per iod of time in an urban co n tex t  by p r iva te  in d iv i ­
dua ls ,  d i r e c t e d  a g a in s t  o th e r  p r iv a te  persons and/o r  the  l e g a l ly  
c o n s t i tu t e d  government and /or  t h e i r / i t s  p roper ty ,  the  contro l  of  which 
demands use of the  po l ice  power of  the  s t a t e .
2
A r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  l i s t  d e t a i l i n g  our t r a d i t i o n  o f  domestic urban 
d isorder  and v io lence  would include,  as a minimum, the  events c o n s t i t u t ­
ing the  Boston Massacre, th e  pro and a n t i - a b o l i t i o n  d iso rde rs  which 
plagued many American c i t i e s  from the Jackson ad m in is t r a t io n  u n t i l  the  
Civil War, the d r a f t  r i o t s  o f  the Civil  War per iod ,  the labor  manage­
ment d i so rd e r s  fo llowing the  i n d u s t r a l i z a t i o n  of  the  n a t io n ,  and the 




panels  o f  c i t i z e n s  charged with the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of i n v e s t ig a t i n g  the  
causes  o f  the  r i o t s  and presenta tion of suggested ways to prevent  such 
f u t u r e  occur rences .  Most of  these  adv iso ry  groups have been empaneled 
by mayors and governors ,  the o f f i c i a l s  charged with the immediate 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  co n t ro l l in g  and ex p la in ing  the r i o t s .  P l a t t  
regards  the  appointment of such groups by s t a t e  and local governments 
as a p r e d i c t a b l e ,  ro u t in e  response t o  c i v i l  d i s o rd e r s . ^  They a r e ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  unique in t h e i r  commonness. Because of  t h e i r  use 
by a l l  l e v e l s  of government, students o f  adv isory  commissions have 
begun to see them as useful a ides  in understanding a l l  ad hoc advisory  
commissions as po l icy  makers and for t e s t i n g  various  hypotheses about 
t h e i r  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  and impact on t h e i r  p a r t i c u l a r  policy making process,
3
R io t ing  has been a major concern of four of the major pos t -  
World War I I  p re s id e n t i a l  advisory commissions : the  P r e s id e n t ' s
Commission on Law Enforcement and Admin is tra tion  o f  J u s t i c e ,  1967,
(The Crime or  Katzenbach Commission) the  Kerner Commission, 1968, 
the  National Commission on the  Causes and Prevention of Violence ,  1969, 
( the  Violence o r  Eisenhower Commission), and the  P r e s id e n t ' s  
Commission on Campus Unrest ,  1970, (The Scranton Commission). The major 
s t a t e  and local  r i o t  commissions usually d iscussed  in the l i t e r a t u r e  
a r e  the  Chicago Commission on Race R e la t ions  (1919),  the Mayor's 
Commission on Conditions in Harlem (1935),  the  Governor's Committee 
to  I n v e s t i g a t e  Rio t  Occurring in Detro i t  (1943),  Governor 's Commission 
on The Los Angeles Riots (1965).  For a l i s t  o f  r i o t  commissions some­
what d i f f e r e n t  from the above see Anthony P l a t t ,  " In t ro d u c t io n ,"  in 
Anthony P l a t t ,  e d . .  The P o l i t i c s  of Riots Commissions, (New York:
C o l l i e r  Books, 1971),  pp. 8-9.
^ I b i d . , pp. 5-6.
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F u r th e r ,  as P l a t t  has shown, examination of r i o t  commissions allows 
us to b e t t e r  unders tand  the  evo lu t ion  of the r e l a t i o n s h i p  of  the  soc ia l
5
sc iences  to the  governmental policy-making process .  R io t commissions 
and the re sea rch  they  genera te  a re  the major source o f  da ta  fo r  
government o f f i c i a l s  r e sp o n s ib le  f o r  developing p o l i c i e s  f o r  p reven t ion  
and con t ro l  of f u t u r e  d i s o r d e r s . ^  F in a l ly ,  r i o t  commissions a r e  an 
analogous,  and in many cases  i so m e t r i c ,  model to which the  p r e s i d e n t i a l  
adv iso ry  commission can be compared fo r  purposes of b e t t e r  under­
s tan d in g .^
B) A D e f in i t io n
Rio t commissions can be defined as " . . .  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  t r i b u n a l s ,  
f inanced  and/or  supported by a governmental body, e s t a b l i s h e d  
tem pora r i ly  to i n v e s t i g a t e  and expla in  s p e c i f i c  o u tb u r s t s  o f  i l l e g a l
p
c o l l e c t i v e  v io le n c e  by p r i v a t e  c i t i z e n s ,  no tably  b l a c k s . "  Their
^ I b i d . ,  p ,  7.
^This p re s e n t s  socia l  s c i e n t i s t s  working on r i o t  r e l a t e d  problems 
fo r  commissions and o th e r  government agencies with s e r io u s  re sea rch  
problems, as sha l l  be seen.
^Obviously, f o r  th i s  e ssay ,  such a n a ly s i s  is  necessa ry  f o r  a 
b e t t e r  unde rs tand ing  of the  Kerner Commission. Analogous,  but p e r i ­
pheral va lues  r e a l i z e d  by s tudying r i o t  commissions a r e  i n s i g h t s  in to  
the  work of the B r i t i s h  Royal Commission, an i n s t i t u t i o n  possess ing  
many of  the  f e a t u r e s  of  the  American r i o t  commission.
^ P l a t t ,  " I n t r o d u c t i o n , "  p .  4.
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membership p r o f i l e  is  made-up o f  m id d le -c la ss ,  middle-aged (average age ,
54.3 y e a r s ) ,  whi te  (70 percent)  males (9.4 pe rcen t ) ,  57 percent o f  whom
were lawyers and approximately two- th i rds  of whom were,  a t  the time of
t h e i r  appointment,  o r  had r e c e n t ly  served a s ,  e lec ted  or employed
government o f f i c i a l s . ^  In s h o r t ,  they rep resen t  the  e s t a b l i s h e d
a u th o r i t y  and values o f  t h e i r  communities.  Thus, i f  the r i o t  under
co n s id e ra t io n  by a given commission was a p o l i t i c a l  express ion of
f e l t  g r ievance  a g a in s t  the  e s t a b l i s h e d  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c tu r e s  of
the community, the judges o f  the v a l i d i t y  of the complaint  were
members o f  the  group which was the ob jec t  of the a c c u s a t i o n . F a c e d
with a sho r tage  of t ime and resources (a s i t u a t i o n  endemic to r i o t
commissions) the  commissioners are  presented with a choice between
mutually incompatible  opt ions ;^^  make as o b je c t iv e  a r ep o r t  as
p o s s ib le ,  desc r ib in g  the r i o t  in  terms the sub jec t s  as well as the
o b je c t s  o f  th e  event w il l  unders tand but which runs the se r ious  r i s k
12of  being r e j e c t e d  by both; d e l iv e r  a p o l i t i c a l l y  acceptab le  re -
Among the  twenty-s ix  black commissioners who have served on r i o t  com­
missions between 1917-70 only f i v e  were a c t iv e  in c i v i l  r ig h t s  o rg an iza ­
t io n s  (the  NAACP and the Urban League). I b i d . ,  pp. 12-17.
^^See th e  d i scuss ion  o f  c i v i l  d iso rders  below, pp. 104-111.
^^See th e  d iscu ss io n  of  the  "commission problem," below, pp. 99-102.
12e . g .  the  r e p o r t  of the  Chicago Commission on the Race R e la t io n s ,  
1919, which has become a model of o b j e c t i v i t y  fo r  such bodies.  Governor 
Frank Lowden o f  I l l i n o i s  appointed s ix  white members who themselves 
r e c r u i t e d  an equal number o f  black members, ra i sed  most of  t h e i r  own 
funds,  h i red  a t e c h n i c a l l y  competent s t a f f ,  produced a p o l i t i c a l l y  
unacceptable  r e p o r t  which was ignored by c i t y  and s t a t e  o f f i c i a l s .
I t  was e v en tu a l ly  published-Chicago Commission on Race R e la t ions ,
The Negro in  Chicago: A Study of Race Rela tions  and Race Riot
(Chicago: U n iv e r s i ty  o f  Chicago Press ,  1922).
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p o r t  which 1) condemns a c t s  o f  v io lence  2) seeks  to exp la in  t h e i r
causes  wi th in  the  e s t a b l i s h e d  values and p r a c t i c e s  o f  the s o c ie ty  and
3) which recommends a c t io n  to maintain law and o rder  and soc ia l  j u s t i c e ,
The d e s i r e  to modify s l i g h t l y  the  s t a tu s -q u o  is  thus combined with a
d e s i r e  to in su re  t h a t  th e re  wi l l  be no reward f o r  the  r i o t e r s  and th a t
p r e - r i o t  co n d i t io n s  w i l l  be co r rec ted  ( in  the  e s t a b l i s h e d  way) in such
a manner t h a t  the  s i t u a t i o n  w i l l  not r e p e a t  i t s e l f .  At b e s t ,  t h i s  type
o f  o f f i c i a l  response  to r i o t s  is  symbolic p o l i t i c s  of  the  kind which
re a f f i rm s  and a t tem pts  to  s o l i d i f y  the  e s t a b l i s h e d  values  of  the
community while r e j e c t i n g  both the form and co n ten t  o f  a cha l lenge  to
13them presen ted  by the  p a r t i c i p a n t s  in the  d i s o r d e r .  Given the  ta sk  
a ss igned  and the  personnel and f i n a n c ia l  resources  provided, i t  i s  not 
s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  few r i o t  commission r e p o r t s  address themselves to the  
under ly ing  causes  o f  urban r a c i a l  v io lence  and few fundamental reforms 
have been proposed.
C). The Commission Problem
All r i o t  commissions s u f f e r  from th r e e  seemingly inescapable  
c o n d i t io n s  inhe ren t  in t h e i r  na ture  which s e r i o u s l y  l i m i t s  t h e i r  e f f e c ­
t i v e n e s s  by allowing t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  c r e d i b i l i t y  to be compromised.
1) The l i m i t a t i o n s  imposed by t ime and resources
2) How to develop commission i n t e g r i t y  (and th e r e f o r e  
c r e d i b i l i t y )
3) How to  develop commission leg i t im acy  (and th e re fo re  
c r e d i b i l i t y )
^ ^ P l a t t ,  " I n t r o d u c t i o n , "  p.  16
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Lipsky and Olson r e f e r  to t h i s  dilemma as "the commission problem"
The amount of time a v a i l a b l e  to a r i o t  commission to in v e s t ig a te  
and r e p o r t  on i t s  p a r t i c u l a r  s e t  of circumstances never seems adequate 
to the major p a r t i c ip a n t s  in i t s  d a i ly  l i f e  and work — commissioners, 
s t a f f  members and c o n su l t an t s .  A r i o t ,  being a spontaneous event,  is  
soon over and public  a t t e n t i o n  is  immediately concerned with control 
o f  any such f u tu r e  event.  Appointing o f f i c i a l s  and commissioners,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  see time as the  most precious commodity they possess i f  
they in tend in  any way to develop a comprehensive i n v e s t ig a t io n  into 
the causes of the  r i o t  as well as make proposals fo r  fu tu re  contro l .
This i s  a p a r t i c u l a r  concern heard and recorded by Lipsky and Olson from 
those members o f  r i o t  commission s t a f f s  and consu l tan ts  whose "normal" 
occupation is  t h a t  of a soc ia l  s c i e n t i s t ^ U s e d  to longer periods o f  
t ime f o r  da ta  c o l l e c t i o n ,  a n a l y s i s ,  r e f l e c t i o n  and w r i t ing  they were 
v i r t u a l l y  unamious in express ions  of concern over the  lack o f  time 
a v a i l a b le  to do what they regarded as the  minimum amount of work 
necessary  to provide government o f f i c i a l s  and the public  with the kind 
of r e p o r t  which would be, in t h e i r  terms,  useful both as an a id  to 
understanding and deal ing with  the problems a t  hand.
The resources  fo r  doing the job a re  also in sh o r t  supply for 
most r i o t  commissions. Only the four na tional r i o t  r e l a t e d  commissions 
mentioned above^® had the s t a f f  and f in a n c ia l  resources to do the job
^^Lipsky and Olson, MSS, I I I ,  pp. 15-18.
T̂ Ibid.
^^The Crime, Kerner, Violence and Scranton Commissions.
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p a r t i c i p a n t s  and observers  f e l t  to be necessary.  This n iggard ly  
a l l o c a t i o n  of  human and f i n a n c i a l  resources  is  the s t ro n g e s t  evidence 
which can be mustered to j u s t i f y  the  charge t h a t  the naming o f  r i o t  
commissions cannot be deemed a s e r io u s  e f f o r t  by s t a t e  and local  o f f i ­
c i a l s  to understand in  any depth the dynamics o f  the causes o f  the  
d i s o r d e r s ,  t h e i r  e f f e c t s  o r  the prospects for t h e i r  c o n t r o l .
The second ing red ien t  in  the  Lipsky-Olson "commission problem"
(the d i f f i c u l t y  in developing commission i n t e g r i t y )  i s  obviously  re la ted  
to  the  f i r s t .  The time needed to  bring together the i n t e r e s t s  and 
o b je c t iv e s  represented  by th e  commissioners,  the  s t a f f  and the  advisory 
system within  which they f i n d  themselves ,  is  usual ly  g r e a t e r  than th a t  
which is a v a i l a b l e .  Working under the pressures  c rea ted  by an urban 
r i o t  members of r i o t  commissions and t h e i r  support  s t a f f s  f ee l  they 
need more time to  i n t e g r a t e  the various  facets  of t h e i r  work in order 
to  produce more than a s u p e r f i c i a l  repor t .
Time and a v a i l a b le  r e s o u rc e s ,  a b i l i t y  to i n t e g r a t e  and give 
d i r e c t i o n  to i t s  component i n t e r e s t s  and ob jec t ives  c re a te s  fo r  the 
r i o t  commission i t s  t h i r d  problem: the d i f f i c u l t y  in developing
p o l i t i c a l  legit imacy. A r i o t  commission can g ran t  and /or  withhold 
leg i t imacy to the  persons and groups involved in the d iso rde rs  only i f  
i t  has been able  to ob ta in  i t  f o r  i t s e l f .  As with p r e s id e n t i a l  
advisory  commissions, p o l i t i c a l  legit imacy fo r  r i o t  commissions is 
dependent as much on the i n t e n t  ( inhe ren t ly  d i f f i c u l t  i f  not impossible 
to  d isce rn  and evalua te) and support  (much e a s i e r  to measure) o f  the 
appointing a u th o r i ty .  The t im e ,  resources  and q u a l i ty  o f  appointments 
made to the r i o t  commission toge ther  with the mandate ana support  pa t te rn s
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developed throughout i t s  l i f e s p a n  are  the key v a r i a b l e s  in determining 
the  p o l i t i c a l  legit imacy of i t s  work. In developing the  "commission 
problem" Lipsky and Olson have given us a useful conceptual tool 
f o r  unders tanding r i o t  commissions.
0) The P res id en t  and Urban Riots
Urban r i o t s  have presented a v a r i e ty  of p o l i t i c a l  problems to
American p re s id en ts .  The pres idency has few d i r e c t  l i n e s  o f  p o l i t i c a l
access  to the  problem. P res id en t ia l  a c t i v i t y  in urban r i o t s  is
complicated  by the c o n s t r a in t s  placed on i t  by th e  f ede ra l  ch a rac te r
o f  American government. Pres iden ts  have gotten  involved in two general
ways in  what i s  genera l ly  considered to be a s t a t e  and local govern- 
17mental concern.  F i r s t ,  p r e s id e n t i a l  a c t io n  is  demanded when 
such d i s o r d e r s  c l e a r l y  v io l a t e  federa l  law. Such circumstances occur 
when the  r i o t  is  d i r e c ted  a t  and s p e c i f i c a l l y  endangers fede ra l  persons 
a n d /o r  p roper ty  or  i s  in v io l a t i o n  of the  orders  of  a federa l  cour t .  
Second, the  White House has become d i r e c t l y  involved in these  local  
m a t te r s  when i t  has been perceived th a t  the power and resources  of the 
f e d e ra l  government have to be placed between the contending p a r t i e s  in 
the  r i o t  because local  resources  have proven to be inadequate and local
^^This d iscuss ion  is  indebted to Bennet t  M. Rich, The Pres idents  
and C iv i l  Disorder,  (Washington; The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n ,  1941),
pp. 212-216.
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1 8a u t h o r i t i e s  have requested  na t iona l  help.
The most common f i r s t  level  o f  p re s id e n t i a l  involvement in the
circumstances of  a r i o t  has been as policeman: the  r e s t o r e r  o f  c i v i l
o rde r .  His a c t i o n s  a r e  usua l ly  d i rec ted  toward conf ining and ending
the r i o t  by the use o f  e i t h e r  n a t iona l ized  u n i t s  of  the  s t a t e ' s
na t iona l  guard o r  by the  use of  federal  t roops .  The r e s t o r a t i o n
of o r d e r ,  once p r e s id e n t i a l  a c t ion  is  deemed l e g a l ly  necessary  and
p o l i t i c a l l y  unavoidable ,  has been the only goal most p re s id en t s  have
been wi l l i ng  to e n t e r t a i n .  Pres iden ts  have p re fe r red  not to a c t  beyond
e f f o r t s  to contro l  the  r i o t ,  and have been r e l u c t a n t  to  recommend much
federa l  a id ,  to the  personal and property v ic tims of the r i o t .  They
wish to avoid any appearance th a t  the p re s id en t  was "rewarding" the
behavior  o f  the r i o t e r s ,  and to r igorous ly  avoid any p rec ip i to u s
c ross ing  o f  the  boundary s ep a ra t in g  federal  from s t a t e  and local  r e s p o n s i -
1 0
b i l i t i e s .  This r e lu c tan ce  is  one of the primary reasons fo r  th e  app o in t ­
ment of  na t iona l  advisory commissions to i n v e s t ig a t e  and r e p o r t  on the 
various forms of  r i o t s  and the o th e r  forms o f  domestic v io lence  e x p e r i ­
enced in the  post  World War I I  period.  The commission, a t  the  very 
l e a s t ,  could buy time and provide  valuable informat ion th a t  would keep
1 O
The sending o f  para t roopers  to D e t ro i t  in the summer o f  
1967 a f t e r  Governor Romney conceded th a t  h is  resources were incapab le  
of c o n t r o l l i n g  the r i o t  in  t h a t  c i t y  is  an example. A more e l a b o r a t e  
d iscuss ion  o f  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  in c id en t  i s  undertaken in  the  c o n te x t  of 
the a n a ly s i s  of the  Kerner Commission in Chapter 6, pp. 184-201.
^"Rich ,  P r e s i d e n t s  and C iv i l  D i s o rd e r s ,  p. 219.
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the  p res iden t  from being put in to  a s i t u a t i o n  which could be in te rp re te d  
as rewarding r i o t e r s  or  local  governments fo r  what the White House 
in e v i ta b ly  i n t e r p r e t e d  as inep t  management of  local  a f f a i r s .
E) Riot Commissions and the  Causes of Riots
There have been a number of r e c e n t  s tu d ie s  of  the causes ,  c h a r ac te r ,
and in te n t  o f  the  1960s'  r i o t s  conducted independently of the presidency
and any of i t s  major commission e f f o r t s  to ga ther  data  on and i n t e r p r e t  the
same events .  These s tu d ie s  shed l i g h t  on the work of the p re s id en t i a l
r i o t  commissions. The work of  Robert Fogelson and James Q. Wilson is
20th e  most he lpfu l in i n t e r p r e t i n g  the  o f f i c i a l  responses  to r i o t s .
Fogelson c l a s s i f i e s  those American r i o t s  which have rac ia l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  as e i t h e r  race  r i o t s  or  c iv i l  d i s o rd e r s ;  the former 
a r e  those which are  c l e a r l y  i n t e r - r a c i a l  (u su a l ly  whites a t tack ing  
b lack s ) ,  very v i o l e n t  to persons,  and re a c t io n a ry  in  the sense of being 
a ttempts  ( l a r g e ly  unsuccess fu l )  a t  mainta ining the  rac ia l  s ta tus-quo .
20See a l s o :  Lipsky and Olson, MSS; Robert M. Fogelson, Violence 
As P ro te s t ,  (Garden C i ty ,  N.Y.: Double Day, 1971); James Q. Wilson,
"Why Are We Having a Wave of  Vio lence ,"  New York Times, May 19, 1968,
VI, p. 23; Robert J .  McNamara, S . J . ,  "The Ethics o f  Violent 
D issen t ,"  Proceedings of  the  Academy o f  P o l i t i c a l  Science XXIX (Ju ly ,  1968) 
140-145; Allan A. S i l v e r ,  "O ff ic ia l  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of Racial Rio ts",  
Proceedings of the  Academy o f  P o l i t i c a l  Science XXIX (Ju ly ,  1968) 146-158; 
H.L. Hieburg, P o l i t i c a l  Violence: The Behavioral Process (New York:
S t .  Martins P r e s s 7 1969,)'.
105
Civil d i s o r d e r s ,  on the o ther  hand, a re  defined by Fogelson, as being 
i n t r a - r a c i a l  (b lacks  cen te r ing  t h e i r  wrath on persons and property  
within  the black g h e t to ) ,  d i rec ted  more a t  property  than persons and as 
se l f -consc ious  e f f o r t s  a t  p o l i t i c a l  p r o t e s t  by blacks d i re c ted  a t  a 
changing s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  order which they perceive  as a negative
21condit ioning  f a c t o r  in t h e i r  individua l and corpora te  ex i s t ence .
Wilson i m p l i c i t l y  accepts Fogelson's dichotomizat ion o f  rac ia l
r i o t s ,  but takes  a broader view of  the  t o t a l  problem by ca tegor iz ing
22urban r i o t s  as e i t h e r  ins trumental  or  express ive .  He, th e re fo re ,
places Fogelson 's  race r i o t s  in to  h is  ins trumenta l  category  along
with th e  d r a f t  r i o t s  of  the  n ine teenth  centu ry  and the  labor-management
vio lence  of  the  tw en t ie th ;  these  instrumenta l  r i o t s  a r e  ac t ions  aimed
a t  changing a very s p e c i f i c  public  or  quas i -pub l ic  s e t  of  circumstances
( i . e .  the  d r a f t  laws and the a b i l i t y  of  workers to organize  and bargain
c o l l e c t i v e l y ) .  Wilson 's  "express ive  r i o t s "  ca tegory  i s  very c lose
to Fogelson 's " c i v i l  d i s o r d e r s . "  Wilson sees the urban ra c ia l  violence
of the 1950s and 1960s as p o l i t i c a l  behavior which gives express ion to
a p a r t i c u l a r  p o l i t i c a l  s t a t e  of mind (in  t h i s  case ,  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n
with s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  s t a t u s ) ;  i t  is  a form of play,  an i n t r i n s i c a l l y
s a t i s f y i n g  exper ience ,  a s e l f  i n t e g ra t in g  a c t i v i t y  fo r  those who
23p a r t i c i p a t e  in the  r i o t s .
21 Fogelson, Violence as P r o t e s t , pp. 21-25.
Z^Wilson, "Why," p. 24.
po
For a d i s cu s s io n  of play f i t t i n g  t h i s  model see  Robert Neale, 
In Pra ise  o f  PI a y , (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).
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McNamara expla ins  the urban vio lence  of the  1960s in terms of
24t r a d i t i o n a l  j u s t  war theory.  He descr ibes  the  black American as 
viewing the  e s ta b l i sh e d  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  as e x p l o i t a t i v e  
and h im /he rse l f  as v ic t imized .  Black r i o t e r s  see  t h e i r  v io l e n t  p ro te s t  
as having a reasonable  chance to succeed; the e s tab l ishm ent  may reduce 
the level o f  aggress ion and e x p lo i t a t i o n  i f  the c o s t  to them can be 
ra i sed  high enough by the r i o t e r s .  All o the r  public  remedies f o r  t h e i r  
v i c t im iz a t io n  are seen as progressing too slowly.  F in a l ly ,  blacks  
seeking red ress  through violence see the  goal as being worth the  
personal and property  co s t  i t  exacts from them.
Nieburg draws an analogy between urban r i o t s  in the United Sta tes  
and the Von Claswitz theory o f  war, by saying t h a t  the r a c ia l  r i o t s  of 
the  1960s were e s s e n t i a l l y  p o l i t i c a l  p ro te s t s  c a r r i e d  out by o th e r  means 
when t r a d i t i o n a l  p a t t e rn s  of p o l i t i c a l  ac t ion  became in c re a s in g ly  unpro­
duc t ive  o f  r e l i e f  from the socio-economic d ep r iva t ion  experienced by
pc
ghetto  b lacks .  In th i s  argument Nieburg is  in e s s e n t i a l  agreement 
with Fogelson 's  theme of violence as p r o t e s t .
The most important co n t r ibu t ions  made by the  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of  the 
r i o t s  of the  1960s sketched above has been to chal lenge  e x p l i c i t l y  in three  
ways the  conventional wisdom (held by e lec ted  o f f i c i a l s  as well as members 
of the r i o t  commissions) concerning the  o r ig in  and purpose of American
9Ù.
McNamara, "Ethics  of Violent D issen t ,"  p. 143. His th ink ing  
roughly follows t h a t  o f  Fogelson ( c iv i l  d i so rde r )  and Wilson 
(express ive  r i o t s ) .
Nieburg,  P o l i t i c a l  Vio lence,  p. 17.
r i o t  behavio r
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F i r s t ,  r i o t s  a re  not c i t y - s p e c i f i c ,  but systemic in cause 
2.1and e f f e c t ;  the  " f l a sh - p o in t "  which s e t  a given r i o t  in motion 
may have been c i t y - s p e c i f i c ,  but the express ions  of r e l a t i v e  depr iva­
t i o n  by the  r i o t e r s  as well as more o b je c t iv e  c r i t e r i a  fo r  measuring 
bas ic  socio-economic causes could be found in each o f  the urban 
c en te r s  exper ienc ing  a r i o t .  Second, these  s tud ie s  have conclus ively  
shown t h a t  the  p a r t i c i p a n t s  in recen t  r i o t s  are  not the r i f f - r a f f  
o f  s o c ie ty .  The p r o f i l e s  of  the p a r t i c i p a n t s  in a l l  the major c iv i l  
d i so rd e r s  from Watts through the Washington D.C. r i o t s ,  which came in 
the wake o f  the  murder of  Dr. Martin L. King, J r . ,  developed by a 
v a r i e t y  o f  s c h o la r s ,  members and non-members of s t a t e  and local commis­
s io n s ,  d i s p la y  persons re p re se n ta t iv e  of  the social-economic-educational
po
norms, or s l i g h t l y  h igher ,  of the community.
F i n a l l y ,  the  work of  Fogelson and Wilson d i s c r e d i t  the conven­
t iona l  view o f  urban r i o t s  as being sense less  ac ts  devoid of  logic  or
p çr
For examples of  the  conventional view see Violence in the City - 
An End or a Beginning? ( the  r e p o r t  o f  the Governor's  Commission on the 
Los Angeles Riots [The McCone Commission]}, Report For Action 
( the  r e p o r t  o f  the Governor 's  (flJ) S e le c t  Commission on Civi l  Disorders ,  
Trenton, N. J .  1968). See a lso  the d iscuss ion  of P res id en t  Johnson's 
speech to th e  I n te rn a t io n a l  Associa tion of  Chiefs o f  Po l ice ,  below 
p. 315.
^^Lipsky and Olson, MSS, I ,  pp. 14-16.
Z ^ I b i d . ,  I. pp. 23-25.
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29reason,  a t  b e s t ,  and having common criminal i n t e n t  a t  worse. The 
pos i t ion  descr ibed  here as  conventional wisdom does not deny the  need 
fo r  socia l  j u s t i c e  f o r  b lack ghetto  r e s id e n t s ;  i t  does deny those 
persons any r i g h t  to use c i v i l  d i so rd e r  as a means to t h a t  end. All 
o f f i c i a l  responses  to the  c i v i l  d i so rde rs  of the  1950s and 1960s agreed 
with the New Je r sey  Governor ' s  Commission Report which summarized i t s  
f ind ings  by saying:
The i l l u s i o n  i s  t h a t  f o r c e  alone wil l  so lve  the problems 
but ou r  s o c ie ty  cannot d e l iv e r  on i t s  promises when t e r r o r  
s t a l k s  the  s t r e e t s ,  and d i so rd e r  and lawlessness  t e a r  our 
communities a p a r t .  No group of  people can b e t t e r  themselves 
by r i o t i n g  and breaking laws t h a t  are  enacted for  the b e n e f i t  
and p ro te c t io n  o f  everyone. Riots must be condemned. The 
c a rd in a l  p r i n c i p l e  o f  any soc ie ty  is  law and o rder .  I t  i s  
v i t a l  to  a l l .  Without i t  no one wil l  succeed or endure. The 
primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  government toward a th rea tened  r i o t  
o r  mass v io lence  is  prompt and f i rm  a c t io n ,  ju d ic io u s ly  app l ied  
and s u f f i c i e n t  to  r e s t o r e  peace and order .
At the  same t ime ,  we recognize  t h a t  in the  long run law and 
o rder  can preva i l  only in the condi t ions  o f  socia l  j u s t i c e .
Law enforcement in our  country i s  n e i the r  designed nor equ ip­
ped to  deal with massive u n re s t .  Our po l ice  es tabli shments  
should not be fo rced  i n to  the r o l e s  of armies of occupat ions .  
There fore  r e a l i t y  demands prompt ac t ion  to solve the long- 
neg lec ted  problems o f  our c i t i e s .  Inherent in these  problems 
i s  the  v i ru s  of seg reg a t io n .
E f fo r t s  to  te rm ina te  "unlawful" r i o t  behavior dominates the  
o f f i c i a l  responses  to the  urban r i o t s  o f  the p a s t  t h i r t y  y e a r s .  Lipsky
2QThe conventional wisdom concerning r i o t s  def ines  "cr iminal"  
in two m utua l ly  in c lu s iv e  ways. 1) a n t i - s o c i a l ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in 
v io l a t i o n  o f  s t a t u t o r y  law, and 2) n o n - p o l i t i c a l  (while the re  may 
be p o l i t i c a l  consequences t h e r e  was no admission of  s e l f - co n sc io u s  
p o l i t i c a l  i n t e n t  on the  p a r t  o f  the  r i o t e r s ) .
Report f o r  Action,  p. XII I .
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and O lson 's  "commission problem" has been the major c o n t r i b u t o r  to th i s  
narrow re sponse ;  lack  of time and adequate  resources  to s tudy the 
problem under ly ing  th e  d i so rde rs  have le d  a l l  r i o t  commissions to a 
s i n g u l a r  concern with  contro l  o f  the  immediate d iso rde r  and the
c r e a t i o n  of  a so c ia l  e thos  in  which i t  cannot be repeated.  I t  i s  fo r
t h i s  reason t h a t  Lipsky and Olson see  th e  primary "American e l i t e
response  to  be to  a t tem pt  to reduce the  frequency and to con d i t io n  the
31publ ic  p e rc e p t io n  of the  r i o t s " .  The r i o t  commission composed as i t
always has been o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  t h a t  e l i t e  is  a primary agen t  in the
32 *f u l f i l l m e n t  o f  t h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  Lipsky and Olson see  the 
o f f i c i a l  response  to r i o t s ,  inc luding  th e  r e p o r t s  of r i o t  commissions 
a s  having t h r e e  components:
"1) The c o s t s  o f  the r i o t i n g  must be r a i s e d  beyond t o l e r a b l e  
l i m i t s  to the  r i o t e r s .
"2)  Reduce the ex ten t  to which r i o t  events a re  perceived as 
r e l a t e d  to rea l  gr ievances  and s t r a t e g i e s  designed to 
a ch ie v e  r e d r e s s .
" 3 )  Reduce the sense o f  g r ievance  over the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of
va lues  or the  process by which the values are d i s t r i b u t e d " .  "
^^Lipsky and Olson, MSS, I ,  pp.  5-6 .
3 2 The p o l i c e ,  c h e r r a t io n a l  guard,  the  c o u r t s  and the  e lec ted  
o f f i c i a l s  o f  the  r i o t  a f f l i c t e d  community are  the  o the r  s i g n i f i c a n t  
primary a gen ts .
'^“'Lipsky and Olson, MSS, I ,  p . 5.
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All r i o t  commission rep o r t s  r e f l e c t  these  th ree  ways of eva lua t ing  
the nature  o f  the  r i o t s .  All begin t h e i r  work and t h e i r  r ep o r t s  with 
an i n v e s t ig a t io n  of the outbreak and recommendations f o r  i t s  c o n t r o l ,  
followed by recommendations fo r  d i f f e r e n t  t r a in in g  techniques in r i o t  
contro l  fo r  the police  and the na t iona l  guard and the f i r e  depar tment,  
fo r  upgrading the  firepower of the  po l ice  and the na tional guard,  
fo r  expanded physical  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  d e ten t io n  and in c a r ce ra t io n  o f  
r i o t  a r r e s t e e s ,  fo r  s treamlined methods of  processing  a r r e s t e e s  through 
the ju d i c i a l  system, fo r  improved communications systems, and f o r  
the leve l s  of control  of the  media needed during the d i so rd e r .  They 
then explain  the  outbreak as the  product  of the " r i f f - r a f f "  o f  so c ie ty  
or a criminal conspiracy.  F in a l ly ,  as with the New Jersey  Commission, 
they make recommendations designed to r e l i e v e  the immediate p re s su re  of 
r e l a t i v e  socia l  and economic d ep rav i ty  f e l t  by the r i o t e r s .
Thus the o f f i c i a l  response does not acknowledge the r i o t s  as 
expressive of c i v i l  p r o t e s t  in Fogelson 's  and Wilson 's terms. The 
substance of the  key quest ion posed by s tuden ts  of  the  r i o t s  o f  the 
1960s represen ted  above - "Were the  r i o t s  in any sense conscious 
p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n s ,  designed to achieve  rea l  p o l i t i c a l  gain a t  the  
expense of the  dominant p o l i t i c a l  e l i t e ? "  - is  denied from the beginning.
The r i o t s  may have been spawned by i n j u s t i c e ,  but acknowledgement 
o f  conscious p o l i t i c a l  i n t e n t  by the  r i o t  p a r t i c i p a n t s  was r e j e c t e d  by 
a l l  o f  the  r i o t  commissions when they began t h e i r  work. Such an 
approach to the problem th e re fo re  precludes  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  reaching 
any accomodation between the r i o t e r s  and the  e s tab l i shed  p o l i t i c a l
I l l
a u t h o r i t i e s ;  when the socia l  a c t i v i t i e s  of  a minor ity  group, p a r t i c u l a r ­
ly  one standing ou ts ide  the p o l i t i c a l  e s tab l i shm ent ,  are c l a s s i f i e d  
as criminal by the  es tab l i shed  a u th o r i t y ,  i t  is  v i r t u a l l y  impossible
fo r  the  t r a d i t i o n a l  p a t te rn s  of p o l i t i c a l  accomodiation, bargaining
34and compromise to take place.  By accepting th e  premise t h a t  the r i o t e r s  
have no conscious p o l i t i c a l  i n t e n t ,  the  r i o t  commissioners f ind  them­
se lves  in the  p o s i t io n  of  ru le r s  imposing order on a criminal segment 
of  the  populat ion; they cease being democratic p o l i t i c i a n s  a ttempting 
to accomodate p o l i t i c a l  d i f fe rences  through bargaining and compromise 
in an e f f o r t  to resolve  c o n f l i c t .  When on the o the r  hand, commissioners 
seek to cons ider  the  r i o t  a c t i v i t y  as conscious p o l i t i c a l  p r o t e s t  ac t ion  
( e .g .  the Scranton and the Kerner Commissions) they in ev i tab ly  encounter 
the  f r u s t r a t i o n s  and l im i t a t i o n s  of the  "commission problem"; the lack 
of  time and resources  make i t  v i r t u a l l y  impossible to pursue th i s  
l i n e  of  in qu i ry ,  depending as i t  does on la rge  q u a n t i t i e s  of both.
In such circumstances ,  the r i o t  commissioners f i n i s h  t h e i r  task 
personal ly  f r u s t r a t e d  with t h e i r  work and a disappointment to the 
o f f i c i a l s  who appointed them.
F) The P o l i t i c a l  Fa i lu re  of S ta te  and Local Advisory Commissions
There i s  agreement in the work reviewed thus fa r  th a t  s t a t e  
and local r i o t  commission have f a i l e d  in two ways: f i r s t  as devices
"^Lowi, End of Liberalism, p. 300.
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fo r  th e  r e d u c t io n  o f  the  frequency and i n t e n s i t y  of  urban r ac ia l  
d i s o r d e r s  and, second, as ins truments  f o r  enaol ing  s t a t e  and local 
o f f i c i a l s  to  begin and mainta in  the  im i ta t iv e  in the  c r e a t io n  o f  publ ic  
po l icy  designed to a f f e c t  the r i o t s  and the c o n d i t io n s  which creased 
them.
There a r e  th ree  general  exp lana t ions  f o r  t h i s  f a i l u r e  which can 
be e x t r a c t e d  from the l i t e r a t u r e .  These commissions commonly f a i l  
because:
1) S t a t e  and local  r i o t  commissioners and th o se  o f f i c i a l s  
who appo in t  them misunderstand the p o l i t i c a l  ch a rac te r  
of  the  v io lence  a s s o c ia te d  with the  r i o t s .
2) Such commissions car ry  o u t  t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  in an 
environment in  which p o l i t i c a l  am bigu i t ie s  a r e  more pro­
nounced than American p o l i t i c a l  a c to r s  a r e  used to .
35Whether or  not th e y ,  to g e th e r  with non-commission e f f o r t s  to 
exp la in  and co n t ro l  r i o t s ,  have provided an i n t e l l e c t u a l  resource 
in unders tand ing  and c o n t r o l l i n g  c i v i l  d i so rd e r s  is  ano ther  matter .  
The assumpt ion here  is  t h a t  they have, but the  development of the 
p o in t  cannot be at tempted here.  What should be unde r l ined  a t  th i s  
p o in t ,  however, is  the i n a b i l i t y  o f  s t a t e  and loca l  r i o t  commissions 
to compete with  a p re s id e n t  determined to have a hand in the c r e a t io n  
o f  th e  p o l i c y  surrounding  urban c i v i l  d i s o rd e r s  in  t h e i r  community. 
The p r e s i d e n t i a l  r i o t  commission i s  a va luable  p o l i t i c a l  resource 
f o r  a c h ie f  execu t ive  determined to  mainta in  n a t io n a l  dominance over 
the se  types  o f  local  problems by no t  only  'pre-empting the f i e l d  from 
the  c o n g r e s s ,  and some o f  the  fed e ra l  depa r tm en t /ag en c ie s ,  but a lso  
from th e  e l e c t e d  s t a t e  and local o f f i c i a l s .
The fo l lowing  d i s cu s s io n  can be applied  to p r e s i d e n t i a l  adv i ­
sory commissions under one s e t  o f  c o n d i t io n s .  The th re e  fac to rs  
d i scussed  a r e  f a t a l  to p r e s i d e n t i a l  advisory  commissions when the 
appo in t ing  p r e s id e n t  withdraws some or  a l l  h is  su p p o r t  f o r  i t s  
work an d /o r  r e p o r t .
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3) Such r i o t  commissions i n e v i t a b l y  s u f f e r  from s t ru c tu ra l  
and o r g a n iz a t i o n a l  problems which a re  major co n t r ib u t io n s  
to  t h e i r  f a i l u r e .
The f i r s t  o f  the  congeni ta l  weaknesses c o n t r ib u t in g  to the
p o l i t i c a l  f a i l u r e  o f  these  r i o t  commissions is  obvious when Fogelman's
concep t  of  c i v i l  d i s o rd e r  i s  r e c a l l e d .  The d i s t i n c t i o n  between i t  and
37convent ional  wisdom about r i o t s  i s  not s e l f  e v id en t .  Because they
see  r i o t  v io le n c e  as a p e r io d i c ,  i l l e g a l  behavior p a t t e rn  engaged in  by
d e v ia n t  and u n r e p r e s e n ta t i v e  persons,  r i o t  commissioners a re  unable
to  comprehend v io lence  as ex p re s s iv e  p o l i t i c a l  behavior  (Wilson)
38designed to  t e s t  and cha l lenge  what th e  r i o t e r s  regard as the symbols
39o f  t h e i r  o p p re s s io n .  The im p l i c a t io n s  of  t h i s  f a i l u r e  become more 
obvious when A r e n d t ' s  i n s i g h t s  a re  a p p l i e d .  She sees v io lence  as a 
weapon to which p o l i t i c a l  re formers  h i s t o r i c a l l y  turn  when the goals  
o f  t h e i r  r e fo rm a t io n  a re  unachieved an d /o r  perceived as unachievable."^^ 
As long as th e  conventional wisdom exempts exp ress ive  p r o t e s t  as a 
p o s s ib l e  e x p la n a t io n  f o r  r i o t  v io le n c e ,  and as long as r i o t  commissions 
r e p r e s e n t  the persons and groups c r e a t i n g  and s u s ta in in g  the  con­
ven t iona l  wisdom, the  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e n t  of c i v i l  d i so rde rs  wil l  be
^^Skoln ick ,  P o l i t i c s  o f  P r o t e s t , pp.  33-34.
^"Nieburg,  P o l i t i c a l  V io lence , pp. 124-125.
~^Lowi, End o f  L ib e ra l i s m , pp. 206-207.
^^Hannah Arendt,  "R ef lec t ions  on Violence ,"  New York Review 
o f  Books 12 (February  27, 1969):30.
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ignored and the per im ete rs  w i th in  which p o l i t i c a l  s o lu t io n s  to  urban 
r a c i a l  problems can be achieved w i l l  be severe ly  c o n t r a c te d .
The second general  reason fo r  the f a i l u r e  of  these  r i o t  commis­
s ions  i s  t h a t  r i o t s  c r e a t e  a p o l i t i c a l  environment d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  
to  which most e l ec te d  public  o f f i c i a l s  and commissioners a re  accustomed. 
The sp o n tan e i ty  o f  the  events  o f  a r i o t ,  t h e  u n c e r t a in t y  about  the  
amount o f  suppor t  i t  has,  (and th e r e f o r e  a consequent concern fo r  i t s  
t e n u r e ) ,  the  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  and l o g i s t i c a l  demands made in  what i s  
e s s e n t i a l l y  a p a r a - m i l i t a r y  o p e r a t io n ,  the  general  confusion  over i t s  
meaning f o r  the  p o l i t i c a l  f u t u r e  of  e l ec te d  o f f i c i a l s  and the general 
f u t u r e  of  the  community, a l l  blend to produce a s e r i e s  of d ec i s io n  
making s i t u a t i o n s  unique in th e  p o l i t i c a l  exper ience  o f  a l l  p a r t i c i ­
pants  in the  a f f e c t e d  system. The r i o t  commissioners placed in  the 
c e n t e r  o f  t h i s  storm f ind  i t  d i f f i c u l t  to :  1) de termine a l l  t h a t
i s  expected o f  them, and by whom and 2) determine how to accomplish 
i t  even i f  purpose and expec ta t io n  can be a s c e r t a i n e d .  T he re fo re ,  
they f ind  t h a t  t h e i r  appointment r a i s e s  a s e r i e s  of o f f i c i a l  and publ ic  
ex p ec ta t io n s  which a re  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  them to  meet; p o l i t i c a l  events  tend 
to  move very ra p id ly  during and fol lowing a r i o t ;  o f f i c i a l s  f ind  the 
development o f  pub l ic  po l icy  in t h i s  con tex t  not only  complica ted ,  but 
f r a u g h t  with  general  and personal p o l i t i c a l  dangers.  Riot commis­
s io n e r s  most o f t e n ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  f ind  themselves between an anxious 
and un ce r ta in  group o f  public  o f f i c i a l s  and an angry ,  sometimes 
t e r r i f i e d ,  and c e r t a i n l y  confused p u b l ic .  Such a s i t u a t i o n  i s  a 
zero-sum game with  the  commissioners on the  los ing  s id e  of  the  equa t ion .  
Within t h i s  c o n tex t  the  c r i t i c i s m  t h a t  r i o t  commissions have a b u i l t -
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i« tendency to "white-wash” o f f i c i a l  handling o f  the  d i s tu rb a n c e ^ !
42t h a t  they a l l  tend to produce the same kinds of r e p o r t s ,  and t h a t  
they a re  unequal in the s t r u g g le  with the i n t e r e s t  groups which have 
a s take  in the publ ic  policy  developed in th e  p o s t - r i o t  pe r io d ,  a re  
obvious ly  j u s t i f i e d .  The tendency to white-wash and make s i m i l a r  r e ­
por ts  can be c r e d i t e d  to the f a c t  t h a t  these advisory  bodies e x i s t  in 
s im i la r  p o l i t i c a l  environments;  urban r io t s  a re  more systemic  than 
c i t y - s p e c i f i c  in c h a rac te r .  That kind of environment produces s i m i l a r  
a c to r s  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e s  not inc l ined  to ch a l l en g e  the  
e s t a b l i s h e d  p a t t e r n  of making recommendations by advocating s i g n i f i c a n t ,  
immediate,  implementable changes in public p o l i c y .  In a d d i t i o n ,  
because o f  the  c r i s i s  atmosphere in which they work and the  s h o r t  
period o f  t h e i r  ex i s t en c e ,  th e se  r i o t  commissions must r e l y  on the  
support  o f  t h e i r  appointing o f f i c i a l s ,  and th e  p re s t ig e  of the  
ind iv idua l  commissioners f o r  a u t h o r i t y  and l e g i t im a c y  in the  po l icy  
making s t r u g g l e  between the var ious  i n t e r e s t  groups competing f o r  
p o s i t io n s  o f  d e c i s iv e  in f luence .  In t h a t  t e n s e  and p o l i t i c a l l y  
ambiguous environment,  r i o t  commissioners g e n e r a l ly  f in d  t h e i r  p re s t ige  
of l im i t e d  value in the s t ru g g le  to obtain and hold the  i n i t i a t i v e  in  
the policymaking s t ru g g le .  Unlike p re s id en t i a l  adv isory  commissions, 
s t a t e  r i o t  commissions,  a r e g u la r  and p red ic tab le  response  by s t a t e  and 
loca l  o f f i c i a l s  to a s i t u a t i o n  o f  c i v i l  d i so rd e r ,  have not been found 
very h e lp fu l  to those same o f f i c i a l s  in se iz ing  and main ta in ing  the  policy-
S i l v e r ,  "O ff ic ia l  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n , "  pp.  149-150. 
^^Kennedy Hear ings,  p. T Lipsky and Olson, MSs, I .  P- 7.
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making i n i t i a t i v e .  Nor have they been found he lp fu l  in f in d in g  and 
d is sem ina t ing  in format ion  concerning the  causes o f  the  r i o t s  which 
run coun te r  to  the  conventional wisdom and the  e s t a b l i s h e d  values  of 
the  community. They do, however, serve  the  appo in t ing  o f f i c i a l s  well 
in buying t ime and providing a b u f f e r  between them and those in the 
community who would take  p rec ip i tous  ac t io n s  of  any s o r t .  This pos i t iv e  
fun c t io n  i s  no small c o n t r i b u t io n  to  community w e l l -be ing  and the p o l i t i c a l  
s e c u r i t y  o f  those  in power.
The f i n a l  s e t  o f  reasons commonly s e t  fo r th  to exp la in  the 
f a i l u r e  o f  t h e se  commissions can be found in what P l a t t  c a l l s  the 
s t r u c t u r a l  and o rg a n iz a t io n a l  cond i t ions  of  f a i l u r e . W h i l e  much of 
what follows i s  implied in the d i scuss ion  o f  the  f i r s t  two s e t s  of 
v a r i a b le s  a f f e c t i n g  r i o t  commission f a i l u r e ,  i t  i s  well to be e x p l i c i t  
a t  t h i s  p o in t .  Because o f  the na ture  of  the  s e l e c t i o n  process and the  
cond i t ions  under which the  commissioners a re  ap p o in ted ,  r i o t  commis­
s ions  a re  s e v e re ly  l im i t ed  by t h e i r  formal mandates in what they can 
accomplish; as has been seen, general  expec ta t ions  fo r  these  groups 
o f t e n  exceed t h e i r  mandate which in tu rn  c re a te s  a s i t u a t i o n  fnought 
with ambiguity and p o te n t i a l  f o r  f r u s t r a t i o n .
Second, commissioners have not been r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  a very 
wide range o f  American so c ie ty .  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  th e  i n t e r e s t s  of those 
c i t i z e n s  most p e r s o n a l ly  a f f e c t e d  by the d i s o rd e r s  a re  u su a l ly  not 
r ep resen ted  in any way on the commission. Thi rd ,  c o n s t r a i n t s  of time 
and resources  combine to  produce Lipsky and Olson 's  "commission problem"
^ ^ P l a t t ,  " I n t r o d u c t i o n , "  p.  45.
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which u su a l ly  r e s u l t s  in ,  a t  b e s t ,  poor s c h o la r s h ip  a ttempting  to
expla in the causes  o f  the  r i o t s ,  and a t  w o r s t ,  what Epstein c a l l e d
44" p o l i t i c a l  t r u t h . "  Fourth,  no study of a p a r t i c u l a r  r i o t  commission, 
to  d a te ,  r e f u t e s  P l a t t ' s  conten t ion  t h a t  "The r e l a t i o n s h i p  of  commis­
s ioners  with t h e i r  research  s t a f f  is  t y p i c a l l y  e x p l o i t a t i v e  and 
manageria l .  In t u r n ,  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  have g e n e r a l ly  demonstrated an 
unwil l ingness  to  be misused, coopted and e x p lo i t e d  by the  commissioners." 
This f a i l u r e  to  a t t r a c t  persons of  i n t e l l e c t u a l  t a l e n t  ab le  to a id  in 
the  resea rch  necessa ry  to develop a good r e p o r t  i s  perhaps the  most 
ser ious  of th e  reasons fo r  the  c o n s i s t e n t  f a i l u r e  of  these  groups.
F i f t h ,  r i o t  commissions have produced t h e o r i e s  about r i o t s  which are  
poorly grounded on hard data  and which a r e  p o l i t i c a l l y  naive.  These two 
weaknesses a r e  the  consequences o f  the  t ime and resources  problem and 
the  inhe ren t  i n a b i l i t y  of  the  r i o t  commission to  be p o l i t i c a l l y  e f f e c t i v e  
in the pol icy-making  c o n f l i c t  a re a .  S i x t h ,  r i o t  commissions, by t h e i r  
very n a tu re ,  have been unwil l ing to im p l i c a te  the e s t a b l i s h e d  government 
as a pa r ty  to  the  causes of the  r i o t s .  There i s  an assumption in a l l  
r i o t  commission r e p o r t s  t h a t  the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p r a c t i c e s  and i n d i v i ­
dual behavior o f  local  government o f f i c i a l s  had nothing to do with
44 Edward Jay Epste in ,  Inques t:  The War r en Commission and The
Establi shment o f  T r u th , ( New Ybrk: The Viking P res s ,  1956). H? 
uses the  term to  mean a conclusion reached which i s  accep tab le  to the 
commission more f o r  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  meri ts  than i t s  lo g ic a l  cons is tency  
with the i n v e s t i g a t i o n  conducted by the  commission and i t s  s t a f f .
^ ^ P l a t t ,  " I n t r o d u c t i o n ," p. 46.
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46caus ing  th e  r i o t s .
All o f  these  i n h i b i t i n g  f a c t o r s  leave  the  commission with l i t t l e  
more to  do than appeal to the  good f a i t h  and reason o f  the government 
and th e  genera l  public  to c o r r e c t  the  c i rcumstances  which produced 
the  u n r e s t  ( the  essence  of most of the  r e p o r t s )  w i thou t  ques t ion ing  
th e  under ly ing  assumption t h a t  changes in the  conduct of  the p a r t i c i ­
pants  in  the  d i s o r d e r s  can be achieved w i thou t  changes in the  s o c io ­
p o l i t i c a l  co n d i t io n s  which produced the c i v i l  d i s o r d e r s .
Nat ional Commission on the causes and p resen ta ion  of  V io le n c e ,  
Chicago Study Team, Rights in C o n f l i c t , (New York; A Signet Broadside ,  
The New American L ib ra ry ,  1968),  The r e p o r t  o f  the  Walker Commission, 
concerned with the d i s o rd e r s  in Chicago dur ing  the  1968 Democratic 
National p a r ty  convention,  i s  a no tab le  excep t io n  to t h i s  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n .  
The r e p o r t  c a l l e d  th e  d i s o r d e r s ,  "The Chicago Po l ice  R io t . "  The 
s u s ta in e d  h o s t i l i t y  of  Chicago o f f i c i a l s  to the  r e p o r t  and i t s  au thors  
i s  an example of  one reason why such r e p o r t s  o f ten  a re  not w r i t t e n .
PART I I .  POLITICAL USES OF AD HOC ADVISORY GROUPS IN THE ADMINISTRATION 
OF LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON
CHAPTER IV
LYNDON JOHNSON: THE MAN AND HIS DOMESTIC POLICY
MAKING SYSTEM -  AN OVERVIEW
In the f i v e  year s  he served as p r e s i d e n t ,  Lyndon Johnson moved 
from a p o s i t io n  o f  being ab le  to  secure  any l e g i s l a t i v e  goal he desi red  
to one where no new l e g i s l a t i v e  programs could be i n i t i a t e d  and l i t t l e  
more than su rv iva l  guaranteed f o r  the e x i s t i n g  ones.  Curing his l a s t  
e ig h teen  months in o f f i c e  Johnson t r i e d  d e sp e ra te ly  to main ta in  the 
p o l i t i c a l  p rocess  and programs which had served him and the o ther  
i n h e r i t o r s  o f  th e  Roosevelt  New Deal so we l l ;  he at tempted to force 
a p a t t e r n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  behavior from the  p a s t  on an in c reas ing ly  
r e l u c t a n t  n a t io n ;  th e  r e s u l t s  f o r  Johnson ap p roo r ia te ly  can b,e 
d e sc r ib e d  in  l i t e r a r y  terms - tragedy.  New forms of p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r ­
sh ip  were developing in the 1960s with which the persons and t r a d i t i o n s  
o f  l e a d e r s h ip  o f  the  1950s were i l l - equ ipped  to cope.  The new 
le a d e r s  were a r t i c u l a t i n g  new goals and new p o l i t i c a l  means fo r  
o b t a in in g  them. This c rea ted  an i n e v i t a b l e  c o n f l i c t  between them 
and e s t a b l i s h e d  l e a d e r s ,  l i k e  Johnson, who regarded  the goals and 
means of  the  e s t a b l i s h e d  policy-making system as normative.  In s h o r t ,  
th e  l i b e r a l  rea l ism o f  the 1950s became the romantic conservatism of  
tne  Î9büs '  and as romantic conse rva t ives  g e n e r a l ly ,  Johnson and his
1 2 0
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generat ion of  p o l i t i c a l  leaders  led themselves,  and the na t ion ,  into 
t r a g e d y J
Johnson was a member of the generat ion o f  American p o l i t i c a l  
leaders  who, in f luenced  by the two world wars and the Depression,  saw 
severe l i m i t s  to  the  p o l i t i c a l  idealism of  p re s id en ts  l i k e  Woodrow Wilson 
and Herbert  Hoover and re jec ted  i t  in favor o f  a pragmatism of  accomplish­
ment. They were d oe rs ,  p o l i t i c a n s  who had a record o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  and 
ad m in is t r a t iv e  accomplishment. They not only s e t  g o a l s ,  they achieved 
them. Their  sense of accomplishement v/as not only fed by the at ta inment 
of s e l f - c o n s t r u c t e d  goals  but a lso  by major v i c t o r i e s  in p o l i t i c a l  b a t t l e s  
th ru s t  upon them; the second world war had been won and the Depression 
favorably ended. They were, th e re fo re ,  not only  committed to winning, 
but were the  most experienced winners in the p o l i t i c a l  b a t t l e s  of  t h e i r  
time. Unfor tunate ly ,  i t  was t h e i r  impressive record  of l e g i s l a t i v e  and 
p o l i t i c a l  accomplishment which clouded the v i s io n  o f  Johnson and his 
contemporaries to the changing p o l i t i c a l  c l imate  of the  1960s.
Lyndon Johnson was both the i n h e r i t o r  and a s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r i ­
butor to t h i s  p o l i t i c a l  environment. He had been a vigorous New
There a re ,  of course ,  other explanations  of  the f a l l  o f  Lyndon 
Johnson. Three have been helpful in th i s  study. In t h e i r  study of 
American p o l i t i c s  in 1967 - 1968 the  authors o f  An American Melodrama 
(Lewis C hes te r ,  Godfrey Hodgson, Bruce Page, An American Melodrama:
The P r e s id e n t i a l  Campaign of 1968, (New York: The Viking Press,  1969)
i s o la ted  a sense of hubris  as a roo t  cause o f  the problem. David 
Halberstam ( The Best  and the B r ig h te s t , (New York: Random House,
1972) and I rv ing  J a n i s ,  ( Victims of "Group-Think, (New Haven: Yale
Univers ity  P ress ,  1972) agree t h a t  a group-consciousness and a closed 
information ga ther ing  and d i s t r i b u t io n  system was the  major source of 
Johnson's undoing.
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Deal l i b e r a l  p a r t i c i p a n t  in Washington p o l i t i c s  s ince  the Roosevelt 
ad m in i s t r a t io n .  He began his Washington p o l i t i c a l  caree r  as a member of  
th e  House o f  Representa tives  during the New Deal. He was t ra in ed  fo r  
congressional  leade rsh ip  by fe llow Texan Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the 
House of  Representa t ives  and master p r a c t i t i o n e r  o f  the a r t  of Democratic 
l i b e r a l  p o l i t i c s .  He was the major i ty  leader  o f  the  United S ta tes  Senate 
during the Eisenhower adm in is t ra t ion  and, a f t e r  an unsuccessful a t tempt 
to  secure the  p re s id e n t i a l  nomination fo r  h imse lf ,  became Vice Pres iden t  
under John F. Kennedy and succeeded him a f t e r  h is  murder. Few of Johnson 's  
contemporaries were as experienced as he in national p o l i t i c s ,  publ ic  
po l icy  debates ,  and decis ion  making; he was the p o l i t i c a l  equal,  i f  not 
the  su per io r ,  o f  his post-World War II Democratic predecessors  in the 
White House and he was determined to leave his personal imprint  on 
the  presidency and the  nation.
B) Johnson The Man
The l i t e r a t u r e  about Johnson reveals  f i v e  pe rsona l i ty  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
the  understanding of which is  e s s e n t i a l  in expla ining him as a 
2
p o l i t i c a l  a c t o r .  F i r s t ,  he t i e d  his  s e l f - e s te e m  to recognit ion
2
The d iscu ss io n  which follows is deeply indepted to Doris Kearns' 
Lyndon Johnson and the  American Dream. I t  a l so  draws on James D. Barber,  
The P r e s id e n t i a l  Character:  Pred ic t ing  Performance in the White House,
(Englewood C l i f f s ,  N .J . :  Prent ice  Hall ,  1977),  Fred I. Greenste in ,  and
Lawrence Berman, "Presidents  and Their  Advisors from 1933 to 1974," 
paper presen ted a t  the  Conference on P r e s id e n t i a l  Advising in the 
United S ta te s ,  sponsored by the P o l i t i c s  Department and Woodrow Wilson 
School of Pr inceton Univers ity ,  October 31 - November 1, 1975, Edwin 
C. Hargrove, "P re s id en t i a l  Persona l i ty  and R ev i s io n is t  Views of the 
Pres idency,"  American Journal of P o l i t i c a l  Science XVII (November 1973), 
Harry McPherson, A P o l i t i c a l  Education and George Reedy, The Twil ight 
o f  the Pres idency , (New York: World Press ,  1970).
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and a p p re c ia t io n  by o th e r s  of his personal accomplishments.  Kearns 
d iscusses  Johnson 's  need to earn the love o f  o t h e r s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h a t
3
of his  mother.  His obsess ion  with amassing a s i g n i f i c a n t  record o f  
accomplishment s u i t e d  him well fo r  a le ad e r sh ip  p o s i t io n  in the ranks 
of  the Democratic New Deal l i b e r a l s  - persons whose s e l f  o r i e n t a t i o n s  
were f ixed  to  l a r g e  s c a l e  social  and p o l i t i c a l  accomplishment.
I t  is  useful to cons ide r  the  second and th i r d  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
toge the r .  Johnson was possessed of a need to contro l  h is  immediate 
environment as completely  as poss ib le .  To accomplish t h i s  he gave what 
many regarded as  undue a t t e n t io n  to d e ta i l  and the  consequent accumula­
t ion  of informat ion usefu l  to the maintenance of c o n t r o l .  I l l u s t r a t i o n s  
of  these  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  include h is  personal s e l e c t io n  o f  bombing s i t e s  
in Vietnam, h is  i n s i s t e n c e  on being involved in the handling of  the  
sm al les t  d e t a i l s  o f  th e  Dominican Republic and Panama c r i s e s ,  h is  
in t imate  involvement in  "head-counting" of votes  in the development of 
the Great Soc ie ty  l e g i s l a t i v e  program, what some regard as an almost 
pa thological  penchant fo r  secrecy,  and his repeated  e f f o r t s  to reduce 
ser ious  policy  problems fac ing  him to dimensions which would allow him 
to have a one-on-one r e l a t i o n s h i p  with the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of the  
various concerned i n t e r e s t  groups. The Johnson s t y l e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
leadersh ip  was then p e rsona l ,  grounded on an enormous amount of  s e l f  
confidence ,  the  f u l f i l l m e n t  of which was based on the  premise t h a t  he
3
See in p a r t i c u l a r  Chapters 1 and 2 o f  her ,  Lyndon Johnson and the 
American Dream.
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could demand and rece ive  more informat ion than anyone e l s e  in  the 
po l icy  making mix.
Fourth,  Johnson had an a b i l i t y  to turn  l im i t ed  personal resources  
in to  su b s ta n t ia l  p o l i t i c a l  ho ld ings .^  From a minor ju n io r  congressman- 
p re s id en t  r e l a t i o n s h ip  between him and FDR, Johnson developed an image 
o f  h imself  as a White House conf idan t  which was useful to him both 
with the  executive branch o f  government and with h i s  c o n s t i t u e n t s .
From b i t s  and pieces of  informat ion ,  unimportant in themselves ,  he 
developed a data  base of  personal and p o l i t i c a l  in fo rm at ion .  This 
enhanced his a b i l i t y  to move his  fellow sena tors  to support  his 
l e g i s l a t i v e  moves, which converted him from a reg iona l  and i n s t i t u ­
t io n a l  to a na tiona l p o l i t i c a l  leade r .  Johnson earned well his 
re p u ta t io n  o f  being ab le  always to take what he had and put i t  to 
good use.
F i f th ,  Johnson tended to  fee l  the need to run from personal and 
h ighly  dangerous p o l i t i c a l  problems while a t  the same time exaggera ting  
h is  accomplishments in the  events  which p r e c i p i t a t e d  the f l i g h t .  Kearns
5
r e l a t e s  two such ado lescen t  f l i g h t s .  His d e c i s io n  not be seek r e -  
e l e c t i o n  and the o b je c t iv e ly  indefensable  hyperbole he i n s i s t e d  on using 
during the l a s t  year  o f  h is  ad m in is t r a t io n  in d e sc r ib ing  his  l e g i s l a t i v e
^Throughout her book, Kearns a t t r i b u t e s  t h i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  to 
h is  r e l a t i v e l y  impoverished childhood.
42-44.
^Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the  American Dream, pp. 38-39 and
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accomplishments a r e  f u r t h e r  examples.^
Johnson a lso  brought to the presidency a p e r s o n a l i t y  deeply 
conditioned by the  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  environment in  which he matured.
Lyndon Johnson was f i r s t  and foremost a west Texas p o p u l i s t . ^
Like o th e r  v a r i e t i e s  o f  American populism, t h a t  o f  Johnson 's  west 
Texas h i l l  country  was condit ioned by extreme pover ty ,  rooted in the 
s o i l ,  v igorous ly  i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  and unques t ion ing ly  dedicated to b e l i e f  
in a d i r e c t  c o r r e l a t i o n  between hard work and su cc e ss ,  provided an 
individual  i s  given an equal chance to compete in l i f e .  For Johnson, 
government e x i s t ed  to  in su re  indiv idua ls  an equal chance to compete and 
achieve in the  s o c i e ty ;  whatever e l se  government might be, i t  was to be 
the l e v e l e r  o f  the  advantages of the acc iden ts  o f  b i r t h .  Johnson's brand 
of populism opposed t h e  advantages o r d in a r i l y  given to those who 
accumulated v a s t  concen t ra t ions  of money; he i n s i s t e d  t h a t  those who 
are  so advantaged have an ob l ig a t io n  to use t h e i r  money and i t s  
consequent power fo r  the  public  good.^ Johnson and o thers  of his
For examples o f  t h i s  see the fol lowing f i l e s  in the LBJ Library: 
Califano 49-50 " L e g is la t io n "  and Cater 3 & 4 ,  "P re s id en t ia l  Memoranda"
6/67 (1) and 12/67, in  which a l l  l e g i s l a t i o n  was e i t h e r  c l a s s i f i e d  as 
"land-mark" or  "major",  and his  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  l e g i s l a t i v e  accomplish­
ments were compared in  some d e t a i l  to t h a t  o f  previous adminis t ra t ions  
and where the re  i s  a c l e a r  assumption being made t h a t  a l l  b i l l s  proposed 
by the White House were worthy of passage and only a r e c a l c i t r a n t  Congress 
stood in  the way of even g re a t e r  l e g i s l a t i v e  accomplishment by the adminis­
t r a t i o n .
^Kearns'  Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream is  the  bes t  study 
of  the in f luence  of Johnson 's  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  environment on his 
p o l i t i c a l  " s t y l e . "
^ I b i d . ,  p.  27.
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generation of  west  Texans were f a m i l i a r  with poverty,  i t s  personal e f f e c t s  
and the r e l a t e d  problems of poor ranchers being v ic t imized  by banks 
and o ther  f i n a n c ia l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  which exploited ru ral  landowners 
during the  Depression year s .  They were genera lly  l e s s  f a m i l i a r  with 
the problems o f  r u r a l  to  urban migrat ion and the urban poverty of 
the 1960s. They confused them with the rural  poverty o f  t h e i r  youth to 
the de tr iment  of both the inc reas ing  number of  urban poor and Johnson's  
p o l i t i c a l  accomplishment.
In the  world o f  the  young Lyndon Johnson the soc ia l  and personal 
worth o f  hard work was never quest ioned; ca r r ied  on in  a s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  
c l imate  of f r e e  compet i t ion ,  hard work leads to indiv idua l  and corpora te  
w e l l -be ing .^  Trans la ted  in to  the p o l i t i c a l  s t y l e  of Johnson, such 
persons f i g h t  to win a share of the p o l i t i c a l  p ie  wait ing  to be 
divided among the  p o l i t i c a l  c o n te s t a n t s  a t  any given time; one f i g h t s  
to win and uses a l l  the p o l i t i c a l  and personal resources  a v a i l a b l e ;  
one, in s h o r t ,  works hard.  Losing he i n s i s t e d ,  even fo r  a seemingly 
good cause gains no th ing; fo r  Johnson, a major ta sk  in  any p o l i t i c a l  
s t rugg le  i s  to de f ine  the s i t u a t i o n  in such a way t h a t  something 
can be gained which then can be used as a p o l i t i c a l  resource 
for gaining more in the next phase of  the s t ru g g le .  This is a quanti  t a -
q
As P r e s id e n t ,  Johnson showed l i t t l e  app rec ia t ion  of the i n ­
c reas ing ly  obvious (to  the non-popu l i s t  l i b e r a l ,  a t  l e a s t )  i n s i g h t  
gleaned from contemporary socia l  research th a t  some human labor p re ­
vents p a r t i c u l a r  ind iv id u a ls  and c la s ses  of persons from achieving 
much o f  the  common good and t h a t  fo r  the persons so entrapped by the 
"system" l e a rn in g  to  beat  the system of  e l i t e  control  was more 
important to t h e i r  "success" than hard work of the type used in 
p opu l i s t  r h e t o r i c .
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t i v e  view o f  l i f e  and the  p o l i t i c a l  process; more is  b e t t e r . T h e  
only impor tant  ques t ions  are the c rude ly  pragmatic ones o f  economic 
and mater ia l  success .  There is  simply no t ime fo r  the luxury o f  
ask ing  q ues t ions  which cha l lenge  the  fundamental values o f  the  s o c ie ty .  
For Johnson the  values  o f  America were obvious and unders tood,  and suc­
cess  in  ach iev ing  them could be measured by the  economic and mate r ia l  
s tandard  of  ind iv idua l  and c o rp o ra te  w e l l -  being. This was a p o l i t i c s  
of  a c t io n  over  r e f l e c t i o n  favoring  the t e c h n i c a l l y  and p o l i t i c a l l y  
competent and skewed toward those p ub l ic  i n t e r e s t  groups of the  oas t  
from which the  p re sen t  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s h ip  evolved.
C) The Johnson Adminis trative  S ty le
There were t h r e e  components o f  Jo h n so n ' s  a d m in i s t r a t iv e  " s t y l e "  
while  he was in the  White House. Binding each to the o th e r s  were h i s  
concerns f o r  c o n t r o l ,  d e ta i l e d  in fo rm a t io n ,  and secrecy.
F i r s t ,  in  h is  approach to and h i s  assumptions about na t iona l  
pub l ic  p o l i c y  making Lyndon Johnson was very formal.  In being so he 
was c l o s e r  to  P re s id e n ts  Eisenhower and Nixon than to any o f  h is  
Democratic pos t  World War I I  p redecesso rs .^^  His was a very t i g h t  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  system designed to al low him to have maximum e f f e c t  on
Doris Kearns, "Lyndon Johnson: P e r s o n a l i t y ,  Culture  and P o l i t i c s , "
paper  d e l iv e re d  a t  the  annual Qxeeting o f  the  American P o l i t i c a l  Science  
A ss o c ia t io n ,  Chicago, September,  1971.
^ ‘See Richard R, Johnson, Managing the  White House: An In t im ate
Study of the  Presidency,. (New York: Harper and Row, 197&) f o r  a s i m i l a r
e v a lu a t io n  o f  the  a d m in i s t r a t i v e  s t y l e s  o f  p re s iden ts  from Frankl in  
Roosevelt  through Nixon.
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the  dec i s io n s  which would determine n a t io n a l  public  policy .  He took 
very s e r io u s ly  the  f a c t  t h a t  the p re s id en t  i s  the  only Washington o f f i c e  
holder e l ec te d  by a na tiona l cons t i tuency .  He saw himself  as f i r s t  
among the  Washington le ade rsh ip ,  by v i r t u e  of  h i s  na t iona l  e l e c t i o n ,  
and in no way equal to the  o the rs .
Johnson accepted the  conventional wisdom of  Washington New Deal 
l i b e r a l s  t h a t  th e  na t iona l  leadership i s  chosen by a v a r ie ty  of 
democratic means from among the leaders  of  the var ious t r a d i t i o n a l  
na tional i n t e r e s t  groups. For Johnson t h e r e  were two kinds of na t iona l  
le ad e r s ;  p o l i t i c a l  and i n t e r e s t  group l e a d e r s .  Within the  former c a t e ­
gory were the p re s id e n t ,  vice  p re s iden t  and o the r  members of the 
a d m in is t r a t io n ,  and the members of congress .  In the  l a t e r  category 
were the  persons serv ing as the e lec ted  leade rs  of the various na t iona l  
i n t e r e s t  groups. All had in common an e l e c t o r a l  consti tuency as the 
source of  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  power with th e  p r e s i d e n t ' s  being not only the 
broadest  but c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  and p o l i t i c a l l y  the  most important.  For 
Johnson the  process of  government cons is ted  of bargain ing and compromise 
among these  var ious  groups o f  persons u n t i l  a consensus was reached. The 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  the  leade rs  was to c o n s t r u c t  the  necessary consensus,  
to  govern and serve t h e i r  c o n s t i tu e n c ie s .  I f  these  leaders  did 
not produce,  new leaders  would be sen t  to Washington by the various  
v o te r s .  All those  who stayed in Washington then were by d e f i n i t i o n  
l e a d e r s ,  winners ,  producers of public b e n e f i t s  fo r  t h e i r  various 
c o n s t i t u e n c i e s .  Johnson saw th is  system as based on mutual confidences 
and t r u s t  and a w i l l ingness  to bargain in  good f a i t h .  The product of 
t h i s  system, the  much valued consensus,  was, by d e f i n i t i o n  then, the
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common good, o r  as near to  i t  as is p o l i t i c a l l y  p o ss ib le .  F u r the r ,  he 
saw the major i n t e r e s t s  o f  the  body p o l i t i c  as e s s e n t i a l l y  fixed and 
f i rmly  rep resen ted  by the e s tab l i sh ed  na t iona l  i n t e r e s t  groups. New 
groups would a r i s e  only when the  e s ta b l i sh e d  ones f a i l e d  to produce.
The normal s t a t e  of  a f f a i r s  would be fo r  the  new i n t e r e s t s  to be 
absorbed by the e x i s t in g  i n t e r e s t  groups.
Johnson saw h imself  as the  de j u r e  head of  t h i s  na tional system 
of  public po l icy  production through i n t e r e s t  group compet it ion.  All 
o the r  leaders  in the  public po l icy  process were p a r t  o f  his na tional 
const i tuency  and had a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to bend t h e i r  parochial
12i n t e r e s t s  to the  common good i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  in his Great Socie ty .  
This a t t i t u d e  toward his pos i t ion  in the na t iona l  po l icy  making l e a d e r ­
ship helps to exp la in  his need fo r  secrecy  in the policy  making debates  
w ith in  the na t iona l  leade rsh ip .  Secrecy not only allowed un fe t te red  
debate with in  the ru l ing  e l i t e ,  but a g r e a t e r  degree o f  p re s id en t i a l  
c o n t ro l .  Once a consensus was a r r iv e d  a t  among the national leaders  
Johnson expected public  deba te ,  not before :  Public  debate then was to
be confined to cons ide ra t ion  of the wisdom o f  dec is ions  made by the 
na tiona l l e ad e rs .  Public debate was not to be a p a r t  o f  the process 
of making the d ec i s io n .  Therefore ,  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of groups not a 
p a r t  of the Washington le ade rsh ip  who began to  clamor in  the 1960s 
f o r  a voice in the  decis ions  on public  p o l i c i e s  they f e l t  a f fec ted  
them were considered by Johnson to be i r r a t i o n a l  a t  b e s t  and subversive
12 I t  is  important to  emphasize here t h a t  Johnson saw his na tiona l 
const i tuency  as re sponsib le  to him, r a t h e r  than the oppos i te .  For 
Johnson, the p re s id e n t  has a mandate to r u l e , not govern,  un t i l  the next 
e l e c t io n .
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a t  worse. Public  debate  fo r  Johnson was bes t  confined to e lec t io n s
not to the  po l icy  making process .  Thus, th e re  i s  a sense in which
Johnson can be s a id  to  have t r i e d  to  function more as a prime m in is te r
than as a p re s id e n t :  i . e .  as party l e ad e r ,  c h i e f  of  s t a t e  and head
o f  government whose l e g i t im a te  r i g h t  to govern i s  so le ly  dependent
on the conf idence  of  h is  e lec ted  peers.  When a prime m in is te r  loses
contro l  o f  the  e l e c t e d  e l i t e ,  when th e re  is  no conf idence ,  he f a l l s
from power. When Johnson f e l t  he had l o s t  con tro l  of congress ,  when
he could no longer  command the r i g h t  to i n i t i a t e  policy  f o r  the war
13and his  domestic programs, he resigned.
Johnson 's  system, then , was one of  p o l i t i c a l  brokering among 
ru ling  e l i t e s .  I f ,  as Johnson seemed determined to main ta in ,  the 
persons making up the national leadersh ip  remained r e l a t i v e l y  s t a t i c ,  the  
a b i l i t y  o f  the  p re s id e n t  to maintain h is  p o s i t io n  o f  dominance in 
the po l icy  making process was assured.  For Johnson, the be s t  type of 
policy making group to f i t  h is  personal and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  needs was a 
small group o f  key l e a d e r s ,  re p re se n ta t iv e  of the  major i n t e r e s t s  con­
cerned with the  problem a t  hand, who met s e c r e t l y ,  p re fe rab ly  with him, 
or with persons in  whom he had g rea t  confidence ,  and by whom his
1 1For a s i m i l a r  d iscuss ion  of Johnson's le ad e rsh ip  s t y l e  see 
McPherson, A P o l i t i c a l  Education and Irving L. Horowitz, "Lyndon 
Baines Johnson and the  Rise o f  P res iden t ia l  M i l i t a r i s m ,"  Social 
Science Q ua r te r ly  53 (September, 1972). Much o f  the  above is  indebted 
to Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream. For one account,  not 
ye t  in the  publ ic  record ,  of  Johnson's reasons fo r  res igning see The 
Cabinet Meeting o f  April 3, 1968: The White House, pp. 1-2,  LBJ
Library.
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p re s c r ip t io n  f o r  the  problem could be accepted.  Johnson 's  s t y l e  
never allowed the  o ther  e l i t e s  to question  whether h is  views deserved 
primary and s i n g u l a r  co n s id e ra t io n .  Thus Johnson saw e l i t e  brokering 
as a one-way process  in which the  o ther  e lec ted  p o l i t i c a l  leaders  
and those from the  p r iv a te  s e c to r  came to terms with and accepted 
the  pos i t ion  o f  " th e i r "  p re s id en t .
In c r i s i s  po l icy  making (e .g .  the  war in Vietnam and the  c iv i l
d iso rde rs  of 1967-1968) Johnson chose a small group (The Tuesday Lunch
Group and his White House Civil  Disorders Control Group) o f  persons in
whom, by a l l  accounts ,  he would t r y  to implant h is  pe rcep t ions  of the
problem a t  hand and whom he expected to r a t i f y  h is  d e c i s i o n s . H i s  then
was not the c o l l e g i a l  s t y l e  of c r i s i s  management o f  Kennedy who developed
the  Executive Committee (EXCOM) fo r  handling the Cuban m i s s i l e  c r i s i s  and
from which he absented himself  in order to  allow the  p a r t i c ip a n t s  to come
to t h e i r  bes t  recommendation; nor was Johnson's  method t h a t  o f  FDR who
encouraged c o n f l i c t  and compet it ion among his po l icy  adv iso rs  in order  to
ge t  a v a r i e ty  o f  poin ts  of view before  he made a d e c i s io n ;  h is  was r a th e r
a formal system o f  execu t ive  policy-making with the  c h i e f  executive
in a pos i t ion  from which he expected to maintain complete control
15over the whole of the system.
See, f o r  in s tan ce ,  Henry F. G r a f f ' s  The Tuesday C ab ine t : 
Delibera t ion  and Decision on Peace and War under Lyndon B. Johnson 
(Englewood H i l l s ,  New York: P ren t ice  H a l l ,  1970),  McPherson, A P o l i t i c a l
Education, pp. 334-383 and Chapter 12, pp. 446-471, below.
^^During the  l a s t  two years  of his  ad m in i s t r a t io n ,  however, Johnson 
experienced an inc reas ing  amount of open d i s s e n t ,  compet it ion and c o n f l i c t  
among his  adv iso ry  s t a f f ;  he received more c o n f l i c t i n g  advice than he 
seemed to want,  t h i s  lo ss  of contro l  over his most immediate environment 
was a s i g n i f i c a n t  co n t r ib u t io n  to his decis ion  not to seek r e - e l e c t io n .
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The place  o f  c i t i z e n  voting in the Johnson scheme of  democratic 
policy-making and governing needs to be b r i e f l y  discussed i f  a complete 
p ic tu re  i s  to be sketched. Johnson became a na t iona l  leader  during 
the Eisenhower Admin is tra tion  on the  basis  of the  support  he gave to 
tlie voLii'iy p rov is ions  of the  Civil  Rights Act o f  1954. He worked 
hard to have a s t rong  voting t i t l e  included in what was an otherwise
weak b i l l .  He was from t h a t  time committed p u b l i c ly  to the expansion
of  the  voting l i s t s  -  increas ing the number of  persons who could 
p a r t i c ip a t e  in  shaping the government. He intended to make th i s  a 
vehic le  fo r  the  m a te r ia l  progress of  the poor. He never wavered from 
his de termination to broaden the f ranch ise  and to ease the problems 
a ssoc ia ted  with  be ing black and try ing  to r e g i s t e r  to c a s t  a vote.
Ci t izens  voting f o r  t h e i r  individual choices between competing leader­
ship e l i t e s ,  in  th e  public  and p r iva te  s e c to r ,  was the essence of 
democracy fo r  Johnson.
Simple pragmatism was the second ing red ien t  in the Johnson s ty le ;  
pragmatism not in the  philosophical  sense of eva lu a t in g  the consequences
of a c t i o n ,  bu t  in the  common sense of being p r i n c i p a l l y  concerned
with action i t s e l f  - does a p a r t i c u l a r  ac t ion  produce r e s u l t s  
commensurate with the  goals s e t  ou t  fo r  i t ?  The unasked question 
underlying t h i s  approach i s ,  "How can p o l i t i c a l  power be used to obtain 
commonly agreed upon goals of the  society?"  This approach to problem 
solving works b e s t  in  a policy making system where, th e re  are  commonly 
assumed values .  Johnson and his cohort  assumed such va lues .  For 
him the basis  of t h i s  pragmatic approach was grounded in the west 
Texas Depression populism of his youth and young adulthood which perceived
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mater ia l  advancement o f  the people ,  of  any s o r t ,  as a good, and the 
g r e a t e r  such advancement the g r e a t e r  the  good. This is a hon- ideo log i-  
cal approach which i s  concerned with r e s u l t s .  Discussions of  the m e r i t s ,  
the p o l i t i c a l  and moral im pl ica t ions  o f  the  r e s u l t s ,  were not e n t e r ­
ta ined  and as  such were regarded as  i r r a t i o n a l  o r  argumentative a t  b e s t  
and p o l i t i c a l l y  i r r e s p o n s ib le  a t  worse.
For some o f  Johnson 's  p o l i t i c a l  genera t ion  and persuasion,  
eva lua t ion  o f  a c t ion  took place a t  the level  of technique,  not  a t  t h a t  
of ends; i f  the  methods by which po l icy  was made were good ( i . e .  they 
were legal  and did not  cause too much damage to the people and i n s t i t u ­
t ions  which produced and implemented them) the r e s u l t s  could not be r e ­
garded as bad. Johnson, on the o the r  hand, seems to have made no p r io r  
judgments about l im i t s  to the techniques  o r  the r e s u l t s  o f  h is  po l icy  
making e f f o r t s .  "I do understand power . . .  whatever e l s e  may be 
sa id  about me I know where to look for i t  and how to  use i t . "  "I 
want the  pres idency to  improve how people l i v e . " ^ ^  Power, in he ren t  in 
the  p o l i t i c a l  o f f i c e ,  developed by the person holding i t ,  used fo r  the 
well being o f  the  popula t ion ,  as determined by the o f f i c e  ho lders ,  
was the  s e t  o f  pragmatic p re supposi t ions  underlying Johnson's 
approach to policy  making. This i s  the foundat ion for his  d e s i r e  to 
win something in  every p o l i t i c a l  b a t t l e ,  to  get  something from every 
policy-making s t ru g g le .  I t  a l so  exp la ins  his  d i s t r u s t  of  the persons he 
and Sam Rayburn c a l l e d  " e n th u s i a s t i c  l o s e r s . T h e  l a t t e r ,  f o r  him.
^^McPherson, A P o l i t i c a l  Educa t ion ,  p. 450 and 202.
^ ^ I b i d . ,  p. 160.
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were u su a l ly  i n t e l l e c t u a l s ,  persons who questioned the  value o f  the 
r e s u l t s  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  p o l i c i e s  and thereby in f a c t  questioned the value 
of  the t o t a l  Johnson approach to po l icy  making. Johnson saw the 
mass o f  people shar ing  h is  concern fo r  r e s u l t s ,  but being unconcerned 
about having a share  in th e  de te rmina tion  o f  the  p o l icy .  He th e re fo re  
resented  and r e s i s t e d  those who, in the 1960s,  asked f o r  a way to 
p a r t i c i p a t e  in the  policy processes which a f f e c t e d  t h e i r  l i v e s .
They wanted a sh a re  in th e  techniques  and the  r e s u l t s ;  Johnson thought 
t h a t  f o r  the system to func t ion  proper ly  they  must be s a t i s f i e d  with 
the r e s u l t s  and l i m i t  t h e i r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  to the  process of leade rsh ip  
s e l e c t io n .
Johnson assumed, as Lowi n o te s ,  t h a t  t h e r e  a re  no ap r io r i  l im i t s
to the p r i o r i t i e s  of  government o r  to the uses o f  government power 
18to ob ta in  them. Limits are  imposed by the  r e a l i t i e s  of the p o l i t i c a l  
market p lace ,  a kind of Adam Smith i n v i s i b l e  hand opera t ing  to  p ro te c t  
the  public  a t  l a r g e  ag a in s t  excessive  governmental a c t i o n .  As with 
Smith's  economics,  such an approach assumes t h a t  the r h e to r i c  of  j u s t i c e  
insures  the  r e a l i t y ,  t h a t  no prov is ions  f o r  th e  evalua t ion  of r e s u l t s  
a r e  needed as long as they and the  techniques  used to obta in  them are  
not s e r io u s ly  con tes ted .
Johnson a l s o  saw th e  power possessed by the  p res iden t  to be
1STheodore J .  Lowi, "One Dimensional P res id en t :  Lyndon Johnson 's  
The Vantage P o in t , "  Social  Science Quarterly  53 (September, 1972): 
410-412.
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ex c lu s iv e ly  h i s ,  to be used by him to c r e a t e  new oppor tu n i t i e s  fo r
c i t i z e n s  to  achieve  fo r  themselves the  b e n e f i t s  of the  Great Socie ty .
19Power f o r  Johnson was not as Neustadt described i t ,  an ins trument
of  l a s t  r e s o r t ,  used only when the maximum of  influence  had f a i l e d
20to achieve  d e s i red  goa ls .  Because o f  his concern to maintain
contro l  o f  the  t o t a l  po l icy  making s i t u a t i o n ,  Johnson became a power
maximizer who used the  re source  in d e l i b e r a t e  and in s id ious  ways to
21accomplish the goals  he s e t  f o r  the s o c ie ty .  In the end, many 
observers  f e l t  t h a t  he became fa sc in a te d  with the manipulation of
22p o l i t i c a l  power and l o s t  s ig h t  of the goals o f  the Great Soc ie ty .  
Regardless of the  judgement o f  h i s to ry  on the po in t ,  Johnson did regard 
personal use of  as much p o l i t i c a l  power as necessary to accomplish the 
goals he s e t  fo r  his  adm in is t ra t ion  as the  v i t a l  component of his 
pragmatic approach to na tiona l policy making.
C e n t r a l i z a t i o n  of the  t o t a l  po l icy  making process in him and 
his immediate White House s t a f f  was the  t h i r d  component of  Johnson's  
s t y l e .  Johnson 's  view o f  na tiona l p o l i t i c a l  leadersh ip  placed the
19Neustadt,  P r e s id e n t i a l  Power.
20See Greenste in  and Berman, "Pres iden ts  and t h e i r  Advisers ,"  
p. 5. f o r  a s i m i l a r  d i scuss ion  of the  d i f f e r en c es  between the p ra c t ic e  
of Lyndon Johnson and the model of the  presidency s e t  f o r th  in 
N eu s tad t ' s  work.
Ib id .
2 2 i b i d . ,  Lowi, "One Dimensional P r e s id e n t , "  p. 410 and McPherson, 
A P o l i t i c a l  Education,  pp. 97-98.
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presidency in  the c en te r  of the process which developed the goals o f ,  
and the  means fo r  achieving, na t iona l  po l icy .  For him, na tional 
leaders  s e t  the s tandards  fo r  na t iona l  po l icy  goals ;  they were e lec ted  
to  l e ad ,  to provide the people with  p o l i c i e s  and programs, the means 
fo r  achieving an economically secure  l i f e .  He thought the national 
leader  should s e t  very high s tandards  toward which the poor,  in the 
con tex t  o f  h i s  War on Poverty,  could a s p i r e ;  but i t  was he, as t h e i r  
e lec ted  le ad e r ,  who s e t  the s tanda rds .  His des i r e  fo r  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  
and control  a lso  led  him to t r y  to confine in the White House the 
debate on the s tandards  and the various  po licy  options open to the 
so c ie ty .  His unwil l ingness  to condone l e ak s ,  unless he au thor ized  
them, of information to the press  and the congress is  well known. I t  
i s  th i s  p a t e r n a l i s t i c ,  and a t  t imes d i c t a t o r i a l ,  d r ive  toward c e n t r a ­
l i z e d  c o n t ro l ,  more than any o t h e r ,  t h a t  led to his adoption of  the 
s e c r e t  task force method fo r  the  development of novel po l icy  proposals .
Johnson's r e l a t i o n s h i p  with the  black leadership  of  the c iv i l  
r i g h t s  movement o f f e r s  the bes t  evidence o f  t h i s  p a t e r n a l i s t i c
23d e s i r e  to  c e n t r a l i z e  a l l  power and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  in h is  own hands.
He did not t r u s t  the  leadersh ip  o f  persons l ik e  Martin Luther King,
J r .  because they i n s i s t e d  on developing goals for the so c ie ty  which 
did not  coincide  with those of th e  p re s id en t .  In the Vantage P o in t ,
23See MePerson, A P o l i t i c a l  Education, pp. 35-37 fo r  a s im i la r  
d is cuss ion .  The minutes of the cab ine t  meeting of April 3, 1968 
(Cabinet Meeting, April ^  1968, The White House, LBJ Library) 
conta in  a record o f  Johnson's a t t i t u d e s  toward the leadersh ip  and 
goals of the c i v i l  r i g h t s  movement a t  the time of the March on 
Washington.
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Johnson rev ea l s  t h a t  he wanted control o f  the  public  policy p a r t  of 
the c i v i l  r ig h t s  movement: public  po licy  was h i s  by r ig h t  of e l e c t i o n ,
and black l e a d e r s ,  in p a r t i c u l a r ,  should follow his  lead.  When many 
followed Dr. King and took an independent d i r e c t i o n  Johnson regarded 
i t  as a personal a t t a c k .  They had f a i l e d  him.^^ His was e s s e n t i a l l y  a 
southern p a t e r n a l i s t i c  view o f  the c iv i l  r i g h t s  movement. As t h e i r  
p re s id en t ,  he would lead  black Americans to  g r e a t e r  opportunity  fo r  
fu l l  c i t i z e n s h i p  in and b enef i t s  from the s o c i e ty .  Their r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
was to cooperate  with his p o l i c i e s ,  work hard and achieve much within 
the con tex t  o f  oppor tuni ty  he provided f o r  them.
Thus, Johnson 's  s t y l e  can be charac te r iz ed  as serving l ib e r a l
o r  O r
democratic values with o l ig a rch ica l  means. As Johnson's p o l i t i c a l
caree r  developed, p a r t i c u l a r l y  during the time o f  his presidency,
his l e ad e rsh ip  s t y l e  s l ipped fu r th e r  and f u r t h e r  from the po lyarchical
s ide  o f  Robert  Dahl ' s  s ca le  f o r  measuring p o l i t i c a l  regimes and c lo se r
27to the po in t  designated as hegemonic ru le  by e l i t e s ;  he was unwil l ing  
to t o l e r a t e  and encourage c i t i z e n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  the development and
24See his  d iscuss ion  of  the e f f e c t  on his c i v i l  r ig h t s  s t r a t e g y  
on the events a t  Selma, Alabama. Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage 
P o in t : Perspect ives  on the Presidency, 1963-1969. (New York Chicago
and San Francisco : Holt,  Rinehart  and Winston, 1971), pp. 161-162.
25Universal  a d u l t  f ranch ise  and massive governmental a c t i v i t y  
designed to  encourage maximum individual i n i t a t i v e  in the p u r s u i t  
of the mater ia l  b e n e f i t s  ob ta inab le  from the  so c ie ty .
Government fo r  the people by p o l i t i c a l  and i n t e r e s t  group
e l i t e s .
^^Robert A. Dahl, Modern P o l i t i c a l  A n a ly s i s , (Englewood C l i f f s ,  
N . J . : P ren t ice  H a l l ,  1976), pp. 82-99.
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execution of p o l i c i e s  a f f e c t i n g  them. This s t y l e  led to a myopic per ­
spec t ive  on the s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  consequences of  h is  p o l i c i e s .  Moynihan 
i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a s t u t e  in poin ting th i s  ou t  when he observes t h a t  by 
pu t t ing  the l a r g e s t  p a r t  o f  the local  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  fo r  the War on 
Poverty on the  c i t y  mayors and t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  o rgan iza t ions  (when the 
o r ig in a l  plan fo r  c i t i z e n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in the  Community Action Program 
became a p o l i t i c a l  l i a b i l i t y )  Johnson not on ly  e n t ru s te d  a program the 
urban poor had been led to  be l ieve  was a major s t ep  in social  j u s t i c e  to 
the  most r e a c t io n a ry  p o l i t i c a l  group in American p o l i t i c s ,  but i t  a lso
e f f e c t i v e l y  p i t t e d  a g a in s t  each o the r  two o ld  f r i e n d l y  groups in the
28t r a d i t i o n a l  Democratic a l l i a n c e : b i g  c i t y  mayors and urban Negroes. Here,
as he always t r i e d  to do, Johnson won something in  his  s t rugg le  with the
o th e r  components of the  na tional domestic po l icy  making system. But in
doing so he was blinded to  the  u l t im a te  so c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  consequences
of  the  po l icy  u n t i l  i t  was too l a t e .  The 1967-1968 c r i s i s  in the
c i t i e s ,  which such p o l i c i e s  helped to produce,  came too l a t e  to convince
him th a t  many o f  the  Great Socie ty  urban programs were as much a p a r t
29of  the problem as the  s o lu t io n .  This crude fu m o f  pragmatism had
" Daniel P. Moynihan, Maximum Feas ib le  Misunders tanding: 
Community Action in the War on Poverty , (New York: The f ree  Press ,
1969)7 pp. 142-143.
pq
See in p a r t i c u l a r  the r e p o r t s  (pp. 178-179, 427-428, below) 
prepared f o r  Johnson by ju n io r  members of the  White House s t a f f  a f t e r  
they made extended v i s i t s  to urban ghetto  a reas  during the l a s t  year 
and one-ha l f  of  the ad m in i s t r a t io n .  In the se  they repeatedly  
pointed out t h a t  much of  the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  program e f f o r t s  was 
not reaching the intended r e c ip i e n t s  and t h a t  the  adm in is t ra t ion  and 
i t ' s  Great Socie ty  programs were g e t t in g  the  blame.
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no a p p re c ia t io n  f o r  the key in g red ien t  of i t s  long fo rgo t ten  ph i losophical
s i r e  t h a t  the  consequences of a c t io n  must be a n t i c ip a t e d  and evaluated
before the  a c t io n  i s  taken.
This i n t e g r a t i o n  of personal s t y l e  and in h e r i t e d  p o l i t i c a l
con tex t  which c o n s t i t u t e  the essence o f  Johnson's  approach to the  p re s -
dency can be summarized as fo llows: F i r s t ,  the  p re s id e n t ,  in Johnson 's
view, provided the  nation  with cohesion through the implementation of
the  l i b e r a l  New Deal Democratic creed.  Second, Johnson saw one a spec t
of his  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r o l e  of commander-in-chief to be the p a c i f i e r  of
the  world and thereby the guarantor o f  the domestic l ib e r a l  values
30inhe ren t  in the f i r s t  view.
When Johnson perceived t h a t  his  f i r s t  unders tanding of the 
pres idency was under a t t a c k  and in danger of co l laps ing  under the 
pressure  of  events  in the l a s t  two years  of h is  adm in is t ra t ion  he 
sh i f t e d  to th e  second to mainta in co n t ro l .  One major adv iser  t o ld  
him how he could use h is  commander-in-chief r u l e  in his at tempts to  
deal with  domestic po licy  problems. National Secur i ty  Adviser Walt 
W. Rostow saw the two as e s s e n t i a l l y  id en t ica l  in substance and th e re f o r e  
demanding s i m i l a r  responses:
I was much s t ruck  — in your e x c e l l e n t  address l a s t  n ig h t  - -  
by the  p a r a l l e l s  between your formulation of  domestic po l icy  and 
those  you have appl ied  to  fo re ign  po l icy .
I f  and when th e  time comes to appeal to our people to  s t a r t  
th e  course both a t  home and abroad - -  perhaps in the con tex t  of a 
tax  in c rease  - -  you may wish to make these  p a r a l l e l s  e x p l i c i t .
3 0 I r v in g  L. Horowitz "Johnson and Rise o f  P r e s id e n t i a l
M i l i t a r i s m , "  p. 395.
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S p e c i f i c a l l y  —
1. At home your appeal is  f o r  law and order as the framework 
f o r  economic and soc ia l  p rogress .  Abroad we f i g h t  in Vietnam to 
make aggress ion  u n p ro f i t ab l e  while helping the  people of  Vietnam 
and a l l  o f  Free Asia — build  a fu tu re  of  economic and social  
p rogress .  The equ iva len t  o f  domestic law and o rder  on the world 
scene i s  t h a t  na tions  forego the  use of v io lence  across 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f r o n t i e r s .
2. The p a r a l l e l  can be done in g rea te r  d e t a i l .  Abroad, you have 
formulated our p o l i c i e s  under four  headings which have domestic 
p a r a l l e l  as fo llows:
Abroad At Home
Deterrence  o f  aggress ion  -  Law and order
Economic and social  progress  - Economic and soc ia l  progress
U.S. p a r tn e r sh ip  with regional -  Federal p a r tn e r sh ip  with the
o r g a n iz a t i o n s .  S ta te s .
R e c o n c i l i a t io n  among na t ions  - Reconcil ia t ion  among a l l  groups
which now a re  postured in in our own s o c i e ty ,
mutual h o s t i l i t y .
3. I c i t e  these  p a r a l l e l s  because i t  is  a f a c t  t h a t  we cannot
play our p a r t  on the world scene unless we do so from a base of
o rder  and progress  a t  home; and, equal ly ,  we cannot build  order 
and progress  a t  home in a world where U.S. withdrawal from i t s  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  r e s u l t s  in an in te rna t iona l  environment o f  chaos 
and v io lence .  I t  is  unsafe fo r  our socie ty  - -  a t  home and abroad 
- -  to walk away from i t s  domestic problems and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .
I t  i s  equal ly  unsafe f o r  our so c ie ty  — a t  home and abroad — to
walk away from i t s  ex te rna l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  Therefore ,  we
must - -  and we can - -  f ind the energy, t a l e n t ,  and resources to
work f o r  order and progress  a t  home and abroad which means:
- -  the  c i t i e s ;
- -  fo re ign  a id ;
- -  and seeing i t  through in  Vietnam.
Memo, Rostow to LBJ, Ju ly  28, 1967. McPherson 8/R io ts  1, LBJ 
L ib ra ry .  This memo was w r i t t en  in response to Johnson's  address to the 
n a t io n  following the events of the  D e t r io t  r i o t  and the subsequent 
appointment o f  the Kerner Commission. There is  no record  of Johnson 
responding  to  i t .
CHAPTER V 
THE JOHNSON AD HOC ADVISORY SYSTEM
A) In t roduct ion
The system o f  ad hoc advisory groups developed by Lyndon Johnson 
i s  a prime example o f  the in te g ra t io n  o f  personal s t y l e  and in h e r i t e d  
p o l i t i c a l  t r a d i t i o n  d iscussed  in  the previous s e c t io n .  The t r a d i t i o n  
of  using such groups to enhance the policy-making dominance of the 
presidency was well e s t a b l i s h e d  when Johnson became p re s id en t ,^  and 
his r e l i a n c e  on i t  i l l u s t r a t e s  a general c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  his p re ­
sidency: a s t ro n g e r  tendency to  p e r f e c t  the a d m in i s t r a t iv e  p a t te rn s
of the  p a s t  than to  innovate .  The use of p r e s id e n t i a l  advisory groups,
2
p a r t i c u l a r l y  s e c r e t  ta sk  f o r c e s ,  was well su i t e d  to his personal s t y l e ;
As noted above, p. 35, Johnson as the  majo r ity  l e a d e r  o f  the 
Senate had run afoul of Pres iden t  Eisenhower's  use o f  s e c r e t  advisory 
committees in the d ispu te  over national s e c u r i t y  which cen tered  on the 
Gai ther Commission.
2
These groups were the p r incipal means by which his  adm in is t ra t ion  
generated i t s  t r u l y  impressive record o f  po l icy  making id e a s ,  program 
recommendations and l e g i s l a t i v e  proposals ;  by l a t e  1968, by i t s  count 
and hyperbole the Johnson adm in is t ra t ion  had seen 401 p ieces  o f  l e g i s l a ­
t ion  passed ,  most of  which were concerned with domestic pol icy  m at te rs ;  
of these  291 were branded as "major" and 110 as "landmark" with  s ix ty -seven  
b i l l s  s t i l l  pending! See "Legis la t ive  Record o f  the Johnson Administ rat ion" 
[undated] Cal ifano  4 9 /L eg is la t io n ,  LBJ L ib ra r y .
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beyond s a t i s f y i n g  his personal need to  con tro l  his immediate environ­
ment, the t r a d i t i o n  of ad hoc advisory groups which Johnson in h e r i t e d  
f u l f i l l e d  a powerful complementary i n s t i t u t i o n a l  need; i t  provided 
his presidency with an adm in is t ra t ive  and p o l i t i c a l l y  e f f e c t iv e  
means fo r  ob ta in ing  policy  making informat ion from t e c h n ic a l ly  competent 
exper ts  o u ts ide  the government without pass ing  through the f i l t e r  o f  
the executive  bureaucracy or the l e g i s l a t i v e  p rocess ;  the avoidance o f  
both allowed Johnson to  enhance the  White House's p o s i t io n  as i n i t i a t o r  
o f  public p o l ic y .  Glazer c o r r e c t ly  contends t h a t  the  system evolved 
as a r e f l e c t i o n  of two p o l i t i c a l  f a c t s  o f  b u r e a u c r a t i c - p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  
in Washington: 1) the p re s iden t  does not expect to  get what he wants
or  needs in the  way of  policy-making th ink ing  from the caree r  bureau­
cracy or  his  p o l i t i c a l  ap po in tees ,  and 2) no permanent p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u ­
t ion  can give the p re s id en t  what he needs to  mainta in  his  pre-eminent 
policy making pos i t ion  f a s t  enough, cheap enough, r e f l e c t i n g  a broad enough, 
range of values and i n t e r e s t s  with  such r e l a t i v e l y  low p o l i t i c a l  c o s t  to
3
him as the ad hoc advisory group.
Nathan Glazer ,  "On Task Forcing,"  The Public  I n t e r e s t  15 (Spring 
1959): 42-43. Clapp sees  s ix  s p e c i f i c  reasons fo r  recent p res iden ts  
e s t a b l i s h in g  task  forces  within the Executive O ff ice  o f  the  P res iden t :  
to provide v i s i b i l i t y  f o r  the p r e s i d e n t ' s  i n t e r e s t  in a p a r t i c u l a r  sub­
j e c t  o r  po l icy  problem, to e l i c i t  new id e a s ,  to eva lua te  on-going pro­
grams, to give an independent view o f  a problem, to  provide support  f o r  
a program regarded as important to  the  p r e s id e n t  and p re sen t ly  under 
some form of p o l i t i c a l  a t t a c k ,  and encourage as broad as possib le  p a r t i ­
c ipat ion  by e l i t e  leadersh ip  in the p o l i c y  making process .  See Charles 
L. Clapp, Montauk Symposium, 1971, pp. 80-83.
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The mature Johnson system o f  ad hoc advisory groups ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
the agency and outs ide s e c r e t  ta sk  fo rces  and the pub l ic  advisory 
commissions, was,  by any a d m in i s t r a t iv e  s t an d a rd s ,  a highly soph is ­
t i c a t e d ,  c lo s e ly  in teg ra ted  means f o r  producing and c o n t r o l l i n g  the 
information f o r  and the p o l i c i e s  o f  the  Great Society programs.^
As a general r u l e ,  Johnson appointed t a sk  forces on a r e g u la r ,  planned 
schedule as a v i t a l  element in h is  production of  the l e g i s l a t i v e  
foundation fo r  his programs. Advisory commissions,  on the o th e r  hand, 
were i r r e g u l a r l y  appointed in response to  the various p re s su res  on his  
o f f i c e  d iscussed  in  Chapter 4.  I l l u s t r a t i o n s  abound o f  Johnson 's  
appoin ting a pub l ic  commission and one o r  more task  forces  to cons ide r  
the same po l icy  problem, o r  s e t  o f  problems. To a n t i c i p a t e  somewhat the  
d iscuss ion  to be found in the next s e c t i o n ,  a useful i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h i s  
type of  close  in t e g ra t io n  can be drawn from Johnson 's  s t ru g g le  to  command 
the federal  govermental response to  the urban r i o t s  of  1967; the  Kerner 
Commission, charged with general co n s id e ra t io n  o f  the d i s o r d e r s ,  e x i s t e d  
coterminus with the Kaiser Commission on housing and fo u r  major task  
fo rces  on c i v i l  r i g h t s :  the  1967 (annual)  Task Force on Civil  R ights ,  
the  Task Force on Urban Employment Opportunity ,  the  Task Force on Crime 
and the Task Force on Summer Programs.^ A major reason f o r  so c lo se ly
^See Wolanin, "P res iden t ia l  Advisory Commissions," p. 54, f o r  a 
s i m i l a r  d iscuss ion  of the i n t e g ra te d  c h a r a c t e r  o f  the Johnson system.
5
The record and repo r t  of  each Johnson task force can be found, 
by name, in th e  Task Force Finding Aid in  the  LBJ Library .
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i n t e g r a t i n g  the work o f  the  ta sk  forces  and commissions was the  educa­
t i o n  of p a r t i c u l a r  e l i t e  publics  discussed  in  Chapter 2 .  Of a l l  the 
various p o s s ib l e  b e n e f i t s  to the adm in is t ra t ion  acc ru ing  from the use 
of  adv iso ry  commissions in conjunct ion with task f o r c e s ,  education o f  
co n g re s sp e r so n s , the federa l  bureaucracy and various p r i v a t e  e l i t e s  
were high on Johnson 's  l i s t .  A prime example would be th e  use o f  the 
Commission on Rural Poverty as an educational device t o  r e in fo r c e  
a d m in i s t r a t i v e  recommendations on the  school lunch program which had 
been p rev ious ly  pe r fec ted  for the  ad m in is t ra t ion  by th e  A g r icu l tu ra l  
and Rural Life  Task Force of 1965.^
The following l i s t  of commissions and task f o r c e s ,  chosen to 
re p re se n t  the  v a r i e ty  of sub jec ts  given to these  groups by the  Johnson 
a d m in is t r a t io n  and l i s t e d  here w i thou t  rank o rd e r in g ,  bears  wi tness  to 
i t s  impressive record of policy i n i t a t i v e  and accomplishment.
Commissi ons^
Warren,  Kerner,  Eisenhower, Kappell (pos t  o f f i c e )  Kaiser 
(h o u s in g ) ,  na t iona l  l i b r a r i e s , mental r e t a r d a t i o n ,  ru ra l  
p o v e r ty ,  heal th  f a c i l i t i e s ,  in t e rn a t io n a l  s t u d i e s ,  ve te rans  
h o s p i t a l s ,  automation and technology, pa ten t system, crime 
in Washington, D.C.,  m i l i t a r y  d r a f t ,  t e n a n t s '  r i g h t s ,  and 
h e a r t ,  cancer and s t ro k e .
^See Cater  4 /P r e s id e n t i a l  Memoranda, 9/67-10/67 and FG 690/Task 
Force on A g r icu l tu re  and Rural L i f e ,  1965, LBJ L ib ra ry .
^Popular or s u b je c t  t i t l e s  a re  used.
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Task Forces
Civil  R ig h t s ,  Crime, P ro tec t ion  f o r  the  P ub l i c ,  Health and 
Educat ion,  Innovation and Economic Growth, Consumer P ro tec t io n ,  
Urban Employment O p p o r tu n i t i e s ,  G if ted  Persons,  Agr icu l tu re  and 
Rural L i f e ,  Government Organiza t ion ,  Summer Programs, Child 
Development, Communications, Housing, C i t i e s .
Even a casual comparison o f  t h i s  l i s t  with  the  major l e g i s l a t i v e  accomp­
lishments  o f  the  Johnson adm in is t ra t ion  shows t h a t  the  system o f  task  
forces  and adv isory  commissions was c lo se ly  t i e d  to  the major i n t e r e s t s  
supporting the Great  Soc ie ty  program. The a n a ly s i s  of  the ad hoc 
advisory groups which follows f u r t h e r  r e in f o r c e s  t h a t  impression.
The Johnson use o f  ad hoc advisory groups in  the  development of  
his l e g i s l a t i v e  program was pa t te rned  a f t e r  those systems used by his  
immediate p redecesso rs .  And, as with much o f  the Johnson a d m in is t r a t iv e
O
s t y l e ,  in  p u t t i n g  to g e th e r  his system he r e f in e d  h i s  in h e r i t a n c e .
Johnson came to  the  White House determined to  be a s trong p re s id ­
e n t .  He be l ieved  in the adage t h a t  the  p r e s id e n t  proposes and the 
congress d i sp o se s .  He arranged the informat ion ga ther ing  and po l icy
g
The substance  o f  t h i s  sec t ion  has been taken from in te rv iew s ,
Joseph C a l i f a n o ' s  ora l  h i s to r y  tape in th e  Johnson Library ,  Thomas and 
Wolman, "Policy Formula tion,"  and an undated and unsigned paper  t i t l e d  
"Policy Formulation in th e  Johnson Adminis t ra t ion"  found in the  LBJ 
Library in G a i the r  17/Pol icy  Formulation During the  Johnson Adminis tra tion.  
Content an a ly s i s  o f  the l a s t  document f i x e s  the  da te  of i t s  composition 
l a t e  in the  h i s t o r y  o f  the  a d m in i s t r a t io n ,  probably sometime in  the l a s t  
s ix  months.
146
development system of  the  White House to  maximize his a b i l i t y  to  
r e a l i z e  i t s  t r u t h .  Kearns confirms t h i s  view o f  Johnson's under­
s tanding  of the  ro le  of the  p r e s id e n t  in na t iona l  policy making; she 
shows i t  not to  have been a r e s u l t  o f  h is  acceding to the o f f i c e .  While 
the  substance o f  the following remarks was concerned with na t iona l  s e c u r i t y  
m a t t e r s ,  the  a t t i t u d e  expressed concerning p res iden t ia l  i n i a t i v e  in 
po l icy  making i s  app l icab le  to  a l l  h i s  r e l a t i o n s h ip s  with congress.
In Johnson 's  view-which many sh a red - th e  presidency was the 
only i n s t i t u t i o n  in the American system capable of c o n s i s t e n t ly  
i n i t i a t i n g  major l e g i s l a t i o n .  I t  was up to  the pres ident to 
id e n t i f y  problems, f i r s t  to  b r ing  them to  public  a t t e n t i o n ,  
and to d r a f t  b i l l s  designed to  so lve  them. The executive 
must provide the agenda fo r  Congressional ac t ion  and s e t  f o r th  
the sub jec t  matte r and p r i o r i t i e s  fo r  debate  and decis ion .
Congress was no t ,  in h is  view equipped with the exper t i se ,  
the  t ime, o r  the type o f  coherent  o rg an iza t iona l  s t ru c tu re  
needed to formalize and i n i t i a t e  programs o f  action on a 
reg u la r  and s y s tem a t ica l ly  r e l a t e d  b a s i s .  "Whenever my 
c r i t i c s  in the  Congress t a lk ed  to  me about the  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  
o f  c re a t in g  i s s u e s ,  I came back to  the  question  of where the 
hell  they expected the i s sues  to  come from-from our heads?
I f  an i s su e  i s  not included in  th e  p r e s id e n t i a l  agenda, i t  
i s  almost imposs ib le -shor t  o f  c r i s i s - t o  ge t  Congress t o  focus 
on i t .  T h a t ' s  the way the system works; but these fe llows 
never understood t h a t .  They d i d n ' t  understand-with a l l  
t h e i r  c a l l s  f o r  Congress to  have a l l  s o r t s  of  exper t ise  and 
c l a s s i f i e d  in fo r m a t io n . . .  t h a t  the  Congressional r o l e . . . i s  
not to ac t  but to  respond to  the  e x e c u t iv e .9
The s t r u c t u r e  and the t r a d i t i o n  o f  po l icy  making Johnson in h e r i t e d  
provided fo r  the  depar tments /agencies  o f  the  executive branch to g e th e r  
with t h e i r  i n t e r e s t  group c l i e n t s  to  propose new programs and l e g i s l a ­
t i v e  proposals to the p re s id en t  through the  Bureau of the Budget.
g
Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and The American Dream, pp. 139-140.
^^Changed to  the Office o f  Management and Budget during the 
adm in is t ra t io n  of Richard Nixon.
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Johnson thought t h a t  t h i s  t r a d i t i o n a l  p r a c t i c e  worked well in two p a r t i ­
cu lar  ways a t  d i f f e r e n t  t imes in  the h i s t o r y  of  an adm in is t ra t ion .  F i r s t ,  
i t  i s  the  b e s t  way to provide f o r  incremental  adjustments and minor changes 
to e x i s t i n g  programs with the  f u l l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  a l l  the major 
i n t e r e s t s  concerned. I t  was i d e a l ly  s u i t e d  to the bureaucra t ic  and 
p l u r a l i s t i c  demand for slow incremental  development and change o f  p o l icy .  
Second, during the  f i r s t  two years  o f  an a d m in i s t r a t io n ,  when the re  
were l a rg e  numbers of new persons s t a f f i n g  the  various agencies/  
departments ,  the  system permits a f r e e ,  non- inc rementa l , flow o f  po l icy  
ideas .  I t  was the  problems inheren t  in th e  incremental  process o f  the 
t r a d i t i o n a l  way o f  execut ive  branch po l icy  making t h a t  moved Johnson 
to c r e a t e  a process which could overcome b u re a u c ra t i c  i n e r t i a  by br inging 
to the  White House outs ide  exper ts  who could  provide evaluat ions of  
e x i s t i n g  p o l i c i e s  and recommendations f o r  changes.  He wanted to provide 
a means fo r  innovative  po l icy  sugges t ions  t o  come in to  the White House 
from u n i v e r s i t i e s  and o th e r  cen te rs  of  p o l i c y  planning without f i r s t  going 
through the  f i l t e r i n g  process o f  the fede ra l  bureaucracy. Like a l l  
post-World War I I  p r e s id e n t s ,  and more determined than most, Johnson wanted 
a system which would be responsive to h is  p r e s id e n t i a l  leadersh ip  and 
which would give him the  a b i l i t y  to dominate the  executive agencies /  
departments,  by c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e i r  pol icy  making agenda from the White House.
He and h is  White House s e n io r  s t a f f  were f r u s t r a t e d  by the f a c t  t h a t  the  
execut ive depar tments/agencies  did not see themselves as func t iona l  u n i t s  
of the  White House. Johnson s e t  out to change t h a t .  He wanted more 
in format ion,  more c o n t ro l ,  in order  to enable  him to  produce more l e g i s l a t i o n .
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Johnson 's  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i n c t s  compelled him to  r e s i s t  any tempta­
t io n  to  a l t e r  r a d i c a l l y  the White House po l icy  making system he in h e r i t e d  
in 1953; the primary reason being, o f  course ,  the  f a c t  t h a t  he had not 
been e lec te d  to the  o f f i c e .  Johnson was caut ious  and r e s i s t e d  any 
tempta tion to  change s t a f f  personnel and/or  po l icy  making procedures w i th ­
in  one y e a r  of  a na tional e l e c t i o n .  This was p a r t i c u l a r l y  important,  he 
thought,  i f  he was not to jeopordize  what he regarded as an almost c e r t a i n  
v ic to ry  in  t h a t  e l e c t i o n .  He, t h e r e f o r e ,  adopted a p o s i t io n  of  holding 
the l in e  in ad m in is t ra t ive  changes and any new programs and to  prepare 
fo r  the  f i r s t  two year s  of the  new ad m in is t r a t io n  in  which he could take 
quick advantage o f  the congress and the  federa l  bureaucracy by the  new 
personnel and procedures fo r  executive  po licy  making he planned to i n t r o ­
duce.
Johnson had been impressed with the  s t r e n g th s  and weakness of 
the  task  forces developed in  the 1960 campaign. These t a sk  forces  were 
used to  produce i s su e  papers and to a id  the p r e s i d e n t - e l e c t  during the 
t r a n s i t i o n  pe r iod .  They were ex ce l le n t  veh ic les  fo r  tapping the r ich  
idea resources  o f  the  p r iv a te  sec to r  as well as a means f o r  al lowing 
innovators  w i th in  the  government to s u r f a c e .  But he found t h e i r  public 
exposure to be a disadvantage.  The openness o f  t h e i r  work allowed the  
oppos i t ion  too much time to  develop i t s  co u n te ra t t a c k .  In the p o l i t i c a l  
world o f  Lyndon Johnson one did not al low the p o l i t i c a l  opposit ion to  know 
one 's  s t r a t e g y  and the s t r en g th  of  o n e ' s  proposals  u n t i l  the  time was r i g h t  
to  use both to insu re  v ic to ry .  I t  was th e re fo re  na tura l  fo r  Johnson to 
want to  use idea producing ta sk  forces  in his  ad m in is t r a t io n  and to keep t h e i r
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work from f r iend  and foe a l ik e  un t i l  he was ready t o  use i t .
A f te r  the  e l e c t i o n  of 1964, Johnson moved qu ick ly  to  secure  
the b en e f i t s  o f  the  Kennedy task  force  idea wi thou t  i t s  l i a b i l i t i e s .
He e s t a b l i sh e d  w i th in  the  White House his  system o f  s e c r e t  o u t s id e ­
ta sk  fo rces  which became the major c o n t r ib u to r  to  h i s  y e a r l y  production 
o f  Great Socie ty  l e g i s l a t i v e  p roposa ls .  In a d d i t io n  to  s a t i s f y i n g  his  
previously  discussed  personal penchant fo r  secrecy  and c o n t r o l ,  Johnson 
saw f ive  v i r t u e s  in having ta sk  forces  do t h e i r  work secure  from the 
g la re  of Washington p u b l i c i t y .  F i r s t ,  pub l ic  adv iso ry  groups are  fo rced ,  
by t h e i r  v i s i b i l i t y ,  to  be too cau t ious ;  such e x e r c i s e s  in  caution run 
the ser ious  p o l i t i c a l  r i s k  of giving t a c t i c a l  advantage to  opponents.
Second, in  a d d i t io n  to  receiv ing  innovat ive po l icy  ideas  Johnson wanted 
to know what was be ing done in c o r r e c t ly  in the fede ra l  bureaucracy. He 
did not th ink  he could  receive  from a pub l ic  advisory  group very ob jec t ive  
information about the  q u a l i ty  of  the work being done by the agencies 
supposedly under h i s  c o n t ro l .  Three, Johnson did not  want t o  fo rce  mem­
bers o f  ta sk  fo rces  to  endure the pressures  of working under what he 
regarded as the  harrassment from the na t iona l  p re s s  corps which i s  i n f l i c t e d  
upon a l l  p r e s i d e n t i a l  appoin tees .  Four, s e r v ic e  on a pub l ic  advisory 
group makes too many demands on persons a l ready  too  busy. The s e c r e t  t a sk  
force  is  l e s s  demanding; because o f  i t s  lack  o f  p u b l i c  exposure i t s  work 
can be f in i sh ed  f a s t e r  than t h a t  of  a pub l ic  advisory  commission. F in a l ly ,  
the s e c r e t  task  fo rce  allowed the p re s id en t  and members o f  his s t a f f  
time to r e f i n e  the t a s k  force  recommendations b e fo re  exposing them to
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the  reac t ions  o f  congress ,  execu t ive  branch and the va r ious  concerned 
i n t e r e s t  groups
An addi t iona l  value can be added to Johnson's  l i s t  of the  v i r t u e s  
o f  the  s e c r e t  task fo rce ;  they provided a way fo r  the a d m in i s t r a t io n  to 
experiment with policy ideas  a t  l i t t l e  or no p o l i t i c a l  r i s k .  They 
were in f a c t  in-house th in k - tan k s  in which the  White House could 
experiment with policy ideas  which i t  may or  may not in t roduce  to 
the  congress and na t ion .  Such exper imentat ion and the o p por tun i ty  i t  
o f fe red  fo r  the development o f  n ea t ly  re f ined  ideas and l e g i s l a t i v e  
s t r a t e g i e s  provided Johnson with y e t  another  veh ic le  f o r  domination of 
the  congress in the policy  i n i t i a t i o n  game.
Throughout 1964, Johnson and his  sen io r  s t a f f  t i n k e r e d  with t h e i r  
ad hoc advisory system and by 1965 i t s  s t r u c t u r e  and procedures  were 
re f in ed  in to  the form to  be maintained through the end o f  the admin­
i s t r a t i o n ;  outs ide  ta sk  fo rces  produced the s u b s ta n t iv e  po l icy  
ideas  f o r  the Great S o c ie ty ,  department/agency task  fo r c e s  reviewed 
t h e i r  work and coordinated programs which had over lapping  agency j u r i s ­
d i c t i o n ;  commissions were appointed to buy time in the midst  of
The s e c re t  task  force  a l so  allowed the a d m in is t r a t io n  more s k i l l ­
f u l l y  to  use what became f o r  them a very important  s t r a t e g i c  tool in t h e i r  
s t r u g g le  with the congress:  the  planned leak to  the p re s s  of  information 
genera ted  by the  o f f - t h e - r e c o r d  research  groups.  The t i g h t e r  the control 
over the  task  f o r c e s ,  the more p o te n t i a l  use the  informat ion  they produced 
would be in the b a t t l e  fo r  p o l i t i c a l  advantage in p o l i c y  making. See 
Cal ifano 57 [1758]/Press C on tac ts ,  LBJ L ib rary ,  fo r  evidence  of  the  White 
House's e f f o r t s  to control  what to  i t  were "bad",  or unplanned leaks 
thought to be detrimenta l  to  the p re s id en t  and his  program while a t  
the  same time providing fo r  the  press  those leaks  which were thought  to 
be o f  use in fu r the r ing  or c l a r i f y i n g  the White House's des igns .  For 
o th e r  example of  leaks see the d iscuss ion  of t h i s  to p i c  in  the context 
of  the work o f  the Kerner Commission below.
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various types of c r i s e s  and, in  ad d i t ion ,  aid the  a d m in is t r a t io n  in 
supporting the  Great Socie ty  l e g i s l a t i v e  proposals  before  the  congress.
The key person in the development and o p e ra t ion  o f  th e  Great
Socie ty  during i t s  most productive  years was Joseph C. C a l i fano ,  J r . ,
Johnson's c h i e f  White House domestic a ide .  He came to  the  White House
from the  Department of Defense with l i t t l e  exper ience  in  domestic pol icy
making. Johnson gave Califano th ree  general r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s :  1) develop
the l e g i s l a t i v e  program. 2) coord inate  a l l  the  domestic departments and
3) coord inate  the  economic p o l i c i e s  of the  a d m in i s t r a t i o n .  When he
took o f f i c e ,  Cal ifano thought the  scope o f  the  t a sk  force  system he
inhe r i ted  was too broad and the  groups too i n e f f i c i e n t .  To remedy both
defects  he a ttempted a r e s t r u c t u r i n g  of the  t a s k  fo rce s  along the l in e s
of the Department o f  Defense's  Programming-Planning-Budgeting (PPB)
17system. This e f f o r t  a t  i n s t i t u t i n g  PPB was even l e s s  successfu l  than 
most o f  the  o th e r s  t r i e d  in Johnson 's  Washington. However, C a l i fano 's  
e f f o r t s  did c o n t r ib u t e  to the c rea t io n  of  t i g h t  a d m in i s t r a t iv e  contro ls  
on task  fo rces  and c l o s e l y  in te g ra te d  t h e i r  work with the  po l icy  goals 
being s e t  by the White House.
The th re e  major p a r t s  of  the ad hoc advisory  group system Califano 
and his  s t a f f  p e r fec ted  were commissions, agency ta sk  fo rces  and outs ide  
ta sk  fo rce s .  In the e a r l y  s tages  of  t h e i r  development each had a p a r t i ­
cu la r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to perform. Public commissions "took the  heat" 
fo r  the  ad m in is t r a t io n  generated by the c o n t ro v e rs ia l  p a r t s  o f  the Great
1 ?“See C a l i f a n o ' s  d iscuss ion  of th i s  development in h is  oral  h i s to ry  
type in the  LBJ Library .
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Socie ty  program and served as the  major educator of congress and the  
public  concerning p a r t i c u l a r  po l icy  i s sues  under d i s p u te .  Outs ide 
task  fo rces  were the idea g e n e r a t o r s ,  the  groups which proposed 
s p e c i f i c  l e g i s l a t i v e  program recommendations. The agency task fo rce  
was o r i g i n a l l y  intended to  review the recommendations of the o u t s id e  
ta sk  fo rces  fo r  p o l i t i c a l  and a d m in i s t r a t iv e  a cc e p ta b i l i t y ;  as var ious  
p ressures  mounted on the a d m in is t r a t io n  and as congressional su p p o r t  fo r  
the Great Socie ty  programs d im in ished , Johnson and Califano tu rn e d  more 
and more to these  advisory groups composed of admin is tra tive  i n s i d e r s  to  
help them in what was to become the  inc reas ing ly  f u t i l e  task  o f  domestic 
policy  coo rd ina t ion .
The ana lys i s  of  these  p a r t s  of the Johnson ad hoc advisory groups 
system which fol lows i s  intended to  reveal the  unique c o n t r ib u t io n s  of 
each and the p o l i t i c a l  and a d m in i s t r a t iv e  l inkages between them.
B) D ef in i t ions
The Johnson a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  advisory commissions can be f i t t e d
comfortably in to  the general d e f i n i t i o n  o f  p res iden t ia l  advisory
commissions put f o r th  in Chapter 2:
A p r e s i d e n t i a l  advisory commission i s  an ad hoc body 
o f  t e c h n i c a l l y  competent, h igh ly  p re s t ig ious  persons,  
the  major i ty  of whom are not a t  the  time of t h e i r  
appointment government o f f i c i a l s ,  appointed and pub­
l i c l y  charged by the p re s id e n t  to  independently study 
and rep o r t  on what he pe rce ives  to be a highly s e n s i t iv e  
na t iona l  p o l i t i c a l - p o l i c y  i s s u e  which cannot be managed 
by the  re g u la r  a d m in i s t r a t iv e  devices created fo r  th a t  
purpose by a given a d m in i s t r a t io n .
13 P a r t i c u l a r  commissions dev ia ted  from the norm; v iz ,  the  members of 
the Warren Commission were a l l  a c t i v e  members of the government. But, 
here the  exception does prove the  r u l e .
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An opera t ional  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  the two types o f  Johnson task  fo rces  
takes the following form:
A con f iden t ia l  advisory group, composed o f  t e c h n i c a l ly  
competent and/or persons bear ing  o f f i c i a l  p o l i t i c a l  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  fo r  a p a r t i c u l a r  domestic po l icy  a re a ,  
appointed by the p re s id en t  to  re f ine  and p e r f e c t  a 
p r e s i d e n t i a l l y  s e le c te d  publ ic  problem area  and to 
p resen t  to  the White House independent p o l i t i c a l  and 
f i s c a l  recommendations fo r  l e g i s l a t i v e  and/o r  admin­
i s t r a t i v e  a c t i o n . 14
C) Purpose of  Ad Hoc Advisory Groups
The c rea t ion  of  a l e g i s l a t i v e  foundation f o r  his Great  Society 
was Lyndon Johnson's ove r r id in g  concern as p re s id e n t .  Unti l  the 
events of Vietnam overwhelmed him and his a d m in i s t r a t io n ,  a l l  his 
formidable personal resources  were attuned to  the achievement o f  t h i s  goal 
Kearns describes  i s  s i n g l e  minded obsession to  make the l e g i s l a t i v e  pro­
cess his  p r in c ip a l  concern:
In words and deeds,  Johnson made known h is  in te n t io n  to  
concentra te  on l e g i s l a t i o n . . .  he committed most of his  
waking hours to  the  Great Soc ie ty  . . .  (he saw his job with 
Congress to  be) to  obta in  the  maximum l e g i s l a t i v e  o u tp u t  
th a t  any p a r t i c i p a n t  could be made to produce .15
Central to t h i s  task  were h is  commissions and ta sk  fo rce s .
The purpose of the Johnson advisory commission d i f f e r e d  l i t t l e  
from the general p a t t e rn  d iscussed  in Chapter 2; t h e i r  fundamental 
purpose was to  ga ther  and process  policy information to serve  p re -
See Glazer  "On Task Forcing,"  p. 43, Thomas and Wolman, "Policy 
Formulation," p. 129 and pp. 136-138 and Gaither  F ile  17 /Po l icy  For­
mulation During the Johnson Adminis tra tion,  LBJ Library .
^^Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and The American Dream, pp. 233-234.
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s i d e n t i a l l y  defined purposes.  Johnson appointed two types of  advisory 
commissions. The f i r s t  was intended to  buy t im e .  Appointed in the 
context of  an ad m in is t ra t ive  or p o l i t i c a l  c r i s i s ,  these  were a means 
of  secur ing  time and breath ing room fo r  the o th e r  advisory groups 
and/or execu t ive  depar tments/agencies .  These commissions took the 
h e a t ,  al lowing the White House to avoid making rash ac t ions  which might 
be p o l i t i c a l l y  damaging to  the ad m in is t r a t io n  o r  the na t ion .
The second type was created  to  a s s i s t  in supporting  the admin­
i s t r a t i o n ;  they were given mandates to prod the agencies /depar tm ents ,  con­
gress and th e  various i n t e r e s t  groups on beha l f  of  programs and 
p o l i c i e s  thought to be in t rouble  on the H il l  o r  with various e l i t e  
p u b l i c s .  These commissions served both an execu t ive  overs igh t  and 
an educa t iona l  func t ion .
Popper c o r r e c t ly  describes  most Johnson commissions as c r i s i s  
o r i e n te d .  (Popper,  P r e s id e n t ' s  Commissions, p.  5) e .g .  During 
the  t ime the Kerner Commission was car ry ing  out i t s  assignment the 
congress  was debating an a n t i - r i o t  b i l l  with which the adm in is t ra t ion  
f e l t  uncomfortable .  Being able to po in t  to the y e t  uncompleted 
information ga ther ing  a c t i v i t y  of  the commission allowed the admin­
i s t r a t i o n  to  avoid having to take a pub l ic  s t an d  on the b i l l  and 
thereby slow i t s  congressional progress  and to  even tua l ly  amend i t s  
con ten t .  See Ex/FI/4,  10/13/1967 -  1 /26 /68 ,  LBJ Library  fo r  documen­
t a t i o n  d esc r ib ing  the White House s t r a t e g y  regard ing  t h i s  b i l l .
^^The Kappel Commission (Post  Off ice) i s  a good example. The 
a d m in is t r a t io n  used t h i s  commission to  inform the  Post Off ice  Depart­
ment t h a t  p re sen t  p ra c t i c e s  were under carefu l  examination and t h a t  
ad m in i s t r a t iv e  changes might be in the o f f in g .  I t  a lso  a le r ted .congress  
and the  p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  groups which were concerned t h a t  an a d j u s t ­
ment in po l icy  was being contemplated.
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Johnson 's  ta sk  forces  were more i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  w i th in  his  
domestic l e g i s l a t i o n  product ion system. Regardless o f  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
(agency or  o u t s i d e ) ,  t a sk  forces  were in t im a te ly  t i e d  to the  adminis­
t r a t i o n ' s  y e a r ly  cycle  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n .  The i r  purpose was to  provide
innovat ive  and " o b je c t i v e " ,  policy ideas  with in  the  boundaries o f  the  goals
18o f  the  Great Soc ie ty .  In the Johnson domestic pol icy  making system, 
then ,  t a sk  fo rces  provided the i n t e l l e c t u a l  c o n te n t ,  fo llowing the  guide­
l i n e s  s e t  by the p re s id en t  and the agenc ies /depar tm en ts ;  congress and 
the sp ec ia l  i n t e r e s t  groups,  in response to  White House l e a d e r s h ip ,  p ro ­
vided the  l e g i s l a t i v e  subs tance .  Johnson 's  p r in c ip a l  purpose in  dev is ing  
the system was to allow him d i r e c t  c o n t r o l l e d  access  to a l l  p a r t i c i p a n t s  
and the  major sources o f  information in the  na t iona l  pol icy  making sys ­
tem and making them dependent on him f o r  po l icy  making i n i t i a t i v e ;  having 
a l l  p a r t i e s  to a po l icy  i s sue  e i t h e r  drawn in to  the  White House to deal 
with the  given problem, or dependent upon the  White House f o r  in format ion 
or  ac t io n  before  doing anything themselves ,  Johnson secured contro l  
over i n i t i a t i v e  and guaranteed h imself  a s i g n i f i c a n t  say in  the f in a l  
l e g i s l a t i v e  and a d m in i s t r a t iv e  form o f  t h e  po l icy  mat te r .  Fu r the r ,  Johnson 
was concerned to  circumvent the conse rva t ive  b a r r i e r  which the combined 
fo rces  of the executive  depar tments/agencies  and the  major i n t e r e s t s  
groups e rec ted  before  any innovative fo r ce  in Washington.
18
Califano 5 / ' 6 7  Task Force on C iv i l  Rights (1 ) ,  National Housing, 
LBJ Library  f o r  an example of Johnson 's  gu id e l in e s  to a t a sk  force .
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. . .  Let me b r i e f l y  desc r ibe  the  normal course  o f  a new 
idea in the h i s t o r i c a l  p a t t e r n  of l e g i s l a t i v e  program 
development. A new idea could emerge from any number of  
sources ,  from an Advisory Council or  Commission, from an 
academic i n s t i t u t i o n ,  o r  from any in t e re s t e d  person or 
group . . .  Then the ideas  would have to  go through a r a th e r  
tortuous process  o f  study with in  a Department o r  Agency.
I t  would have to  be checked fay a l l  the  i n t e r e s t e d  groups 
and cons t i tuenc ie s  and the various  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  w ith in  
a given Department and elsewhere in the government.  As 
i t  moved up the l i n e ,  i t  would be reviewed fay more and 
more people ,  people who had t h e i r  own ideas and were e i t h e r  
f ig h t in g  to  get  them heard o r ,  i f  they had been adopted 
to  see them preserved .  More of ten  than n o t ,  the  new 
idea ,  i f  i t  ever emerged was a d u l te ra ted  by in t e rn a l  
bu reaucra t ic  c o n s id e ra t io n s  and the pressures  o f  the 
Congress and c l i e n t  i n t e r e s t  groups.  The general  theme 
was not to rock the boat . . .  The end product was normally 
a compromise. Then those same ideas would be pressed 
forward . . .  y ea r  a f t e r  y e a r .  - —Perhaps the  most important 
reason for t h i s  kind of opera tion l i e s  both in the  d i f f i c u l ­
t i e s  o f  e x t r a c t i n g  new ideas  from the Departments and Agencies 
and a lso  in  the very nature  o f  the Pres idency.  The 
Pres ident and the members o f  his s t a f f  are l i t e r a l l y  swamped 
by emergencies,  by c r i s i s  a t  home and abroad . . .  Accordingly,  
a Pres ident  must be able  to  reach out of the  government and 
obtain the bes t  th ink ing  av a i l ab le  in  the c o u n t ry .19
Las t ly ,  i m p l i c i t  in the  o th e r  announced reasons for naming task 
f o r c e s ,  Johnson saw the  system as a way o f  i n t e r j e c t i n g  in to  the 
the national po l icy  making mix the  personal c o n t r ib u t io n s  o f  a var ie ty
1QGaither 17 /Pol icy  Formulation in the Johnson Administ rat ion,
LBJ Library ,  pp. 3-4,  15,  while th e re  is  no in d i c a t io n  in the  f i l e s  con­
s u l t e d  t h a t  Johnson asked to  have th i s  paper prepared or  read i t ,  i t s  
con ten t  does correspond to  his  a t t i t u d e  concerning the reasons fo r  the 
es tabli shment o f  the  t a s k  fo rce  system recorded by o th e r  s tuden ts  of  h is  
ad m in is t ra t io n .  See Kearns ,  Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, pp. 
210-250, Thomas and Wolman, "Policy Formulation," Thomas E. Cronin, 
"Pres idents  and Domestic Policy Devices," paper prepared fo r  delivery  
to the  Princeton Conference on P res id en t ia l  Advis ing,  and Greestein and 
Berman, "Pres idents  and t h e i r  Advisers."
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of technica l  exper ts  whom he thought were overlooked by the  t r a d i -
20t i ona l  procedures.  This system served the purpose im p l i c i t  in the 
organization of a l l  post-World War II p re s id e n c ie s ;  i t  allowed the  pre­
s id en t  to determine the  terms of the po l icy  debate and th e  grounds upon 
which i t  would be waged. In doing so the  ta sk  fo rce  system allowed the 
pres iden t  to maintain h i s  p os i t ion  o f  policy  i n i t i a t o r  and thereby keep 
maximum pressure  on the  congress and, the  executive  departments /agencies  
and t h e i r  i n t e r e s t  group c l i e n t s .  In t h i s  system the  congress was depend­
ent upon p re s id e n t i a l  i n i t a t i v e  fo r  i t s  po l icy  making i d e n t i t y ;  i t s  major 
function was as e i t h e r  suppor te r  or opponent o f  the  p r e s id e n t i a l  program. 
Fur ther ,  the depar tment /agencies  were reduced to r e f i n e r s  and imple-
menters of e x i s t in g  programs and reviewers of the  innovat ive  ideas of
PIthe ta sk  forces  and the  White House s t a f f .  What remained was a 
system with the p re s id e n t  in the commanding p o s i t i o n .  Johnson r e i n ­
forced the pos i t ion  of  s t r e n g th  his system gave him by c a r e fu l ly  reminding 
members o f  his  task  fo rces  t h a t  t h e i r s  was a s e rv ice  to the  p res iden t  
and thereby the  na t ion :
20 See the cover l e t t e r  to  the Task Force on Government Organiz­
a t io n ,  1967, LBJ Library  and a lso  see the  d iscuss ion  o f  ta sk  force  
membership, below. Johnson i n s i s t e d  t h a t  the re  be some type o f  geo­
graphical  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of the technica l  exper ts  named to  ta sk  forces 
and commissions. As w i l l  be d iscussed ,  t h i s  was an important but not 
convincing c o n t r ib u t io n  toward breaking down the p a t t e r n  of excluding 
non-es tab li shed  i n t e r e s t  groups from national po l icy  members.
21
See Thomas and Wolman, "Policy Formulation,"  pp.  127-129 for 
a s im i la r  d iscuss ion .
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I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to note t h a t  d e sp i t e  per iods  when 
n\y p o p u la r i ty  in the  academic community was not very 
h igh , there  were v i r t u a l l y  no r e f u s a l s  from members 
o f  the academic community to serve on P r e s id e n t i a l  
Task Forces.  There were probably many reasons f o r  
t h i s ,  but th e  f i r s t  among them, and by f a r  th e  most 
important I t h i n k ,  l i e s  in the f a c t  t h a t  whether o r  not 
a p a r t i c u l a r  American happens to  agree with h i s  Pre­
s id e n t ,  most Americans are w i l l in g  to  do t h e i r  p a r t  to  
help meet t h e  problems of t h i s  country.  In a d d i t i o n ,  
most people,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  academics, know t h a t  they 
have c e r t a in  ideas which are  worth pursuing and when 
given the o p por tun i ty  to bring them to the  P r e s id e n t ,  
and hopeful ly  the Congress, they are quick to  respond 
to the o p p o r t u n i t y .22
This message was not l o s t  on the task  force members. In h is  report  to
Johnson as Chairman of  the  P r e s id e n t ' s  Task Force on Government
Organization Ben Heineman made the following comment about t a sk  force s e rv ice s
to the  p re s id e n t :
We recognize the s e n s i t i v i t y  of our work. We have r e t a in e d  
t i g h t  con tro l  of i t s  contents  and au th o rsh ip .  While the 
repor t  i s  organized to  permit r e f e r r a l  o f  some pa r ts  to 
the departments concerned, i f  you d e s i r e  t h i s ,  we have 
w r i t t en  i t  p re-eminently  fo r  your personal review and con­
s id e ra t io n  ........... I want to express our c o l l e c t i v e  thanks
to you and your  s t a f f  fo r  o f f e r in g  us ' th is  sp lend id  oppor­
tu n i ty  to be o f  s e r v ic e  to you p e r so n a l ly ,  and to acquire  
addit ional i n s ig h t s  in to  some of the problems o f  the  
modern P res id en cy .23
Thus, by p e rsona l iz ing  the task force system, Johnson i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d
the t r a d i t i o n  o f  p re s id e n t i a l  dominance o f  p o l icy  i n i t i a t i o n .
Las t ly ,  Johnson used his task  fo rces  as a kind o f  execut ive grand 
jury  f e r r e t i n g  ou t  information about how and why Great Soc ie ty  programs 
were or were no t  working as planned. Given Johnson 's  known res is tance  
to publ ic  c r i t i c i s m ,  a public  advisory group would find i t  very d i f f i c u l t
77 "Policy Making in the Johnson A dm in is t ra t ion ,"  p. 16.
23
L e t t e r ,  Heineman to  Johnson, October 1, 1967 in 1966 Task Force 
on Government Organ iza t ion ,  LBJ Library.
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to carry  out such a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  He wanted the ta sk  forces  to
t e l l  him what was going wrong in the  adm in is t ra t io n  o f  the Great 
24Socie ty .  Again,  the  ad hoc advisory group system r e f l e c t s  
Johnson's de te rmina tion  to  absorb func t ions  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  and l e g a l ly  
reserved to  the congress—overs igh t  o f  a d m in is t r a t iv e  performance.
In s h o r t ,  the  task  force system was c en t r a l  to  Johnson 's d e s i r e  
to merge the Executive Off ice  of the  P r e s id e n t ,  the executive  depar tments /  
agencies and the congress in to  one i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  process dedicated  
to the c r ea t io n  and execution of the  Great Soc ie ty  programs. As Kearns 
c o r re c t ly  m a in ta in s ,  Johnson, with t h i s  domestic po l icy  system, had come 
close  to the development of  a kind o f  par l iamentary  government with
l e g i s l a t i v e  and execu t ive  power being vested in  the same decis ion
, 25makers.
D) Creation
Because they  were publ ic  agenc ies ,  gen e ra l ly  appointed in the  
context o f  some c r i s i s ,  the c rea t ion  of  Johnson advisory commissions 
was usua l ly  accomplished by p re s id en t i a l  announcement, the  fo rmal i ty  
of which was d i c t a t e d  fay Johnson's pe rcept ion  o f  the importance o f  the 
work the commission was being given to do. The i n v i t a t i o n  to membership,
24 "Policy making in  the Johnson A dm in is t ra t ion ,"  p.  8.
25Kearns,  Lyndon Johnson and The American Dream, pp. 221-222,
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on the o th e r  hand, was is sued  in an almost casual manner; s en io r  White 
House o f f i c i a l s  c a l l e d  the nominees on the  phone and is sued  an 
i n v i t a t i o n  which included re fe rences  to the  s e r v ic e  being of  personal 
value to the  p r e s i d e n t .
While the  i n v i t a t i o n  to  membership on an o u ts id e  ta sk  force  was 
issued in the same casual manner, the c r e a t i o n  o f  the se  advisory groups 
was much more i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d .  The process  began in the spring when 
sen io r  White House a ides  requested "idea books" from the heads of  the  
execut ive  depar tments  and v i s i t e d  the major u n i v e r s i t y  campuses looking 
fo r  novel ideas  capable  of being t r a n s la t e d  i n to  Great Society l e g i s l a t i o n ,  
When i t  was determined,  usua l ly  by la te  June,  who and where the resources  
were fo r  the  development o f  White House public  p o l ic y  p la n s ,  the  t a sk  
force  was named and i t s  work schedule c o n s t r u c te d .  Obviously,  no 
announcement was made concerning the appointment of  s ec re t  ou ts ide  ta sk  
fo rces .  A phone c a l l  was the  only o f f i c i a l  announcement individual 
appointees rece ived  concerning h is /her  appointment;  no l e t t e r s  of  
appointment were i s su e d .  There was, however a b i t  more fo rm al i ty  con­
nected with the appointment of  in te r-agency task  f o r c e s .  A form l e t t e r  
26was used. I t  was s en t  to  the designated chairperson  and contained 
blanks in to  which was to  be in se r ted  the  name of  the  in te r-agency  ta sk  
force  to  be c r e a t e d ,  those  of  the agencies/departments  to be represented  
on i t  ( the  form provided f o r  the expansion of t h i s  rep re sen ta t io n  a t  the
2 6 See memo Gai ther  to  Ross 8/8/67 and a t tachm ents .  Task Forces,  
Organization o f ,  Robson-Ross 27/Pricing F i l e s ,  LBJ Library .
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d i s c r e t i o n  o f  the  c h a i r p e r s o n ) ,  the  name of  the White House l i a i s o n  person, 
a s tatement of the p a r t i c u l a r  concerns the White House had in e s t a b l i s h in g  
the  group and the date  i t s  f in a l  r e p o r t  was due. The form a l so  contained 
a suggested o u t l in e  fo r  the  f in a l  r e p o r t  and a recommendation t h a t  a 
shor t  ( ten  page) summary should a l so  be produced. As noted above, these 
task  forces  were intended t o  ev a lu a te  and make cont inuing  recommendations 
fo r  refinement of  e s t a b l i s h e d  Great Society programs and po l icy  p r i o r i ­
t i e s .  Therefore ,  the more formalized approach seems to  have been d i c t a ­
ted by the routineness  o f  the  appointment and the work.
E) Authori ty  and Funding
Johnson's  au th o r i ty  f o r  naming task  forces  was c l e a r l y  grounded 
in his c o n s t i tu t io n a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to inform the congress of the
27s t a t e  of the  union and to  execute  f a i t h f u l l y  the  laws o f  the  land .
While his a u th o r i ty  to appo in t  pub l ic  advisory commissions might be 
challenged on the s t a t u t o r y  grounds mentioned above, h i s  c lose  in teg ra t ion  
o f  the work of outs ide  t a sk  force  to  the S ta te  o f  the Union message 
provided no such bas is  f o r  a t t a c k .  Some cab ine t  members, however, 
f e l t  the s e c r e t  outs ide  t a s k  fo rce  system removed them and t h e i r  depar t ­
ments from anything but a r e v ie w e r ' s  ro le  in the development o f  new Great 
Socie ty  l e g i s l a t i v e  programs, t h i s  was exac t ly  the pe rcep t ion  o f  the
oo
task forces  which Johnson wanted to  c r e a te .
27See p. 66, above.
28Source: in te rv iew d a t a .
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Johnson had access to  two funds e s t a b l i s h e d  by th e  congress fo r
p re s id e n t i a l  contingency use with which he could f inance  the  work o f
29task  forces  and commissions. In g e n e r a l ,  however, he p re fe r red  the  
method of agency con t r ibu t ions  fo r  t h i s  purpose; he thought t h i s
30approach had the spec ia l  v i r t u e  of  having a c l e a r  s t a t u t o r y  a u th o r i t y .
The in te rv iew  data c o l l e c te d  fo r  t h i s  study corresponds with t h a t  o f
Wolanin on t h i s  poin t:
Johnson ra re ly  used his d i s c r e t i o n a r y  funds to support  com­
m issions .  He i n s i s t e d  on them being funded with con t r ib u t io n s  
from agencies .  Each of  them would be assessed to suppor t  a 
commission in t h e i r  area . . .  He f e l t  t h a t  he should  re turn  
t h i s  money [ in  the  two p re s id e n t i a l  contingency funds] to 
Congress every y e a r ,  t h a t  t h i s  somehow made him a frugal and 
wise man.31
Thus Johnson avoided any need fo r  a c o n g re s s io n a l -p re s id en t i a l  con-
Op
f ro n ta t i o n  over advisory group funding. F u r th e r ,  by following t h i s  
method, Johnson e a s i l y  hid the rea l  cos t  o f  h is  advisory group 
system from the congress.  The ex ten t  o f  the p o l i t i c a l  r i s k s  to the 




The Emergency Fund fo r  the P res iden t  and the  Special  Projec ts  
Fund.
See 31 USCA 691
31Wolanin, "P res iden t ia l  Advisory Commissions," p .  154.
32A problem more pronounced when dea l ing  with  commissions than ta sk  
fo rces .  See the d iscuss ion o f  the problems o f  commission funding in the  
previous c h ap te r .  Funding fo r  ta sk  f o r c e s ,  as no ted,  was more e a s i l y  
accomplished by the p re s iden t  appealing to  h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to f u l f i l l  
his c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  mandates.
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seen in the exper ience o f  the  Kerner Commission to  be discussed  below.
An i n d i r e c t  form of funding, often  used by Johnson, was to have 
the var ious governmental depar tment/agencies  and p r i v a t e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
lend q u a l i f i e d  persons to be members o r  s t a f f  to  the commissions-task 
forces  fo r  f u l l - t i m e  work while carry ing the s a l a r y  cos ts  o f  such per ­
sons in the budget of  the "home" i n s t i t u t i o n .  The f a c t  t h a t  ta sk  
fo rces  and advisory commission members received no compensation o ther  
than modest per diem and t rave l  expenses was an add i t iona l  form of  
subs id iza t ion  by the persons asked to serve and by the  i n s t i t u t i o n s  with 
which they were r e g u la r ly  a f f i l i a t e d .  S o l i c i t a t i o n  o f  d i r e c t  funding 
from p r iva te  sources  ( foundat ions ,  c o rp o ra t io n s ,  e t c . )  was of ten  used 
to help support  p a r t i c u l a r  commissions.
F) Membership
Membership fo r  the  type of ad hoc groups being examined in th i s  
chapte r was drawn from th r e e  d i s t i n c t  c o n s t i tu e n c ie s :  the  major groups
'which had a vested i n t e r e s t  in the p a r t i c u l a r  m at te r  being d iscussed , 
federa l  personnel from agencies/depar tments  which had an i n t e r e s t  in the 
ta rg e ted  policy area and persons from u n i v e r s i t i e s , p r iv a t e  "think tanks" ,  
foundations and indus t ry  who had spec ia l  knowledge and s k i l l s  to c o n t r ib u te .  
In g enera l ,  the  membership of commissions and agency ta sk  forces  was com­
posed of  persons drawn from the f i r s t  two groups and th a t  of  the s e c re t  
task forces from the l a s t .
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Regardless o f  the type of  advisory group being appointed,  Johnson 
wanted h is  s t a f f  to  maintain t i g h t  con tro l  over th e  two c r i t i c a l  i n t r a ­
group leade rsh ip  p o s i t i o n s :  the chairperson and th e  executive  d i r e c t o r  
of the s t a f f .
Ernest  G o lds te in ,  an A ss i s tan t  to P re s id e n t  Johnson, telephoned 
me in December 1967 and asked me to  accep t  appointment to 
the Commission of  Obscenity and Pornography as  i t s  Chairman
  I agreed to serve  on the Commission but c a l l ed  Mr.
G o ld s te in ' s  a t t e n t i o n  to  the f a c t  t h a t  the  Act c a l l ed  fo r  
the Commission i t s e l f  to  e l e c t  i t s  chairman. The President 
announced the  appointment,  which announced me as chairman 
in a press  r e l e a s e ,  but I be lieve  t h a t  ny o f f i c i a l  appointment 
was simply as a member of  the commission . . .T h e  Commission
e lec te d  me chairman by unanimous v o t e  I know nothing about
the manner of  s e l e c t i n g  the o the r  members of the  Commission.
I made no recommendations as to i t s  membership to  anyone in 
the White House . . .  (Goldstein) . .  read me a l i s t  o f  names, I 
knew none o f  them, but t h e i r  po s i t io n s  made i t  sound l ik e  a 
well balanced commission of  highly competent peop le ,  and th i s  
in f luenced  my w il l in g n e s s  to  accept appoin tment.^3
Johnson wanted to have a person r e sp o n s ib le  fo r  White House 
l i a i s o n  work on each advisory group. In the case of the agency advisory 
group t h i s  person was e x p l i c i t l y  designated  in th e  document c re a t in g  
the body. With the  o th e r  two groups the  chairperson  or  the  execut ive  
d i r e c t o r  was most o f ten  expected to ca r ry  out t h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  With 
each type of  adv isory  group the re  was appointed a White House s t a f f  per ­
son whose r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i t  was to "look a f t e r "  the  advisory group on 
behalf  of  the  p re s id e n t  and his l e g i s l a t i v e  g o a ls .
The ac tua l  appointment of the two o u ts id e  groups was c a r r i e d  out  
in a r a t h e r  informal manner. A White House s t a f f  member would phone 
the nominees and o u t l i n e  the proposed work o f  the  group and in v i t e
00
L e t t e r  from William Lockhart , chairman o f  Commission on Obscenity 
and Pornography to  Senator Edward Kennedy, Kennedy Hearings ,  pp. 25-26.
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each to  p a r t i c i p a t e .  By a l l  accoun ts ,  t h e r e  were very  few re fusa l s .
With the agency t a s k  forces  the process was more formal;  the s tandar ized  
forms and memos were used and i t  was assumed t h a t  an appointment was 
being made, not an i n v i t a t i o n  i s sued .  The s e l e c t i o n  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  p e r ­
sons f o r  adv isory  group membership was n o t ,  however, a m a t te r  o f  casual 
concern to  the Johnson White House l e a d e r s .  The group s e le c te d  would 
be expected to suppor t  the Johnson program. Advisory group membership 
se le c t io n  always involved p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by the s e n io r  po l icy  s t a f f  o f  
the Johnson White House. The p re s id e n t  involved h imse lf  in the  se lec t ion  
process on ly  when c re a t in g  p o l i t i c a l l y  s e n s i t i v e  public  advisory com­
missions .  By d e f i n i t i o n ,  then ,  moderates dominated these  groups,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  the pub l ic  advisory  commission, with  " ra d ica l s "  being
e i t h e r  of  the  "show" (Hoffer on the Violence Commission) o r  the  "house"
34va r ie ty  (George Ball  on the  Vietnam adv iso ry  group).
The pub l ic  c h a r a c te r  of the  advisory  commissions forced Johnson
to be extremely ca re fu l  in those membership appointments to  insure t h a t
i n t e r e s t  group balance  was ob ta ined .  Considerable  White House time was
devoted to  t h i s  balancing in an e f f o r t  to  in su re  adequate rep re sen ta t io n
from the e s t a b l i s h e d  groups concerned with  the  is sues  genera t ing  the
need fo r  the  commission. Lipsky and Olson found t h a t  Johnson drew h is
public  advisory membership from e ig h t  s p e c i f i c  groups of  pe rsons ,  groups
upon which Johnson a l so  counted very heav i ly  f o r  general  p o l i t i c a l  suppor t :
b lacks ,  l a b o r ,  b u s in e s s ,  women, big c i t y  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s ,  Texans,
35college  p ro f e s so r s  and college p re s id e n t s .
^ S c P h e r s o n , A P o l i t i c a l  E d u c a t io n , p .  348,
^^Michael Lipsky and David Olson, "Riot Commission P o l i t i c s , "  
Trans-Action 6 (July/Augus t 1969): 63-64.
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Agency ta sk  fo rce  membership was drav/n from the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  o f ­
f i c i a l  fam i ly ,  p r im ar i ly  cab ine t  members, and agency/depar tment heads.
These groups needed high level  government r e p re se n ta t i v e n e s s  to  v a l id a te  
t h e i r  ro l e  as p e r io d i c  (u su a l ly  year ly)  reviewers o f  e s t a b l i s h e d  programs. 
The working membership o f  these  cask forces  was,  o f  course ,  made up of 
the  a s s i s t a n t  s e c r e t a r i e s  and d i r e c to r s  of  the  depar tm ents /agencies  con- 
earned. Such o f f i c i a l  ad m in is t r a t iv e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  which included 
the  i n e v i t a b l e  White House l i a i s o n  person, was designed to maintain a close 
i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  White House po l icy  o b je c t iv e s ,  and department/agency 
i n t e r e s t s .  Refinement and incremental development o f  e s t a b l i s h e d  programs, 
not innovat ion ,  r e s u l t e d  from t h i s  mix o f  agency task  fo rce  membership.
The c r i t e r i a  f o r  membership on the s e c r e t  ou ts ide  t a s k  forces 
were d i f f e r e n t ;  s e l e c t e d  fo r  t h e i r  techn ica l  e x p e r t i s e  the  members of  
these  groups were expected to c rea te  innovative proposa ls  which,  i f  
enac ted ,  would allow the  Great Society program t o  make a quantum leap 
r a t h e r  than progress  in  ordered incremental s t e p s .  Beyond an in s i s t en c e  
on some form of  reg iona l  r e p re s e n ta t i o n ,  Johnson only demanded t h a t  
these  persons be recognized exper ts  in t h e i r  f i e l d s .  In a d d i t i o n ,  
the  sen io r  White House s t a f f  members who did most o f  the work in 
s e l e c t i n g  members f o r  the  s e c r e t  ou ts ide  ta sk  f o r c e s ,  a l so  looked fo r  
persons with independent a t t i t u d e s  who had not had recen t  government
See f i l e  Summer Programs (2),  Robson/Ross 2 7 /P r ic ing  F i l e s ,  LBJ 
Library  fo r  a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  l i s t  of " o f f i c i a l " and " rea l"  members of the 
1966 Youth Opportunity Task Force.
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37se r v ice  exper ience .  They chose a la rge  number o f  what Glazer c a l l s  
a spec ia l  breed of i n t e l l e c t u a l s ;  persons well known in t h e i r  f i e l d s ,  
persons who l iv e d  out t h e i r  p rofess ional  l i v e s  in i n s t i t u t i o n s  with 
close  t i e s  with governmental a c t i v i t y  and r e sea rc h ;  persons who 
had had exper ience  working fo r  the  government and who were th e re fo re  
aware o f ,  i f  not p rac t iced  i n ,  the  p ra c t i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  o f  national
OO
po l icy  making. In the f ina l  two years  o f  the  a d m in i s t r a t io n ,  the s e n io r  
s t a f f  added to  these  c r i t e r i a  the  condi t ion  t h a t  nominees to  these t a sk  
fo rces  would not have pub l ic ly  opposed Johnson p o l i c i e s ,  e sp ec ia l ly  those 
p e r ta in in g  to  Vietnam.
All nominees had to  agree  to  one major cond i t ion  before  appointment 
to one of the s e c r e t  t a sk  fo rce s :  he/she would not reveal the  f ac t  t h a t  
he /she  had been named to membership nor would he/she publ ish  any of  the  
techn ica l  re search  done for  the task  f o r c e .  This type o f  agreement, 
fo re ign  as i t  i s  to the normal commitments of  academics,  j u s t i f i e s  G laze r ' s  
c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  o f  s e c re t  ta sk  force members as an unique brand of  
i n t e l l e c t u a l .
G) S ta f f in g
As with the  commissions appointed by o th e r  p r e s i d e n t s ,  Johnson's 
depended on t h e i r  s t a f f s  to do the  work given them. The s i z e  of  the
^^Thomas and Wolman, "Policy Formulation," p p .133-136 and House 
Hearings,  Pa r t  1,  p. 192, testimony o f  Thomas E. Cronin.
^^Glazer,  "On Task Forcing,"  pp 41-42,
on
For o t h e r  i l l u s t r a t i o n s  see memo Ginsburg to Cal i fano ,  12/14/67, 
Executive/LE/A65/FG690, LBJ Library ,  a l so  Thomas and Wolman, "Policy 
Formula tion," p. 126.
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s t a f f  of a p a r t i c u l a r  commission depended f i r s t  on the budget a l lo c a te d  
f o r  i t s  work which in turn  depended on the importance a t tached  to the 
work o f  the commission by the White House. Senior s t a f f  persons were 
drawn reg u la r ly  from the pool of  Washington lawyers,  foundations ,  
corpora t ions  and u n i v e r s i t i e s  on f r i e n d ly  terms with the White House. 
S e lec t io n  of members o f  the ju n io r  s t a f f  was l e f t  to  the  members o f  the 
commission and t h e i r  executive  d i r e c t o r .  The l a t t e r  was almost always 
named by the White House, o r  a t  l e a s t  with i t s  concurrence,  and served 
as the  " p r e s id e n t ' s  man" on the commission, responsib le  fo r  keeping the 
White House informed of the d i r e c t io n s  o f  the commission's work.
Both types o f  Johnson task  forces  needed l i t t l e  in  the  way o f  
s t a f f ;  the members of  the ta sk  fo rce  were chosen because o f  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  
to  do the t echn ica l  work ass igned to  the group. The s t a f f  which was 
used was drawn almost ex c lu s iv e ly  from the Executive Off ice  of the 
P res iden t  and the execut ive  agencies/departments .  Some ta sk  forces  had 
a fu l l  time execut ive  d i r e c t o r .  As task  forces  became more i n s t i t u t ­
io n a l iz ed  in the Johnson po l icy  making system, the Bureau o f  the  Budget 
became more i n s i s t e n t  t h a t  i t  have a l i a i s o n  person on each major ta sk  
f o r c e . T h e s e  l i a i s o n  persons served a very important p o l i t i c a l  func­
t io n  in the l i f e  and work o f  the ta sk  fo rce s ;  they kept the  advisory groups 
in  c lose  touch with  the l e g i s l a t i v e  goals of  the adm in is t ra t ion  and the 
p o te n t i a l  fo r  cooperat ion o f  proposed programs with those a l ready  in 
e x i s t e n c e .
^^See Thomas and Wolman, "P o l icy  Formula t ions ,"  pp. 136-138.
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H) Independence
Independence from the White House by Johnson Adminis tra tion ad hoc 
advisory groups can be d i r e c t l y  c o r r e l a t e d  with the  amount o f  pub l ic  
exposure each had and the scope o f  the p r e s id e n t i a l  mandate given. Ad­
visory  commissions, almost a l l  o f  whose work was done in p u b l i c ,  had the 
g r e a t e s t  degree o f  independence and s e c r e t  t a sk  forces  the l e a s t .  A 
commission with i t s  pub l ic  appointment and p r e s id e n t i a l  mandate, i t s  highly 
experienced and p o l i t i c a l l y  a s tu t e  membership, c a r e f u l ly  balanced by the 
White House with  the r e l e v a n t  major i n t e r e s t  groups in mind, o f te n  holding 
a l l  i t s  meetings in public  and always i s su in g  a rep o r t  which could be­
come the o b jec t  o f  public  s c r u t i n i t y ,  had s t rong  incen t ive  to main ta in  
enough d is tance  from the White House to g ran t  c r e d i b i l i t y  to  i t s  work and 
r e p o r t .  The same incen t ives  were p re sen t  f o r  the  White House; i f  the 
commission was appointed to give i t  o b je c t iv e  independent in fo rm at ion ,  then 
commission independence must be maintained.^^ Senior  Johnson White House 
aides  th e re fo re  r e a l i s t i c a l l y  assumed t h a t  i t  was v i r t u a l l y  impossible  to 
contro l  a publ ic  advisory  commission. They d id ,  however, assume t h a t  
they had the r i g h t  and the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  demand two th ings  from 
them. F i r s t  a reasonable  oppor tun i ty  in the  form of  time and personnel to 
p resen t  the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  po in t  o f  view on the  su b jec t  under com­
mission co n s id e ra t io n .  Obviously,  the d e s i r e  here was to  have the  
opportuni ty  to  educate  the e l i t e  publics  rep resen ted  by the commission
^ ‘See the d e ta i l ed  d iscuss ion  of commission independence found
in Chapter  2 ,  pp. 40-44.
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membership to the  p o l ic y  p o s i t io n s  o f  the  a d m in i s t r a t i o n .  Such educa­
t io n  was one o f  the  major reasons fo r  the  appointments o f  the  commission 
in the f i r s t  p lace .  Second, the  White House s t a f f  made i t  c l e a r  to the 
chairperson and th e  executive  d i r e c t o r  o f  the  commission t h a t  the  p re ­
s id e n t  d id  not want to  be s u rp r i s e d  o r  embarrassed by t h e  d i r e c t i o n s
42the commission's work took or the substance o f  i t s  f in a l  r e p o r t .
Thus, Johnson and h is  s e n io r  a ides  were r e a l i s t i c a l l y  accomodated to 
the f a c t  of  adv isory  commission independence and were w i l l i n g  to support  
and defend i t  w i th in  the  bounds o f  the  s p e c i f i c  policy-making goals o f  
the a d m in i s t r a t io n .  They found "gr inn ing  and bear ing i t "  when com­
missions " turn  around and b i t e  your  ass"^^  a s tance  p r e f e r a b l e  to  t ry in g  
to apply p ressure  t o  p o l i t i c a l l y  re source fu l  persons.  B es ides ,  the  White 
House always had o t h e r  resources  in h e re n t  in  the  pres idency  f o r  rendering 
impotent the work o f  a "run-away commission." These made i t  unnecessary 
to apply d i r e c t  p r e s su re  on a commission while  i t  was a t  work. The d i r e c t  
conf ron ta t ion  with the e l i t e  publ ics  rep resen ted  on the  commission t h a t  
would r e s u l t  from such an a t t a ck  was more p o l i t i c a l  r i s k  than the  Johnson 
White House was w i l l i n g  to  take in  the  con tex t  of most o f  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l
4?Wolanin's  in te rv iewees  put t h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  on th e  " p r e s id e n t ' s  
man" on the  commission. They saw t h i s  person as f u l f i l l i n g  two re sp o n s i ­
b i l i t i e s  fo r  the White House: 1) keeping i t  well informed and 2) giving 
the p re s id en t  a person whose eva lua t ion  of  the  work and the  r e p o r t  o f  the  
commission he could understand and t r u s t .  Wolanin, " P r e s i d e n t i a l  Advisory 
Commissions, pp. 194-196.
^ I b i d . ,  pp.  183-184.
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commissions. The r e p o r t  could be ignored ,  swamped by o the r  news generated  
by the White House a t  the  time o f  i t s  p u b l i c a t i o n ,  or  " lo s t "  by a l l  con­
cerned because o f  the ending o f  the  l i f e  o f  the commission and the  re tu rn  
of i t s  members to "p r iva te"  l i f e  o r  o t h e r  government se rv ice  and the 
turn ing  of  the  a t t e n t i o n  o f  the  White House to o th e r  concerns due to  a 
s h i f t  in  events  o r  public  a t t e n t i o n .
In sum, Johnson advisory commissions t r i e d  to  maintain the image 
and the r e a l i t y  o f  being independent o f  the  White House. They sought 
to give the  p re s id en t  independent advice  and a f r e e  flow o f  in form at ion .
In t h i s  e f f o r t  they g enera l ly  were supported  by the  White House. The 
degree o f  independence they were ab le  to  mainta in  was c o n te x tu a l ly  
determined by a d e l i c a t e  mixture o f  the  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e n s i ty  o f  the 
matter under c o n s id e ra t io n ,  and the  amount of support  the group received  
from congress  and/or depar tments /agencies  of  the  executive  branch and 
the major r e l e v a n t  i n t e r e s t  groups and the  p re ss .
Howard Schuman, HR Hearings,  P a r t  2, p.  141, d iscussed  the  work 
of the  Douglas Commission (na t iona l  housing needs) .  Because housing was 
a high p r i o r i t y  pol icy issue  o f  the  a d m in i s t r a t i o n ,  the work o f  the  
commission was of spec ia l  concern to the  p r e s i d e n t .  The commission made 
i t s  r e p o r t  l a t e  in the l i f e  of  the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ;  i t s  c o n ten t  was an 
attempt to e s t a b l i s h  a p o s i t io n  on n a t io n a l  housing c le a r ly  independent 
of t h a t  of  the  Johnson a d m in i s t r a t io n .  The con ten t  of  the  f i n a l  r e p o r t  
became known by the White House p r i o r  to  i t s  p u b l ic a t io n .  Johnson 
refused to accept the r e p o r t  and, in a d d i t i o n ,  leaked to the  p ress  a HUD 
document which countered the substance  o f  the work of  the commission. 
Schuman' s  conclusion i s  t h a t  the  White House was not going to  allow a 
p r e s i d e n t i a l l y  appointed commission to  i s sue  a repo r t  c r i t i c a l  o f  a major 
a d m in is t r a t io n  program.
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Independence of the White House i s  almost a c o n t r a d ic t io n  in 
terms when used in an opera t ional  d e f in i t io n  of the  work and s t a t u s  
o f  the Johnson task  f o r ce s .  Both types o f  task  forces  were intended to 
be c lose ly  t i e d  to the White House and i t s  public  po l icy  purposes.
Persons accepted membership with t h a t  c l e a r ly  in mind.^^ Independence 
of  mind, no t  of  fu n c t io n ,  was what the  s t r u c tu r e  and i n t e n t  of the 
Johnson ad hoc advisory system demanded.
I) Functioning of Commissions and Task
Forces in the Johnson Policy-Making System
Johnson appointed advisory commissions a t  a f a s t e r  r a t e  than any 
previous p re s id e n t ;  on th e  average ,  he appointed f i v e  advisory  commissions 
per y e a r . ^ ^  Of the many ways commissions have been used by p re s id en ts ,  
Johnson s t r e s s e d  two in p a r t i c u l a r :  1) to  aid him in  deal ing  with a pro­
blem which had proved to  be untenable  in the normal process of accomo­
dation and compromise a v a i l a b l e  to  the adm in is t ra t ion  and 2) to  provide 
him with an e f f e c t i v e  means of advancing the program o f  the  adm in is t ra t ion  
with the congress and the various e l i t e  pub l ic s .  Buying time in  order 
to delay a c t io n s  fay the congress or  f a t a l  c r i t i c i s m  by the Republicans 
was an obvious p a r t  o f  the  s t r a t e g y  o f  the a d m in is t r a t io n  in c rea t ing  the  
Kerner,  and Eisenhower commissions. These were dramatic  except ions  which 
prove the ru le ;  in the r e g u la r  course o f  p o l i t i c a l  even ts ,  however,
See the d iscuss ion  o f  membership pp. 164-168 above where i t  i s  noted 
t h a t  the appointees  committed themselves to not r e v e a l in g  the ex is tence  
of t h e i r  ta sk  force  or the  subs tance of  t h e i r  r e p o r t .
46 For a discuss ion of  the former see Thomas and Wolman, "Policy 
Formulation,"  pp. 127-128.
47
See p.  4 above and Lipsky and Olson, MSS. I l l ,  pp.  1-2.
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Johnson used commissions most often to advance a p o l i c y  program or po licy  
idea which,  f o r  a v a r i e t y  of reasons ,  were stymied in the o ther  p a r t s  
o f  the policy-making system. Ideas generated by t a sk  forces  or in o ther  
p a r t s  o f  the system were often  given public exposure through the device 
o f  the advisory commission. As noted above, the Rural Poverty Commission 
was used to  give pub l ic  exposure to recommendations f o r  a school lunch 
program developed f i r s t  by a s e c r e t  task  fo rce .  Despite  i t s  eventual 
r epudia t ion  by the ad m in is t r a t io n ,  the White House fed the Douglas 
Commission much of the work of the Kaiser Commission and th a t  of several  
t a sk  forces  on housing. Other examples include changes in the d r a f t  laws, 
r eo rgan iza t ion  of the  Post Off ice  Department and var ious  programs in the 
area  of cr imina l  j u s t i c e  and in the general area o f  c i v i l  r i g h t s .  By 
sur fac ing  novel po l icy  ideas in th i s  manner Johnson was not only able 
to  cont inue to  pre-empt the policy-making f i e l d  from congress ,  but he
could gauge the reac t ion  of congress and the var ious e l i t e  publics  without
48having to be committed to the proposals in any p o l i t i c a l l y  damaging way.
The primary purpose o f  the mature Johnson t a s k  fo rce  system was 
to  provide substance  to and support  fo r  the Great So c ie ty  l e g i s l a t i v e  
program. F i r s t ,  and most s u b s ta n t iv e ly ,  the system provided the White 
House with  a s teady flow of innovat ive ideas fo r  the  Great Soc ie ty
48 I t  i s  worth noting a t  t h i s  po in t  t h a t  task fo rces  were a l so  often 
fed informat ion from congress and from work in process in  various pa r ts  of  
the  Executive Off ice  of the Pres iden t  by White House s t a f f  members. Staying 
ahead of the  o the r  po ten t ia l  i n i t i a t i o n s  of  po l icy  proposals and education 
of  e l i t e  pub l ic s  through t h e i r  rep re sen ta t ive s  was c l e a r l y  the i n t e n t  of 
these  a c t i v i t i e s  a l s o .
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programs. Second, i t  supported the adm in is t ra t io n  by provid ing in -  
house means of  reviewing the  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f  the execut ive  departments 
in fu r th e r in g  the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  po licy  goa ls .  In pursuing each o b je c t iv e  
the ta sk  forces  enabled the p re s id en t  to maintain contro l  over the  
i n i t i a t i o n ,  in t roduc t ion  and progress through the congress and the  federa l  
depar tments/agencies  of the  Great S oc ie ty  l e g i s l a t i v e  program. This use 
of the ta sk  fo rces  to  guarantee White House contro l  over the  t o t a l  l e g i s ­
l a t i v e  p rocess ,  save t h a t  o f  the  c a s t i n g  o f  congressperson 's  v o te s ,  tends 
to confirm Kearn's  con tent ion d is cussed  above, t h a t  the  e f f e c t  o f  Johnson 's  
organ iza t ion  o f  h i s  po l icy  making system was to c r e a t e  an American expres­
sion of  a par liamentary  form of  government. Johnson saw, in s h o r t ,  the 
congressional l e g i s l a t i v e  process as an extens ion o f  the White House policy 
making system. A d e t a i l e d  d iscuss ion  of the  ro le  o f  t a sk  fo rces  in  the 
formulation o f  the l e g i s l a t i v e  program follows s h o r t l y ;  a t  t h i s  po in t  
i t  i s  important to  note the ways th e s e  advisory  bodies were used to  review 
the work o f  the  executive  branch and thereby usurp func t ions  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  
belonging to the Congress and the Bureau o f  the  Budget.
Every ta sk  force  e s tab l i sh ed  during the Johnson adm in is t ra t io n  had 
an important review function  i m p l i c i t  in i t s  charge.  Suggestions of 
new p o l i c i e s  and programs had to  be grounded on the presumed non­
ex is tence  o f  such a program or  on perceived programmatic o r  ad m in is t ra ­
t i v e  d e f i c i e n c i e s  in some e x i s t in g  fede ra l  program. Johnson e s ta b l i s h e d  
year ly  task  fo rces  to deal with those  areas  o f  his  Great Socie ty  program 
he regarded as c ruc ia l  ( e .g .  c iv i l  r i g h t s  and housing).  One purpose 
of these  ta sk  fo rces  was to  review th e  programs begun in the previous
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y e a r s .  Such e f f o r t s  were examples o f  h i s  de termination to mainta in
as much control  as poss ib le  o f  h i s  Great Society program by a llowing
congress and the Bureau of  the  Budget very l i t t l e  in the  way o f  the
p o l i t i c a l  advantage which they normally  obta ined through the  p rocess  o f
49overs igh t  and review o f  agency/department performance.
The ta sk  force  system became fu n c t iona l  in the manner the  p re s id e n t  
wanted in 1965 and remained e s s e n t i a l l y  i n t a c t  u n t i l  1967. I t s  purpose 
was to provide the  White House with  "ob jec t ive"  recommendations fo r  
domestic programs which,  i f  adopted by the  p re s id en t ,  would be proposed 
to the congress in h i s  annual S t a t e  o f  the  Union address .  That message 
would be quickly  followed by a bar rage  o f  spec ia l  messages d e t a i l i n g  the 
substance of each p roposa l ,  t o g e th e r  with  b i l l s  w r i t t e n  in the execu t ive  
department to  be in troduced the day fo llowing the  p a r t i c u l a r  sp ec ia l  
message. This system was designed by Cal ifano and his s t a f f  to  provide 
a maximum flow o f  in format ion from the  various  sources they had c r e a te d .  
I t  was designed to  work b e s t  when under the  t i g h t  control  o f  t h e  White 
House. Until  they were overcome by the events produced by the adm in is ­
t r a t i o n ' s  fore ign p o l i c y ,  the  domestic ta sk  force  system did in f a c t  
work as planned and did  produce f o r  the  p re s id en t  an impressive amount 
o f  new po l icy  id e as ,  l e g i s t a t i o n  and programs.
See the l e t t e r s  e s t a b l i s h i n g  the  year ly  ta sk  fo rces  on the c i t i e s  
and c iv i l  r ig h t s  found in C a l i f a n o ' s  f i l e s  and in the  f i l e s  of the various  
ta sk  forces  for mandates to  review the work o f  previous t a sk  f o r c e s ,  com­
missions and o ther  publ ic  ag en c ie s ,  e . g .  Califano 9/Economic/Innovation 
and Economic Growth (1) and the f i l e s  o f  ta sk  forces  on the  c i t i e s  and 
c iv i l  r i g h t s ,  LBJ Library .
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The Johnson system had i t s  own rhythm. The l a t e  sp r ing  was the  
period in  which new ideas were s o l i c i t e d  and generated.  The Bureau of  
the Budget served as the f i r s t  c o l l e c t i o n  po in t  fo r  these  p lans ;  i t  
compared the sugges t ions  with e x i s t i n g  and p ro jec ted  programs and bud­
gets f o r  degrees o f  d u p l ic a t ion  and redundancy. These ideas  would be ,  
in p a r t ,  s o l i c i t e d  from the major execu t ive  department o f f i c e r s  by 
Cal ifano . They were asked to  provide idea  books r e f l e c t i n g  the most 
innovative  program thinking in t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  agenc ies /depar tm ents .^^
The next s tage  was one h ighly  regarded by Johnson and C a l i f a n o ,  
spring t r i p s  to  the major u n iv e r s i ty  cen te r s  by s en io r  members o f  the 
White House s t a f f . C a l i f a n o  and h i s  s t a f f  v i s i t e d  geograph ica l ly  va r ied  
u n iv e r s i ty  c en te r s  where n a t io n a l ly  known scho la rs  worked on Great  Soc ie ty  
re la ted  problems on which the White House was ready to move. Cal ifano  
had one cen t ra l  question to ask a t  each o f  the  cen te r s :  what should the
Suggest ions came not only come from domestic adv ise rs .  S e c re ta ry  
of Defense Robert McNamara submitted 50 domestic proposa ls  one y e a r .  See
Thomas and Wolman, "Policy Formulation," p. 128.
Johnson i n s i s t e d  t h a t  care  be taken to v i s i t  the major reg iona l  
c en te r s .  He was adamant t h a t  the u n i v e r s i t y  resource  from which the
task forces  not be l im i ted  to the "Harvards" ,  h is  name fo r  the
major u n i v e r s i t y  cen te rs  o f  the  n o r th e a s te rn  United S t a t e s .  As noted 
above. Section F, pp. 164-167, Johnson a l s o  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  task  fo rce  
membership, p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h a t  taken from the  academic world be broadly 
geographica lly  r e p re se n ta t iv e .
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federa l  government be doing in your area  o f  e x p e r t i s e ?  While the  
d iscuss ions  were open-ended, Cal ifano  and h is  a ides  looked f o r  ideas  
which f i t  the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  general l e g i s l a t i v e  program f o r  t h a t  yea r .
In te rv ie w s ,  oral  h i s to ry  accounts and the  documentary evidence 
a l l  i n d ic a te  t h a t  la rge  numbers o f  persons were consu l ted  during t h i s
C O
s tage  o f  the  p rocess .  The persons consulted  were t e c h n i c a l l y  know­
ledgeab le ,  f a m i l i a r  with the  processes  o f  federa l  policy-making , and 
accustomed to  advis ing high federal  o f f i c i a l s .  They were,  in s h o r t ,  
accep tab le  [ t o  Johnson) persons ,  working in  and f o r  accep tab le  i n s t i t u ­
t i o n s ;  they were persons to  whom Cal ifano and h is  a ides  f e l t  comfortable 
in tu rn ing  because they expected proposals  which would challenge the 
p a r t i c u l a r s  o f  adm in is t ra t ion  p o l i c y ,  but not question  i t s  ends.  When 
t h a t  boundary was v io la ted  by l a r g e r  and l a r g e r  numbers o f  the  academics 
consu l ted ,  beginning in 1967, the u n iv e r s i ty  v i s i t s  ceased and the  
q u an t i ty  and the q u a l i ty  o f  White House con tac t s  with the  academic com­
munity were sever ly  reduced. Housing, banking, c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  medical , 
educational and o th e r  major i n t e r e s t  groups were a l so  consu l ted  fo r  ideas 
and pe rsonne l .  I t  was not un t i l  l a t e  in  the  ad m in is t r a t io n  however, t h a t  
the  White House opened i t s e l f  to a d i r e c t  flow o f  pol icy  and program- 
s p e c i f i c  in format ion from the  persons a t  whom most o f  the  Great Society 
programs were d i rec ted  and who would have to  absorb them in to  t h e i r  l i v e s .
52Cal ifano d iscusses  in d e ta i l  one o f  these  t r i p s  and the  Great 
Socie ty  program i t  produced (the  e a r ly  childhood educat ion program) in h is  
ora l  h i s t o r y  tape a t  the  Johnson L ibrary .
53The primary e f f o r t  was to ga ther  informat ion from major u n iv e r s i ty  
c e n t e r s ,  but the s t a f f  members a lso  consulted  the  various  non-teaching 
" th in k - ta n k s"  and research c en te r s .
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In 1967-1958, with Johnson 's  encouragement,  some ju n io r  members of  the
White House s t a f f  began to  make v i s i t s  to  var ious black urban ghettos
throughout the na tion and wrote e l ab o ra te  r epo r t s  fo r  him on t h e i r
impressions and the r e a c t io n s  to  the  various Great Society programs and
54o th e r  domestic po l icy  e f f o r t s  o f  the  persons they in terviewed. Some 
of  the  in te rv iews  conducted during these  ghetto  v i s i t s  were with non­
o f f i c i a l ,  non-business pe rsons ,  but most were with small business  owners,  
low-level governmental and se rv ice  i n s t i t u t i o n  employees ( d i s t r i c t  p o l i c e ­
men, soc ia l  workers ,  w e l f a r e  employees, e t c . )  In r e t ro s p e c t ,  i t  is 
obvious t h a t  these  r e p o r t s  conta in  va luab le  pre-and post  r i o t  in format ion,  
useful in any unders tanding o f  what had happened in the major urban cen te rs  
in 1967 and what could happen in the f u t u r e .  However, the psychological  
and p o l i t i c a l  condi t ions  in  the White House were not r ig h t  fo r  rece iv ing  
such information and absorbing much of i t  i n to  the domestic p o l i c y ­
making process .  There i s  no in d ica t io n  of  a d i r e c t  passage o f  the 
in s ig h ts  o f  th e se  r e p o r t s  from sen io r  White House persons to any of the 
task forces  c rea ted  in 1967-68.
In J u ly ,  the  s e n i o r  White House s t a f f  and o the r  key p re s id e n t i a l  
policy  advisors  d iscussed  the various  proposals  received in the  context
The coming e l e c t i o n s  and the recen t  r i o t s  were probably the major 
reasons fo r  the  i n i t i a l  req u es t s  by the s t a f f  members to make the v i s i t s  
and fo r  the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  approval.  Each o f  the  reports  was addressed to 
the p re s id en t  and was channeled through Califano and Markham, the normal 
routing  fo r  such documents. There was no ind ica t ion  in the f i l e s  t h a t  
Johnson read the r e p o r t s .  See McPherson 8 /R io ts  (1&2), Robson and Ross 
8 / Pr ic ing  F i les /"G het to  V i s i t s " ,  Watson 1 & 2/Civil  Rights/Negroes,
LBJ Library .
179
of Bureau of the  Budget e v a lu a t io n s  and t h e i r  own sense of the  needs 
and expressed in t e n t i o n s  of th e  p re s id en t .  The t a sk  forces  were named 
in mid-summer and t h e i r  work schedule given to  them. They were asked 
to  r e p o r t  by e a r l y  f a l l ,  seldom l a t e r  than November 1. When the  r e p o r t s  
o f  th e  task  fo r c e s  were r ece iv ed  they were compiled, compared and c o r ­
r e l a t e d  by th e  s e n i o r  White House s t a f f  with program proposa ls  made by 
the  various  execu t ive  depar tm ents /agenc ies  which had been requested  
e a r l i e r .  These compila t ions  were then processed through the Bureau of 
th e  Budget f o r  c o s t  e s t i m a te s .  There the  proposals  were re f ined  to  
conform to  the  perceived  needs of the p r e s id e n t  and taken to  him fo r
h is  c o n s id e ra t io n  and d e c i s io n  as to  th e  f i n a l  components of his
55l e g i s l a t i v e  package fo r  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  year .  Johnson and his  s t a f f  
prepared the  S t a t e  of  the  Union address in the  l a t e  f a l l  and Johnson 
d e l iv e r e d  i t  in January.  During the next two months the s t a f f  s e n t  
numerous spec ia l  messages t o  congress  d e t a i l i n g  the  proposed new programs, 
followed immediately by the  i n t r o d u c t io n  o f  s p e c i f i c  b i l l s .  During t h i s
55The r e p o r t s  of some of th e  t a sk  fo rce s  were also submitted to  a 
q u a l i t a t i v e  eva lu a t io n  process  by the  Bureau of the Budget and key de­
partments  and a g en c ie s .  They were asked to  examine the r epo r t s  of  ta sk  
fo r c e s  which Cal i fano  and h i s  s t a f f  thought had wandered too f a r  from 
White House goa ls  and o b j e c t i v e s .  The e f f o r t  here was to  see i f  anything 
o f  value to the a d m in i s t r a t i o n  could be salavaged f o r  the  next l e g i s l a t i v e  
program. P re d ic ta b ly ,  the  Bureau of Budget and the  o ther  eva lua to rs  of 
th e  o r ig in a l  ta sk  fo rce  r e p o r t  would most often  recommend an in te r -agency  
t a s k  fo rce  t o  make amends and do the job  in the  "cor rec t"  way. I t  was in 
such ways t h a t  Cal i fano  tempered the c r i t i c i s m  of the  ou ts ide  ta sk  
fo r c e s  by persons in policy-making p o s i t io n s  w ith in  the a d m in i s t r a t io n .
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p e r io d ,  immediately following the  S t a t e  of  the  Union message and p r i o r  
to the  i n t r o d u c t io n  of the a d m in i s t r a t i o n ' s  l e g i s l a t i v e  package,  Cal ifano  
and the chairperson  of the Indiv idual ta sk  fo rces  would spend time with  
the congress iona l  l i a i s o n  o f f i c e  of  th e  White House going over the  p ro ­
posed programs and the pieces of  l e g i s l a t i o n  d ra f ted  by the execu t ive  
branch,  developing a s t r a teg y  fo r  i t s  p re s e n ta t io n  to  th e  c o r r e c t  com-
56m it tee  o f  the  congress and assaying i t s  r e a l i s t i c  chances fo r  passage .
No spec ia l  message with i t s  accompanying l e g i s l a t i o n  was s e n t  to con­
gress w ithout a careful head-count o f  both houses .  Major Great Socie ty
57b i l l s  not given an e x c e l l e n t  chance o f  passage were not submit ted .  There 
were weekly r e p o r t s  made to the White House on the progress  o f  s p e c i f i c  
b i l l s  the  substance of which went to  the  p re s id e n t .  He expressed p a r t i ­
c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  in knowing when th e re  were s h i f t s  in a t t i t u d e s  and vote 
p o s i t io n s  on b i l l s .  In all there was very l i t t l e  congressional p a r t i c i ­
pa t ion  before  the b i l l s  were ready f o r  in t r o d u c t io n .  The t o t a l  process  
of l e g i s l a t i v e  production was an e x e r c i s e  in executive management c a r r i e d  
out by non-congressional policy-making e l i t e s .
56Cal ifano in h is  oral h i s to r y  tape  r e f l e c t s  on h is  developing d i s ­
p leasu re  with  what he regarded as weak legal craftsmanship  in  the  BOB.
He e v e n tu a l ly  turned to the Department of  J u s t i c e  fo r  Great Soc ie ty  b i l l  
d r a f t i n g  s e r v i c e .
57Johnson gave Califano the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of White House g a t e ­
keeper fo r  the  flow of l e g i s l a t i o n  to  the cong ress .  The f in a l  dec is ion  
on major b i l l s  was reserved by the p r e s id e n t  f o r  h imself .  He regarded 
such mat te rs  as c l e a r l y  within his e x p e r t i s e  and o f f i c i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,
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With t h i s  overview of the  Johnson Commission and ta sk  force advisory  
system in mind a t t e n t i o n  can now be s h i f t e d  to  a case study of the  system 
in a c t ion :  the  work of  the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders  
( the  Kerner Commission).
PART I I I
THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (THE KERNER 
COMMISSION) : A CASE STUDY OF THE POLITICAL USES OF AN AD HOC ADVISORY 
GROUP IN THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION
CHAPTER VI 
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
For n e a r ly  f iv e  y e a r s ,  s ince  the  adm in is t ra t ion  of 
P res iden t  Kennedy, two long waves of danger had 
raced toward the sa fe  and s e t t l e d  shore where most 
Americans l i v e d —the danger of the war in Southeast  
Asis and the  danger of the Black r e b e l l io n  in the 
hear t  o f  American c i t i e s .  The l a s t  week of  April 
1968 was the week the waves b roke . '
The p o l i t i c a l  tremors which produced the  f in a l  s e t  o f  t i d a l  
waves were f i r s t  f e l t  in 1967.
The shocks began with the convening of the  N ine t ie th  Congress in  
January,  1967. This congress was skep t ica l  o f  Johnson 's  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
of the na t iona l  i n t e r e s t  and the leadersh ip  in the two wars he was 
attempting to wage--the one a g a in s t  poverty a t  home and the o the r  
aga ins t  presumed aggression in Vietnam. By March, 1967 the White 
House had received very c l e a r  messages from congress t h a t  new do­
mestic program proposals would rece ive  a cool recep t ion  and t h a t  th e r e  was




s i g n i f i c a n t  e ro s io n  o f  support  f o r  the  war in  s o u t h e a s t  a s i a .
The i s s u e  with congress was jo ined  when Johnson de termined to  
stand by h is  announced p lans  to  expand the  Great Soc ie ty  domestic p ro­
grams and to  continue  to i t s  conclusion the m u l t i - y ea r  s t r a t e g y  f o r  ending
3
the war.  The s t r a t e g y  i m p l i c i t  in Johnson 's  p u r u s i t  o f  t h e se  g o a l s ,
4
the purchase o f  suppor t  f o r  the war by expanded domestic e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  
was upset by the  c a t a s t r o p h i c  urban d i so rd e r s  o f  1967, congress iona l
^See the  f i l e  P r e s i d e n t i a l  Memoranda, June,  1967 (1) C a te r /3  and 
C a l i f a n o 's  o ra l  h i s t o r y  t a p e s ,  both in the  LBJ L ib ra ry .  The Con­
gress iona l  Q uar te r ly  S e r v i c e ' s  annual review of  congress p i c tu r e d  1967 
as a year  of s ta l em a te  between Johnson and co n g re ss ,  the  r e s u l t  o f  f r u s ­
t r a t i o n s  over  the war,  th e  urban d iso rde rs  and the  r e d u c t io n  of the  
Democratic m a jo r i ty  in  the  house to 61 s e a t s  (57 p e rcen t  o f  the  t o t a l ) .  Th 
losses  r e - e s t a b l i s h e d  s o u th e r n  Democrats and c o n s e r v a t i v e  Republicans 
in to  p o s i t i o n s  of de f a c to  l e ad e r sh ip  in the  House. The rev iv a l  o f  t h a t  
c o a l i t i o n  sev e r ly  th r e a te n e d  the  Great Soc ie ty  programs (See Con­
gress iona l  Q uar te r ly  S e rv ic e ,  P o l i t i c s  in  America, 3rd E d i t i o n ,
(Washington: 1969),  pp. 68-69)1 John Manley, in an i n t e r e s t i n g  s tudy of 
problems o f  congress iona l  v^ p r e s i d e n t i a l  power c a l c u l a t e s  t h a t  in  his 
l a s t  two y e a r s  in o f f i c e  Johnson won less  than one h a l f  the  l e g i s l a t i v e  
b a t t l e s  he waged w i th  the  s o u th e r n  Democrat ic -conservat ive  Republican 
c o a l i t i o n .  See ,  John F. Manley "White House Lobbying and th e  Problem 
of P r e s i d e n t i a l  Power," paper  prepared f o r  d e l iv e ry  a t  the  annual meeting 
of th e  American P o l i t i c a l  Science A sso c ia t io n ,  Washington, D.C. 1977.
3
Louis Hern p e r su as iv e ly  argues  t h a t  General Will iam Westmoreland's 
(Commander of  U.S. fo rce s  in Vietnam) s t r a t e g i c  t im e ta b l e  c a l l e d  f o r  1967- 
1968 to  be the  "Year o f  the  Offens ive"  in which the  war could  be won. in 
the g e n e r a l ' s  scheme the  v ic to ry  y e a r  was the  log ica l  and in d i s p e n s ib l e  
conclusion to the "Year o f  the C r i s i s "  (1964) ,  the  "Year o f  the  M i l i t a ry  
Committment" (1965) and the  "Year o f  the  Development" (1966) ,  (Louis Hern, 
No Hai1, No F a i r w e l l , (New York: Harper and Row, 1970) p.  133).  Evidence 
found ' ' in ' the  f i l e  Post-Vietnam Planning ,  Cal ifano 57/(1752% LBJ L ib ra ry ,  
documents the e s tab l i sh m en t  o f  a post-war c a b i n e t - l e v e l  p lanning group 
e a r ly  in 1957 (March 5) and leads  to a hypothesis  t h a t  Johnson had adopted 
a form of  the  Westmoreland t im e tab le  in to  h is  own s t r a t e g i c  th in k in g  and 
planning about the  war.
^Hern, No H a i l ,  No Fa irwel1 , pp. 133-134. See a l s o  the f i l e  Post-  
Vietnam Planning , Cal ifano  57 /(1753) ,  L3J L ib ra ry .
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r e s i s t a n c e  to  both major Johnson p o l i c y  o b je c t iv e s ,^  and a s e r i e s  o f  
o th e r  major fo re ign  and domestic c r i s e s . ^  But as James Reston observed 
toward the end of the p e r io d ,  the upset  of  Johnson's plans was brought  
on more by systemic co l lapse  than s t r a t e g i c  m i s c a l c u l a t i o n s /  Designed
^On March 16, 1967, Johnson signed  in to  law a b i l l  a u th o r iz in g  
supplemental ap p rop r ia t ions  f o r  the  Department of Defense. The congress 
had w i l l i n g l y  passed the l e g i s l a t i o n ,  but appended to i t  a s ta tem en t  
af f irming support  f o r  the  " f ig h t in g  men in Vietnam," fo r  a l i m i t a t i o n  to 
the war,  f o r  a negot ia ted  s e t t l e m e n t ,  f o r  Vietnamese s e l f - d e t e r m in a t io n  
and fo r  a reconvening of  the Geneva Conference. (Public  Law 90-5 ,  81 
S t a t .  5,  and a lso  see "Statement fay the Pres iden t  Upon Signing th e  B i l l  
Authorizing a Supplemental Appropria tion fo r  the  Department o f  Defense,
March 16, 1967." U.S. P r e s id e n t ,  Public  Papers of the P r e s id e n t s  o f  the 
United S t a t e s , (Washington, D.C.: Off ice  o f  the  Federal R e g i s t e r , National
Archives and Records S e r v i c e ) ,  Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Vol. 1 ,  p .  356.
Hern main ta ins  t h a t  the tone of the  debate on the b i l l  was p o l i t e ,
" . . .  there  was no sugges tion of i n c i p i e n t  r e v o l t ,  but the  message was un- 
mi s tak eab le .  There was no h ea r t  f o r  the  war,  hence the longing f o r  a 
negot ia ted  s e t t l e m e n t . "  Subsequent congress ional  ac t ions  confirms h i s  
i n s i g h t s .  Fur ther  comments on congress ional r e s i s tan ce  to  expanded domestic 
program expenditures  as a consequence o f  the war expense w il l  be made 
l a t e r  in t h i s  chap ter .  In the  90th Congress the  conservative  Democratic- 
Republican c o a l i t i o n  had regained i t s  pos t  World War II  s t a t u s  as  the  
e f f e c t i v e  m a jo r i ty  of the congress and was thereby able to d e f e a t  38 
Johnson sponsored b i l l s  in  1967. (Hern,  No H a i l , No F a i r w e l l s , p p . 137-138.) 
Persons se rv ing  in the White House a t  the time bemoaned the f a c t  t h a t  
they were unable to get  congress ional sponsors fo r  various p iece s  o f  
Great Soc ie ty  l e g i s l a t i o n .  There were four p a r t i c u l a r  areas  o f  the  Great 
Socie ty  under a t t a ck ;  y ou th ,  a id  to  urban a r e a s ,  education and the  Teacher 
Corps programs.
^While no modern p re s id en t  can be sa id  to have served dur ing  a "quie t"  
period of h i s t o r y ,  January 1967 through November 1968 was,  fo r  Johnson, 
and extremely d i f f i c u l t  t ime both in  the  q u a l i t y  of the p o l i t i c a l  events  
with which he had to  deal and the personal p o l i t i c a l  damage they  did to  
him: e .g .  the  r e v e la t i o n s  of CIA domestic spying a c t i v i t i e s ,  the  6 pe rcen t  
tax surcharge  b a t t l e ,  the A r a b - I s r a e l i  war, r a c ia l  un res t  in th e  m i l i t a r y  
(the  mutiny and arson on the U.S.S.  F o r r e s t a l l ) ,  the u n re s t  on th e  various  
co llege  campuses, the c i t y  d i s o r d e r s ,  the TET Offensive,  the d i s o rd e r s  a t  
the Democratic convention in Chicago, h is  decis ion not to  seek r e - e l e c t i o n ,  
and the a s s a s s in a t io n s  of  Martin Luther King, J r .  and Senator Robert  F. 
Kennedy.
^New York Times, March 6,  1968:46, 3.
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e s s e n t i a l l y  to deal with  the problems c rea ted  by previous adm in is t ra t ions  
the  Johnson formula o f  p o l i t i c a l  brokering f e l l  v ic tim to  the  explosive 
dynamics of  i t s  contemporary equ iva len t  o f  the  anc ien t  parable  o f  new 
wine in old wine sk in s .
The te lephone  c a l l  from Attorney General Ramsey Clark which awoke 
him e a r ly  in  the  morning of Ju ly  27th ,  1967 in t roduced him to  a s e r i e s  of
g
events which remain permanently engraved on h i s  memory. The Detro i t
q
d iso rd e r  and those in  the  o the r  c i t i e s  challenged  Johnson a t  the  po in t  o f  
h is  s t r e n g t h ,  the  Great Society domestic programs. The urban d is tu rbances  
widened the d iv i s io n s  w ith in  congress  and allowed Great Socie ty  foes to  
a t tack  i t s  under ly ing  p r in c ip le s  as well as p a r t i c u l a r  programs. Opponents 
claimed the d is tu rbances  revealed weakness in  p r i n c i p l e  and program: s o c i a l  
engineer ing  such as the  Great Soc ie ty  programs cannot ,  by d e f i n i t i o n ,  buy 
socia l  s t a b i l i t y .  Supporters  argued th e  oppos i te :  socia l  change when
^Johnson, The Vantage P o in t , pp. 167-168.
^The Kerner Commission s e t t l e d  on a l i s t  o f  164 d isorders  in 128 
c i t i e s  during the  p e r io d .  They c l a s s i f i e d  them i n to  th ree  ca teg o r ie s :  
Major Disorders (a t o t a l  o f  e ig h t  fo r  5 pe rcen t  o f  the  t o t a l ) .  Serious 
Disorders ( T h i r t y - t h r e e  fo r  20 percent of the  t o t a l )  and Minor Disorders 
(123 fo r  75 pe rcen t  o f  the  t o t a l ) .  The g r e a t e s t  number o f  dea ths ,  
i n j u r i e s  and amount o f  property  damage took p lace  in the  D e t ro i t ,  
Cincinnat i  and Newark d i s o rd e r s .  E igh ty - th ree  deaths and 1897 i n j u r i e s  
in a l l  o f  th e  1967 d iso rde rs  with  80 percen t  o f  the  deaths and over 
one -ha l f  o f  the i n j u r i e s  occuring in Newark and D e t ro i t .  The cos t  f i g ­
ures which could be ca lcu la ted  fo r  the major d i so rde rs  were D e t ro i t ,  
Newark, and C in c in a t t i  (somewhat more than $1 m i l l i o n ) .  The National 
Advisory Commission on Civil D isorders ,  Repor t . (Washington: Government 
P r in t ing  Off ice  1968) pp. 65-67. (H ereaf te r  c i t e d  as Report)
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proper ly  financed by publ ic  funds can provide equ i l ib r iu m ;  the  Great 
Socie ty  had been asked to do too much with too l i t t l e . E a c h ,  however, 
agreed with i t s  opponent on two fundamental p o in ts :  1) t h a t  the  disorders  
were, in p a r t ,  the  r e s u l t  o f  u n re a l i z a b le  promises by the  fede ra l  govern­
ment t o  the poor o f  the  n a t ion ,  in g e n e r a l ,  and to the  urban black pop­
u la t io n  in p a r t i c u l a r ,  and, 2) t h a t  pub l ic  money had to  be taken from
the  a d m in i s t r a t i o n ' s  domestic program budget to  suppor t  the  war in Vietnam.
F u r th e r ,  congress was showing signs o f  becoming weary o f  i t s  commitment 
to  both wars and o f  a w i l l in g n e s s  to draw back and re c o n s id e r  the  
na t iona l  p r i o r t i e s  e x p l i c i t  in both.  Yet, Johnson p e r s i s t e d  in his at tempt 
not only to wage, but to  win h i s  two wars.  To do so he did what he knew 
had to  be done; he maintained the  i n i t a t i v e  in pol icy-making,  con tro l led  
the  flow of in format ion to  congress and the  p u b l ic ,  used the  p re s t ig e  and 
power of h is  o f f i c e  to  maintain pressure  on congress f o r  suppor t  fo r  both 
h i s  w ars ,  while r e s i s t i n g  e f f o r t s  by persons in the  s t r e e t s  to "shoot" 
t h e i r  way in to  a p o s i t io n  of  leg i t imacy  among.the e s t a b l i s h e d  i n t e r e s t s  of  
the  p o l i t y . T h i s  was a ta sk  worthy o f  the  t a l e n t s  o f  the Johnson of  1965
and the  Eighty -n in th  congress ,  but the  t ime,  events  and the  ac to rs  were
The o the r  popular congress ional explana t ion  f o r  the  d iso rders  
was t h a t  they were the  product of  a domestic criminal and /o r  foreign  
subversive conspiracy.
^^All p re s id en ts  use such r h e t o r i c ,  but none has been ab le  to 
r e a l i z e  i t  in the form of  unqual i f ied  public  p o l i c y .  S e l e c t iv e ,  and 
sometimes random uses o f  v io lence  are of  p o s i t iv e  value to  many groups 
in t h e i r  successfu l  at tempts  to gain leg it im acy among the p o l ic y  e l i t e  
o f  the  nation ( e . g .  the  American labor  movement i s  a r ecen t  example).
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a l l  very d i f f e r e n t .  By the end o f  the y e a r  he knew t h a t  he had f a i l e d  
and began the process  which eventuated in his  r e s ig n a t io n .
In the  summer and f a l l  of  1967, however, Johnson thought of
himself  as being in a p o l i t i c a l l y  dangerous but not  f a t a l  s i t u a t i o n .  He
was caught between Great  Society supporters  and opponents-each being
able  to  muster s i g n i f i c a n t  support  in a ttempts  to  move him away from
the pos i t ions  he had adopted,  but n e i th e r  was ab le  t o  marshall the
12s t reng th  necessary to  fo rce  him to follow i t s  l ead .  He was acu te ly
aware t h a t  congress would not accept any new Great Soc ie ty  i n i t i a t i v e s
from the White House; f u r t h e r ,  the  po ten t ia l  was high fo r  pa r t i san
e x p lo i t a t io n  o f  the urban d i so rd e r s .  There was a general  obsession in
Washington with a conspiracy theory o f  the  o r ig i n  o f  the  d i so rd e r s ,
t h a t  the new, young, Negro leaders  were g e t t i n g  he lp  from communist
countr ies  (Cuba in p a r t i c u l a r ) .  There were demands fo r  various kinds
o f  congressional i n v e s t i g a t i o n s .  In s h o r t ,  th e re  was developing a
s t rugg le  fo r  na t iona l  l eade rsh ip  of major p ro p o r t io n s .  Congress was
c le a r ly  a ttempting to  chal lenge the p re s id en t  in the  area o f  domestic
policy and was showing inc reas ing  signs o f  r e j e c t i n g  the  means i f  not
1 3the ends o f  the  Johnson foreign pol icy .
12Much o f  the  pressure  Johnson was f e e l in g  f o r  increased funding fo r  
local  po l ice  and th e  na t iona l  guard was coming from a c o a l i t i o n  of  big 
c i t y  and o th e r  urban p o l i t i c a l  e l i t e s  and a n t i - G r e a t  Socie ty  members 
of  congress.
1 O
During the s p r in g  and summer months Johnson was receiving mixed 
s ignals  about suppor t  f o r  h is  foreign p o l ic y .  The ambivalence of congress 
has been mentioned. The word he was g e t t i n g  from the  campuses was coming 
from fa c u l ty  sources  f r i e n d l y  to the a d m in i s t r a t i o n ,  persons who had 
been suppor tive  of the  war from i t s  beginning. T h e i r  word was not d i s ­
couraging. There i s  no evidence of e f f o r t s  by the  White House to t a l k  
with f a c u l ty  members who were not on the White House l i s t  of  p o ten t ia l  
consul tan ts  and t a sk  force  members. See,  P r e s id e n t i a l  Memoranda, 4 /16 ,  
Cater 3, LBJ L ib rary .
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Three Senators brought the immediate pressure  which led Johnson 
to appoint the Kerner Commission: Edward W. Brooke (Republican-
Massachuse t ts ) , Fred R. Harr is  (Democrat-Oklahoma), John McClellan 
(Democrat-Arkansas),  two o f  whom (Brooke and Harr is )  Johnson named to 
the  commission membership. Each represen ted  a d i s t i n c t  chal lenge  and 
opportuni ty  fo r  him; Brooke's a c t io n  represented t h a t  o f  the  opposit ion 
looking fo r  a way to  use the  d i so rde rs  for pa r t i s an  advantage ,  McClellan's  
t h a t  of  the southern Democratic leade rsh ip  seeking ad d i t iona l  means of 
securing control  o f  domestic po licy  making and Harris t h a t  o f  th e  b r ig h t ,  
ambitious group of l i b e r a l s  who continued to support  Great  Soc ie ty  p r i n c i ­
p le s ,  i f  not a l l  the  s p e c i f i c  programs. Johnson, p r e d i c t a b l y ,  chose to 
a lign  himself  with the  congressional challenge t h a t  promised him the 
g re a t e s t  f l e x i b i l i t y  to  pursue his  own plans and main ta in  his  p o s i t io n  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  dominance and contro l  over  policy .
Senator Brooke in troduced a r e so lu t io n  c a l l i n g  f o r  the  Senate 
to appoint a seven member s e l e c t  committee to study the  o r ig in s  o f  the 
r i o t s  in order to give the nation a " tangib le  demonst ra t ion,  a symbol 
of the f a c t  t h a t  the U.S. Senate i s  a c tu a l ly  and a c t i v e l y  concerned.
His reso lu t ion  was endorsed by the Republican Coordinating Committee with 
the addi t iona l  sugges tion t h a t  the composition of the committee be 
expanded to include members of  the House o f  R epresen ta t ives .  Nothing 
came of  Brooke's o r ig in a l  proposal o r  i t s  amended endorsement by the 
Republican Coordinating Committee. Neither  was supported by th e  Senate
^^New York Times, Ju ly  25, 1967:20,5.
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Republican l e a d e r  E v e re t t  McKinley D i r k s e n J ^  In s tead  Dirksen suppor ted  
an i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  the d i so rde rs  by Sena to r  McClellan and h is  sub­
committee.^^ The choice  of the McClellan sub-committee posed a most 
s e r io u s  cha l l enge  to Johnson; the sub-committee was equipped to  i n v e s t i ­
gate c r iminal and law enforcement problems. In a d d i t io n  to  appo in t ing  
the sub-committee to do t h i s  work, the Senate  s e n t  an ad d i t iona l  message 
to the  White House by r e j e c t i n g  an e f f o r t  by Senate l i b e r a l s  to sp e c i fy  
th a t  the  sub-committee lock i n to  economic ano so c ia l  causes o f  the  d i s ­
orders ." '^  C le a r ly  the Senate was concerned to  s e t t l e  the question  o f  
c r i m i n a l i t y  and consp i racy .  Johnson shared  the S e n a te ' s  concern to  expose 
the c r im inal o r i g i n s  of the d i s o rd e r s  and to  punish the  g u i l t y ,  but 
recognized the  dangers the sub-committee p resen ted  to h is  domestic l e g i s ­
l a t i v e  program. He and his s t a f f  had s p e n t  co ns ide rab le  time dur ing
the s p r in g  o f  1957 p a c i fy ing  powerful congress iona l  opponents to  va r ious
18Great So c ie ty  programs, and Johnson knew well t h a t  a conse rv a t iv e  l i k e
^^ilew York Times, Ju ly  26:19,1 .
^^Two days fo llowing the  appointment o f  the  Kerner Commission, ihe 
Senate Rules Committee, by a vote o f  e i g h t  to  one,  acted  to s e l e c t  the 
McClellan sub-committee to c a r r y  cu t  an i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of  t h e - d i s o r d e r s .
In a d d i t io n  to  McClellan, Democratic members o f  the sub-committee were,
Henry Jackson (Washington),  Sam Ervin (N. C a r o l in a ) ,  Edwin Muskie (Maine) , 
Abraham R ib ic o f f  (Connecticut)  and H a r r i s .  The Republican membership con­
s i s t e d  o f  Karl Mundt (S. Dakota),  Karl C u r t i s  (Nebraska) and Jacob J a v i t s  
(New York).  Discussion of the  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between the  sub-committee and 
the Kerner Commission can be found below, pp. 407-412.
^^Richard Lyons, Washington P o s t , 8 /12 /57 .
1 p
""See P r e s i d e n t i a l  Memoranda, 2 /57 ,  Cater  3, LBJ L ib ra ry ,  and G ra f f ,  
The Tuesday C a b i n e t , p. 153 fo r  a d i s c u s s io n  o f  the time and e f f o r t s  spent 
cn one memcer of  the  House of  R e p r e s e n ta t i v e ,  R epresen ta t ive  George Mahon o f  
Texas.  For a d i s cu s s io n  of Mahon's in f lu e n c e  on Johnson 's  r e c ep t io n  of 
the Kerner Commission Report see pp. 481-483 below.
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McClellan would in e v i ta b ly  turn  h is  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  on the Great Socie ty  
programs as one po ss ib le  cause o f  the  d i s o r d e r s .
Given t h i s  s e t  of  p o l i t i c a l  v a r i a b l e s ,  Johnson was re l ieved
when Senator  Harr is  and Senator Walter Mondale (Democrat from Minnesota)
recommended a j o i n t  c o n g r e s s io n a l -p re s id e n t i a l  commission to i n v e s t i g a t e
the c i v i l  d i s o r d e r s .  Their s u g g es t io n ,  t o g e th e r  with  Brooke's, al lowed
the White House to  claim congress iona l suppor t  fo r  the  appointment
19of a p r e s i d e n t i a l  commission to look in to  the  d i s o r d e r s .  F u r th e r ,  
H a r r i s ' s  and Mondale's recommendation fo r  a congress iona l ly  approved p r e ­
s i d e n t i a l  adv isory  commission meant to Johnson t h a t ,  regardless  o f  who 
did what kind of i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  the  McClellan sub-committee had as a mem­
ber a t  l e a s t  one Senator w i l l i n g  to  broaden the  in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  the  d i s ­
orders  beyond the Senate mandate. Harris  and Mondaie ' s  reso lu t ion  pro­
vided f o r  a commission to i n v e s t i g a t e  the c i v i l  s t r i f e  in the c i t i e s .  I t  
provided f o r  n ine  members appointed by the  p r e s i d e n t .  The commission 
would make recommendations to  a permanent O ff i ce  on Civil  S t r i f e  (which, 
would be c re a te d  by the same ac t  as the  commission) to  be located  in the  
Office o f  Emergency Planning in the  Executive Off ice  o f  the P re s id e n t .
The plan became p a r t i c u l a r l y  e n t i c in g  to  th e  White House when Harris
The f a c t  t h a t  a t h i r d  o f  th e  Senate did not vote on the  McClellan 
a u t h o r i z a t i o n ,  and the  $150,000 app rop r ia ted  fo r  i t s  work, f u r t h e r  
s trengthened  Johnson 's  hand in responding p o s i t i v e l y  to H a r r i s ' s  sug­
g e s t io n s .  See Richard L. Lyons, Washington Pos t ,  8 /12/67.
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sen t  a hand c a r r i e d  l e t t e r  to the p re s id en t  con ta in ing  a copy of the
proposed r e s o lu t io n  to g e th e r  with a suggest ion t h a t  the  p re s iden t
might p r e f e r  to appo in t  a commission by execu t ive  o r d e r  before  the
reso lu t io n  passed the  s e n a t e ;  i f  no t ,  h i s  and Mondale 's  commission sug-
20gest ion would be p r e f e r a b l e  to  any congress iona l i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  Thus 
the congress iona l  c a l l  fo r  na tional leadersh ip  in  the face  o f  the 
d isorders  and the d iv i s io n  within i t s  ranks about the proper  form 
of  i t s  response l e f t  Johnson with the oppor tun i ty  he needed to 
commandeer the  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  the d i so rde rs  and to  gain the time 
necessary  to  recap tu re  the i n i t a t i v e  in the p u r s u i t  o f  h is  Great 
Society goa ls .  His r e a c t io n  to congress allowed him to  maintain control
20There were a t  the time four proposals i n  congress fo r  i n v e s t i ­
gat ions  of th e  d i so rd e r s  by commissions. See memo. Cater  to LBJ 
7 /25/79 , C ater  4/  P r e s id e n t i a l  Memoranda, LBJ L ib ra r y ,  covering H a r r i s ' s  
l e t t e r  to the p r e s id e n t .  See a lso  the document Analysis  o f  Proposals 
fo r  Commissions t o  I n v e s t ig a t e  Crime and R io ts ,  Ju ly  27,  19.67 in t h e '  
same f i l e .  A copy of  the Aarris-Mondale b i l l  can be found in D e t r o i t ( 4 ) /  
Gaither 31, LBJ L ib ra ry .  Wolanin, "P re s id en t i a l  Advisory Commissions," 
pp. 122-124, misunderstands the  context in which H a r r i s  made his proposal 
and i t s  e f f e c t  on the White House and congress .  He says t h a t  the H a r r i s -  
Mondale proposal recommended congressional s tudy o f  the  r i o t s  and t h a t  
none was made because of the  appointment of the  Kerner Commission. This 
assumes t h a t  the con ten t ion  maintained a t  the t ime by both the White House 
and Senator McClellan t h a t  the  two groups were in the p u r s u i t  of d i f f e r e n t  
goals is  t r u e ,  t h a t  the  subcommittee was not i n v e s t i g a t i n g  the d i s o rd e r s .  
Wolanin did not i n v e s t i g a t e  th e  work o f  the McClellan subcommittee and 
i t s  e f f e c t  on the Kerner Commission and the importance o f  H a r r i s ' s  being 
a member of  both .  When one looks a t  t h i s ,  as i s  done below, i t  can be 
seen th a t  the  two groups were not only deal ing  with  the  same sub jec t  
m at te r ,  but they were a c t i v e l y  competing a g a in s t  each o th e r .
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of the policy making environment,  and to claim congress ional  support  
fo r  his  appointment o f  a commission, 40 percen t  o f  whose members 
were congresspersons  and the mandate o f  which placed heavy emphasis 
on seeking the t r u t h  about the alleged criminal  causes o f  the d i s o rd e r s .  
The momentum o f  contro l  of  national leadersh ip  and policy-making was 
again moving in Johnson 's  d i r e c t io n .
For i t s  completion,  the desc r ip t ion  of  the  re levan t  ing red ien ts  
of the Kerner Commission's p o l i t i c a l  context demands a general con­
s id e ra t io n  o f  the  con ten t  and charac te r  o f  the  urban c iv i l  r i g h t s  po l icy
21of the Johnson Adminis tra tion in 1967. I t  i s  important to note a t  
the ou tse t  o f  t h i s  d i scuss ion  that  Johnson had two d i s t i n c t  s e t s  of 
p o l i c i e s  fo r  the  events  being considered he re .  F i r s t ,  control  o f  the 
d isorders  fo r  Johnson was a police problem; a law and order  m at te r  for  
local  o f f i c i a l s —a na t iona l  secur i ty  problem when i t  passed in to  the 
hands o f  the p re s id e n t  as i t  did in  D e t ro i t ;  c i v i l  d isorders  were a con­
cern fo r  the c r im inal j u s t i c e  system. Second, c iv i l  r i g h t s  p o l i c y ,  
on the o th e r  hand, was a national p o l i t i c a l  concern,  the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
fo r  which r e s t e d  p r im ar i ly  with the p re s id e n t .  As he did with h is  two 
wars,  Johnson at tempted to pursue both s imultaneously .  His a t t i t u d e  
and policy toward the r i o t s  was simple; the  d i so rd e r s  were caused by 
c r im in a ls ,  unapprec ia t ive  malcontents who were w i l l in g  fo r  t h e i r  own
21 For the purpose of  t h i s  d iscuss ion ,  Johnson 's  c iv i l  r i g h t s  
pol icy  i s  being def ined  as those l e g i s l a t i v e  and adm in is t ra t ive  pro­
posals and enacted  programs designed to  provide comprehensive federal  
aid to the vic tims o f  r ac ia l  descriminat ion.
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s e l f i s h  reasons to t h r e a t e n  the socia l  gains of a l l  Negroes,  fo r  which
he (Johnson) was l a r g e l y  re sp o n s ib le ;  the d i so rd e r s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  not
22only a ttacked his programs, but him. In discuss ing  th e  summer c iv i l
d isorders  with Kearns,  Johnson lamented,
" I t  simply wasn ' t  f a i r  fo r  a few i r r e sp o n s ib le  a g i t a t o r s  to 
spoil  i t  for  me and fo r  a l l  the r e s t  o f  the  Negroes, who 
are b a s ic a l ly  peace-loving and n ice .  A few hoodlums sparked 
by ou ts ide  a g i t a t o r s  who moved around from c i t y  to  c i t y  making 
troub le .  Spo i l ing  a l l  the progress I ' v e  made in th e se  l a s t  few
y e a r s . "23
In his  published r e t r o s p e c t i v e  ana lys is  o f  the period Johnson admitted to
a wi l l ingness  to e n t e r t a i n  a more complex explanat ion f o r  the  "long
hot summers." There he sa id :
As the mask o f  Black submission began to  f a l l ,  the  coun t le ss  
years of suppressed anger exploded outward. The w i the r ing  o f  
hope, the f a i l u r e  to  change the dismal condit ions  o f  l i f e ,  
and the  complex ta n g le  of  a t t i t u d e s ,  i s s u e s ,  b e l i e f s  and 
circumstances a l l  led to the t r ag ic  phenomena known as "the  
r i o t s " — "the long hot summers."2'+
He never admitted,  however, t h a t  the Great Socie ty programs themselves 
were in any way re spons ib le  fo r  the f r u s t r a t i o n s  to which the p a r t i -
22 Califano recounted t h a t  a t  the time of the Watts d i s o rd e r ,  
which occured during the  week t h a t  the  Voting Rights Act o f  1965 was 
s igned, Johnson was so stunned by the event t h a t  he r e fu sed  to  ac­
knowledge the ex is tence  o f  the  d iso rde r  and was immobilized by i t .  See 
Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the  American Dream, p. 305.
Z^lbid.
2 4 Johnson ,  The Vantage P o i n t , p. 167.
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c ipan ts  in the c i v i l  d isorders  were giving ven t .  During the 1967 
c iv i l  d i so rd e r s  Johnson manifested one cons tan t  a t t i t u d e  toward those  
who took to the s t r e e t s — they must be stopped immediately with no h in t  
of any "reward" to  the r i o t e r s  ( i . e .  any form of  federa l  a i d ) .  Lipsky 
and Olson note an exchange between Johnson and an u n id e n t i f i e d  person 
s l a t e d  to  t e s t i f y  before a congress ional committee on the  day before  
the announcement of the appointment o f  the  Kerner Commission which r e ­
p re sen ts  the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  a t t i t u d e  throughout  1967. When he inqu i red  
what kind o f  testimony might be usefu l to the  White House, he was t r e a t e d  
to the following dialogue:
No reward f o r  the r i o t e r s
What e l s e :
No reward f o r  r i o t e r s
Anything e l se?
No money.25
He was w i l l i n g  with in  a few hours to  do whatever the  fede ra l  government 
was au tho r ized  t o  do fo r  the  c i t i e s ,  businessmen and homeowners v i c t i ­
mized by the d i s o rd e r s ;  they ,  in h is  mind, were the innocent  v ic tims 
o f  criminal a c t s ;  they deserved h e lp .  The criminal elements re spons ib le
25Lipsky and Olson, MSS, I I I ,  p. 9.  Another,  l e s s  dramatic  example 
can be found in a memo from Cal ifano  to  Johnson, da ted Ju ly  15, 1967, 
in which Cal ifano r e l a t e s  h is  conversa t ion  with New Je r s e y  o f f i c i a l s  
concerning federa l  aid to Newark fol lowing the  d iso rde rs  t h e r e .  Cal ifano 
recorded tha t  h i s  f i r s t  concern in the conversa tion was t h a t  the  New 
Je r sey  o f f i c i a l s  understand t h a t  r i o t e r s  a re  not to be rewarded with 
fede ra l  a id .  Commission on Civil  Disorders [2 ) ,  Cal ifano 3,  LBJ 
L ibrary .
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fo r  the  d i s a s t ro u s  events  deserved nothing o th e r  than t h a t  which
the cr iminal j u s t i c e  system i s  designed to provide  fo r  a l l  persons 
26accused of  crime.
The p r e s i d e n t ' s  a t t i t u d e  complicated the  p o l i t i c a l  environment o f
the t ime in another  impor tant way. By 1967 the  urban d i so rde rs  no
27longer immobilized him as they had in  1965. When the  1967 d i so rd e r s
began, Johnson a c t i v a t e d  a command c e n te r  in the  White House fo r  federa l
ac t ion  which c lo se ly  resembled those he developed and used in a v a r i e ty
28of fo re ign  policy  c r i s i s  s i t u a t i o n s .  This t r e a tm e n t  o f  the urban 
d i so rd e r s  f u r t h e r  allowed Johnson to separa te  the  demonstrators  from the 
general cons ide ra t ion  o f  na tional c i v i l  r ig h t s  problems. In the  command 
c en te r  they e a s i l y  became "the enemy." All c i v i l  d i s o rd e r s  looked 
very much a l ik e  and the  so lu t io n s  to  them could e a s i l y  be l imi ted  to 
p o l i c e - m i l i t a r y  a c t i o n s .  The obvious quest ion o f  whether Johnson
26This a t t i t u d e  made i t  very d i f f i c u l t  f o r  Johnson to  accept major 
p a r t s  o f  the Report o f  h is  Commission on Civi l  D isorders .
^^See Note #22, p. 195, above.
28The more or  l e s s  permanent members o f  the  domestic c r i s i s  com­
mand c e n te r  were Johnson, Cal ifano,  D irec to r  o f  the Federal  Bureau of  
I n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  J .  Edgar Hoover, Attorney General Ramsey Clark ,  and 
Secre ta ry  o f  Defense Robert McNamara. Various White House s t a f f  p e r ­
sons p a r t i c i p a t e d  in these  groups depending on how c lo s e ly  the p a r t i c u l a r  
c r i s i s  touched on t h e i r  individual  a reas  of  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  McPherson, 
and various  a ides  o f  Cal ifano f e l l  in to  t h i s  ca tegory .  Mr. Associate 
J u s t i c e  Abe Fortes was a p a r t i c ip a n t  in both the  fo re ign  and domestic 
c r i s i s  command p o s t s .
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had much choice over  the  c re a t io n  and maintenance of  a federa l  r i o t  
command post  can be answered s imply--he  had no cho ice .  No p res iden t  
could allow such a sequence o f  d i s o r d e r s ,  spread over the na tion  as 
those o f  1967 were ,  to  p e r s i s t  without some form of  coord ina ted  na t ­
ional response and s t i l l  expect  to  maintain h is  p o l i t i c a l  s t a t u r e .
Where he did have a cho ice ,  however, and where h i s  judgement and ac t ions
can be ques t ioned  was in h is  s e l e c t io n  o f  the  l o c a t io n  o f  th e  cente r  and
29in his d ec is ion  f o r  personal involvement in the t o t a l  p rocess .  Given 
Johnson's a t t i t u d e s  toward c i v i l  r ig h t s  and p o l i t i c a l  leadersh ip  i t  is  
doubtful th a t  any o th e r  format o f  ac t ion  was e n t e r t a i n e d .  The mindset 
of  the p re s id en t  made i t  impossible  fo r  him to see  th e  p a r t i c ip a n t s  in 
the d i so rd e r s  as c i t i z e n s  engaging in what they f e l t  to be the  only 
avenue o f  p o l i t i c a l  p r o t e s t  l e f t  open to  them. For Johnson, there  were 
good Negroes ( those  who accepted the  oppor tun i ty  fo r  p a r t i c ip a t io n  in 
the Great  Soc ie ty  obta ined f or  them by him and h i s  genera t ion  of  New 
Deal l i b e r a l s )  and bad Negroes ( those who did n o t ) ;  c i v i l  disobedience
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"Graff  records  a conversa t ion  he had with  Johnson 's  National 
Secur i ty  Advisory,  McGeorge Bundy about " . . . t h e  usefu lness  o f  having th e  
White House serve  as a coimand pos t  during a c r i s i s  . . .  Bundy seemed to  
be saying t h a t  h e r e a f t e r  every p re s id en t  must conduct c r i t i c a l  phases 
of his  fo re ign  r e l a t i o n s  as Johnson was doing, making h imself  a more 
ac t ive  commander-in-chief than was ever envis ioned  by those who wrote 
t h i s  p r e s i d e n t i a l  r o l e  in to  the  c o n s t i t u t i o n . "  The Tuesday Cabinet , 
pp. 47-48. G ra f f 'S  d iscuss ion  implies t h a t  the ro le  the  pres iden t  adopts  
to meet a p a r t i c u l a r  challenge not only determines the  c h a rac te r  of th e  
governmental response  but changes the c h a r ac te r  o f  th e  events  to which 
he/she is responding. I f  the p re s id en t  a c t s  as the commander4n-chief 
i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  a l l  those responding to h i s / h e r  orders  to  see the 
events involved as o th e r  than c rea ted  by an "enemy". In tu r n ,  those 
toward whom such na t iona l  fo rce  i s  d i rec ted  f ind  i t  very  d i f f i c u l t  to 
th ink o f  i t  as o th e r  than t h a t  o f  an a l i e n  a n ta g o n i s t  which must be 
opposed.
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of the s o r t  experienced in the  summer of 1967 was f o r  him insurrec tion 
and must be t r e a t e d  as such. In t h i s  response ,  to o ,  Johnson remained 
a Southern p o p u l i s t  i n s i s t i n g  upon the c e n t r a l i t y  o f  his ro le  a s  both 
advocate fo r  r ig h t s  and o p p o r tu n i t i e s  fo r  American Negroes and the 
judge of  the q u a l i t y  o f  t h e i r  reac t ion  to  the  l a r g e s s .
Johnson was not d e te r red  in the p u r s u i t  o f  h is  c i v i l  r ights  policy
goals by the n iggard ly  response to  his  1967 proposals  by the Ninetie th
Congress. Through the f i r s t  nine months of  the  year  the admin is tra tion
proceeded in i t s  customary fashion of  p resen t ing  to the congress a
s teady stream of spec ia l  messages followed by s p e c i f i c  l e g i s l a t i v e
proposa ls .  Before the  end o f  April of  1967 Johnson sen t  to the Hill
twelve specia l  messages c ra f t e d  to  meet the  p r e v a i l in g  White House view
31of the  Great Socie ty  programs needed. Throughout the pre and pos t­
r i o t  period of  1966-67 the White House was rece iv in g  ta sk  force and 
commission repo r ts  on a v a r i e ty  o f  r i o t  r e l a t e d  problems (e.g. the task  
force  repo r ts  on c i t i e s ,  youth  o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  c i v i l  r i g h t s  and the Kaiser 
Commission re p o r t )  and d i re c t in g  cab ine t  level a t t e n t i o n  to what i t  
conceived to be p r e - r i o t  condit ions  in major urban c e n t e r s .  A v a r i e ty  
of debates was tak ing  place in the White House concerning the p o s i t io n s  
the adm in is t ra t ion  should be taking based on these  d a ta .  The sen io r  
aides were not o f  a mind on the s u b je c t .  Some saw the charac te r  o f  c i v i l  
r ig h t s  and d i so rd e r  r e l a t e d  issues  changing because t h e i r  leadership 
was so uns table .  McPherson discusses  a t  some length  a debate going
on
See Samuel P. Huntington, "S t ra teg ic  Planning and the P o l i t i c a l  
Process,"  Foreign A ffa i rs  XXXVIII (January ,  1960), p.  298 for a d i s ­
cussion of  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  into  which a p re s id en t  ge ts  in try ing to be 
both judge and advoca te  f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  po l icy  i s su e .
^^See Public Papers of the P res id en ts ,  LBJ, 1967, P a r t i .
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on a t  the time concerning the fu tu r e  of  the  c iv i l  r i g h t ' s  b i l l  then 
before the congress and the natu re  of the on-going r e l a t i o n s h ip  between 
the a d m in is t ra t ion  and the black leadership  o f  the  c iv i l  r i g h t s  move­
ment. McPherson wanted to open l i n e s  of communication to  the  "new"
Negro leaders  fay means o f  a White House sponsored conference .  Johnson 
d isagreed .  McPherson lamented th e  decis ion by t e l l i n g  a s t o r y  about 
how Johnson continued to  use and pa tronize the e s t a b l i s h e d  Negro leaders  
to serve the  ends o f  h i s  c iv i l  r i g h t s  movement. In the  t a l e ,  a t  the  con­
c lusion  o f  a meeting with  an u n id e n t i f i e d  Negro l e a d e r ,  Johnson t e l l s  him 
t h a t  he cannot leave wi thout  demanding something o f  the p re s id e n t .  Johnson 
picked up the phone and ca l l ed  the  Secre tary o f  the  Navy and sa id  t h a t  
a p e rsona l ly  c a r r ie d  complaint  had come to  him t h a t  day concerning the 
slowness o f  the  Navy to  follow h i s  d i r e c t iv e s  fo r  in t e g r a t i o n  o f  the  
s e rv ice  academies.  What was the  Secre tary going to  do about i t ?  A f te r  
the conversa tion with the  S e c re ta r y ,  Johnson sen t  the " leader"  to  an
arranged press  conference to  give d e t a i l s  of  the  s t a t u s  o f  Negroes in
32the naval academy taken from a l i s t  which Johnson had handed him.
Other d ispu tes  tak ing  p lace  ear ly  in 1967, which helped in formu­
l a t i n g  the core of  the  c i v i l  r i g h t s  program fo r  the  y e a r  cen tered  around
the a d m in i s t r a t i o n ' s  p o s i t io n  on the extension o f  the l i f e  o f  the U.S.
33Commission on Civil Rights and how to handle the  1967 c i v i l  r ig h t s
^^McPherson, A P o l i t i c a l  Education, p. 350-359.
33The major d i sp u te  cen tered  on a d iscuss ion  of  whether the com­
mission should be extended fo r  f iv e  years or be given a permanent exten­
s ion .  See memo Cal ifano to Gaither  1/3/67 in Gaither 25/Civ i l  Rights (3),  
LBJ L ibrary .
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package in the face  of the p a r t i c u l a r  challenge presen ted fay the  con-
3d-gress iona l  a n t i - r i o t  b i l l ,  which a l l  sen io r  White House aides  opposed. ' 
Johnson met the challenge in c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  s t y l e .  He s en t  to congress 
his t o t a l  c iv i l  r igh ts  package fo r  the y e a r ,  the  product o f  the s e c r e t  
task  force  system, a f t e r  submit t ing st rong measures providing fo r  a 
cut in t o t a l  government spending, but which a l so  proposed inc reases  fo r  
the budgets fo r  the  war and the  an t i -c r im e  programs. In shor t  he was 
determined to  have his Great Soc ie ty ,  win h i s  foreign war, and do i t  
on his  te rms.
^^Memo Gaither  to Cal i fano ,  1/23/67 in Gaither  25/Civi l  Rights 
(3 ) ,  LBJ L ib rary .
^^See "Annual Message to the Congress," January 10, 1967 (pp. 2 -14) ,  
" P r e s id e n t ' s  News Conference," January 17, 1967, (pp. 16-26),  "Annual Budget 
Message to  the Congress," January 24, 1967 (pp. 39-61) ,  "Special Message 
on Crime in  America," February 6,  1967 (pp. 134-146),  and "Special Message 
to the  Congress on Equal J u s t i c e , "  February 15, 1967 (pp. 184-196). All 
found in Publ ic  Papers of the  P r e s id e n t , LBJ, 1967, Book 1 .
CHAPTER VII 
CREATION AND PURPOSE
The p re s id e n t  announced the  c r e a t io n  of  th e  Kerner Commission in
a speech to the na t ion  on July 27,  1967. '  I t  was fo rmal ly  impanelled
2
by means of Executive Order 11365. As with any p r e s i d e n t i a l  advisory 
commission, the appointment of  the Kerner Commission had both e x p l i c i t  
and im p l i c i t  purposes .  The pa ten t  reasons fo r  the  appointment were 
fo r c e fu l ly  s t a t e d  in two p re s id e n t i a l  speeches and the  execut ive  o rde r .
The f i r s t  address was given in the wake of the s e r i e s  o f  d i s o rd e r s  which 
climaxed in D e t ro i t  on July 2 6 th . ;  he announced the c re a t io n  o f  the  
commission, i t s  members and in very general  terms o u t l i n e d  the  purposes 
fo r  which he c rea ted  i t  —  " ( to )  . . .  i n v e s t i g a t e  the  o r ig i n s  o f  the  
recen t  d iso rde rs  . . .  make recommendations — to me, to  the  congress ,  to  
the S ta te  Governors and to  the Mayors —  fo r  measures to  prevent or
3
contain such d i s a s t e r s  in the f u t u r e . "  In t h i s  speech Johnson a r t i c u l a t e d  
the two p r i n c i p l e s  which were cons tan ts  in h is  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  the d i s ­
o rde rs .  F i r s t ,  the  d i so rde rs  were no t  p a r t  of  what he recognized as the
^See Publ ic  Papers of the P r e s i d e n t , LBJ, 1967, p.  721.
2
Executive Order 11365, " E s tab l i sh in g  a National Advisory Commission 
on Civil  D iso rders ,"  3 Weekly Comp. P res .  Doct. p.  1069; 32 F.R. 11111,
3 CFR, 1967 Comp. p. 310, July 29, 1967.
^Public Papers o f  the P r e s id e n t , LBJ, 1967, p.  721.
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l e g i t im a te  c iv i l  r i g h t s  movement; the p e rp e t r a to r s  o f  the  un res t  were 
c r im ina ls  and would,  under the  law, be t r e a t e d  as such . Second, 
the  v a s t  majo r ity  o f  the  Negroes l iv in g  in the r i o t  plagued ghet tos  
were law abiding and had been vic timized by t h i s  c r im inal m ino r i ty .  His 
prime r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  as p r e s id e n t ,  was to  put an immediate end to  the  
d i s tu rbances .  "There w i l l  be attempts  to i n t e r p r e t  the  events  o f  the 
past  few days. But when v io lence  s t r i k e s ,  then those in  public  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  have an immediate and very d i f f i c u l t  job :  not to  analyze,  
but to  end d i s o r d e r . " ^  He a l so  used the speech to rehearse  another  
theme which would remain cons tan t  throughout the  months ahead - -  
congress must bear a s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t  of  th e  blame f o r  the  d i s o r d e r s .
They had c o n s i s t e n t l y  f a i l e d  to  pass the Great Socie ty  l e g i s l a t i o n  de­
signed to  r e l i e v e ,  i f  not remove, the causes o f  the cond i t io n s  which 
breed d i s p a i r  and v io lence  - -  the  Model C i t i e s  Act,  Voters Rights  Act,
Rent Supplement Act,  medicare and medicaid,  twenty -four  educa t ion  b i l l s ,  
haad s t a r t ,  job co rps ,  rdanpower development and t r a i n i n g ,  e t c . ^
The execu t ive  o rd e r  and the remarks he made on th e  occas ion  of 
s igning i t  were more s p e c i f i c  and formed the  normative b a s i s  fo r  the 
work o f  the commission. The executive o rder  chatged the  commission with 
the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  i n v e s t i g a t e  and make recommendations f o r  four  general 
a reas :
1) Find the  o r ig i n s  o f  the  major d i s o r d e r s ,  " . . .  inc lud ing  
the ba s ic  causes and the fac to r s  leading  to such d i so rde rs  
and the i n f lu e n c e ,  i f  any, o f  o rgan iza t ions  or  in d iv id u a l s  
dedicated to  the inc itement or encouragement o f  v io le n c e . "
^ I b i d . ,  p. 722 
^ Ib id .
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2) Develop " . . .  methods and techniques  f o r  a v e r t in g  o r  con­
t r o l l i n g  such d i s o r d e r s . . . ; "
3) Determine "The appropr ia te  ro le  of  l o c a l .  S t a t e  and Federal 
a u t h o r i t i e s  in deal ing with c i v i l  d i s o r d e r s . . . ; "
4) "Such o th e r  mat te rs  as the Pres ident  may place before  the
Commission."G
I t  was in the  speech o f  July 29th ,  however, t h a t  Johnson became most 
s p e c i f i c  in his charge to the commission. He wanted i t  to f ind the  
answer " . . .  to t h r e e  basic  quest ions  about the  r i o t s :
" what happened?
" why did i t  happen?
" what can be done to keep i t  from happening again and again?
Beyond these  th ree  were four teen s p e c i f i c  ques t ions  he wanted answered
to a id  him and s t a t e  and local o f f i c i a l s  " . . . t o  cope with  t h e i r  immediate 
and long range problems in maintaining order:
-why r i o t s  occur in some c i t i e s  and do no t  occur in  o thers?  
-why one man breaks the law, whi le  a n o th e r ,  l i v in g  in the 
same c i rcum stances ,  does not?
- to  what e x t e n t ,  i f  any, the re  has been planning and 
o rg a n iz a t io n  in any o f  the r i o t s ?
-why have some r i o t s  been contained be fo re  they got
out of  hand and o thers  have not?
"------ how well equipped and t r a in e d  are the loca l  and S ta te
p o l i c e ,  and the S ta te  guard u n i t s ,  to  handle r i o t s ?
"------ how do p o l i c e  community r e l a t i o n s  a f f e c t  the  l ik e l ih o o d
o f  a r i o t   or the a b i l i t y  to  keep one from spreading
once i t  has s t a r t e d ?
" who took p a r t  in the r io t s ?  What about t h e i r  age,  t h e i r
level  o f  educa t ion ,  t h e i r  job h i s t o r y ,  t h e i r  o r i g i n s ,  
and t h e i r  ro o ts  in the  community?
" who su f f e r e d  most a t  the hands o f  the  r i o t e r s ?
^Executive Order 11365.
'^"Remarks Upon Signing Order E s tab l i sh ing  the National Advisory 
Commission on Civi l  Disorders" Public Papers of  the P r e s id e n t s , LBJ
1967, p. 725,
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-what can be done to  help innocent people and v i t a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  escape se r ious  in jury?
-how can groups o f  lawful c i t i z e n s  be encouraged, groups 
t h a t  can help to  cool the  s i tu a t io n ?
-what i s  the  r e l a t i v e  impact o f  the  depressed condit ions
in the ghetto  j o b l e s s n e s s ,  family i n s t a b i l i t y ,  poor education,
lack of  m o t iva t ion ,  poor hea l th  care -------  in s t im u la t in g  people
to  r i o t ?
-what Federa l ,  S t a t e  and local programs have been most 
he lpfu l  in r e l i e v i n g  those  depressed condit ions?
-what i s  the  proper  pub l ic  ro le  in helping c i t i e s  
r e p a i r  the damage t h a t  has been done? g
-what e f f e c t  do the  mass media have on the  r i o t s ? "
He wanted a p r o f i l e  of  th e  r i o t s  " . . .  o f  the r i o t e r s ,  o f  t h e i r  environment,
9of  t h e i r  v i c t im s ,  o f  t h e i r  causes and e f f e c t s . "  He wanted d e t a i l e d ,  
advice fo r  s h o r t  term r i o t  p reven t ion ,  fo r  containment p o l i c i e s ,  and 
long-term measures fo r  t h e i r  fu tu re  prevention.^^
A cata loguing  of  the  P r e s i d e n t ' s  public ly  s t a t e d  purposes for 
appoint ing the commission can be made from these  d e c l a r a t i o n s .  F i r s t ,  
the  appointment o f  the commission i t s e l f  was to be one means o f  s topping 
the immediate d iso rders  in the c i t i e s .  Second, Kerner and his  col leagues  
were to  provide the  in format ion  necessary to c rea te  a pol icy  which would 
insure  i t s  not happening aga in .  Th i rd ,  information must be gathered 
to provide fo r  a legal means o f  exposing and punishing the  criminal con­
s p i r a to r s  presumed to be re sp o n s ib le  f o r  the r i o t s .  Four th,  Johnson saw 
two types o f  v ic tims whose p l i g h t  government must address :  those vic timized
^ Ib id .
^ Ib id .
^*^Notes f o r  the var ious  d r a f t s  o f  the speech, o f  which McPherson 
was the major w r i t e r ,  can be found in the  LBJ Library  in the  f i l e  Riots 
(1 ) ,  McPherson (8) .  Another document which appears to be a d r a f t  of 
the speech can be found in the f i l e  Riots (3),  McPherson (8 ) .  The 
tone and substance of the  address  did not change s u b s t a n t i a l l y  in i t s  
evo lu t ion .
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by the  d isorders  and those victimized by the environment o f  the  black 
urban ghetto  to the poin t where they became d i s o r d e r ly .  To each group 
he o f fe red  sympathy and unders tanding; to the former the promise of  
federa l  a id ;  to the l a t t e r ,  unders tanding, but no promise of  reward 
un t i l  t h e i r  a n t i - s o c i a l  behavior p a t te rn s  ceased. F i f t h ,  Johnson f irmly  
be lieved  in a criminal conspiracy theory explanation of the  c i v i l  d i s ­
o rde rs .  They were, fo r  him, a t  l e a s t  in p a r t ,  the  product o f  cr iminal 
malcontents ,  whose behavior  can be explained and unders tood, but never 
t o l e r a t e d . S u c h  an assumption allowed him to i s o l a t e  the " v io le n t
few" and to ass ign legit imacy and v i r tue  to the  "law abid ing Negro fami-
12l i e s  who have suf fe red  most a t  the hands of the r i o t e r s " ,  to e s t a b l i s h
these  "vic tims" as the p r in c ip le  ob jects  of h is  concern in dea l ing  with
the d i s o r d e r s ,  to  make them the proper re p re se n ta t iv e s  o f  the i n t e r e s t s
o f  the  urban black popula tion; " I t  i s  re sponsib le  Negro c i t i z e n s  who
hope most fe rv e n t ly  —  and need most urgently  ------ to  share  in America's
13growth and p r o s p e r i t y . "  S ix th ,  the commission was in s t ru c te d  to  con­
duct a comprehensive i n v e s t ig a t i o n  including examination o f  the  causes 
and e f f e c t s  of  the d i s o r d e r s ,  s tud ie s  of those a r r e s t e d  in the d is tu rbances  
and o f  t h e i r  v ic t im s ,  of the pol ice  and national guard,  of  the e f f e c t s  
o f  the  news media on the  d is tu rbances  and eva lua t ions  o f  s t a t e  and local 
governmental programs designed to prevent and contro l  such outbreaks .
I t  i s  c l e a r  from his  public  s ta tements  and his  subsequent ac t ions  t h a t  
th i s  g ran t  o f  broad power to the  commission was designed to  emphasize 
what Johnson regarded as the f a i l u r e  of congress to  come to g r ip s  with
^^See Public Papers of the P re s id e n t s , LBJ, 1967, pp. 721 
723 and 725.
T ^ l b i d . ,  723.
T^ibid.
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the problems he saw underlying the r i o t s  and the i n a b i l i t y  of  the s t a t e  
and local governments to  comprehend and respond adequate ly  to what he 
considered a na t iona l  problem. The seventh  and f i n a l  p re s id e n t i a l  p u r ­
pose in a ppo in t ing  the  Kerner Commission s t a t e d  in  h is  public  pronounce­
ments was to  r e in f o r c e  in  the minds of the  pu b l ic ,  the  congress and any 
doubtful members o f  the executive branch the  c oun t ry ' s  need f o r  the  
Great Soc ie ty  programs. He used the  occasion of the  d iso rde rs  to rehea rse  
the major l e g i s l a t i v e  accomplishments o f  the  Great Socie ty  which were 
aimed a t  c o r r e c t i n g  what he considered to be the r i o t  producing c o n d i t io n s ;  
the examples Johnson used here and on many other occasions during t h i s  
period were th e  model c i t i e s ,  v o t e r ' s  r i g h t s ,  omnibus c iv i l  r i g h t s ,  r e n t  
supplement,  medicare-medicaid,  educa t ion ,  job c o rps ,  neighborhood youth  
corps and t e a c h e r  corps p r o g r a m s . H e  chas t ized  congress f o r  f a i l i n g  
to follow the  a d m in i s t r a t i o n ' s  lead  on p a r t i c u l a r  b i l l s  ( e .g .  the r a t  
control  b i l l ) ^ ^  and made i t  very c l e a r  t h a t  he had no in te n t io n  o f  abd ica ­
t in g  na t iona l  l eade rsh ip  in developing and executing c iv i l  d i s o rd e r  
r e l a t e d  p u b l i c  p o l i c i e s .
The importance of  these pub l ic  s ta tements  by the  p res iden t  in 
e s t a b l i s h in g  th e  commission were not l o s t  on his appointees  and t h e i r  
s t a f f .  Early  in i t s  l i f e  David Ginsburg and Victor  Palmieri (Executive 
and Deputy Executive D i rec to rs ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly )  put f o r t h  what they thought
T ^ i b i d , ,  p.  722.
T^lbid.
^^See i tems 17 and 19 of " P r e s i d e n t ' s  News Conference o f  Ju ly  31, 
1967," Public Papers of  the P r e s id e n t s ,  LBJ, 1967, pp. 730-731.
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the  o rder  of the commission's r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  to be. The o rde r ing  follows 
p re c i se ly  the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  p r i o r i t i e s  as s e t  out in his  pub l ic  s ta tem ents .  
The commission did not s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d ev ia te  from t h i s  agenda: 1) answer 
the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  q u e s t io n s ,  2) provide guidance to n a t i o n a l ,  s t a t e  and local 
o f f i c i a l s  regarding the prevention  and control  o f  v io lence  and make recom­
mendations fo r  e f f e c t i v e  soc ia l  and economic ac t ion  programs by a l l  levels  
of  government and a l l  segments o f  the  community, 3) focus the  a t t e n t i o n  
of the  people ( e s p e c ia l ly  the  whi te  surburban popula tion) on the c r i t i c a l  
i s sues  of the  r i o t s .
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  p r e s id e n t i a l  purpose cannot be based s o l e l y  on 
the  public  record .  Im p l i c i t  purpose a lso  can be in fe r r ed  from an a ly s i s  
of p o l i t i c a l  behavior .  The appointment o f  the  Kerner Commission reveals  
th r e e  i m p l i c i t  purposes,  one of  which i s  unique to Johnson in the  appoin t ­
ment of t h i s  commission and the remainder o f  which are indigenous  to  a l l
1 n
p re s id en t i a l  advisory commissions. F i r s t ,  Johnson wanted no l inkage of 
the  war in Vietnam and the urban d i s o r d e r s .  He made no mention o f  the war 
in h is  public  s ta tements  connected with  the c rea t ion  o f  the  commission and, 
as wi l l  be seen ,  deeply re sen ted  any e f f o r t s  by the commission, o r  
o th e r s ,  to do so; he maintained t h i s  p o s i t io n  desp i te  the f a c t  t h a t  a major 
p a r t  of congress '  r e s i s t a n c e  to  the Great Socie ty  in 1967-68 stemmed 
from i t s  f r u s t r a t i o n  with Johnson 's  e f f o r t s  to  gain i t s  support  f o r  his
"'^Memo, Palmieri  to Ginsburg,  9 /12 /67 ,  49 /9-3 /5 ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ 
L ib r a r y .
1 8 See discuss ion  o f  p r e s i d e n t i a l  purpose in naming commissions, 
pp. 55-65, above.
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guns-and-bu t te r  approach to public  p o l i c y .  The impl ications  of  the  omission
of re fe rence  to the war were not l o s t  on the members of the commission and
19t h e i r  sen ior  s t a f f .
The second and t h i r d  purposes,  common to a l l  p re s id en t i a l  advisory
commissions in varying degrees ,  were to  buy valuable time and to educate
the publ ic  about p re s id en t i a l  po l icy  and purposes.
Johnson's desire  to purchase time by the  appointment of the
commission i s  e a s i l y  unders tandable .  The level  of  personal and proper ty
damage and violence r e s u l t i n g  from the d isorders  was unprecedented.
He was ge t t ing  enormous pressure  from congress ,  s t a t e  and local o f f i c i a l s ,
the media and h is  own adv ise rs  to do something to cool the  inflamed 
20atmosphere. But, important as the  need to do something is to any 
p re s id e n t  in such a s i t u a t i o n ,  the re  were various o th e r ,  more important,  
reasons for  Johnson to s e ize  the option of  naming a commission to give 
h imself  time and p o l i t i c a l  space in which to  opera te .  Cal ifano,  in a 
broad ranging d iscuss ion  of the Johnson advisory system pointed to the need 
fo r  the  adm in is t ra t ion  to buy time in o rder  to gather information on
19The following exchange between Senator Edward Kennedy and David 
Ginsburg,  though ben e f i t in g  g r e a t ly  from h in d s ig h t ,  does r e f l e c t  never­
t h e l e s s ,  the a t t i t u d e  of  the commissioners and the sen io r  s t a f f  members 
whenever the quest ion of  the war was r a i s e d .  Senator Kennedy: "There is  
no mention o f  the  war in the r e p o r t .  Can you t e l l  us why?" David 
Ginsburg: "I can quickly  answer t h a t .  We were given a c e r t a in  mandate 
in the  Executive Order and in the P r e s i d e n t ' s  charge.  We were not to 
concern ourse lves  with the  war." Kennedy Hearings  ̂ p. 21, Being p re ­
s i d e n t i a l  commissioners, they e x c lu s iv e ly  concerned themselves with the 
i s su e s  he gave to  them.
20
See Wolanin,  " P r e s i d e n t i a l  Advisory Commissions," p. 39 and Max
F ra n k e l ,  New York Times, Ju ly  2 8 :1 , 8 .
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the d iso rders  not then a v a i l a b le  to the White House. The public  
charac te r  of the commission and the charge Johnson gave to i t  
quickly a t t r a c t e d  a da ta  flow toward i t  upon which the  adm in is t ra t ion  
accordingly could a d ju s t  i t s  p o l i c i e s .  In developing h i s  argument,
Califano f a i l e d  to  mention the vast  quan t i ty  of in format ion av a i l ab le  
to the adm in is t ra t ion  in the  form of task  force  r e p o r t s .  The Kerner Com­
mission might have been useful to Johnson in a t t r a c t i n g  b i t s  and pieces of 
new informat ion r e l e v a n t  to  understanding the  d i s o r d e r s ,  but i t s  most 
important function  was to provide a very public  means, over a period of 
time determined by the p r e s id e n t ,  of d isseminating to i n t e r e s t e d  publics 
the p a r t s  of the work o f  the  various task  forces  the  White House wanted 
known.
Johnson a lso  wanted to buy time to head o f f  the  burgeoning e f f o r t s  
by congress to  i n v e s t i g a t e  the d isorders  and by means o f  i t  move in to  pos i ­
tion to  command the c o n te s t  fo r  na tional  urban d i s o r d e r  policy  leade rsh ip .
There were p a r t i c u l a r  reasons why the White House wanted to pre-empt
22
the congressional  e f f o r t s  to crea te  a commission by l e g i s l a t i o n  and 
to avoid what the White House regarded as the  dangerous p o l i t i c a l  p i t -
23
fa l l  of an i n v e s t ig a t i o n  o f  the d isorders  by a congress ional committee."
Of p a r t i c u l a r  concern was the danger inherent  in the p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
such an i n v e s t ig a t i o n  being launched as a support  device  fo r  the proposed 
a n t i - r i o t  and crime contro l  b i l l s  then before the  congress .  There was
21 Notes from the Pr inceton Conference on Advising the P res iden t ,  
in the possession of the  author.
2 2
See the d iscuss ion  of the proposals by Senators  Brooke, Harris  
and Mondale, above, pp. 190-194.
23
See the d iscu ss io n  of the McClellan Sub-Committee above, Ib id .
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fea r  t h a t  these  b i l l s  and o thers  t h a t  would in e v i t a b ly  be produced from 
such a congressional in v es t ig a t io n  would s e r io u s ly  endanger the  p re s id e n t ' s  
pro jec ted  Great Society l e g i s l a t i v e  program. Therefore ,  the  White House 
needed time to s o r t  through the various approaches to the  po l icy  problems 
developing in the changing environment c rea ted  by the summer d i s o rd e r s .
By r a i s i n g  the in v es t ig a t io n  of the d iso rders  to the  level of 
p re s id e n t i a l  concern,  the f i r s t  na tiona l r i o t  commission not  only 
allowed the Johnson Administration time to  maintain i t s  policy-making advant­
age over congress ,  but also helped prevent formation of a legion of
s t a t e  and local  inves t iga t ions  of  the d i s tu rbances .  New Je r se y  did
24appoint a governor 's  advisory commission to  study i t s  d i so rd e r s  and 
the Michigan l e g i s l a t u r e  did some in v e s t ig a t i v e  work as a pre lude to pro­
posing l e g i s l a t i v e  r e l i e f  fo r  i t s  several  d i so rd e r s .  But,  the  exceptions 
proved the r u l e .  In both i n s t a n c e s ,  c lo se  con tac t  was maintained by local 
and s t a t e  o f f i c i a l s  with White House s t a f f  members and the  Kerner Commission. 
The appointment of the commission slowed down such local ac t ions  and con­
cen t ra ted  a t t e n t i o n  on i t  and the White House as the nexus of  c i v i l  d i s ­
order in v e s t i g a t i o n  and policy development.
The Kerner Commission was no exception to the  norm t h a t  p re s id en t i a l
nc
advisory commissions are appointed in l a rg e  p a r t  to educate the  publ ic .  
Cal ifano,  in  h is  remarks a t  the Princeton Univers ity  conference ,  remembered
pc
th i s  as the major reason fo r  naming the  Kerner group. The commission
24The Governor's Se lec t  Commission on Civil  Disorders (Charles D. 
Li 1 l e y .  Chairman).
^^See pp. 58-60, above.
Motes from Princeton Conference on Advising the P re s id e n t .
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was appointed to  meet two educational needs;  1) to ca l l  a t t e n t i o n  to 
the  Great Socie ty  programs which had been designed to a l l e v i a t e  the 
problems the adm in is t ra t ion  f e l t  to be the roo t  causes o f  the  d iso rde rs  
and 2 ) ,  to c rea te  a highly v i s i b l e  executive  agency through which new 
p o l i c i e s  could be advanced. The White House considered i t  necessary  
to  f u l f i l l  both needs.  The d is tu rbances  could produce a na t iona l  con­
s e r v a t i v e  reac t io n  which might e a s i l y  be t r a n s l a t e d  in to  congress ional 
r e ac t io n  aga ins t  e x i s t i n g  programs and agenc ies.  The White House was 
a cu te ly  aware of  congressional r e s i s t a n c e  to any new domestic programs.
The Kerner Commission provided a h ighly  v i s i b l e  means o f  f l o a t i n o  a v a r ie ty  
of  s e c r e t  ta sk  fo rce  proposals  before  the public  and congress .  The 
purpose of th i s  s t r a t e g y  was to bu i ld  pressure  on congress to accep t  and 
support  these  adm in is t ra t ion  p roposa ls .  The adm in is t ra t ion  provided the 
commission with s i g n i f i c a n t  data  and program proposals from depar tments /
agenc ie s ,  s e c r e t  task  f o r c e s ,  and o the r  commissions, most o f  which were
27advanced in some manner in the commission's f ina l  r e p o r t .
There were add i t iona l  educational functions  some members o f  the  
White House s t a f f  saw the commission f u l f i l l i n g .  F i r s t ,  a id  th e  
adm in is t ra t ion  in ad jus t ing  publ ic  expec ta t ions  to what r e a l i s t i c a l l y  
can be expected of forces  of law and order in reaction  to  the ci rcumstances 
surrounding a c iv i l  d i so rd e r .  The commission provided a publ ic  forum f o r  
such an exp lana t ion .  Second, and most important fo r  these  a d v i s e r s ,  the
27The f a i l u r e  of the commission to give the kind of  s t rong  endorse­
ment o f  e x i s t i n g  Great Society programs which Johnson expected was a 
major c o n t r ib u to r  to the  cool recep t ion  the Pres ident gave the Repor t .
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commission was needed to  analyze and i n t e r p r e t  f o r  the  general  publ ic  those  
soc ia l  dynamics which led  to the  c i v i l  d isorders .
The i n t e n s i t y  o f  the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  commitment to the  achievement 
of his  purposes in appointing the commission was most c l e a r l y  revealed  
by the way in  which he e s t a b l i s h e d  i t .  The announcement of  i t s  c r e a t io n  
was made on n a t iona l  t e l e v i s i o n ;  the  commissioners were brought to
Washington the  nex t  day where they were again t r e a t e d  to  the  p r e s i d e n t ' s
28publ ic  endorsement;  they met p r i v a t e l y  with Johnson, Vice P re s id e n t  
Hubert Humphrey, Attorney General Ramsey Clark,  the  sen io r  members o f  the  
p r e s i d e n t ' s  domestic po l icy  advisory  s t a f f ,  and Cyrus Vance, the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  
spec ia l  envoy to  D e t ro i t .  The p re s id e n t  spoke to  them in very s t ro n g ,  p o s i ­
t i v e  terms about t h e i r  ass ignment,  and his  support  o f  t h e i r  work. He to ld
them t h a t  t h e i r  work would be i n i t i a l l y  funded by use o f  the  P r e s i d e n t ' s  
29Emergency Fund; he appointed t h e i r  execut ive d i r e c t o r  and the  execut ive  
o f f i c e r ;  he reviewed fo r  the commissioners the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  and s t a ­
t u to r y  a u t h o r i t y  he possessed for  o rde r ing  arrpy troops  i n to  D e t r o i t ;  
he had Vance b r i e f  them on the s i t u a t i o n  in D e t r o i t ;  in b r i e f ,  the 
context  c o n s t r u c te d  by the p re s id e n t  and his s t a f f ,  the symbols of  
p re s id e n t i a l  a u th o r i t y  and purpose invoked at the time o f  t h e i r  appo in t ­
ment re in fo rced  f o r  the commissioners the  f a c t  t h a t  they were p re s id e n t i a l
^^See Publ ic  Papers of the  P r e s i d e n t , LBJ, 1967, pp.  724-726.
29Most o f  the  commissioners came from t h i s  meeting with a sense  o f  
p r e s id e n t i a l  commitment to get  from congress whatever a d d i t io n a l  money 
they would need f o r  t h e i r  work. This understanding, o r  lack  o f  i t ,  became 
a bone of  con ten t ion  between some members of the  commission and i t s  s t a f f  
and the White House.
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app o in tees ,  s e t  upon a c l e a r l y  defined p re s id e n t i a l  mission f o r  which
he was promising them s t rong  support .  As a group they aff irmed Johnson's
purpose and le ad e rsh ip  by taking a s e r i e s  of  ac t ions  which s e t  t h e i r
goals c l e a r l y  w i th in  h is  framework; they unanimously voted to  seek
power from congress to  i s su e  subpoenas by which they could compel
30test imony from persons t e s t i f y i n g  before them. They agreed not to
t e l e v i s e  t h e i r  hear ings  a t  any t ime, to confine  t h e i r  meetings to cow-
31missioners  without a l t e r n a t e s ,  to d i r e c t  the s t a f f  not to c a l l  any 
meetings u n t i l  they and the  commissioners were f u l l y  prepared on the to p i c s  
to be d i scu ssed ,  and to  eschew a l l  p a r t i s an  p o l i t i c s  from t h e i r  e f f o r t s .
32They agreed , to o ,  not to make these dec is ions  pub l ic  fo r  the time be ing.
From t h e i r  a c t i o n s ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  the commissioners took the 
p r e s i d e n t ' s  pe rcep t ion  o f  the nature  of the d i so rd e r s  very s e r io u s ly .
That they so quickly  and completely adopted the p re v a i l in g  White House 
view o f  the d i so rd e r s  should not be s u rp r i s in g  fo r  a t  l e a s t  two simple 
reasons ;  f i r s t ,  they were the re  to  do work the p re s id en t  had appointed 
them to do and second, a t  t h i s  po in t  they had no o th e r  p lace  to  stand
^^Public Law 90-61, 90th Congress, J .  S. Res. 98, August 2, 1967. 
Popper sees commissions as not needing subpoena power as they do not 
hear h o s t i l e  w i tn e s se s .  He c i t e s  Mercy as saying commissions do not 
look f o r  wrong doing by in d iv idua ls  but fo r  general  f a c t s  and t rends .
Popper says of the  r ecen t  commissions only the Warren Commission had 
subpoena power. (Popper,  P r e s id e n t ' s  Commissions, p.  38.) This is  
obviously i n c o r r e c t  as f a r  as the Kerner Commission i s  concerned. Since 
Popper 's  work the  Rockfe l le r  Commission and the P r e s i d e n t ' s  Commission on 
the Accident a t  Three-Mile Is land  asked fo r  and received subpoena power 
from congress .
31Though v io la t e d  some in p r a c t i c e ,  the degree to which they adhere 
to t h i s  p r in c ip l e  g r e a t l y  impressed a l l  experienced commission observers .
32Memo, Bohen to  Ca l i fano ,  7/31/67 covering a f iv e  page document 
t i t l e d  "Special Commission on Civil D isorders ,"  "Minutes of the  Meeting- 
Saturday, July 29 th ,  the White House," in the f i l e  Civil  Disorder (2) ,  
Cal ifano 3, LBJ Library .
214
from which to  view the d i so rd e r s .  They were a c r e a t io n  o f  the p re s id en t  
and t h e i r  f i r s t  ac tions  r e f l e c t e d  t h e i r  commitment to  the  o f f i c e ,  the  
man and his  understanding of the problem he had charged them to s tudy.
Despite these  i n i t i a l  a t tempts  to br ing t h e i r  work in to  con­
formity with the view of the problem held by the  White House, o th e r  
reactions  were not long in emerging. I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of the  broad 
p re s id en t i a l  mandate was as might be expected,  an open-ended m at te r  fo r  
some of the commissioners. The v a r i e ty  of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  was exposed 
during the f i r s t  meeting of the  commissioners. John Lindsay expressed 
impatience with  Kerner 's  d e s i r e  fo r  d e l ib e r a t e  speed and s t r i c t  adher­
ence to the four teen  poin t mandate in t h e i r  work (a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  s tance  
for the  mayor throughout the l i f e  of  the  commission).  He suggested t h a t  
the commission meet again w i th in  a few days to  r e a sses s  the  r i o t  s i t u a t i o n  
and then def ine  i t s  role in dealing  with i t .  He, jo ined  by Senator 
H a r r i s ,  pushed hard for a study of  any broad s o c i a l  problems which might 
lay behind the r i o t s .  Senator Brooke wanted th e  commission to provide the  
people l iv in g  in the  urban ghe t tos  with a reason f o r  confidence in the 
nationa l government (a p o s i t io n  with which Johnson found i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  
d isagree ,  but not one included in his charge to  the commission.) Thornton 
was adamant in wanting the commission to s erve  the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  purpose in 
the b roades t  poss ib le  ways. I t  was he who pushed h a rd e s t  to have the  com­
missioners address themselves to the e f f e c t  o f  the  d i so rd e r s  on the  conduct
33lbid.
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of U.S. fo re ign  pol icy .  Subsequent meetings and exposure to in c reas in g  
amounts of data  would lead to  o the r  suggestions  t h a t  the commission s e t  
i t s  own agenda. While never a "run-away", the  Kerner Commission was able  
to mainta in a considerable  d is tance  from the ad m in is t r a t io n .  The move­
ment away began during i t s  f i r s t  meeting.
The broad mandate given the  commission had o the r  p o l i t i c a l  consequ­
ences which are important to note a t  t h i s  p o in t .  F i r s t ,  i t  claimed urban 
d i so rd e r  policy-making for the execut ive  branch and thereby assured 
p r e s id e n t i a l  dominance in t h a t  a r e a ;  deference from congress and s t a t e  and 
local government o f f i c i a l s  was assured u n t i l  they could a s s e r t a in  which 
par ts  of the  mandate would rece ive  the bulk o f  the  commission's and the 
p r e s id e n t ' s  a t t e n t i o n .  Second, the broad mandate gave Johnson time and 
maneuvering room in dealing with congress.  He was well aware t h a t  a congress 
aroused from i t s  customary subse rv ien t  s t a t e  could become a formidable  op­
ponent,  even f o r  a s trong p re s id en t .  The p o l i t i c a l  t e r r i t o r y  def ined  in 
the mandate,  the  i m p l i c i t  t im e - l in e  and the fou r teen  points  gave the congress 
and s t a t e  and local o f f i c i a l s  enough pause to allow the White House t ime to  
channel through the commission to  the  congress a v a r ie ty  of  recommenda­
t ions  from o th e r  p a r t s  of the advisory  system —  p a r t i c u l a r l y  from 
the ta sk  fo rce s .  T h i rd ,  the broad mandate s e t  some public expec ta t ions  
too h igh .  While the White House was well aware o f  the benef i t s  and the 
drawbacks o f  r a i s in g  the expec ta t ions  of var ious  p ub l ic s ,  they were 
w i l l in g  to take the r i s k ;  they ca lcu la ted  the r i s k  as being l im i ted  to 
the group they re fe r re d  to as the  victims of the  d i so rd e r s .  But, ex p ec ta ­
t ions  were ra ised  a lso  for persons concerned with "law and order" i s s u e s .
They heard only the harsh words spoken to the  "apostles  of violence"
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and ad jus ted  t h e i r  ex p ec ta t io n s  accord ing ly .  Fourth,  o thers  a lso  engaged 
in t h i s  e x e rc i s e  of s e l e c t i v e  hear ing ;  l i b e r a l s  d i s s a t i s f i e d  with Johnson's  
le ade rsh ip ,  saw the  mandate as an oppor tun i ty  to c a s t  as ide  the con­
ventional wisdom and p re sen t  the  ad m in is t r a t io n  and the nation with 
novel pol icy i d e a s ;  the document "Harvest  o f  Racism", an abor t ive  
attempt by a m a jo r i t y  o f  the  p ro fes s iona l  s t a f f  to  w r i t e  the f in a l  r e p o r t  
fo r  the  commission, was a l i b e r a l  e f f o r t  to respond to what i t s  authors 
thought was the  i n t e n t  of the p r e s i d e n t ' s  mandate m e s s a g e s . F i f t h ,
Johnson wanted a wide ranging study in to  the f a c t o r s  which permit one
35c i ty  to explode in to  a r i o t  and ano ther  to remain calm. This d i r e c t iv e  
forced the  commission and i t s  s t a f f  in to  e labo ra te  research on non-r io t  
as well as r i o t  c i t i e s ,  using up much o f  t h e i r  scarce  resources of time 
and money.
This approach d e f l e c te d  s t a f f  a t t e n t i o n  from an a l t e r n a t i v e  
exp lana t ion ;  t h a t  the  r i o t s  were the  r e s u l t  o f  na tional 
f a c to r s  and o f  n a t iona l  scope,  t h a t  Black r e b e l l io n  was 
a t t r i b u t a b l e  to  the Black p o s i t io n  in America, not the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  or  p o l i c i e s  o f  ind iv idua l  c i t i e s .36
The mandate defined p r e s id e n t i a l  purpose and consequent ia l ly  the 
boundaries of  the  work of the commission. The four teen  poin ts  were 
regarded by the commissioners and t h e i r  s t a f f  as t h e i r  agenda; because
^^See the  d i s cu s s io n  of  the ensu ing controversy  pp. 455-457.
or
See the  f i r s t  o f  Johnson 's  14 poin t  mandate, Public Papers o f
the P r e s i d e n t s , LBJ, 1967, Book 2,  p. 725.
o r
Michael Lipsky, "Social S c i e n t i s t s  and the  Riot Commissions,"
The Annals of the  American Academic o f  P o l i t i c a l  and Social Science 394
(March, 1971): 79-80. Lipsky a lso  no tes  t h a t  in making the  f in a l  repo r t
the commissioners used very l i t t l e  of  the  enormous amount of  s t a f f  work 
done on ind iv idua l  c i t i e s .
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they  were so broadly drawn i t  was easy fo r  any person to  r a t i o n a l i z e  
p r e s i d e n t i a l  i n t e n t  an d /o r  endorsement and thereby put some commission 
p a r t i c i p a n t s  a t  odds with  o t h e r s ;  but the comprehensive c h a r a c t e r  o f  the  
mandate and the  ensuing  c o n f l i c t s  over i t s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  i n e v i t a b l y  
fo rced  them in to  a p o l i t i c a l  middle where a l l  could agree when the  f i n a l  
r e p o r t  was w r i t t e n .  The f a c t  t h a t  t h a t  middle ground was not one upon 
which Johnson could s tand  with  h is  commission was due more to  the kind of 
persons he appointed than to  th e  charge he gave them. A t te n t io n  must now 




In the  address  to  the na tion in  which he laid  out the  g u id e l in e s  
f o r  the  commission th e  p re s id en t  announced the  names of those he had 
chosen to  se rve  on i t :  Chairman, Otto Kerner,  Governor of I l l i n o i s ;
Vice Chairman, John V. Lindsay, Mayor of  New York City ;  Fred R, H a r r i s ,  
United S t a t e s  Senator from Oklahoma; Edward W. Brooke, United S ta t e s  
Senator from Massachuse tt s ;  James C. Corman, United S ta te s  R ep re se n ta t iv e  
form the  Twenty-second D i s t r i c t  of C a l i f o r n i a ;  William M. McCulloch,
United S t a t e s  R ep resen ta t ive  from th e  Fourth D i s t r i c t  of Ohio; I .  W.
Abel, P r e s id e n t  o f  the  United Steel  Workers of America (AFL-CIO);
Charles B. ("Tex") Thornton, Chairman of the  Board and Chief Executive 
O f f i c e r ,  L i t to n  I n d u s t r i e s ,  In c . ;  Roy Wilkins ,  Executive D irec to r  of 
the  Nat ional Assoc ia t ion  f o r  the  Advancement of  Colored People;
Katherine Graham Paden, Commissioner of Commerce fo r  the S ta te  of 
Kentucky; H erber t  J en k in s ,  Chief of P o l i c e , - A t l a n t a ,  Georgia.^
On th e  fo llowing day the commissioners were informed t h a t  David 
Ginsburg a Washington, D.C. a t t o rn e y  had been chosen as Executive D i rec to r ,
The o rder ing  of the names o f  the  commissioners given here i s  t h a t  
of the p r e s i d e n t  in h is  speech. This order ing  was mainta ined in a l l  the  
o f f i c i a l  p u b l i c a t i o n s  of the commission.
2 1 8
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In t u r n ,  he and Califano named Victor H. P a l m i e r i , a Los Angeles
lawyer and businessman, to be the Deputy Executive D irec to r .  These
t h i r t e e n  persons became the p r in c ip le  public  agents  in Johnson 's
e f f o r t s  to maintain control  over the domestic d i so rd e r s  and the public
2
policy-making responses to them.
There i s  a curious q u a l i ty  to these  appo in tees .  They lacked the  
d i s t i n c t i o n  which the circumstances surrounding t h e i r  appointment seemed 
to  demand. They were, to be s u r e ,  members o f  the leade rsh ip  group 
to  whom the p res iden t  always turned when making major appointments —
3
high s t a tu s  in d iv id u a l s ,  experienced in the ways o f  na t iona l  p o l i t i c s ,  
r e p r e s e n ta t i v e  of most of the major groups and i n s t i t u t i o n s  deemed by 
the  White House to have a vested i n t e r e s t  in the  r e s o lu t io n  o f  the 
d i s tu rb a n ce s ,  obviously of po ten t ia l  value to the p re s id en t  in his  
e f f o r t s  to cool the flames of r e b e l l io n  in the  c i t i e s  and reduce the 
l ike l ihood  o f  independent policy ac t ion  toward them by s t a t e  and local  
governments and the congress .  Yet,  they were not in any ob jec t ive  
way the  s t r o n g e s t  candidates  av a i l ab le  to the White House.
The fo u r  congresspersons, fo r  i n s ta n ce ,  symbolized the importance 
of  the  commission to the  p re s id en t ;  f u r t h e r ,  each served on a t  l e a s t  
one committee possessing the po ten t ia l  fo r  causing Johnson ser ious  p o l i ­
t i c a l  t ro u b le  i f  i t  began the process of  mounting major in v e s t ig a to r y  
hearings in to  aspects o f  the d isorders  f a l l i n g  under i t s  j u r i s d i c t i o n ;  
and one (McCulloch) was the ranking Republician on the important House
2
A discuss ion  o f  the o ther  members of the  p ro fess iona l  s t a f f  can 
be found below.
3
A term used by Lipsky and Olson in d e sc r ib ing  the members o f  the 
commission. See MSS, IV, p. 13.
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J u d ic i a ry  Committee. However, none was a chairperson  or a member o f  the 
" inner c i r c l e "  of  leadersh ip  in e i t h e r  house. The two sena tors  were 
r e l a t i v e l y  new to congress ,^  and undoubtedly were se lec ted  because they 
had achieved p o l i t i c a l  v i s i b i l i t y  by advocating the c r e a t io n  of some type 
of commission to  in v e s t ig a te  the r i o t s . ^  Representa tive  Corman was begin­
ning h is  second term. Only McCulloch, who was in his t e n th  term, had any­
thing l i k e  the s e n i o r i t y  one might expect in  a congressperson appointed 
to such an important commission.
A governor o f  a la rge  s t a t e  and the mayor o f  the  most densely 
populated c i t y  in the na t io n ,  of course ,  did s ignal  the a d m in i s t r a t io n ' s  
concern to appoin t persons fam i l ia r  with urban problems. Yet Kerner 
was not a d i s t in g u ish ed  governor,  desp i te  his  experience in  c i v i l  r i g h t s ,  
urban a f f a i r s  and national guard mat te rs .  Lindsay i s  an exception to 
the g e n e r a l i z a t i o n .  He was well known n a t io n a l ly  as the Mayor o f  New 
York, and, a t  the t ime,  he was considered a "dark horse" candidate  for 
the Republican nomination fo r  the presidency the next y e a r ;  he had a wide­
spread r e p u ta t io n  fo r  being an a b l e ,  aggress ive  (even a b r a s iv e ) ,  hard 
working, e f f e c t i v e  execu t ive ;  some regarded him as  having an almost 
compulsive concern with c iv i l  l i b e r t i e s .  Many questioned the wisdom of  
naming Lindsay to the commission. As one commission s t a f f  member put 
i t ,  "I d o n ' t  see  why LBJ co u ld n ' t  have foreseen t h a t  with Kerner as Chairman 
and Lindsay as Vice Chairman, Lindsay would end up dominating the  p i c tu r e . "
^Harris had,  in 1967, served th ree  y e a r s  in the sena te ;  in 1966 he 
had been e lec te d  to  h is  f i r s t  (and, as i t  turned o u t ,  only) six year  term 
(h is  f i r s t  e l e c t i o n  was to  f i l l  out the unexpired term o f  the l a t e  Senator 
Robert Kerr) .  Brooke was in his f i r s t  y e a r  o f  senate  se rv ice  when appointed 
to the commission.
^See above,  p p . 190-194.
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Highly recommended by Secre tary o f  Defense Robert  McNamara (a 
former colleague a t  Ford Motor Company) and C a l i f a n o ,  few persons ou ts ide  
a small par t  of the bus iness  community knew of  L i t to n  In d u s t r i e s  o r  of  
"Tex" Thornton. His presence on the commission could  hard ly  be expected to 
ca l l  fo r th  immediate and widespread support  from the  business  community f o r  
the commission and i t s  work.^ He was, however, a s t rong  suppor te r  of 
Johnson 's  war po l icy .
I .  W. Abel was a major leader but he rep resen ted  only a p a r t  of 
the  labor  movement and a t  the  time of  h is  appointment and was not regarded 
as a national spokesman f o r  labo r .  The s e l e c t io n  of  Abel was made on 
the t r a d i t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  p r in c ip le  of rewarding o n e ' s  f r i e n d s .  He was 
a g rea t  fav o r i te  of Johnson and Califano fo r  "going out on a limb fo r  
us during the 1965 s t e e l  n e g o ia t io n s ." George Meany, P res id en t  of the 
AFL-CIO was considered b r i e f l y  for appointment to  the  commission, but 
was passed over.  Roy Wilkins was not the  f i r s t  choice of  the White 
House to f i l l  one o f  the "Negro pos i t io n s"  on the commission. His name 
was drawn from the l i s t  of "Negro leade rs"  kept by the White House fo r  
such occas ions.  The f i r s t  choice of the  White House was Whitney Young, 
Pres iden t  of the National Urban League, who was passed because of having
The commission e s t a b l i s h e d  a spec ia l  panel on p r iv a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  
chaired  by Thornton from which l i t t l e  was heard.  When Johnson became 
se r ious  about involv ing  the business community in the  work o f  prevent ing 
fu tu re  c iv i l  d i so rde rs  he named Henry Ford I I  to  head the National Assoc­
i a t i o n  of Businessmen and gave i t  the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  f ind ing  ways to 
open new job o p p o r tu n i t i e s  fo r  urban b lack s .  See d iscuss ion  below, pp. 507- 
508.
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recen t ly  served on th r e e  o th e r  p re s id e n t i a l  adv iso ry  commissions. Wilkins, 
while not as well thought o f  by Johnson and h i s  s e n i o r  aides  as Young, 
was regarded as being an acceptable  Negro l e a d e r .  Thurgood Marshall ,  
the S o l i c i t o r  General o f  the  United S t a t e s ,  was b r i e f l y  considered fo r  
appointment but h is  name was put aside  because the  p re s id e n t  did not 
want to j e o p a rd ize  h is  pending confirmat ion as an Assoc ia te  J u s t i c e  of  
the United S ta te s  Supreme Court .^  The leade rs  o f  the  r e l a t i v e l y  new 
Negro c i v i l  r i g h t s  o rg an iza t io n s  (e .g .  Martin Luther King, J r . ,  Stokley 
Carmichael,  e t c . )  were d e f i n i t e l y  not on the White House l i s t  o f  Negro- 
Americans e l i g i b l e  fo r  appointment to Johnson adv iso ry  groups.
A r a t h e r  e x tens ive  l i s t  of women who might be named to various
Q
executive  p o s i t io n s  was kept in the Johnson White House. The a rchival 
evidence in d i c a t e s  a general  propens ity  by Johnson to  see t h a t  every 
public advisory body had " i t s  woman" on board.  Representa tion was granted 
when i t  was determined t h a t  women had a p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  in the matter 
under commission c o n s id e ra t io n .  Katherin Paden's s e l e c t i o n ,  th e r e f o r e ,  
ind ica ted  t h a t  the  White House viewed women's concerns with the  urban d i s ­
orders as being marg ina l ,  a t  b e s t .  The only o th e r  woman considered was 
J u l i a  Davis S t u a r t ,  o f  the  League of  Women Voters National Board, who 
was dropped because she had r e cen t ly  served (1966) as a member of the
^Johnson nominated him on June 13, 1967; h i s . s e n a t e  conf irmation 
came of August 30, 1967.
O
See f i l e  Women f o r  Task Forces or Commissions Exec. FG 690/Task 
Forces,  LBJ Library .  (This is  a 7 page document with  the no ta t ion  on 
the f i r s t  page "from Liz Carpenter" ) .
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P r e s id e n t ' s  Committee on Law Enforcement and the Adminis tra tion o f  
J u s t i c e .
Herber t  Jenkins  was a re spec ted  po l ice  c h ie f  o f  a major Southern 
c i t y ,  but he was by no means a na t iona l  l eade r  in  h is  p rofess ion  on 
matters  having to do with r i o t s  and c i v i l  d i so rd e r s .
David Ginsburg was a Washington lawyer,  knowledgeable o f  the  ways 
o f  the C ap i to l .  Like Lindsay, he came c lose  to having the  kind o f  
p o l i t i c a l  r e p u ta t io n  t h a t  would m er i t  appointment to such a commission. 
Palmieri was a person of  v i r t u a l l y  no p o l i t i c a l  r e p u ta t io n  ou ts ide  
Southern C a l i fo rn ia .
This group f i t s  Drew's d e sc r ip t i o n  o f  what o f f i c i a l  Washington 
usual ly  regards  as an ideal  commission; n o n - c o n t r o v e r s i a l , b i - p a r t i s a n ,  
r e p re se n ta t iv e  of  the  major concerned i n t e r e s t s  and r e s p e c ta b le ,  chaired 
by a person who i s  ab le  and/or  sa fe  ( to  the  a d m in i s t r a t i o n ) .^  That 
d e f in i t i o n  while con ta in ing  a kernel o f  t r u t h ,  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  f l i p p a n t  
and more o f  a handicap than a help in making a s e r io u s  exp lana t ion  as 
to why p a r t i c u l a r  commission appointments are  made. This is  e sp e c ia l l y  
t ru e  when consider ing  the Kerner Commission. These appointments were 
made fo r  a v a r ie ty  o f  complex reasons ,  not t o t a l l y  ex p l icab le  by the 
usual reasons fo r  naming persons to  commissions. I t  is  t rue  t h a t  
Johnson did  want a b i - p a r t i s a n ,  r e p r e s e n ta t i v e ,^ ^  and non-controvers ia l
^Drew, "On Giving Oneself  A Hotfoot, "  p. 47.
^^According to  Lipsky and Olson, Johnson's commissions always con­
ta ined r e p re se n ta t i v e s  from e ig h t  major cons t i tuency  groups which the 
p r e s id e n t  regarded as cen t r a l  to  na tional policy  making: Negroes, labor ,  
big b us iness ,  women, big c i t i e s ,  Texas,  college p ro fesso r s  and p re s iden ts .  
Only the  l a s t  two were omitted from membership on the  Kerner Commission.
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commission cha ired  by a "safe" person. But,  i t  i s  c l e a r  in the s e l e c t i o n  
of the Kerner Commission membership t h a t  Johnson wanted much more out 
of his  appoin tees  and he was w i l l in g  to  spend some p o l i t i c a l  c ap i t a l  to  
ge t  i t ;  in r e tu rn  fo r  obta ining known s t r e n g th s  in aiding him in man­
aging the c o n f l i c t  in the  c i t i e s  and c e n t r a l i z i n g  policy-making i n i t i a ­
t i v e  in the  p re s idency ,  he was w i l l i n g  to allow i t  to be sa id  th a t  
the  "wrong" i n t e r e s t s  were being represented  on the commission. These 
persons had, f o r  Johnson, four important p o l i t i c a l  a t t r i b u t e s  in com­
mon which led to  t h e i r  appointment: 1) they were in basic  support  of
the  Johnson c i v i l  r i g h t s  po l icy ;  2) they favored ,  in p r i n c i p l e ,  govern­
ment programs to a id  the economically deprived of  American soc ie ty  
( t h e re  were d i f f e r e n c e s  in  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  what c o n s t i tu ted  economic 
d e p r iv a t io n ,  but a l l  were supporters o f  major pa r t s  o f  the Great S o c ie ty ) ;
3) a l l  were proponents o f  a vigorous na t iona l  pol icy  o f  law and order  in 
response to the d i s o r d e r s —order  must be r e s to re d  and maintained before 
any e f f o r t s  are  made to  provide r e l i e f  fo r  a l leged  or  real  grivenances,^^
4) none had voiced any public  opposit ion  to  Johnson 's conduct o f  the war 
in Vietnam.
Kerner as a former United S ta te s  Attorney, Jenkins as an urban 
p o l ice  c h ie f  were c l e a r l y  on the s ide  o f  a t r a d i t i o n a l  law and o rder  r e ­
sponse to the d i s o r d e r s ;  even Wilkins ,  who fought Thornton in  p a r t i c u l a r  
on th i s  i s s u e ,  saw the re -e s tab l i shm en t  of  p o s i t i v e  police-community r e ­
l a t i o n s  in the  urban-Negro communities as the  f i r s t  ta sk  of the commission. 
(See Minutes of  Meeting 's  of Commission, taken by Kyran McGarth, Civi l  
Disorders (2) Califano 3 ,  LBJ L ib r a r y ) .  The minutes o f  the f i r s t  two 
meetings are  most reveal ing  on t h i s  p o in t ;  on the law and order i s sue  Abel 
and Paden were pass ive ly  supportive  of  the  p o s i t ions  taken by Jenkins and 
the  o th e r  commissioners whom they regarded as having the most exper ience 
in these mat te rs  ( c f .  Minutes o f  the  Commission fo r  12/7/67,  fo r  example); 
H a r r i s ,  McCulloch and Corman each came to the  commission favoring suppor t  
f o r  the  p o l i c e  in the form o f  prov is ions  f o r  add i t iona l  equipment as a da­
t è r e n t  to fu tu r e  d i so rd e r s  and passage of  a r ep re ss iv e  a n t i - r i o t i n g  b i l l  by 
the  Congress; Thornton favored a s t rong  show o f  fo rce  in the  face o f  the 
chal lenge o f  the r i o t e r s .  He a lso  was a harsh c r i t i c  o f  the  courts fo r
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In ad d i t io n  to  possessing these  v i r t u e s ,  each of the  appointees  
offered  Johnson specia l  resource  in h is  e f f o r t s  to contro l  the d i s ­
orders and to  gain support  fo r  his overa l l  leadersh ip  e f f o r t s  in the 
midst o f  the urban u n re s t .  He and h i s  aides were looking  fo r  and found 
p a r t i c u l a r  types of persons with unique s k i l l s  and connections in t h e i r  
pool o f  "commission pe rsons ."  The major i ty  of  the t h i r t e e n  brought to 
t h e i r  appointment the  e x p e r t i s e  one would expect o f  a group named by 
Johnson. They had the p o l i t i c a l  connections and resources  to a id  him in 
heading o f f  chal lenges  to  h is  au th o r i ty  and a b i l i t y  to lead  the national 
e f f o r t  to c u r t a i l  the  d i so rd e r s .  Also,  they brought to  the task experience 
in national economics, a useful resource in  a t tack ing  what Johnson f e l t  
to be a t  the ro o t  o f  the d iso rde rs .
The appointments of the  four congresspersons and Mayor Lindsay to 
the commission were a lso  undoubtedly aimed a t  co -op ta t ion  of  p o l i t i c a l  
opposit ion to the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  policy leade rsh ip .  Lindsay, as mayor of 
the l a r g e s t  c i t y  and a p o ten t ia l  opponent in the  next e l e c t i o n ,  as with 
George Romney in  Michigan, posed a ser ious  t h r e a t  to  Johnson. He had a 
potent p o l i t i c a l  platform and a record in urban p o l i t i c s  from which to 
c r i t i c i z e  the adm in is t ra t io n  in p o l i t i c a l l y  t e l l i n g  ways. Bringing him 
on the commission not only brought some of his ideas  i n to  the adm in is t ra t ion ,
being too s o f t  on crime; Lindsay, while  not a h a rd - l in e  law and order  
person, was from the beginning in favor  of supporting the  pol ice  in the 
fu l f i l lm e n t  of  t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  He was w i l l i n g ,  however, to  be 
an advocate of c i v i l i a n  review boards;  Brooke's pos i t ion  was the most 
skewed from the commission norm on t h i s  matter.  From th e  beginning 
he spoke a g a in s t  i n t e r p r e t i n g  the r i o t s  as communist in sp i re d  and/or the 
r e s u l t  of  a criminal  conspiracy.
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but a l so  t i e d  him to  the a d m in i s t r a t io n ' s  policy e f f o r t s ,  o r  so the
reasoning went. Brooke's  proposal f o r  a j o i n t  commission was p u b l i c ly
ignored by the  White House and h is  l e ad e r s  in the Sena te ,  but  was
accepted and e labora ted  on by o ther  members o f  his p a r t y ' s  l e ad e r s h ip .
Naming him to  the commission was c l e a r l y  aimed a t  tempering the Republican
congress iona l oppos i t ion .  H a r r i s ,  Corman and McCulloch each had committee
assignments in the congress ,  any one o f  which could cause th e  White House
some t ro u b le  by launching independent in v e s t ig a t io n s  in to  the  d i s o r d e r s .
Harr is  was a member of the very impor tant  Permanent Sub-Committee on
In v e s t ig a t io n s  (McClellan Sub-Committee) o f  the  Senate Government Operations
Committee. In add i t ion  he served on the S e le c t  Committee on Small Business
and the Senate Finance Committee, each of  which could be c a l l e d  upon to
handle White House proposals t o  remedy the  urban d iso rders  and t h e i r  causes,
Corman served on the  House Committee on Small Business, but more important
to Johnson, he was a member o f  the  a l l -pow erfu l  Ways and Means Committee,
McCulloch was the ranking Republican member o f  the House J u d ic i a r y  Committee,
In sum, each congressman offered Johnson an important mdtns of  access  to
one of  the  congressional committees most l i k e l y  to do him p o l i t i c a l  harm.
The congressmen were viewed as  being o f  l i t t l e  help to Johnson in the passage 
12of l e g i s l a t i o n ;  he had o ther  resources  to help him with t h a t ;  they were
commissi
12See the d iscuss ion  of congressional membership on adv isory  
o n s ,  above pp. 78-79.
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thought,  however, to be useful in  be ing , i f  no t  h is  eyes and ears  on th e
11committees, as Harr i s  was very e f f e c t i v e  in be ing ,  a t  l e a s t  a means 
by which the various  po l icy  p o s i t io n s  o f  the a d m in i s t r a t io n  could be placed 
in to  the congress ional d ia logue .  All Johnson expected from these  persons was 
to communicate hones t ly  the a d m in i s t r a t io n ' s  p o s i t i o n  and /or  plans con­
cerning a p a r t i c u l a r  m a t te r ;  they need not become c o n v e r t s ,  only r e l i a b l e  
messengers. As long as they were not opponents ,  Johnson was ahead by 
naming them to the  commission.
Employment and housing were po l icy  i s su es  very much on the minds 
of Johnson and his  s e n io r  adv ise rs  when they pu t  the  commission to g e th e r .  
Whatever the commissioners did they would have to  speak to  these  two 
pivota l  urban i s s u e s .  Throughout the  commission's tenure  a m ajo r i ty  
of i t s  members (Corman, Lindsay, Wilk ins,  McCulloch, Paden and Thornton) 
voiced support  f o r  p o l i c i e s  d i r e c te d  a t  providing g r e a t e r  access to  jobs  
and homes for  b lack  urban c i t i z e n s . ^ ^  Ginsburg and Palmieri  a lso  
brought to  the commission exper ience  in these  two a re a s .  Ginsburg had 
prac t iced  labor  law, inc lud ing  se rv ice  as a l a b o r  media tor.  He had 
served as a s t a f f  person on the Secu r i ty  and Exchange Commission and the 
wartime Pr ice  S t a b i l i z a t i o n  Board. Palmieri was the  P res id en t  of the  
Janus Corpora tion,  a west coas t  rea l  e s t a t e  f i rm  and thereby brought to  
Washington s i g n i f i c a n t  con tac ts  with  t h a t  reg iona l  economic community.
T^See pp. 233-234 below.
^^This m a jo r i ty  had a c l e a r  s e t  o f  po l icy  p r i o r i t i e s  which became 
those of the commission: f i r s t ,  law and o rde r ;  second, jobs  and housing; 
t h i r d ,  educa tion .
228
Abel,  of c ou rse ,  brought important l a b o r  experience to the t a s k ,  i f  not 
d i r e c t  c o n ta c t  with the  urban labor  market.  Abel also could draw upon 
ex tens ive  exper ience in i n s t i t u t i o n a l  r a c i a l  i n t e g r a t i o n .  Lindsay had 
had in t im ate  experience with urban la b o r  problems. Of p a r t i c u l a r  he lp 
to the  commission and the White House was the  mayor's exper ience with  
unionized p o l ice  and f i r e  depar tments .  Those commissioners who d id  not 
have d i r e c t  experience with urban p o l i t i c a l  problems p r i o r  to  t h e i r  appo in t ­
ment made spec ia l  e f fo r t s  to become thoroughly  informed (the  bes t  example 
is  H a r r i s ) .  The commissioners, th e n ,  were not eleven o f  the  key i n t e r e s t  
group le ad e rs  of the country by whose presence on the commission the  
p re s id en t  could hope to  swing o th e r  e l i t e s  behind his l e ad e rsh ip .  Rather 
they  were exper ienced p r a c t i t i o n e r s  o f  Lyndon Johnson 's  type of l i b e r a l  
p o l i t i c s  whom he knew to be ab le  to se rve  him well in t h e i r  a reas  o f  policy  
competence, as l i s t e n in g  pos ts  fo r  what was being said  and planned in 
various  p o l i t i c a l l y  i n f l u e n t i a l  c en te r s  and as i n t e r p r e t e r s  o f  the  adminis­
t r a t i o n ' s  po l icy .
J u s t i c e  cannot be done to  the members of the  Kerner Commission 
and i t s  s e n i o r  s t a f f  i f  a n a ly s i s  ends a f t e r  d e t a i l i n g  t h e i r  ind iv idua l  
and co rpo ra te  co n t r ibu t ions  to  the achievement of  e x p l i c i t  and i m p l i c i t  
p r e s i d e n t i a l  goa ls .  This group did a f t e r  a l l  compile a d i s t in g u i s h e d  
record in the  annals o f  p r e s i d e n t i a l  advisory  commissions. The i r  r e p o r t  
was more widely  read and d iscussed  than any o th e r ,  save t h a t  of t h e  Warren 
Commission.
The minutes of the p r i v a t e  meetings of  the  commission, various  
r e f l e c t i o n s  by commissioners and members of the  s t a f f  in  in t e rv ie w s ,  and 
in intra-commiss ion memos and in publ ished  works,  reveals  a group o f  
persons w i l l i n g  and able to  work hard a t  understanding the problems
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assigned; t h i s  de termination was the  ex te rnal m an ife s ta t ion  o f  t h e i r  deep 
commitment to  th e  p re s id en t  and the na t ion .  They began as c i t i z e n s  dedi­
cated to  the pub l ic  good as seen by the  p r e s id e n t ;  they were p res iden t ia l  
appointees in  the  most l i t e r a l  sense,  committed to  "doing a job" for him, 
adhering r e l i g i o u s l y  to h is  mandate; in the  end a m ajor i ty  o f  them moved 
c lo se r  to t h e i r  commitment to the  nat ion and f a r t h e r  from the  o f f ic e  t o  
which they owed t h e i r  corporate  ex i s t ence .  An exp lana t ion  o f  the psycho­
dynamics r e sp o n s ib le  fo r  t h i s  development i s  n e i t h e r  po ss ib le  nor neces­
sary a t  t h i s  t ime.  What i s  poss ib le  and necessary  i s  a sketch o f  the 
most important ind iv idua l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  which co n t r ib u ted  to  th i s  
evolu tion.
Otto Kerner was regarded as "quie t  and tough ,"  not a forcefu l 
p e r s o n , i n e x p e r i e n c e d  in the ways of W a s h i n g t o n C o m m i s s i o n  p a r t i ­
c ipants  and observers  a l ik e  agree th a t  the White House wanted a deferent 
chairperson so David Ginsburg (the  o r ig ina l  " p r e s i d e n t ' s  man" on the com­
mission) could d i r e c t  the work of  the group; Kerner f i t  t h i s  mold. He 
had, however, compiled a c o n s i s t e n t ly  p o s i t iv e  record o f  support  for c i v i l  
r ig h t s  fo r  Negro-Americans. He and his  f a t h e r  p ioneered in I l l i n o i s  the  
opening of l ega l  access channels to  Negroes. As governor he had been 
e f f e c t iv e  in d e a l in g  with urban rac ia l  problems and had s t r i k i n g  success in 
developing the  a b i l i t i e s  of the national guard to  deal with  r i o t  problems 
(a m at te r  o f  importance to  Johnson and the work o f  the  commission). The
^^See the memos from Califano and C h r i s t i an  in the f i l e  Press
Contacts ,  Cal ifano 57 (1758),  LBJ Library.  
^^New York Times, Ju ly  28:1 ,8 .
230
s t a f f  of  the  commission was prone to i d e n t i fy  him as a lawyer-judge type 
commissioner— a person who saw a p a r t i c u l a r  " r igh t"  f o r  every "wrong" 
encountered in t h e i r  work. Kerner was a member o f  the  job opportuni ty - 
open housing major i ty  on the c o m m i s s i o n . H e  was one o f  the  commissioners 
most in f luenced  by the ghetto v i s i t s  which became so d e c i s iv e  in wri t ing  
the f ina l  r e p o r t .  He moved in c reas ing ly  c lo se r  to  the  " l i b e r a l  wing" of 
the commission (a p o s i t io n  occupied by Lindsay from the  beginning) and a t  
the end f u l l y  adopted both the white  racism po in t  of view o f  the "Summary" 
and a view which dep rec ia ted ,  i f  i t  did not exclude,  a criminal conspiracy
1 O
explana t ion  o f  the d i s o r d e r s .  Kerner was a person who came to the 
commission with  a s t rong  commitment to the  pres iden t  and his  programs, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  those in c iv i l  r i g h t s ,  and who l e f t  with  a s t ro n g e r  com­
mitment to  c i v i l  r i g h t s .  Throughout t h a t  process Kerner served the pre­
s id e n t  and the commission well as the leader  o f  r eco rd .  He labored hard on 
commission business (by his own account,  60 percent o f  his time during the 
time o f  the  appointment);  he o f f i c i a l l y  represen ted  th e  commission before 
the White House and congress and toge the r  with Ginsburg was responsib le  
fo r  the  amazing amount o f  work the  indiv idual commissioners d id .  Until very 
near the end of  the l i f e  of the commission, Kerner was the leader  o f  the 
" p r e s i d e n t ' s  people".
Lindsay too was c o n s i s te n t  in his performance. He was very p re ­
d i c t a b l e .  The White House never expected him to be one o f  " th e i r "  people.
‘^See above p. 228.
18See Kerner te s t im o n y ,  th e  Kennedy H earings ,  pp. 7-14.
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From th e  beginning he was the le ad e r  of  the  loyal oppos i t ion  on the 
commission. He a l so  l iv e d  up to h is  r ep u ta t ion  as an a c t i v i s t ,  hard 
working, p o l i t i c a l l y  s o p h i s t i c a te d  person possessed o f  a "stubborn 
concern" fo r  c i v i l  r i g h t s . H e  was the f i r s t  to  push the commission
to d iscuss  i ssues  broader than those contained in the  p r e s i d e n t ' s
20four teen p o i n t s ,  and throughout ,  he saw one o f  the commission's  
primary tasks to  be to  make the na t ion ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  congress ,
21uncomfortably aware o f  the  p l ig h t  o f  the urban Negro gh e t to  r e s id e n t .
His aggress ive  (some s a id  abrasive)  concern f o r  the " l a rg e r "  i s s u e s ,
toge the r  with h is  p o l i t i c a l  s k i l l  were useful too ls  in his ro le  as
22the  prime a r c h i t e c t  in the  production of the  "Summary" and his  at tempt  to
23c a l l  th e  commission back in to  being during the summer o f  1968. His 
ro le  in  the development o f  the "Summary" was the f in a l  s tep  in  his 
evolu tion from the  opposit ion to  his subsequent p o s i t io n  as the  leader  o f  
the  loyal oppos i t ion .
"*^See Nat Hentoff ,  A P o l i t i c a l  L ife :  The Education o f  John V.
Lindsay, (New York: Alf red  A. Knopf, 1969), p. 8 ,  and Charles 37X 
Kenyetta, "The Changing Role of  the M i l i t a n t s , "  Harvard Review 4 (Second 
Quarter,  1968) :45.
^^See "Minutes of the  Meeting of the  Commissioners o f  7/29/67" in 
f i l e  Commission on Civil  Disorders (2 ) ,  Cal ifano 3, LBJ Library .
^ ^ I b i d . ,  "Minutes o f  Meeting of the Commissioners, 12 /9 /67 ."
^^See below pp. 450-455.
23Lindsay and Harr is  were unsuccessful  in t h i s  e f f o r t ,  but they  did 
a id  in the production of  a book. One Year L a t e r , (Urban America, One Year 
L a t e r : An Assessment o f  the Nat ion 's  Response to  the  C r i s i s  Described by 
the  National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Sanford ,  N.Y.: Praeger ,  
1969) as an e f f o r t  and r e in fo rce  t h e i r  content ions  t h a t  the  ad m in is t r a t io n  
and congress had d is regarded  the recommendations of th e  commission.
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H a r r i s ,  by the account of  commissioners and s t a f f  members a l i k e ,  p ro ­
vided the  i n t e l l e c t u a l  and p a r t i s an  p o l i t i c a l  leade rsh ip  necessary to  make 
the s h i f t  which allowed the  "Sunmary" to be pub l ished .  He came to  the com­
mission c l e a r l y  marked as one o f  the  " p r e s i d e n t ' s  men." A sou thwes terner ,  
a s t rong  suppor te r  of  the Great Socie ty  and the  war in  Vietnam, b r i l l i a n t ,  
hard working, Harris  was in many ways a young LBJ. The two men were 
a t t r a c t e d  to  each o th e r  ea r ly  in  H a r r i s '  f i r s t  term and maintained a c lose  
p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  u n t i l  he "turned on Johnson" with h i s  st rong endorse­
ment o f  the  Report and his  subsequent ac t ions  which ran d i r e c t l y  counter  to
24Johnson 's  major domestic and fo re ign  p o l i c i e s .
25H a r r i s ,  too,  had a long commitment to c i v i l  r i g h t s .  Like Lindsay, 
he was aggress ive  and hard working; he was n o t ,  however, regarded as 
ab ra s iv e .  He was seen as a person o f  good humor able to make his poin ts  
wi thout  a l i e n a t i n g  h is  fellow commissioners. He s t rove  f o r  an open com­
mission,  which would share the problems of  the  d i so rde rs  (he did not 
see much in the  way o f  so lu t ions  a t  the  time) with  the people and the  
congress .  As he learned  more, p a r t i c u l a r l y  from the v i s i t s  to the  g h e t to s ,
24 For H a r r i s '  account of the c loseness  o f  the  r e l a t i o n s h ip  and an 
account of  h imse lf  as "Johnson's Man" on the commission see his Potomac 
Fever: A Personal and Good Humored Memoir o f  Twelve Years in the N a t ion 's
C a p i t o l , (New York: Norton, 1977),  pp. 107-108.
25He wrote h is  book Alarms and Hopes a t  the  same time the commission's 
rep o r t  was being completed.
^^McGrath Minutes 2/9/68.
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27Harris  became le s s  the " p r e s i d e n t ' s  man" and more his  own.
Brooke was a major d isappoin tment  to most o f  the commissioners 
and the s e n i o r  members o f  the s t a f f .  Being b lack ,  a. n o r th e a s t e r n  
l i b e r a l  Republican s e n a t o r ,  and one o f  the f i r s t  persons to  sugges t  
the fo rmation  o f  a commission, most o f  h is  co lleagues  expec ted him to  be 
an ag g re s s iv e  commissioner.  His c o n t r i b u t i o n s  to t h e i r  common work, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  to  the  development o f  the  p o s i t i o n  expressed in the "white 
racism" and "two s o c i e t i e s "  themes o f  the  Repor t , were s i g n i f i c a n t ,  when 
he was p re sen t  fo r  meet ings;  h is  abs ten tee i sm  from scheduled meetings 
however, was regarded as excess ive  and a consequent handicap to  members 
of the  s t a f f  and th e  o th e r  commissioners .  His value to  the  common e f f o r t  
l ay ,  however, in h i s  a b i l i t y  to  comprehend and a r t i c u l a t e  the b roader  issues  
underly ing the  d i s o rd e r s  and to r e s i s t  easy answers to  the q u es t io n s  before  
the commission; t h i s  obviously  a l l i e d  him with  Lindsay and H a r r i s .  He 
was a l so  he lp fu l  t o  the  l i b e r a l s  on the  commission as a s t rong  a l l y  a g a in s t  
any vengeful law and o rde r  p o s i t i o n .
Congressman Corman expressed  more t r a d i t i o n a l  New Deal v a lu e s .  A 
second term member o f  the  house o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  who had been r e e l e c t e d  
in C a l i f o r n i a  d e s p i t e  a sweep o f  the  s t a t e  by the  c o n s e r v a t iv e s ,  led by 
the new Republican governor Ronald Reagan, Corman came to the commission 
with a r e p u ta t i o n  fo r  e x p e r t i s e  in  urban and c i v i l  r i g h t s  m a t t e r s .  He was
2 7 His independent p o l i t i c a l  s tance  was not confined to h i s  work on 
the commission. I t  subsequently  c o s t  him his  s e a t  in the s e n a t e .  He chose 
not to run f o r  r e - e l e c t i o n  in 1972.
234
an e a r ly  su p p o r te r  o f  the  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  white rac ism under lay  the
d i so rd e r s  and t h a t  the  "two s o c i e t i e s "  theme a c c u r a t e l y  r e f l e c t e d  the
28c h a r a c t e r  o f  urban America. He was anxious f o r  the  commission to pursue 
the  ques t io n s  of o f f i c i a l  law lessness  in the  d i s o r d e r s  and was unwil l ing  
to do any th ing  to  lower the  expec ta t ions  o f  American Negroes j u s t  because 
th e re  was some evidence  t h a t  u n f u l f i l l e d  e x p ec ta t io n s  were a f a c to r  in 
caus ing  the  d i s o r d e r s .  As with many New Deal-Grea t  Soc ie ty  Democrats o f  
the  t ime ,  Corman adhered to  a l i b e r a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  the  causes o f  the  
urban d i so rd e r s  ( e . g .  racism) but was c o n se rv a t iv e  in his  o r i e n t a t i o n  toward 
some o f  the  systemic  im p l ic a t io n s  o f  those v a lu e s .  For i n s t a n c e ,  through­
out the  l i f e  of the  commission, Corman was a t  odds with the  s t a f f  over 
proposa ls  f o r  the  f i n a l  r e p o r t  they were s u b m i t t in g  to the  commissioners.
In a l e t t e r  to  Kerner and the  o the r  commissioners,  Corman was highly c r i t i c a l  
of what he regarded as a proposal which,  i f  adopted  and s en t  f o r t h  to the  
nation and the  p r e s i d e n t ,  would commit the  commission to advocacy o f  a
"complete overhaul o f  the American system". Corman's i n c l i n a t i o n  was to
29a d j u s t ,  not scrap  the  e x i s t i n g  system. He and Thornton were united  on 
t h i s  and to g e th e r  were s t ro n g  advocates o f  p e r f e c t i n g  the  e x i s t i n g  system 
o f  educa t ion ,  j o b s ,  and hous ing;  poin t  out the e r r o r s ,  p e r f e c t ,  but do not 
scrap the system. They stood over a g a in s t  the ch ange -o r ien ted  commissioners
- h e e  McGrath Minutes o f  11/20/57 and 12 /9 /6 7 .
2 0
■'Letter,  Corman to Ginsburg,  Ginsburg 's  Corman f i l e ,  NACCD papers,  
LSJ L ib ra ry .
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on
as well as most o f  the s t a f f  on these  m a t t e r s .  Corman's t r a d i t i o n a l  
l ib e ra l i sm  led him to  adopt a s t a tu s  quo o r i e n t a t i o n  concerning ex is t in g  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  and programs. He was a " p r e s id e n t ' s  man" not in the usual 
sense of  one who c a r r i e s  information to the  White House but in  the sense 
th a t  Lyndon Johnson understood and apprec ia ted  b e s t ;  he wanted the com­
mission to s t i c k  narrowly to the mandate given i t  by the  p re s iden t ;  he 
supported the i n s t i t u t i o n s  created  by New Deal Democrats and the Great 
Society programs designed to  p e r f e c t  t h a t  i n h e r i t a n c e .  His approach to 
the need f o r  so c ia l  change im p l i c i t  in the urban d i s o rd e r s  o f  1967 was one 
of i n s t i t u t i o n a l  and programmatic re finement,  not dismantlement.
Congressman McCulloch brought to the commission a much more con­
serva t ive  record  than Corman except in c i v i l  r ig h t s  where t h e i r  per­
formance was v i r t u a l l y  i d e n t i c a l .  His co n t r ib u t io n  to  the work and 
the f ina l  product of  the  commission, unlike  Corman's, was smal l .  A 
long-time advocate o f  c i v i l  r ig h t s  he,  l i k e  Johnson, was w i l l i n g  to 
come down very hard on the "criminal element" he saw as causing the 
r i o t s .  He too was eager  to support  and a id  the Negro-Americans who 
showed g r a t i t u d e  fo r  the progress obtained fo r  them in national c iv i l  
r ig h t s  po l icy  by hard work and non-involvement in the  r i o t s .  He
The i s su e s  were drawn over recommendations concerning  education,  
jo b ,  the p o l i c e  and th e  media. Lindsay, H a r r i s ,  Brooke and Wilkins 
became in c re a s in g ly  p e r s i s t e n t  and aggress ive  in t h e i r  endorsements of  
recommendations fo r  rad ica l  changes in i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e s  to over­
come the e f f e c t s  of  racism. See, the McGrath "Minutes, of  th e  Commission 
Meeting" o f  1/11/68 f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r l y  harsh c lash  between Corman and 
Wilkins over recommendations concerning the  school system.
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accepted the idea o f  America as a r a c i s t  s o c i e t y  but saw t h a t  as no 
reason fo r  "cr iminal"  a c t i v i t y  on the  pa r t  of  some Negroes. Johnson 
was pleased enough with the congressman’s work on the Kerner Commission 
th a t  he named him to  the  Eisenhower (Violence) Commission.
I.W. Abe l 's  ro le  on the commission i s  d i f f i c u l t  to d e sc r ib e .  The 
s t a f f  regarded him as an independent in the  intra-commission c o n f l i c t s .
He was a person who made up his  own mind, who did not seem t o  be i n t e n t  
upon advocating s e t  poin ts  o f  view on a l l  the  issues  facing the group.
He was open to l i s t e n i n g  to  the v a r i e ty  of  proposals  which came f o r th .  
Unlike Corman, f o r  in s tan ce ,  he was not  prone to  lecture  his colleagues  on 
the need to maintain the s t ru c tu r e s  o f  the s o c i e t y ,  but a t  the  same time 
he agreed and voted with him. He was a r t i c u l a t e  about the  r e a l i t i e s  o f  
American Negro soc ia l  and economic l i f e .  He was a long-time supporter of 
a p o s i t iv e  publ ic  c i v i l  r ig h t s  policy  and a vigorous advocate o f  an 
id en t ica l  po l icy  in the labor  movement. When the time came fo r  decis ion  
making, however, he f e l l  in to  the middle range of  commissioner behavior .  
Willing to accept the white racism d oc t r ine  and s ig n i f i c a n t  r a d ic a l  changes 
in i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  those  per ta in ing  to  employment 
and wage p r a c t i c e s ,  he was r e lu c t a n t  to t i e  the  war to the  d i s o rd e r s  o r  
to  chal lenge the p ra c t i c e s  of  the po l ice  or  na t iona l  guard.  He c l e a r ly  
belonged to the cautious  middle of the  commission.
Thornton p resen ts  no such ro le  assignment problems. He was a 
so l id  c o n se rv a t iv e ,  an e n th u s i a s t i c  suppor te r  of  the s t a tu s  quo. He 
endorsed the Johnson c i v i l  r ig h t s  policy  and the  basic  Great Socie ty 
programs, inc luding  the War on Poverty. He was in every sense th e
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" p r e s id e n t ' s  man". He wanted more job programs and more emphasis on the
pe rfec t ion  of the e x i s t i n g  educational system. He could not accep t  the
contention  of  the s t a f f  and most o f  the  commissioners t h a t  pover ty ,
as well as rac ism,  was a major cause o f  the  d i s o r d e r s .  He mainta ined
th a t  i f  they put too much s t r e s s  on poverty . . . " 3 0  m i l l ion  poor people
31wil l  use i t  as an excuse to r i o t . "  He was to  the  r i g h t  o f  Corman and 
those o thers  who were w i l l i n g  to r a i s e  ex p ec ta t io n s .  He was wedded to  a 
p r in c ip le  of incremental  so c ia l  change which led him to a ff i rm  e x i s t i n g  
socia l  and p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  as the base upon which any change 
must be b u i l t .  He never seemed to  e n t e r t a i n  the  p ropos i t ion  t h a t  
e x i s t i n g  s t r u c tu r e s  may have o u t l iv e d  t h e i r  u s e f u ln e s s ,  and may have 
become a p a r t  of  the problems of the so c ie ty  r a t h e r  than a basis  f o r  t h e i r  
s o lu t io n .  Here he and Corman were adamant in defense o f  e x i s t i n g  Great 
Society programs and p o l i c i e s .  Thornton remained the " p r e s id e n t ' s  man" 
u n t i l  the end; the Great S o c i e ty ' s  War on Poverty,  c iv i l  r igh t s  program, 
and the war in Vietnam were accep tab le  to him because they were the  
p r e s i d e n t ' s ;  the ta sk  o f  the commission was to  def ine  those p o l i c i e s  and 
programs which were working be s t  and defend and support  them; re f inement  
was his method of  change, and then only  when the White House, the  locus  
o f  those who knew the most about such m a t te r s ,  was favorab le .
Roy Wilkins was regarded  by Johnson and his  a ides  as one o f  t h e i r  
Negro le ad e rs .  He was one o f  the  group o f  execut ives  of  o rgan iza t ions  
to  which the  Johnson a d m in is t r a t io n  always turned when they needed a
^^McGrath Minutes,  11/10/67.
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32Negro on an adv iso ry  group. He was a s t rong  suppor te r  of  the Great 
Soc ie ty ,  c r i t i c i z i n g  i t  only when i t  did not go f a r  enough, f a s t  enough 
in i t s  announced goals of  s o c i a l ,  r a c i a l ,  p o l i t i c a l  and economic j u s t i c e .  
He was an opponent o f  the  "Black Power" movement as i t  was being 
a r t i c u l a t e d  by many younger and more rad ica l  Negro l e a d e r s .  I t  is  
quest ionable  whether he even f e l t  very c lo se  to the p o s i t io n  being 
taken by Dr. Martin Luther King, J r .  and h i s  fo l lo w e rs .  Wilkins 
e s p e c i a l l y  did not want the  white  l i b e r a l  e s tab l i shm en t  to view any 
Negro person or group as the spokesperson or  the  sav io r  of  the Negro- 
American community. He sought fu l l  i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  Negro Americans in to  
the mainstream o f  American l i f e  and he saw the  e s t a b l i s h e d  Negro groups 
as a means to  t h a t  end. Wilkins saw h im se lf  on the commission as the 
advocate o f  what had become " t r a d i t i o n a l "  Negro-American public  policy  
goals —  access to  the b en e f i t s  o f  American c i t i z e n s h i p :  j o b s ,  educat ion 
and housing. He sought federal  governmental a id  to the  Negro community as 
a means o f  moving in to  pos i t ion  to compete equa l ly  fo r  a share of  the 
American dream. He played th i s  ro le  by adopting  a s t r a t e g y  of c a r e f u l l y  
nur tu r ing  those persons who occupied the middle o f  the commission's range 
of commitments on c i v i l  r ig h t s  m a t te rs .  When the time came fo r  decis ion  
making on the  various  i s s u e s ,  he spoke f o r c e f u l l y  fo r  h is  poin t  of  view 
and g e n e r a l ly  brought the moderates with him. He was a fo llower,  a 
r e a c to r ,  a r e f i n e r ,  in the  development of  the  Report.  He gave st rong
32McPherson w r i te s  th a t  Johnson and h i s  key a ides  were aware, a t  the 
time o f  the  Watts d i s o r d e r s ,  t h a t  the  major Negro " leaders"  had more of  
a fo llowing among w hi te  than black-Amer icans . McPherson, A P o l i t i c a l  
Educa t ion , p.  344.
239
33support  to the  lead o f  o thers  in development of  the  w h i te  racism theme.
He r e s i s t e d ,  with German, the two s o c ie ty  concept f ind ing  i t  coun te r ­
productive  to  the achievement o f  the  bas ic  goals the commission had se t  
34fo r  i t s e l f .  He never  wavered, however, from advocating s t rong  statements  
on open housing and police-community r e l a t i o n s  (he once th rea tened  to 
re s ign  unless  there  was a s ta tement on open housing which he could accept
O C
in the  f ina l  repor t )  and was a c o n s i s t e n t  suppor te r  o f  the  e f f o r t s  to 
connect po l ice  ac t ion  to  the causes o f  the d i s o r d e r s .  Wilkins can be 
c l a s s i f i e d  a cautious  moderate,  ready to  become an a c t i v e  advocate or, 
i f  necessa ry ,  the swing-vote fo r  the  i s su es  of rea l  concern to him —  
in e v i t a b ly  is sues  concerning systemic change. The c h a r a c t e r  of those issues  
puts  him in to  the group led by Lindsay.
Other than the f a c t  t h a t  she was a southern woman, and an announced 
candidate  fo r  the United S ta te s  Senate from Kentucky, Kather ine Paden 
had few q u a l i t i e s  to  j u s t i f y  her appointment.  In f a i r n e s s  to  h e r ,  i t  i s  
impor tant to  note t h a t  her senate  candidacy and region were se r ious  handi­
caps to any personal d e s i r e s  she may have e n t e r t a i n e d  to  j o in  in  the e f f o r t s
In h is  syndica ted  column o f  2/10-11/68,  Wilkins defends the com­
mission aga ins t  an a t t a c k  by the s o c i o l o g i s t  Amatai E tz ion i  t h a t  few socia l  
s c i e n t i s t s  were employed by the commission. Wilkins contended t h a t  the 
work o f  the commission uncovered racism and held i t  up a s  an explanat ion 
of the  r i o t s ,  something socia l  science had f a i l e d  to do. A typed copy o f  
his column o f  2/10-11/68 i s  in the f i l e s  of  the  Off ice  o f  Information,  
Papers o f  the  NACCD, LBJ Library .
^S cG ra th  Minutes,  12/9/67.
3 S l b i d . ,  1 / 1 1 / 6 8 .
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a t  recommending systemic change developing In the  commission. She was,
however, a good example o f  how a p r e s i d e n t  can use commission s e r v i c e  as a
means of  educa t ing  c e r t a i n  e l i t e s .  She began her s e rv ice  embracing a
r a t h e r  t r a d i t i o n a l  southern  c o n se rv a t iv e  viewpoint on a l l  i s sues  be fo re
her.  She moved to a p o s i t io n  of  vocal suppor t  o f  the  t o t a l  Repor t .
She was a p e r s i s t e n t  c r i t i c  of  the  mass media, f in d in g  i t  a t  l e a s t
p a r t l y  r e s p o n s ib le  fo r  the  d i s o r d e r s .  On the  f i e l d  t r i p s  to  the  va r ious
c i t i e s  which had exper ienced d i s o r d e r s ,  Paden was f a i t h f u l  to  her r o l e
as the  " r e p r e s e n t a t i v e "  of  women by a c t i v e l y  s o l i c i t i n g  the views o f
Negro women. She ended her s e r v ic e  a vocal moderate who was o p t i m i s t i c
about the  f u t u r e  of race  r e l a t i o n s  in the  country  and w i l l i n g  to suppor t
not only the Report but the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  c i v i l  r i g h t s  program. She
c l e a r l y  belongs in the  cau t io u s  middle of  the commission's membership.
Herber t  J e n k in s '  name came to  th e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  the White House
through Attorney  General Ramsey Clark who was impressed by his  work on
Department o f  J u s t i c e  adv iso ry  groups .  Clark recommended him because
of  h is  openness;  he was not locked i n to  a r a b id  law and o rder  p o s i t i o n
37c h a r a c te r i z e d  on the commission by Thornton. He used his exper ience  as
 ̂ The 'Wal 1 S t r e e t  Journal c a r r i e d  an i n t e r e s t i n g  a n a ly s i s  o f  her 
work on the commission which caught he r  t r a n s i t i o n  in mid-stream. See 
the  i s sue  o f  12/3 /67 .
^^See H erber t  J e n k in s ,  Keeping the  Peace: A Pol ice  Chief Looks 
Ac His J o b , (New York: Harper and Row, 1970),  p. 95, fo r  his d i s cu s s io n  
of h i s  l i b e r a l  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s  w i th in  the  law enforcement p ro fes s io n  and 
his reac t io n  to  oppos i t ion  to his appointment to the commission from his 
pel ice p e e r s .
241
a police c h ie f  in the South to  the  advantage o f  the commission. While he 
was not from a major urban c e n t e r ,  he did have ex tens ive  experience with 
urban Negro ghettos  and with c i v i l  d i so rd e rs .  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  he brought an 
informed concern fo r  the  r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  the na t iona l  guard as a peace keeping 
force under the command of a p o l i t i c a l  o f f i c i a l  l i k e  Governor L e s te r  Maddox 
o f  Georgia. He helped sway the  d iscuss ions  away from recommendations 
advocating extens ive  re l i a n ce  on the guard as the s o le  means of  fo rce  
fo r  c u r t a i l i n g  d i so rde rs  and toward support  o f  local  police  f o r c e s .  I t  
was he who proposed and gave th e  s t ro n g es t  support  to  the  various 
proposals in the Report fo r  changes in in te rna l  po l icy  department 
p o l ic ie s  and fo r  b e t t e r i n g  policy-community r e l a t i o n s .  Jenkins was pro­
foundly influenced by the  th in k in g  o f  Senator Harr is  and gradua lly  moved 
with him from the cau t ious  middle to a rad ica l  and change o r ien ted  p o s i t io n .
B) The Executive S t a f f
The s i z e  and q u a l i t y  o f  the  s t a f f  o f  a commission more than any
other  va r iab les  determine the  subs tance ,  ch a rac te r  and importance of
i t s  work. The s ize  o f  the s t a f f  i s  dependent on the  pres ident and i t  is
he who a lso  approves the  budget as well as ass igns  the work of the  advisory
body. As noted in the  Chapter 2 the s ize  of a commission's s t a f f  i s  one
major c r i t e r a  on by which the importance a p re s id en t  vests  in a given
38commission can be measured. The q u a l i ty  of the  s t a f f  is dependent f i r s t  
on the s k i l l  of those doing the  procuring and second on the q u a l i t y  o f  the  
pool of a v a i l ab le  people from which the choices are  made.
^^Above, pp. 8 7 -8 8 .
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39The Report l i s t s  115 members o f  the  p ro fess iona l  s t a f f .  In 
add i t ion  to genera t ing  a la rge  q u a n i t i t y  o f  data f o r  use by the  com­
missioners such a s t a f f  has to  a t t r a c t  a cons ide rab le  amount of  p o l i t i c a l  
a t t e n t i o n ,  a t  t h e  very l e a s t ,  from members o f  congress  who serve on 
committees whose j u r i s d i c t i o n s  p o t e n t i a l l y  over lap the  areas  in which 
the  commission has been ass igned  to work. The f a c t  t h a t  Johnson and 
Cali fano allowed the  Kerner Commission s t a f f  to  grow so la rge  was a st rong 
ind ica t ion  t h a t  they  expected more from t h i s  advisory  group than window 
dress ing .
The appointments  o f  Ginsburg and Palmieri  were f u r t h e r  ind ica t ions  
to the p o l i t i c a l l y  aware, t h a t  Johnson expected something o f  substance 
from th i s  group. Each provided the s t a f f  and commissioners with more 
than good e x ecu t iv e  l e ad e r sh ip ;  they were the p rofess iona l  peers o f  
the  commissioners,  the kind o f  person to  whom Johnson tu rned most o f ten  
to appoint to membership on advisory  bodies r a th e r  than to t h e i r  s t a f f s .
In the case of e ach ,  but more in t h a t  o f  Ginsburg,  the  leadersh ip  pro­
vided was not e x a c t ly  what the White House wanted o r  expected .  Ginsburg's  
p o s i t io n ,  t h a t  to  serve the  p re s id e n t  be s t  one serves  the nat ion f i r s t ,  
more than any o t h e r ,  moved the commission from being p re s id en t i a l  to  being 
a national advisory  body. Henry Kissinger has w r i t t e n  t h a t  e f f e c t iv e  pol icy  
leadership  " . . . r e q u i r e s  a sense of p ropor t ion  and a sense o f  s ty le .
^^Report , p. VIII .
^^Henry A. K is s inge r ,  "The Policy Maker and the  I n t e l l e c t u a l , "  Thomas 
E. Cronin, Sanford D. Greenburg, e d . .  The P r e s id e n t i a l  Advisory System, (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 160.
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Ginsburg provided both to  the s t a f f  and the commissioners. I t  was with 
h is  sense o f  p ropor t ion  and s t y l e  t h a t  he led the whole commission to  
fo l low his t r a n s i t i o n .  Ginsburg, then and now, did not see h im se l f ,  or 
the  commission, as d e l i b e r a t l y  s e t t i n g  out to  defy the  p re s id en t .  But the  
mandate did address  the  commission to  the na t ion .  Ginsburg took t h i s  
s e r i o u s l y .  The data  compiled by h is  s t a f f ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h a t  which 
poin ted to the Great Socie ty  as more the  cause than the  so lu t ion  to  
the d i s o r d e r s ,  convinced him t h a t  the  commission must speak over the  
head of the p re s id en t  to  the  n a t io n .  From t h a t  p o in t  on Johnson knew 
the  commission was no longer  h i s . In Johnson 's  a d m in is t ra t ion  i t  was he_ 
who def ined the  needs o f  black-Amer icans .
Ginsburg pe r fec ted  h is  a b i l i t y  to  function e f f e c t i v e l y  in 
Washington p o l i t i c s  during an almost s t e r e o ty p i c  c a r e e r  as a Washington 
lawyer.  Beginning in the  Roosevelt  Adminis tra tion he had developed a 
r e p u ta t io n  in and around the  White House and Capitol H i l l  as a person 
ab le  to get  th in g s  done because o f  h i s  supe r io r  a b i l i t i e s  and c o n ta c t s .
He moved in and out of  government s e r v ice  e a s i l y , s p e c i a l i z i n g  in
Elaine M. Wolfson c a l l s  Ginsburg a Washington " in -and-ou te r"  ( a f t e r  
Richard E. Neustadt in his  "The White House and W h i teh a l l , "  The Public 
I n t e r e s t  2 (Winter,  1965):55-69) and notes t h a t  he served Johnson ex ten­
s iv e l y  and well as an economic t ro u b l e - s h o o te r  in the  months p r i o r  to his 
s e l e c t io n  as execu t ive  d i r e c t o r  o f  th e  commission. See her "Pres idents  
and Advisers:  F i l t e r i n g  the Two-way Flow o f  Informat ion ,"  a paper prepared 
fo r  de l ive ry  a t  the  annual meeting o f  the American P o l i t i c a l  Science 
A ssoc ia t ion ,  Washington, D.C.,  1977.
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serving  Democratic adm in is t ra t ions  as an a d v i se r  and p r a c t i t i o n e r
42in wage and p r i c e  matters  and p r iv a te  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law. He was 
in s h o r t  a very experienced and highly success fu l  member o f  the  
Washington po l icy  making es tab l ishment .
N e i ther  he nor his old f r i en d s  Lyndon Johnson and Joe Califano 
expected him to  be o th e r  than the c l a s s i c  " p r e s i d e n t ' s  man". Being such 
had been the  one of  the hallmarks of  h is  c a r e e r .  That  he became o ther  
was a r e s u l t  o f  a mixture of a p a r t i c u l a r  kind o f  person with  a very unique 
s e t  of even ts .  Ginsburg was known as a man o f  reason who followed i t s  
d i c t a t e s  wherever i t  lead him in the  p u r s u i t  of answers to  problems he 
had before  him. A highly i n t e l l i g e n t  and s k i l l e d  lawyer,  he was f i rm ly  
commited to the  v i r t u e s  o f  extensive  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  a problem, inc luding 
f i e l d  r e s ea rch .  He never seemed s a t i s f i e d  with the  conventional wisdom 
of  law or p o l i t i c s .  He was not  given to  quick judgements.  He was, then ,  
a c a r e f u l ,  s c h o la r ly  man, completely devoted to l i b e r a l  democratic p r i n ­
c i p l e s ,  w i l l in g  to  serve  the p re s id en t  to  the  be s t  o f  his a b i l i t y  during 
the c r i s i s  o f  th e  urban d i s o rd e r s ;  bu t ,  as always,  he was his own person. 
That meant t h a t  he served f i r s t  the d i c t a t e s  of h is  reason and m ora l i ty .
4.?A l i s t  o f  Ginsburg's  accomplishments inc ludes :  a s t a f f  p o s i t io n  on 
the Secur i ty  and Exchange Commission (1935) ,  law s e c r e t a r y  to Assoc ia te  
J u s t i c e  William Douglas (1939), general  counsel o f  the Office  o f  P r ice  
S t a b i l i t y  (1941),  member o f  the  Aust r ian  Trea ty  Commission (1947), Adminis­
t r a t i v e  A ss i s t a n t  to  Senator Sam Neely (Dem. W. Va.) (1950),  Adjunct 
P ro fesso r  o f  In te rn a t io n a l  Law, Georgetown Univers i ty  (1960-1967),  Chairman, 
P r e s id e n t i a l  Board in te rven ing  in the March 1967 r a i l r o a d  s t r i k e ,  member 
Kappel (Post  O ff ice )  Commission (1967).  See Anthony P r i s e n d o r f t ,  "Charles 
D. Ginsburg: Digging up the Roots of Violence in the  C i t i e s , "  New York Post ,
8 /19/67.
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Ginsburg performed a l l  the t r a d i t i o n a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  the  
executive  d i r e c t o r , b u t  h is  unique ro le  on t h i s  commission was his  
a b i l i t y  to transcend his capac i ty  as the  “p r e s id e n t ' s  man," and what 
the  New York Times called  his  abso lu te  middle -c lass  background, and 
become a c ruc ia l  leader in the evo lu t ion  o f  the  commission in to  a 
na t iona l  advisory body.^^ I t  was he and Lindsay who from the f i r s t  
meetings of  the group took most s e r io u s ly  the p re s id e n t i a l  mandate to 
speak to  the na t ion  as well as to  the  p re s id en t .  As one high s t a f f  
o f f i c i a l  put i t ,  “This commission had a mandate and s tuck  to  i t  —  
i t  d i d n ' t  l im i t  i t s e l f  to advice to the  p re s id e n t . "
Ginsburg was a p e r s i s t e n t  proponent of f i e l d  r e sea rc h ;  in the  case  
o f  the  commission of exposing the commissioners to the r e a l i t i e s  o f  l i f e  
for  Negro urban dwellers .  Those t r i p s  became the major means o f  educa t ing  
the  commissioners. The t r i p s  were a l s o  the  g r e a t e s t  s in g l e  in f luence  on 
Ginsburg. In the  l a s t  a n a ly s i s ,  however, Ginsburg as w i th  a l l  the com­
m iss io n e rs ,  remained a member o f  the  “commission c la s s "  and while a 
dedicated  re former ,  he was not a re v o lu t io n a ry ;  he, too ,  was con ten t  to  
bear the  burden o f  his c la s s  and impose so lu t ions  on the s e r io u s  problems 
o f  the  economic and rac ia l  lower-c lass  he and his co l leagues  uncovered.
Victor H. P a lm ie r i ' s  f i r s t  assignment was to oversea and coord in­
a te  the  work o f  the  s t a f f .  With such a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i t  was i n e v i t a b l e  
t h a t  he be tagged as the "heavy" of the  s t a f f .  His p ropens i ty  for  imposing 
ideas in to  the subs tan t ive  as well as the procedural d e l ib e r a t i o n s  of 
the various  s t a f f  departments a lso  co n t r ib u te d  to his  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  t h a t
a?
See Chapter 2, pp. 50-94.
44
New York Times, August 1,  1967, 17:4.
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l a b e l .  He had a very t r a d i t i o n a l  view o f  the  s t a f f - c o im is s i o n e r  r e l a t i o n ­
ship —  the s t a f f  c a r r i e s  out the  work ass igned in the  name of  the  commis­
s io n e r s .  Ginsburg .and Kerner,  with the obvious support  of  the  White House
saw the r e l a t i o n s h ip  d i f f e r e n t l y .  The in h e ren t  c o n f l i c t  in th i s  s i t u a t io n
45led to some o f  the  well  pub l ic ized  feuds w i th in  the  commission. Palmieri  
supported those members of  the profess ional s t a f f  who held t h i s  view, 
but he did not in any ov e r t  way jo in  the l i b e r a l  fa c t ion  of  the commiss­
ioners .^^  He remained c o n s i s t e n t l y  loyal t o  the  work of the commission 
and in p a r t i c u l a r  to  the  s t a f f .  I t  i s  c l e a r ,  however, t h a t  most o f  the  
negative  c r i t i c i s m  o f  the  commission and i t s  work, based on sources w ith in  
the s t a f f ,  came from persons al igned with Pa lm ier i .
Palmieri  was appointed to  the s t a f f  because of a combination of 
f a c to r s  favorable  to  him, the work of the commission and ce r ta in  
p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  in  the  adm in is t ra t ion .  His name came to  the 
a t t e n t io n  of the  White House and Ginsburg by means of  f r iends  of  his 
in the  Department of  J u s t i c e . H i s  legal t r a i n i n g  and experience gave
45 I t  i s  important to note here t h a t  the  substance o f  these  feuds 
was concerned with who would lead  in doing the work. There was v i r t u a l l y  
no debate over whether o r  not whatever s o lu t io n  a r r iv e d  a t  would be imposed 
upon re s id en t s  of  b lack  urban ghe t tos ;  t h a t  was assumed.
^^Palmieri  did not have a high regard fo r  Kerner 's  leade rsh ip .  He 
did re spec t  Ginsburg and H a r r i s .  His re luc tance  to  r a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  s t a f f  
support  behind the  lead e rsh ip  of Lindsay was probably due to  his st rong 
l ib e ra l  Democratic commitments. He respected  Lindsay and his  work, but 
was unable to a c t i v e l y  support  him.
^^Lipsky and Olson maintain t h a t  the recommendation fo r  his appoin t ­
ment was made by the Secre ta ry  o f  Housing and Urban Development, Robert 
Wood. (MSS, IV, p. 20 . )  Given the ro le  Palmieri  played on the commission, 
the determination o f  the  o r ig in  of his nomination is  important.  By 1967 
Ramsey C la rk 's  Department of J u s t i c e  was being looked upon with some
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him those general  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  so e s s e n t i a l  to the func t ion ing  o f  an 
advisory body. He a lso  had developed a rep u ta t io n  as a knowledgable
person in  urban a f f a i r s ,  with p a r t i c u l a r  e x p e r t i s e  in land use and
48real e s t a t e  m a t t e r s ;  f i n a l l y  h is  known connections in the  l i b e r a l  
Democratic community were o f  use to  the adm in is t ra t ion  fo r  a t  l e a s t  
communication purposes.
C) The Profess iona l S t a f f
Hiring the members o f  the p ro fess iona l  s t a f f  and t h e i r  subord ina tes  
was, of n e c e s s i t y ,  a hasty  and e s s e n t i a l l y  disorganized a f f a i r .  From the 
po in t  of view of  those doing the s e l e c t i n g  and h ir ing  they took on as 
quickly as p o s s ib le  the bes t  people they could f in d .  Those employed can 
be c l a s s i f i e d  in to  th ree  groups: 1) Washington lawyers with good Democratic
es tab li shment connec t ions ,  and some token Republicans,  2) academics who had 
extens ive  exper ience in consu l t ing  government agencies and/or s e rv ing  on 
the  s t a f f s  o f  congresspersons , t a sk  forces  o r  commissions, and 3) a v a r i e t y  
o f  well educated and t a l e n t e d  young people temporar ia ly  l iv in g  in 
the  Washington, D.C. area and in need of  employment. As with the  commis­
s i o n e r s ,  no one on the p ro fess iona l  s t a f f ,  in any way, d i r e c t l y  r ep resen ted
suspic ion by the  White House as being popula ted by ad m in is t r a t io n  po l icy  
d i s s e n t e r s .  Palmieri  regarded the o r ig in  o f  his nomination in th e  Depart­
ment of J u s t i c e  as important to  the  l i b e r a l  r o l e  he played on the  s t a f f .
He saw h imself  as rep re sen t ing  on the  commission the l i b e r a l  d i s s e n t e r s  
in the Democratic Par ty .  I t  a lso  appears t h a t ,  by v i r t u e  of h is  s e l e c t i o n ,  
the  White House was w i l l in g  to have t h a t  i n t e r e s t  group rep re sen ted .
48He was the  Pres iden t  of  the  Janus Corporation,  a C a l i f o r n i a  based 
real  e s t a t e  f i rm.
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the  persons o r  the i n t e r e s t s  of the  p e r p r e t r a t o r s  or  the  v ic t im s  o f  the  
dQ
d i s o r d e r s . '  They were mostly lawyers from the  Washington a rea  who were 
picked f o r  t h i s  s e r v ice  through the  "good old  boy" network o f  the  p ro ­
f e s s io n .^ ^  Many were "loaned" from fed e ra l  a g e n c i e s . L i p s k y  and Olson 
found t h a t  th o se  persons "loaned" were those l e a s t  needed f o r  the  work 
of t h e  loaning agency. They a l so  uncovered an unw i l l ingness  on the
^^Robert  Conot, a sp ec ia l  c o n s u l t a n t  (d i scussed  below) came c l o s e s t  
to being t h a t  type of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,  b u t ,  t h a t  only because he wrote 
about such pe rsons .  Kerner and Ginsburg named Theodore A. J o n e s ,  D i re c to r  
of the  I l l i n o i s  Revenue Department,  to  the  pos t  of  deputy execu t ive  d i r e c t o r  
of  the  s t a f f  before  cons ide r ing  P a lm ie r i ,  but Jones  res igned  f iv e  days 
a f t e r  h i s  appointment fo r  personal  r e a so n s .  (NTT 8 /2 /6 7 ,  1:5)  As with 
the  o t h e r  Negroes on the  commission Jones could be regarded as a r e p r e s e n t a ­
t i v e  o f  the Negroes d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t e d  by the  d i s o r d e r s  only  by persons  
who t h in k  any Negro r e p re se n t s  a l l  Negroes.  There i s  only one p ie ce  o f  
documentary ev idence ,  and t h a t  from a non-commission sou rce ,  t h a t  any 
c o n s id e ra t io n  was given to  having an urban gh e t to  Negro serve  on the  
commission s t a f f .  (Roy Reed NYT 7 /30 /67 ,  1 :1 ) .  In i n t e rv i e w s ,  those  
re sp o n s ib le  f o r  s t a f f  procurement l a i d  heavy s t r e s s  on the  p re s su re  of  
time as the major reason why no e f f o r t  was made to f ind  persons with  
such a background to  se rve  on th e  s t a f f .
50One-ha l f ,  e ig h te e n ,  of  th e  commissioners and members o f  the  pro­
f e s s io n a l  s t a f f  were lawyers .  Most o f  the  members o f  the  non-pro fess iona l  
s t a f f  were lawyers or in o r  about to  be in law schoo l .  Lipsky and Olson 
give f i v e  good reasons f o r  the preponderance o f  a t to rn ey s  on the  s t a f f : 1 )  
lawyers are by t r a i n i n g  g e n e r a l i s t s ,  2) they a r e  more a v a i l a b l e  fo r  t h i s  
kind o f  work,  t h e i r  f irms a r e  l i k e l y  to  give l e av es  o f  absence f o r  s e r v i c e  
on a government advisory body on s h o r t  n o t i c e ,  3) as a p r o f e s s i o n ,  they a re  
bes t  ab le  to  g a ther  and i n t e r p r e t  da ta  under p r e s s u r e —they do not need 
long per iods  o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l  g e s t a t i o n  to produce a f in i s h e d  p roduc t ,  4) 
work on an adv iso ry  commission i s  a kind o f  vo lun tee r ism  indigenous  to 
the  lega l  p ro fes s ion  and 5) lawyers l i k e  to  work with  o th e r  lawyers.
(MSS, I ,  pp. 11-12, and Wolanin, " P re s id e n t i a l  Advisory Commissions," 
pp. 228-230.
^^The most common agency sources  were: HUD, J u s t i c e ,  Labor-and 
HEW. Roy Reed, New York Times, J u l y  29,  8 :1 .
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par t  o f  agencies  t o  loan t h e i r  black  s t a f f  members to the commission 
and a corresponding re luc tance  on the  p a r t  o f  Negro agency employees
CO
to take temporary employment with the  commission. A few came from
C o
the academic world fo r  sh o r t  periods  o f  t ime. The pauci ty  of  academics 
on the s t a f f ,  except  in the ro le  o f  p a r t - t i m e ,  c o n t rac t  co n su l t an t s  is  
exp l ic ab le  in two ways: 1) s t a f f  re c ru i tm en t  could not begin u n t i l  
August a t  which t ime most academic personnel were under con t rac ts  to  
t h e i r  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  and, perhaps most impor tan t ,  2) academics a re  very 
h e s i t a n t  to take  on p re s id en t i a l  commission assignments because such 
appointments fo rce  them to work a t  a pace and manner they find  to  be 
p r o f e s s io n a l ly  unacceptable .  Most so c ia l  s c i e n t i s t s  saw the p r e s i d e n t ' s  
mandate demanding a t  l e a s t  two year s  o f  re sea rch  work; the commission, a t  
b e s t ,  was guaranteed one y ear  of e x i s t e n c e .  The remainder of the  s t a f f ,  
young, pre or newly c reden t ia led  p r o f e s s i o n a l s ,  l a rg e ly  l ib e ra l  Democratic 
in p o l i t i c a l  philosophy, were secured in whatever ways p oss ib le ;  Kerner 
and Ginsburg had l e s s  than one y e a r  to f u l f i l l  the p r e s id e n t ' s  mandate and 
they needed a l l  the  help they could g e t ,  as qu ickly  as i t  could be obta ined.
The Report conta ins  the  names o f  115 members o f  the s t a f f .  Each 
of them served in a more or  l e ss  permanent c a p a c i t y . T h e  s i z e  o f  the
^^Lipsky and Olson, MSS, V, pp. 11-12.
53e . g .  Gary Marx of Harvard was h i red  as a specia l  c o n su l t an t  fo r  
a twelve week period beginning in l a t e  September. His agreement was t h a t
he would work th r e e  days a week a t  a minimum r a t e  of $70 a day. See
memo. Shallow to  Pa lm ier i ,  9/28/67 found in S t a f f  Procurement f i l e ,
NACCD p ape rs ,  LBJ Library.
S^R epor t , p. VIII .
55See the d iscuss ion  below concerning problems over the s i z e  of  the 
s t a f f  and the budget.
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group was a func tion o f  two impor tant  f a c to r s :  f i r s t ,  the  p re s id e n t  
and Califano wanted a working commission and were th e re fo re  w i l l i n g  
to  inves t  in a s t a f f  la rge  enough to get the joB done; 2) t h e  commission 
decided e a r ly  in August to produce two major r e p o r t s ,  one t o  be pub­
l i shed  around Christmas and the  o th e r  in M a r c h . T h e  j u n i o r  s t a f f  
did the basic  research  and w r i t i n g  fo r  the  commissioners.^^ In a d d i t io n ,  
many of them c a r r ie d  th e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  fo r  arranging  the  commissioner 
and sen io r  s t a f f  f i e l d  t r i p s .  Therefore ,  these  persons were most o f te n
the f i r s t  to come in to  con tac t  with the commission's "hard" d a ta .  I t
was they who f i r s t  i d e n t i f i e d ,  met and worked with the indigenous
black leaders  of  the  c i t i e s  i n to  which the f i e l d  t r i p s  were made. Very
of ten  t h a t  was the only c on tac t  those persons had with the commission.
The ju n io r  s t a f f  members became acu te ly  aware of the  d i f f e r en ces  between 
the  leaders  of the var ious b lack  communities with which they came in to  
con tac t  and those e s ta b l i sh e d  spokespersons o f  the c iv i l  r i g h t s  move­
ments in the  various p a r t s  of  th e  country the commissioners were hearing
56The exis tence  o f  t h i s  t ime schedule from the  beginning o f  the  l i f e  
of  the commission has been h o t ly  debated by commissioners and s en io r  and 
ju n i o r  s t a f f  members. In te rv iews confirm t h a t  i t  did have an informal 
s t a t e  of  ex is tence  among the commissioners and the  sen io r  s t a f f ;  the  com­
m iss ioners ,  Ginsburg and Palmieri  understood t h a t  the  s i z e ^ o f  the  s t a f f  
was to  be reduced a f t e r  the i s s u i n g  o f  the f i r s t  r e p o r t .  While the  pro­
blems o f  s t a f f  reduct ions  and the  subsequent debates  are not d i r e c t l y  
r e l e v a n t  to  th i s  essay they w i l l  be b r i e f l y  mentioned below.
^^Those one-hundred members of the p rofess iona l  s t a f f  l i s t e d  on 
page VIII o f  the Report with no t i t l e s  a f t e r  t h e i r  names.
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in the  formal hearings in Washington and during the f i e l d  t r i p s . T h e  
divergence in p e rspec t ive  on the d isorders  which developed from these  
d i f f e r e n t  exposures to the  " leaders"  o f  black urban-American became 
a source o f  se r ious  c o n f l i c t  between the ju n io r  s t a f f  members and the 
commissioners. I t  was a l so  la rge ly  responsib le  fo r  fo rc ing  Ginsburg 
and Palmier i  in to  the brokering  ro le  they played during the l a s t  h a l f  
of the  l i f e  o f  the  commission between the two groups o f  an tagon is ts .
I f  t h e re  i s ,  as Wolanin main ta ins ,  a "commission c la s s "  then 
each o f  th e  s en io r  s t a f f  members to be discussed now should be c l a s s i ­
f i e d  as be longing to  a " s t a f f - c o n s u l t a n t  s u b - c l a s s " A l l  these  men 
were we l l -connec ted ,  p o l i t i c a l l y  and p r o f e s s io n a l ly ,  with the Washington 
p o l i t i c a l  e s ta b l i sh m e n t ;  each had had experience se rv ing  on, advis ing or 
consul t ing  with government agencies a t  a l l  l e v e l s ;  a l l  but two (Shallow 
and Nathan) were by pro fess ion  g e n e r a l i s t s — mostly lawyers;  only two
Deposit ions  from a v a r ie ty  o f  "new" leaders  of the  Negro com- 
muni ty--black  n a t i o n a l i s t s  and black power advocates--were taken fo r  
the commission record  l a t e  in February (the f ina l  r e p o r t  was published 
on March 1 ) .  Those deposed a t  t h a t  time were: Ron Karenga, Charles 
Evers, Floyd McKissick, Stokely Carmichael,  Dick Greogry, Vernon Jordan, 
Carl B. Stokes and Richard Hacker. See memo Ginsburg to  commissioners, 
2/21/68, General Counsel f i l e ,  "Black Power," NACCD papers ,  LBJ Library.
A record o f  one of the depos i t ions  was made in a memo from General Counsel 
Merle McCurdy to Ginsburg dated 3/5/68 ( Ib id . )  in which i t  i s  noted t h a t  
Karenga was deposed a t  7:00 p.m. on Thursday, February 22 by McCurdy and 
his a s s i s t a n t  N. R. Jones .  The Report ind ica tes  t h a t  each o f  the persons 
from whom depos i t ions  were taken were "Witnesses a t  Special  Hear ings," 
Report pp. 300-302. A d iscuss ion  o f  the formal hear ings  of  the com­
mission can be found below, pp. 279-291. I t  can be s a id  here t h a t  no 
formal means was provided fo r  a l l  the  commissioners to meet and hear th i s  
type o f  black  l e ad e r .
59Persons l i s t e d  on p. VIII o f  the Report as heads o f  the various 
departments or  as "specia l  c o n su l t an t s . "
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(McCurdy and Conot) had had a p ro fess iona l  o r  personal h i s to ry  remotely
s im i l a r  to  t h a t  o f  the  segment o f  the  popula tion they studied and
only one o f  th o se ,  Conot, had r e f l e c t e d  on t h a t  exper ience p r i o r  to his
50commission s e r v i c e .
Stephen Kruzman, Deputy D irec to r  f o r  O pera t ions ,  was a Washington
l a w y e r . H e  was a former A s s i s t a n t  United S ta tes  Attorney f o r  New York
City and had worked in various c a p a c i t i e s  f o r  Lindsay and Senator Jacob
J a v i t s  (United S ta te s  Senator from New York).  His i n i t i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s
included the  coord ination of  the  f i e l d  a c t i v i t i e s  and the development of
the c i t y  p r o f i l e s  with the re search  and an a ly s i s  programs. In October,
fi ?
he became the  de fac to  a d m in is t r a to r  o f  a l l  s t a f f  a c t i v i t i e s .  This 
real ignment freed  Ginsburg and Palmieri  to work more c lo se ly  with  the 
commissioners.
Robert Shallow, A ss i s ta n t  Deputy D irec to r— Research, was one o f  the  
two pro fess iona l  socia l  s c i e n t i s t s  on the  s t a f f .  He came from the  
p o s i t ion  o f  Chief,  Special  P ro jec t s  Divis ion of  the  National I n s t i t u t e  of
^^Robert Conot, Rivers o f  Blood, Years o f  Darkness (New York: Bantam 
Books, 1967).
^^A p a r tn e r  o f  Ronald L. Goldfarb,  who was a consu l tan t  to  the  com­
mission (see Repor t , p. 302). Fur ther mention o f  Goldfarb can be found in 
the d iscuss ions  o f  consu l tan ts  and the pub l ic  s a f e ty  sec t ion  o f  the  Repor t , 
below pp. 369-376, 304-332.
^^Memo Ginsburg to s t a f f ,  10/2/67 and Palmieri  t o  Kruzman, 10/31/67 
in Off ice  o f  Operations f i l e ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ L ibrary .
CO
He was a lso  the only member of the s t a f f  to  publish r e f l e c t i o n s  
on commission s e r v i c e .  See Shallow, "Social S c i e n t i s t s  and Social Act ion ."
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Mental H e a l t h . His academic t r a i n i n g  was a s  a soc ia l  psychologis t ;  
during h is  career  he had developed an i n t e r e s t  in police-community 
r e l a t i o n s . S h a l l o w  was no t  supported fo r  th e  p o s i t i o n  by Pa lm ier i ,  who 
wanted to  secure a soc ia l  s c i e n t i s t  with a na t iona l  repu ta t ion  fo r  the  
p o s i t i o n . S h a l l o w  saw P a lm ie r i ' s  con t inu ing  oppos i t ion  to him and his 
work as r e f l e c t i n g  a general  negative  a t t i t u d e  held by most o f  the  lawyers 
on the s t a f f ;  they wanted him to produce a "case"  which explained the  causes 
of the d i s o r d e r s ,  an argument which could hold w a ter ,  which could be used 
to "prosecute" the o f fenders  before the  "cour t"  o f  pub l ic  opinion; he,  on 
the o the r  hand, wanted to produce a p i c tu r e  o f  what had happened.
^^He was a commissioned o f f i c e r  in U.S. Public  Health Serv ice .
^^Shallow thought he got the p o s i t io n  because b e t t e r  known social  
s c i e n t i s t s  saw two ser ious  p rofess iona l  dangers in the  job: 1) the  l i f e  
of  the commission was too s h o r t  to do the re sea rch  necessary to answer 
the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  q u es t io n s ,  and, 2) th e  p o l i t i c s  o f  the  s i t u a t i o n  were much 
too v o l a t i l e  fo r  well known scho lars— there  was a tendency among pro ­
minent so c ia l  s c i e n t i s t s  a t  the time to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  the  commission was 
being named to white-wash the  whole m at te r  o f  the  d i s tu rb an ces .  See 
Shallow, "Social S c i e n t i s t s  and Social  A c t ion ,"  p.  208.
^^See Palmieri  to  Gans, 12/31/67 in Deputy D i r e c t o r ' s  f i l e ,  NACCD 
Papers, LBJ L ib ra ry ,  and Kopkin, "Black on White,"  p.  3.
^^Shallow, "Social  S c i e n t i s t s  and Socia l  Act ion ,"  p.  208 and see the  
following taken from a Shallow to Palmieri  memo (1/10/67) which had as i t s  
sub jec t  a c r i t i q u e  of  a d r a f t  of Chapter 2, "P a t t e rn s  o f  Disorders"
(12/19/67 Draf t ,  D i rec to r  o f  Research f i l e ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library . )  
of the Report prepared by the  Operations Department. In a sec t ion  o f  the  
memo e n t i t l e d  "General Evaluation" Shallow had the  following comments to  
make: " . . . f l a t n e s s  and lack  of  s ig n i f i c a n ce  only  o ccas iona l ly  r e l i e v ed  by 
a well-framed and r e l e v a n t  quest ion competent ly handled.  . . .Beneath  an 
appearance of countable  c e r t a i n t y ,  much ambiguous and sketchy informat ion 
has been 'hardened '  in to  p o s i t i v e  f a c t ,  and the  m a t te r  i s  fu r th e r  complicated 
by inaccurac ies  of d e t a i l  a p o r t r a i t  done with  a broom." This d i s ­
t i n c t io n  between resea rch  methodologies and th e  s t r u g g l e  i t  produced is 
useful in  unders tanding the subsequent b a t t l e s  over the  content and form 
of  the Report .
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Arnold Sagalyn, Assoc ia te  D irec to r  o f  Public  S a fe ty  (a f r iend  o f  
Ginsburg 's)  was "on loan" from HUD where he was r e s p o n s ib le  fo r  publ ic  
s a f e ty  m a t te rs .  He had worked fo r  the  Treasury Department as an adv ise r  
on criminal i n v e s t ig a t i o n  a c t i v i t i e s  and personnel t r a i n i n g ,  had been 
Senior  Vice Pres ident  of  th e  In te rn a t io n a l  Police  O rgan iza t ion  ( I n t e r p o l ) ,  
and was a t  the  time o f  t h i s  assignment the United S t a t e s  r e p r e s e n ta t i v e  
to t h a t  o rg an iza t io n .  He had a l so  served on the s t a f f  o f  the  Crime 
Commission.®^ Sagalyn 's  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  were to coo rd ina te  the work 
r e l a t e d  to  the i n v e s t i g a t i o n  and re p o r t  on police-community r e l a t i o n s  and 
the  development of  new p o l ice  methods fo r  e f f e c t i v e l y  avo id ing  and con­
t r o l l i n g  fu tu re  c iv i l  d i s o r d e r s .
Richard P. Nathan, Assoc ia te  Direc tor  fo r  Program Research,  the
o the r  p ro fess iona l  soc ia l  s c i e n t i s t  on the s t a f f  (an economist ) ,  came
69from the Brookings I n s t i t u t e .  His p r in c ip le  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  were 
to coordina te  the  development o f  the  sho r t  and long-term recommendations 
fo r  which the mandate c a l l e d .  Like Kruzman, Nathan was an exper ienced 
sen io r  adv ise r  to key Republicans.  He had worked fo r  s eve ra l  Republican 
members of  the house of  r e p re se n ta t iv e s  and United S t a t e s  Senator 
Kenneth Keating (New York).  He had a lso  served the 1964 Nelson Rockefel ler
The experience t h a t  Shallow, Merle McCurdy, Milan Miskovsky and 
Sagalyn brought to  the s t a f f  and the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  given them are  strong 
in d ic a to r s  t h a t  the commissioners and the s en io r  s t a f f  wanted the  major 
t h r u s t  of t h e i r  work to be in the area  of cr iminal i n v e s t i g a t i o n .
69A p r iva te  Washington " think-tank"  devoted to re s ea rc h  and wri t ing  
on public  po licy  i s su e s .
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p r e s i d e n t i a l  campaign as i t s  d i r e c to r  o f  domestic re sea rch .
Charles E. Nelson, D irec to r  o f  Field  Operat ions and former super­
v i s o r  o f  f i e l d  opera t ions  f o r  the Agency f o r  I n t e r n a t io n a l  Development, 
was re spons ib le  f o r  d i r e c t in g  the work of the  f i e l d  teams; he assumed 
l a r g e r  d u t ie s  in t h i s  area when Kruzman took on the  t o t a l  adminis t ra t ive  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  the s t a f f ,
Melvin L. Bergheim, Direc to r  of  Research S e rv ic e s ,  was recommended 
fo r  his  p o s i t io n  by Richard Scammon, o f  the Bureau o f  the Census (an 
experienced a d v ise r  to  s en io r  Democrats and a c o n su l t a n t  to the commission) 
but was v igorously  opposed by Palmieri  who wanted a s t a t i s t i c i a n .  Scaimion, 
whose argument p r e v a i l e d ,  contended t h a t  s t a t i s t i c a l  s p e c i a l i s t s  could be 
obta ined  "on loan" from the Bureau of the Census and t h a t  Bergheim's value 
to the commission lay  in his g e n e r a l i s t ' s  a b i l i t i e s .
Merle McCurdy, General Counsel, was in charge o f  the hearings 
held by the  commission in Washington and " o n - s i t e "  in some of  the 
c i t i e s  v i s i t e d  during the f i e l d  t r i p s .  McCurdy won the  re spec t  of 
many f o r  h i s  o rg an iza t io n  and conduct o f  the  hear ings  as well as fo r  
his  sharp ,  p e n e t r a t i n g  questioning during them.^^ McCurdy a lso  clashed
Perhaps because of Nathan's experience with  Republican p o l i t i c a n s ,  
he was o f te n  in general  c o n f l i c t  with H. B. (Boots) T a l i a f e r r o ,  Director 
of Congressional R e la t io n s ,  who was a c lose  p o l i t i c a l  a l l y  of  H a r r i s .
^ V h e  White House was impressed enough with  the  q u a l i ty  o f  the 
witnesses  and t h e i r  test imony, arranged f o r  by McCurdy, to keep special 
f i l e s  on each. For an example of  McCurdy's a b i l i t y  to " trap"  witnesses 
before the commission in to  admissions o f  racism in the  organ iza t ions  they 
re p re sen ted .  See f i l e .  Testimony of  George Meany, NACCD, 10/14/67, 
Gaither 37,  LBJ Library ,
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with Palmieri  on a number o f  i s su e s ;  a former United S ta tes  Attorney in
Cleveland, McCurdy was not used to  having someone t e l l  him how to  conduct
in v e s t ig a t i o n s  o r  witness  in t e r r o g a t io n s .  He was the only black American
holding a s e n io r  p o s i t io n  on the s t a f f .
The p o s i t i o n  o f  D irec to r  o f  In v e s t ig a t io n s  was held by Milan C.
Miskovsky, who was on leave from the p o s i t i o n  o f  A ss i s tan t  General
72counsel o f  th e  Department o f  the Treasurer .  Miskovsky had served in  
the Central I n t e l l i g e n c e  Agency. His major r e s p o n s b i l i t y  for  the  
commission was to  i n v e s t i g a t e  the t ru th  of  the  genera l ly  held susp ic ion  
t h a t  a criminal  conspiracy lay a t  the root  o f  the  d i so rd e r s .
Henry B. ("Boots") T a l i a f e r r o ,  D i re c to r  o f  Congressional R e la t io n s ,  
was recommended to Ginsburg by H ar r i s .  He and the sena to r  had a long 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  and though he held the t i t l e  o f  the d i r e c t o r  o f  a s t a f f  
depar tment ,  T a l i a f e r r o  was regarded by a l l  as "H a r r i s '  man" on the 
s t a f f .  Between them, Harris and T a l i a f e r r o  kept close  tab on the 
e f f o r t s  o f  ongress to in v e s t ig a t e  and enac t  l e g i s l a t i o n  concerning the 
d i s o r d e r s ,  c i v i l  r i g h t s  in g enera l ,  urban problems, or any of  th e  a reas
7?An i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  the method of  assignment o f  persons "on loan" 
from a permanent Federal department/agency, is  contained in the memo from 
Joseph W. Barr ,  Undersecre tary o f  the Treasurery  to  Ginsburg, 10/9 /67:
"This l e t t e r  w i l l  confirm the d e ta i l  o f  Mr. Milan C. Miskovsky to  th e  
National Advisory Commission on Civil D isorders .  The d e ta i l  w i l l  begin 
immediately and,  as an i n i t i a l  m a t te r ,  run through the end o f  March, 1968. 
As a r ranged ,  Mr. Miskovsky's s a la ry  w i l l  not be reimburseable.  The 
Commission wi l l ,  o f  course ,  bear a l l  t r a v e l  and s im i l a r  expenses incu r red  
by Mr. Miskovsky while working f o r  the  Commission." In Ginsburg f i l e  
"Office of I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , "  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library .
73See memo Chambers to  Ginsburg, 9 /5 /68 ,  in Ginsfaurg's, "Commissioner 
Harr is"  f i l e ,  NACCD papers ,  LBJ L ibrary .
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mandated to the commission fo r  inves t iga t ion .  Upon Ginsburg 's  r e s ig n a ­
t ion  he became Acting Executive Direc tor on April 1, 1968.
Robert Conot c a r r i e d  the t i t l e  Special C onsu l tan t .  He was brought 
to the s t a f f  upon recommendation of  Palmieri.  He came f i r s t  in September 
as an educational c o n s u l t a n t  f o r  the  wri t ing o f  the  c i t y  p r o f i l e s  and 
jo ined the s t a f f  in a f u l l - t i m e  capacity  in October .  He c a r r ie d  general 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  fo r  su p e rv i s in g  the sty le  and tone o f  the  prose of  the 
Report . As noted above, Conot was the c loses t  the commission came to 
employing a black-American who had extensive exper ience  in urban Negro 
ghettos of  the type under in v e s t ig a t i o n .
Colonel Norman J .  McKenzie was chosen by Cal ifano to be the  Executive 
O ff ice r .  He, too ,  was an exper ienced advisory group s t a f f  member. His 
r e s p o n s b i l i t i e s  were e x c lu s iv e ly  adm in is t ra t ive  (budget c o n t r o l ,  a l l o c a t io n  
of space,  superv is ion  o f  the  general c le r ica l  he lp ,  e t c . ) .  There is  
no evidence t h a t  he involved h imse lf  in any way in the  s u b s ta n t iv e  work 
of the commission.
There remains to  mention b r i e f l y  something of  the background and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  those  o ther  persons who played impor tan t ,  i f  le ss  
v i s i b l e ,  ro les  in the  work of  the professional s t a f f .  Alvin Spivak, 
Director of In formation ,  was on leave from United Press I n t e r n a t i o n a l . ' ^  
David L. Chambers, Ginsburg 's  spec ia l  a s s i s t a n t ,  was " len t"  by his  
Washington law firm o f  Wilmer, C ut le r  and Dicker ing .  John Koskinen, a 
fellow Los Angeles a t t o r n e y ,  served as special a s s i s t a n t  to Palmieri  
and a lso  shared his  "heavy" repu ta t ion .
^^Later he became press  s e c re ta ry  for the  Democratic National 
Committee when Harris became i t s  chairman in  1969.
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Five men are  l i s t e d  in the Report under the  ru b r ic  Special
A s s i s t a n t  to the Commissioners—William L. Cowin, Kyran McGrath, Will iam 
A. Smith,  Donald W. Webb, Stephen D. W e i n e r . O f  th e se ,  two were 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  important in the l i f e  of  th e  s t a f f .  Kyran McGrath served 
Governer Kerner. His extensive  minutes o f  the  p r iv a te  meetings of th e  
commissioners a re  o f  g rea t  value to s ch o la r s  as they were to  the com­
missioners  and o th e r  members o f  the  s t a f f  with whom he shared them.
His primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  however, was to be the d a i ly  eyes and e a r s  
of  the  chairman. McGrath was "Kerner 's  man" and was c l e a r ly  commissioner- 
d i r e c t e d  in h is  work. He spoke f o r  Kerner a t  s t a f f  meetings and kept the 
chairman and the o the r  commissioners informed about the th ink ing ,  p lanning 
and th e  work schedule o f  the s t a f f . T h i s  unique ro le  o f  a specia l  
a s s i s t a n t  serv ing  as a watch dog fo r  the  chairman was undoubtedly th e  function 
of t h r e e  important f a c to r s :  1) Kerner could  not be in Washington very much 
and he did not t r u s t  Ginsburg to give him a l l  the information he wanted,
2) the  s ize  of the  s t a f f ,  and 3) the importance of the work o f  the commission.
Stephen Weiner,  served as R epresen ta t ive  German's a s s i s t a n t .  Gorman 
of ten  de lega ted  to Weiner the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  rep resen t  him a t  com­
missioner  m e e t i n g s . W e i n e r  was on th e  commission payroll but was t o  do
^^Repor t , p. VII I .
^^See McGrath to Kerner 11/15/67, McGrath to Thornton 11/22/67,
McGrath to  Senior S t a f f  10/31/67, in McGrath f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ 
L ib rary .
77
L e t t e r  German to Kerner 11/17/67 in Kerner f i l e ,  NACCD papers ,
LBJ L ibrary .
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78general  s t a f f  work only i f  his assignments from Corman so perm i t ted .
Weiner had been Congressman Gorman's a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a s s i s t a n t  and had 
been deeply involved in the  passage o f  the  1965 C iv i l  Rights Act and 
the  1966 Omnibus C iv i l  Rights Law. He served p r i n c i p a l l y  in  the  broad 
areas of c iv i l  r i g h t s  l e g i s l a t i o n  and eva lua t ions  of  congress ional a c t i o n s .
At the  time of h is  appointment to  the s t a f f  Weiner was employed by the Bay 
Area T r a n s i t  A u th o r i ty .
Three commissioner a ides  are not l i s t e d  in the  Repor t : V ic to r
French (H a r r i s ) ,  James H. Jones (Abel) and Jay Kriegel (L indsay).  French 
was a member o f  H a r r i s '  s ena te  s t a f f  who was given spec ia l  commission 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  He aided T a l i a f e r ro  in congress ional r e l a t i o n s  and was 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  usefu l in working with and around the  McClellan sub-committee.^^
Jones was very c o n t r o v e r s i a l .  He was not l ik e d  by the s e n io r  s t a f f .  He
80tended to overplay h i s  p o s i t io n  as Abel ' s  a id e .  There were t imes when 
the  sen io r  s t a f f  was convinced t h a t  Jones saw h im se l f  as the  tw e l f th  
commissioner. He came with a long record of l a b o r  movement c i v i l  r i g h t s  
a c t i v i t i e s .  His p r i n c i p l e  con t r ibu t ion  to the  commission was to  consume 
an in o rd ina te  amount of  the  time of the sen io r  s t a f f  and to  add to the
^^Memo, Ginsburg to  McKenzie, 8 /18/67 ,  Ginsburg 's  f i l e ,  NACCD 
papers ,  LBJ L ib rary .
^ \ i k e  Sp ivak ,  French followed Harris  to  th e  Democratic National 
Commi t t e e .
80
He f i r s t  in t roduced  himself  to  Ginsburg in  a memo by saying t h a t  
i t  was necessary f o r  him to  a t tend  a l l  s t a f f  meet ings ,  inc lud ing  executive  
s e s s io n s ;  f u r t h e r  he must have l i s t s  of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  of  a l l  s t a f f  
members and be p e r so n a l ly  n o t i f i e d  o f  a l l  (h is  emphasis) h ea r ings .  L e t t e r ,  
Jones to  Ginsburg,  10/12/67 ,  in Ginsburg f i l e ,  NACCD papers ,  LBJ Library .
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general  confus ion inheren t  in the  ope ra t ion  o f  such a large body o pe ra t ing  
on such a small r a t i o n  o f  time and money.
Jay Kriegel was considered to be one o f  the  b r ig h t e s t  o f  the  b r ig h t
young persons Lindsay had re c ru i t e d  to work f o r  him in New York. He
was a tw en ty - f ive  y e a r  old recen t  graduate o f  the  Harvard Law School,  a
veteran Democratic campaign worker and an exper ienced p rac t io n e r  o f  the
81a r t  o f  c i v i l  r i g h t s  l e g i s l a t i o n  d ra f t in g  and lobbying. Kriegel s a t  in 
fo r  Lindsay in  commission hear ings ,  did a g r e a t  deal o f  research and 
w r i t i n g  f o r  him and was a s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r  in Lindsay 's  eventual domina­
t io n  of  the  "Summary" to the  Repor t . F u r th e r ,  he was respected by mem­
bers o f  the  s t a f f  and of ten  r e f e r r e d  to  by them when they needed opinions  
from someone ou ts id e  t h e i r  day-to-day work.
In summary, the  p rofess ional  s t a f f  can be categorized as w hi te ,  
w e l l -educa ted  (u su a l ly  lawyers) ,  men who had had extens ive  and impressive  
exper ience in  a v a r i e t y  o f  c i v i l  r i g h t s  a r e a s .  C o l lec t iv e ly  they brought 
to the  commission ex tens ive  experience in a l l  l e v e l s  o f  government; they 
knew t h e i r  way around p o l i t i c s  in general  and Washington in p a r t i c u l a r ;  
t h e i r  p a r t i s a n  p o l i t i c a l  a f f i l i a t i o n s  were reasonably  well ba lanced,  d e s p i t e  
l i t t l e  o v e r t  a t t e n t i o n  being given to achieving  i t ;  they were, in s h o r t ,  
p o l i t i c a l  e s tab l i shm en t  types.  Having sa id  t h a t ,  d i s t i n c t i o n  must be made 
between the  execu t ive  s t a f f ,  the  p ro fess iona l  and j u n i o r  s t a f f  and the  
commissioner 's  a s s i s t a n t s .  A d i s t i n c t i v e  mark o f  the  executive s t a f f  mem­
bers was t h e i r  view o f  themselves as counsel to the commissioners. This 
became most marked a f t e r  Kurzman took on the adm in is t ra t ive  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s
81 He met Lindsay while both were working on the  c iv i l  r i g h t s  law 
of  1965. Hentoff ,  A P o l i t i c a l  L i f e , p. 156.
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o r i g i n a l l y  ass igned to  Pa lm ier i .  A la rge s t a f f ,  p o l i t i c a l l y  very  much more 
l ib e ra l  than the commissioners,  and increas ing  amounts o f  p ressu re  coming 
from the White House because o f  the r e c a l c i t r a n c e  o f  congress ,  created a 
s i t u a t i o n  ready made f o r  the t a l e n t s  of  lawyers l i k e  Ginsburg and Palmieri .  
Beginning in October the  two executives  spent most o f  t h e i r  t ime engaged in 
b r id g e -b u i ld in g ,  n e g o t i a t i o n ,  compromise and f a c i l i t a t i o n ;  they spent ever 
increas ing  amounts o f  time working to  avoid a s e r 'o u s  ru p tu re  between the 
s t a f f  and the commissioners.  As the " p re s id e n t ' s  man" Ginsburg had, of 
course,  understood t h i s  as one of  h is  major r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  Palmieri 
saw himself  somewhat d i f f e r e n t l y  and s t rove  to  be the  advocate of s t a f f  
points  o f  view when his and t h e i r  values co incided .  He saw himself  and 
the p rofess ional s t a f f  as the  l i b e r a l  conscience of  the  commission and 
he had no in te n t io n  of  having th a t  voice muted. There can be no question 
th a t  most o f  the  j u n i o r  members of the p ro fes s iona l  s t a f f  saw them­
selves  as the loyal l i b e r a l  opposit ion in a co n se rva t ive  adm in is t ra t ion .
They saw themselves in an adversary r e l a t i o n s h ip  with  the  commissioners.
This c o n f l i c t  broke in to  the open in December a f t e r  informat ion was leaked 
to  the press about the  reduct ion  of the s i z e  o f  the  s t a f f  and the  content
op 23
of the "Harvest o f  Racism" document. As noted in the  P re face ,  these  
c o n f l i c t s  have been h e re to fo re  in te rp re ted  e x c lu s iv e ly  in terms of s t rugg les  
between t ru th  and e r r o r ,  l i b e r a l  j u s t i c e  and conserva t ive  repress ion when 
they were in f a c t  c o n f l i c t s  between fac t ions  o f  th e  r u l in g  national  e l i t e —
^^See pp. 455-459,  below.
po
See pp. 16-17,  above.
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between those who were e s tab l i sh ed  and those on the r i s e .  There was how­
eve r ,  no c o n f l i c t  on a very fundamental premise— they a l l  in tended to  keep 
in t h e i r  own hands the f a te  o f  the  c i t i z e n s  fo r  whom the d i so rde rs  were 
pe rsona l ly  r e a l .  The e f f o r t s  to employ Negroes with  experience in  urban 
ghetto  l i v i n g  died aborning. Black American ghe t to  r e s id e n t s ,  the  p o l i t i c a l  
"outs" ,  had no voice on and th e re  was but one e f f e c t i v e  access po in t  f o r  
them ^  the  commission and th a t  was through a group who had, a t  b e s t ,  a 




The legal  a u t h o r i t y  fo r  the Kerner Commission to  e x i s t  and a c t  
was grounded on the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  a u th o r i t y  to appo in t  i t ;
by v i r t u e  o f  the  a u t h o r i t y  vested  in me as  P r e s id e n t  of 
the  United S t a t e s ,  i t  i s  ordered as f o l l o w s . . .
For i t s  p o l i t i c a l  a u t h o r i t y  i t  was dependent upon p r e s id e n t i a l  favor 
and the  w i l l in g n e s s  o f  th e  execu t ive  depar tments  and agencies to
2
coopera te  by p rov id ing  i t  with  in fo rm at ion ,  personnel and money.
An e lab o r a t io n  o f  the  ways in which i t s  p o l i t i c a l  a u t h o r i t y  was used 
i s  the su b jec t  o f  the  fo llowing c h ap te r s .  I t  is  well known t h a t  
Johnson did not c o n s i s t e n t l y  support  the  commission. Some of the  r e a ­
sons f o r  the suppor t  can be explained by examining the  h i s to ry  o f
3
Johnson 's  e f f o r t s  to secure  funds fo r  i t s  work.
^Executive Order 11365, Repor t , p .  295.
^See Huntington, " S t r a t e g i c  P lann ing ,"  p. 29 f o r  a s im i la r
d iscuss ion  of  the  sources  of p o l i t i c a l  a u t h o r i t y  o f  
na t iona l  defense  groups.
3
The funds provided to the commission f o r  execu t ing  i t s  respon­
s i b i l i t i e s  were garnered  from th ree  sources :  the  Executive Fund of the
Pres id en t ,  t r a n s f e r  o f  funds ,  personnel a n d /o r  in -k ind  serv ices  from 





The Johnson ad m in is t ra t ion  was in se r ious  p o l i t i c a l  t roub le  in 
the summer o f  1967 because of the c o u n t r y ' s  economic problems. The 
$8.1 b i l l i o n  d e f i c i t  in the federal  budget p red ic ted  in January had 
swollen to a p ro jec ted  $23.6 b i l l i o n  by the summer;^ f u r t h e r ,  Johnson had 
been fo rced  to in c rease  his  proposed 6 percent t a x  surcharge to 10 per-
5
cen t .  George Mahon and Wilbur M i l l s ,  chairmen, r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  o f  the 
House A ppropr ia t ions  and Ways and Means Committees, were united in an 
a t tempt  to fo rce  the  White House to  make s i g n i f i c a n t  cu ts  in the 
proposed budget f o r  f i s c a l  1968 and 1969, p a r t i c u l a r l y  in the domestic 
program a r e a . ^  The s t rugg le  was no t  resolved u n t i l  June of  the next 
year when Johnson signed into  law a 10 percent t a x  surcharge; the  c o s t  
fo r  passage was h i s  pledge to congress to make $6 b i l l i o n  in expenditure  
c u t s ,  most o f  which were to come from h is  domestic programs.
At t h e  time the  commission was appoin ted ,  the  commissioners and 
Ginsburg understood t h a t  the money needed to c a r r y  out the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  
mandate would be provided from the Executive Fund of the P res iden t .  
F u r the r ,  th e y  understood th a t  congress iona l approval fo r  a supplemental
^ U .S . ,  P r e s id e n t ,  Public Papers , Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, p. 8. 
^ I b i d . ,  pp. 733-740.
®See pp. 481-483 fo r  a d i scuss ion  of R epresen ta t ive  Mahon's a t t i t u d e s  
toward the  Great Socie ty  programs a t  th e  time o f  the pub l ica t ion  of  
the Reoort .
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a p p ro p r ia t io n  to  cover any add i t iona l  cos ts  would be sought i f  
needed.^ The commission's  leaders  thought a White House a ttempt in 
August to ge t  congress ional approval o f  a supplement to the  Executive 
Fund o f  the P res iden t  would have been success fu l .  However, Johnson's  
r e c o l l e c t i o n  of  the s i t u a t i o n  was t h a t  congress would not have approved
g
such a reques t .  By the end of  August, a l l  agree ,  the  only means open 
to  the White House to  o b ta in  the necessary  public funds fo r  the 
commission's  opera t ion  was by means of  department/agency c o n t r ib u t io n s .  
The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  fo r  n e g o t ia t in g  those c on t r ibu t ions  was assigned 
to Cal ifano ,  Ginsburg and Charles L. Schul tz ,  D irec tor  o f  the Bureau 
o f  the  Budget.
I t  took the commissioners and the  execut ive  s t a f f  a month to put 
t o g e th e r  a d e ta i l e d  budget fo r  the White House. Their  proposed budget 
was in keeping with t h e i r  unders tanding th a t  the p re s id en t  would meet 
whatever money needs they developed in  f u l f i l l i n g  the ta sks  he had la id
See "Funding and Admin is t ra t ive  Arrangements f o r  the Special 
Advisory Commission of C iv i l  Disorders (July  29)" and the  Ju ly  31 Bohn 
to  Califano memo covering the  document e n t i t l e d  "Special Advisory 
Commission on Civil  D isorders ,  Minutes of Meeting Saturday Ju ly  29,
The White House," both o f  which a re  in Commission on C iv i l  Disorders (2),  
Cal ifano  (3 ) ,  LBJ Library .  I t  is  c l e a r  t h a t  Johnson p re f e r r e d ,  
as a matte r  of standing p r i n c i p l e ,  to r e tu rn  to congress each year 
as much of the Executive Fund of the  Pres iden t  as poss ib le  and to 
fund commissions through agency c o n t r ib u t io n s  (based on the a u th o r i ty  
g ranted  in 31 USC 691) o r  by s t a t u t o r y  ap p rop r ia t ion .  As wil l  be seen, 
e f f o r t s  were made to  p re s e n t  the case fo r  the supplemental appropr ia ­
t io n  to  the Executive Fund of the Pres iden t  but Johnson re j e c te d  a l l  
o f  them.
8 See Johnson,  The Vantage P o i n t , pp. 449-461
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g
for  them. The f i r s t  recorded h i n t  o f  t ro u b le  came from Palmieri
who in l a t e  August reported hear ing concerned bureaucra t ic  r eac t ions  
to  Johnson’ s spec ia l  budget message to  c o n g r e s s . H e  suggested to 
Ginsburg t h a t  they delay in moving on securing personnel from govern­
ment agencies  u n t i l  what he descr ibed  as a "murky" f in an c ia l  s i t u a t i o n  
c l e a r e d . G i n s b u r g  a lso  received word t h a t  the Bureau of the Budget 
was gear ing  i t s e l f  to implement the p r e s i d e n t ' s  commitment to f i s c a l  
a u s t e r i t y .  By e a r ly  September the Bureau of the  Budget c l e a r ly  under­
stood t h a t  no supplemental a p p ro p r ia t io n  was forthcoming and Schultz
began the process  o f  pruning the  commission's  budget to a level w i th in
12which the  involved executive depar tment /agencies  could l i v e .
Throughout September and October, however, members of the commission
I t  i s  very d i f f i c u l t  to a f f i x  an exac t  sum to the commission's 
t o t a l  budget.  A v a r i e ty  of v a r i a b le s  a f f e c t  the t o t a l .  For example, 
what i s  the  value o f  in-kind s e rv ice s?  Whose budget should be charged 
fo r  various  "loaned" personnel? (The accounting sheets  of the com­
mission a r e  a v a i l a b l e .  They were not consulted  fo r  t h i s  s tudy. )  What 
can be sa id  f o r  general  re fe rence  i s  t h a t  the f i r s t  budget proposed 
f o r  the  commission exceeded $7 m i l l i o n .  By the  end of September the  
Bureau of  the  Budget was es timating  the  t o t a l  budget to be $5,748,000 
which was c u t  a week l a t e r  by Schultz  to  S4 m i l l i o n .  The f ina l  budget 
appears to  have f a l l e n  between $2 and S4 m i l l i o n .  The $2 m i l l ion  f ig u r e  
was used by the BOB in  accounting f o r  fede ra l  funds and the l a t t e r  
f i g u r e ,  which inc ludes  outs ide  funding, was used by the White House 
when r e p o r t i n g  on the commission's budget .  The d e ta i l  of  these 
changes i s  d iscussed  in the t e x t  below.
^^U.S. P res iden t ,  Public Papers,  Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, pp. 733-
740.
^^Memo, Palmieri  to Ginsburg, 3 /31 /57 ,  Review of S t a f f  Work 8/1-9 /1  
and Object ives  9 /4-14 ,  in Palmieri  f i l e s ,  NACCD papers,  LBJ L ibrary .
^^See l e t t e r  Charles Schultz  (BOB) to LBJ, 8 /7 /67 ,  Commission on 
Civi l  Disorders (1 ) ,  Califano (3 ) ,  LBJ Library .
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s t a f f  s t i l l  were opera t ing  on the assumption th a t  the  funds f o r  the
13orig ina l  budget would be forthcoming. By mid-November, however, 
the f a c t  t h a t  no supplemental appropr ia t ion  request  was going to 
congress became c l e a r  to a l l .  The Bureau of the Budget leaked to 
commission s t a f f  members the  informat ion t h a t  the f i n a l  1967 supple ­
mentary appropr ia t ions  package had been prepared by the a d m in is t r a t io n  
and i t  did not include mention of the commission.
Schultz and Califano secured near ly  $2 mil l ion  fo r  the commission 
from various  depar tments /agencies ,  but did so with ser ious  r e s e r v a t io n s .  
They were not in  to t a l  agreement with the p re s id e n t ' s  dec is ion  to  
exclude the commission from the year-end group of supplemental 
appropr ia t ion  b i l l s .  Both saw something to be gained from sending the 
request  fo r  the supplemental a pp rop r ia t ion  to congress.  Schul tz  i n ­
formed the p res iden t  of th e  d i f f i c u l t y  they were having in ob ta in ing  
money from the depar tment /agenc ies .  The Department of  Defense fo r  
ins tance ,  was forced to g e t  congress ional approval before i t  could 
con tr ibu te  to the  commission's budget;  Representat ive  Mahon had made 
i t  c l e a r  to Defense " . . .  t h a t  he does not want them to reprogram t h e i r  
funds to a s s i s t  the commission. Without reprogramming (and the  conse- 
sequent necess i ty  fo r  congress ional approval)  Defense's  hands a r e  t i e d " ,^ ^
1 3Ginsburg in h is  e f f o r t s  t o  secure pr iva te  funding mentions the 
congressional ap p ro p r ia t io n  as one of the  o ther sources o f  commission 
income in a l e t t e r  to McGeorge Bundy of the Ford Foundation as l a t e  as 
10/29/67. Ginsburg to Bundy, 10/29/67, Ginsburg budget f i l e s ,  NACCD 
Papers, LBJ Library.
^Semo Chambers to  William Carey (BOB), 11/28/57, Ex FI4/FG690, 
WHCF, LBJ Library.
^^Memo Schultz to LBJ covered by memo Califano to LBJ, 10/19/57, 
10/19/67, Ex FI4/FG690, WHCF, LBJ Library.
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F u r th e r ,  the o th e r  a f f e c t e d  depar tment/agencies  would, in  S c h u l tz ' s  
op in ion ,  be in s e r io u s  t ro u b le  i f  and when t h e i r  r e sp e c t iv e  congres­
s ional  o v e rs ig h t  committees r e a l i z e d  th a t  l a rg e  sums of money a p p rop r i ­
a ted  f o r  another purpose were being d ive r ted  to the  commission. Several 
o f  the  depar tments /agencies  t o ld  Schultz t h a t  they f e l t  ob l ig a ted  to 
inform t h e i r  congress iona l  o v e r s ig h t  committees o f  the channeling o f  
any appropr ia ted  funds to the commission. Schultz  feared congress ional  
r e t a l i a t i o n  a g a i n s t  the  ad m in is t r a t io n  fo r  t h i s  budget tampering,  
c r e a t in g  a t h r e a t  to  t h i s  t r a d i t i o n a l  means o f  funding the  ad m in is t r a ­
t i o n ' s  ta sk  fo rces  and commissions. He thought i t  b e t t e r  to submit 
the  ap p ro p r ia t io n  and th e  commission, to congress fo r  review and have 
i t  take the blame f o r  what he saw as the i n e v i t a b l e  te rmina t ion  of  the 
commission's work.^^ Johnson disagreed and chose to provide funding 
through depar tment/agency c o n t r ib u t io n s  and g ran ts  from p r iv a t e  sources .  
Why did  Johnson ignore the  advice  o f  h is  a ides?  The most reasonable  ex­
p lana t ion  i s  t h a t  he saw in the s i t u a t i o n  a no-win outcome fo r  h imse lf ;  
t h e  b e s t  he could do was to minimize the damage. He knew th a t  
congress would not al low him to achieve  the "v ic to ry"  Schultz  and
Ibid .  Despite  the  f a c t  t h a t  th i s  memo contains  no ind ica t io n  
t h a t  Johnson approved the  plan.  White House a ides  and s e n io r  commission 
s t a f f  members f e l t  he had no in t e n t io n  of fo llowing through on i t .
See a l so  Cal ifano to  LBJ 12/4 /67, EXFI4/FG690, WHCF, LBJ Library ,  in  which 
Cal ifano d iscusses  fo r  the  p re s id en t  pa r t s  of  the  f ina l  supplemental 
app rop r ia t ion  b i l l  which could be delayed in being sent to  congress 
u n t i l  January.  He a l so  wanted to avoid having the p re s id en t  blamed 
f o r  te rminating  the  commission. I f  the supplemental app ro p r ia t io n  
were sent  to  congress i t  would be sub jec t  to a poin t  of o rde r  in the  
House (the  commission was not a c re a t io n  of congress) and thus be 
k i l l e d  and congress would get  the  blame, or  so C a l i f a n o 's  reasoning went.
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Cal ifano  p re d ic ted .  A hear ing on a supplemental app rop r ia t ion  re q u e s t  
could be turned in to  a t r i a l  of  the Great Soc ie ty .  Johnson p re fe r r e d  to  
have the  commission f ree  to provide  him with some s e r v i c e .  At the 
very l e a s t ,  the  commission might be a f a c t o r  in reducing the l ik e l ih o o d  
o f  d i s o r d e r s  the  following summer. Fu r the r ,  i f  congress launched an 
a t t a c k  based on the  Independent Off ices  Appropria tion Act of 1946 he 
could charge  i t  with pe t ty  p o l i t i c s  r a th e r  than having to carry the  
label  h im se l f .^ ^  Johnson a l s o  knew t h a t  most congress ional leade rs  
were s a t i s f i e d  with the e x i s t e n c e  o f  the  Kerner Commission; i t  took 
the p u b l i c ' s  a t t e n t i o n  o f f  the  q u a l i t y  o f  t h e i r  responses  to the d i s ­
o rd e rs .  There fore ,  he followed his e s tab l i sh ed  procedure for  funding 
commissions.  I t  allowed him to get  the most s e r v ic e  possib le  from the 
commission d e sp i t e  the f a c t  t h a t  i t  was now doomed to an ear ly  demise.  
F u r the r ,  the  e s tab l i sh ed  procedure  allowed him to f i x  the a t t e n t i o n  of  the 
execu t ive  depar tments /agencies  on h is  mandate to the  commission. They 
might be r e l u c t a n t  to give the  money and personnel ,  but once they saw the 
degree o f  the  p r e s id e n t ' s  de te rm ina t ion  to ob ta in  the  information o u t l in e d  
in h is  mandate to the commission, he knew they would s e t  themselves to 
the t a sk  o f  carving out as much of the  policy  t e r r i t o r y  for themselves 
as p o s s ib l e .  The annexed t e r r i t o r y  would, of course ,  come from the 
congress .  In sum, Johnson was not w i l l in g  to completely s a c r i f i c e  a 
p r e s i d e n t i a l  advisory  body or  con t ro l  over t h i s  p a r t  o f  domestic 
policy-making. Nor was he w i l l i n g  to give congress opportuni ty  to r e -
^^See Chapter I I ,  pp. 70-71, fo r  a d i scuss ion  o f  the Independent 
Offices  Appropria tion Act.
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view his  advisory  system f o r  the sake o f  what i n e v i t a b ly  would be,
i f  ga ined, a minor v ic to ry .
When the  Bureau of th e  Budget c losed i t s  books on the  Kerner
Commission's opera t ions  i t  found the government 's  share  o f  the S4
18m il l io n  budget to  have been obta ined from the following sources:
Executive Fund o f  the  P res iden t  $ 47,00olg
Department of  J u s t i c e  75,0002q
Department of Commerce 150,000pg
Department of  Labor 312,500
Department of Heal th ,  Education ng
and Welfare 312,500
Department of Housing and Urban 
Development 150,000pg
Off ice  of  Economic Opportunity OBB.OOOgn
Department of  Defense 450,0002-1
Department of J u s t i c e  50,000
$1,935,000
With t h i s  budget Johnson kept th e  commission on a s h o r t  leash  
and expected i t  to follow h i s  lead in policy  making and endorse h is  
programs. Reducing the  commission's budget reduced i t s  capac i ty  to  do
1 A
"BOB Fact Sheet on the National Advisory Commission on Civil  
D isorders ,  1968." Obtained from the BOB. A copy i s  in possession of the 
au thor .
^^The commission re tu rned  $53,000 to t h i s  fund. That ac t ion  
allowed Johnson to maintain his record of always re tu rn in g  to congress 
some of  the  money appropr ia ted  for  t h i s  fund.
on
These funds were c o l l e c te d  and d ispersed  by the Interagency 
Committee on Civil  Disorders  which was crea ted  to meet the  requirements 
o f  the Independent Off ices  Appropr ia tions  Act of 1946. Ernest  C.
F r ie sen ,  J r .  was the chairman and Palmieri  was named the  executive  
d i r e c t o r .
21" F o r  con trac tua l  s tu d ie s  undertaken fo r  the commission pursuant 
to the Executive Order," BOB Fact Sheet.
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the  job  the  p re s id e n t  needed. But keeping i t  a l i v e ,  and on a sh o r t  
l e a s h ,  f u l f i l l e d  most o f  the i tems on the p r e s i d e n t ' s  i m p l i c i t  
mandate and kept a c t i v e  the hope t h a t  i t  might a l so  produce a rep o r t  
t h a t  he could use.  Further, having con t ro l  over a l a r g e  budget is  
a means to  p o l i t i c a l  power and Johnson was determined to  con t ro l  the 
commission 's  access  to t h a t  power. By c o n t r o l l i n g  i t s  budget,  Johnson 
more c l o s e l y  t i e d  t h e  commission's a u t h o r i t y  and l e g i t im acy  to his  
own.
~^See Shallow, "Social S c i e n t i s t s  and Social A c t io n ,"  p. 212 fo r  
a complementary explanation o f  the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  a c t i o n s .
CHAPTER X 
STRUCTURING THE COMMISSION'S WORK
a .  In troduction
The commission's s t a f f  was c a r e f u l l y  organized by Ginsburg,  in
c lo se  c o n su l t a t io n  with Cal ifano, to  f u l f i l l  the  demands fo r  service
contained in the p r e s id e n t ' s  e x p l i c i t  and i m p l i c i t  mandates. However,
the reorgan iza t ion  forced by the budget c r i s i s  in December only reduced
the  number of s t a f f  persons av a i l ab le  to  the commission, i t  did not a l t e r
i t s  in te rn a l  o rgan iza t ion .  Only a f t e r  the  f in a l  rep o r t  was published
and the p r e s i d e n t ' s  public  in d i f fe r en ce  to  i t  became obvious did
any member of the  commission express a d e s i r e  to organize commission
]
a c t i v i t i e s  independent of the  p re s id en t .
Ginsburg was determined to organize  the work of the  commission 
in a manner t h a t  would maintain the  confidence of the White House, 
o th e r  p a r t s  of the  ad m in is t ra t ion ,  and the  congress.  As the "complete 
lawyer" Ginsburg t r e a t e d  the  commission s t a f f  as i f  they were members 
o f  his f irm;  they were re ta ined  to bu i ld  a case  fo r  t h e i r  primary c l i e n t ,  
the  p res iden t  of  the United S ta t e s ;  in the  process they a lso  had to make 
a case fo r  a secondary c l i e n t ,  the commissioners. He ch ided ,  encouraged.
‘The Harris -Lindsay attempt to have the commission r e c a l l e d .  See 
pp. 494-497, below.
^Lipsky and Olson, MSS, VI, p. 32.
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pushed and persuaded h is  s t a f f  to  ge t  the  evidence,  do t h e i r  homework, 
s tay  w i th in  the  boundaries  s e t  by the  p r e s id e n t ,  not to take any 
p o s i t ions  they cou ld  not defend and win in  the  cour t  of p o l i t i c a l  
and pub l ic  opin ion . To accomplish t h i s ,  Ginsburg s e t  fo r  h imself  
and h is  s t a f f  four  goa ls :  F i r s t ,  answer the key ques t ions  put by
the  p re s id e n t  and re f in e d  by the commissioners; Ginsburg reduced 
them to  two s e t s  o f  key q u e s t io n s .  The f i r s t  had to do with  law 
and o rde r  i s su es ;  the  question  of  a cr iminal consp i racy ,  the " r i f f ­
r a f f "  theory  of t h e  r i o t e r s ,  and the  problem of  the e f f e c t iv e n e s s  of 
the  p o l ice  and the  na t iona l  guard. The second s e t  o f  key ques t ions  
concerned ex p la in ing  the  "cha rac te r "  o f  the c i t i e s  which exper ienced 
d i so rde rs  as compared with those which did no t .  The f i e l d  t r i p s  and the 
cons t ru c t io n  of  th e  c i t y  p r o f i l e s  were means used to deal with t h i s  s e t  
o f  ques t ions .  Ginburg 's  o r ig in a l  plan was to occupy the commissioners 
and the  s t a f f  with  these key quest ions  during the  f i r s t  h a l f  o f  the  com­
m is s io n 's  l i f e  w i th  the  in te r im  rep o r t  being the  product.  Long range r e ­
commendations f o r  c o r r e c t io n  and a l l e v i a t i o n  o f  the cond i t ions  producing 
the d i s o rd e r s  would be given a t t e n t i o n  in the w in ter  and spr ing  months 
and be the  s u b je c t  matter of  the  f ina l  r e p o r t . ^  Ginsburg to ld  the  s t a f f  
t h a t  in p u r s u i t  o f  the  answers to these  key ques t ions  they must not 
d ev ia te  from the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  concerns;  in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  they must no t  al low 
themselves to  become caught up in support ing and/or opposing pending
3
Harr is  in h is  book Potomac Fever, pp. 112-113, gives an ex post  
f ac to  view o f  the  p r in c ip le s  underlying the o rgan iza t ion  of  the  commis­
s i o n ' s  work. He says the  commission was p r im ar i ly  concerned with  long 
range recommendations from the onset.  This does not conform to  the 
evidence,  developed fo r  t h i s  study.
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l e g i s l a t i o n . ^
Ginsburg ' s  second organiz ing p r i n c i p l e  f o r  the work, of  the com­
mission was h i s  in s i s t e n c e  t h a t  members of the s t a f f  and commissioners 
go to the  source  o f  t h e i r  primary d a t a ,  the  c i t i e s  a f fe c t ed  by the  
d i so rde rs  of 1967. The commission's Washington hearings  were important 
to  Ginsburg,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  for  r e so lv ing  the questions  surrounding the  
conspiracy  i s s u e ,  bu t  the f i e l d  t r i p s  to  the c i t i e s  which experienced 
d i so rde rs  were indispensable  i f  the  case  the  commissioners was to  
make to  the p r e s id e n t  and the na t ion  was to have any c r e d i b i l i t y .  
Ginsburg was a f i rm be l ieve r  in and p ra c t io n e r  o f  f i e l d  research in his 
law p r a c t i c e .  He i n s i s t e d  t h a t  his  people do t h e i r  own f i e l d  r e s e a rc h ,  
experience the physical  environment in which the  f a c t s  of p a r t i c u l a r  
cases  a ro se .  There fore ,  Ginsburg planned and organized the commission's 
f i e l d  t r i p s  and i n s i s t e d  th a t  a l l  major p a r t i c ip a n t s  in the l i f e  of 
the  commission share  in them.
Third ,  Ginsburg in s i s t e d  t h a t  the  work of  the  commission be 
c oopera t ive ,  no t  compet it ive  with  s i m i l a r  l ab o rs  of  the various execu­
t i v e  depar tments /agencies  and o th e r  commissions and task  fo rces .  A 
secondary,  but important,  i n g re d ie n t  of t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  was Ginsburg's 
de termina t ion  to  keep l ines  o f  communication open and a p o s i t ive  r e ­
l a t i o n s h i p  with the leaders  o f  the major academic communities of  the
See memo, Sarah Carey to  Miskovsky, 11/7/67 re :  Pending L eg is la ­
t ion  on the  Control o f  Riots and Sale o f  Firearms,  Office of In v e s t ig a ­
t ion  F i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library .
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n a t io n  and o the r  groups i n t e r e s t e d  in  urban p o l i c y .  This part of  his 
plan was the product o f  a seasoned Washington p o l i t i c a l  opera tor,  
exper ienced in the ways o f  Lyndon Johnson 's  adv iso ry  system; c o n s u l t a t i o n  
with  the  l eade rs  o f  e s t a b l i s h e d  groups concerned with p a r t i c u l a r  po l icy  
i s su e s  and c lo se  i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  a l l  the  c o n s t i t u t e n t  elements o f  the 
a d v iso ry  system were ha llmarks  of  the  Johnson ad m in is t ra t io n .^  Each 
e x ec u t iv e  department was d i r e c t e d  by the p r e s id e n t  to appoint a l i a i s o n  
o f f i c e r  with  the commission. This e f f o r t  was c o -o rd in a te d  by the 
White House in C a l i f a n o ' s  o f f i c e .  Ginsburg e s t a b l i s h e d  h is  cwn po in ts  
o f  c o n ta c t  within  the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  He ac ted  under the e x p l i c i t  
a u t h o r i t y  of  Executive Order 11355 to  seek immediate help from a l l  
depar tm ents /agencies  which might have useful informat ion  for the  
commission.
Fourth,  Ginsburg proposed t h a t  the  commissioners take  no ac t ion  
r eg a rd in g  recommendations u n t i l  each was thoroughly  informed o f  the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s ,  o t h e r  commiss ioner ' s ,  and the s t a f f ' s  thinking in  the
7
p a r t i c u l a r  a rea .  Ginsburg was determined not to have any major s u r ­
p r i s e s  in the work o f  the  commission. He kept a s teady stream of
Lipsky and Olson, HSS, V, pQ. 3-11, d i scu ss  a.meeting c a l l e d  by 
Ginsburg a t  h is  home on August 5, 1967, to which he in v i te d  a number of 
prominent p r iv a t e  and pub l ic  so c ia l  s c i e n t i s t s  to review his 
proposed o u t l i n e  o f  t h e  work o f  the  commission. Throughout h is  t e n u r e ,  
Ginsburg held such a d v iso ry  meetings in Washington and in the academic 
c e n te r s  of Cambridge and ilew York. In a d d i t i o n ,  the  commission f i l e s  
con ta in  a c o n s id e ra b le  volume o f  correspondence between Ginsburg and a 
v a r i e t y  of academic and government exper ts  on c i v i l  d isorders ,
"See pp. 142-153, above.
'T h i s  scheme was r e l a t e d  to the  commission r u l e  t h a t  all recommenda­
t io n s  would c a r ry  the  unanimous endorsement of the  commission. See pp. 212-21
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m a te r i a l s  f lowing to  the commissioners: p r e s i d e n t i a l  speeches,  d e p a r t ­
ment/agency r e p o r t s ,  commission and ta sk  fo rce  r e p o r t s ,  p re s id en t i a l
g
spec ia l  messages to congress ,  books, newspaper c l ip p in g s .  This 
procedure condit ioned the commission's work in t h r e e  major ways. F i r s t ,  
i t  made each commissioner responsib le  f o r  the  s u b s tan t iv e  product of 
the  commission. Second, no one was l e f t  behind; every commissioner 
knew each o f  h i s / h e r  colleagues  had been exposed to every document
Q
whether or  not he /she  was present  a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  meeting. Thi rd,  the 
commissioners were educated about the range o f  options  av a i l ab le  to them 
from the b e s t  th inking of o the rs  working in the f i e l d .  Ginsburg and 
Cal ifano wanted to expand the boundaries o f  p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y  of the 
commissioners by exposing them to the work of  those  whom they regarded 
as the b e s t  th inke rs  in the p o l i t i c a l  and i n t e l l e c t u a l  community.
O
Important examples of m ate r ia ls  found a re  Robert Conot's book 
Rivers o f  Blood, Years of Darkness, the  r e p o r t  o f  the  crime commission, 
"The Quiet  Revolution" by the  Off ice  of  Economic Opportunity,  
a r e p o r t  on the 1943 D e t ro i t  Rio t,  a b ib l iog raphy  on the Negro in 
American c i t i e s  (prepared under c o n t ra c t  with  the commission by Dorothy 
Po r te r  of  Howard U n iv e rs i ty ) ,  the  r e p o r t  o f  the  Advisory Commission on 
Rural Poverty ,  The People Left  Behind, a l l  s t a f f  and consu l tan t  papers 
produced during the l i f e  of the Kerner Commission, i n t r a - s t a f f  memos which 
Ginsburg thought  important enough to share  with a l l  the commissioners, 
and the d r a f t  vers ions  of the  various ch ap te rs  o f  the f ina l  repo r t .
q
See p. 214, above.
^^An important,  but d i f f i c u l t  to c l a s s i f y ,  problem Ginsburg faced 
in  organiz ing  the  commission's work was how and where to phys ica l ly  house 
the s t a f f .  I n t r a - s t a f f  communication, and t h e r e f o r e  o rgan iza t ion  and 
c o n t r o l ,  could have been g re a t ly  f a c i l i t a t e d  i f  th e  s t a f f  had been housed 
in  one b u i ld ing .  Because of  the  extremely l a r g e  number of  s t a f f  persons 
o r i g i n a l l y  employed, Ginsburg was unable to secure  such ideal o f f i c e  ac­
commodations. Some o f  the  i n t r a - s t a f f  problems experienced in the  l a t e  
f a l l  o f  1967 can be p a r t i a l l y  blamed on the s ep a ra t io n  of  members of  the 
s t a f f  in to  two s epa ra te  bu i ld ings .  Ginsburg was never able to ge t  the 
necessary  space in the  e a r ly  f a l l ,  and the  budget c r i s i s  of November and 
December s e t t l e d  the  is sue  fo r  him.
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b. Rules
The s t r u c t u r e  of the  commission's work m s  formalized by the
adoption of  a s e t  o f  ru le s  and t h e i r  p u b l i c a t io n  in the Federal Regis te r
on September 12, 1967.^^ The ru le s  provided fo r  hear ings ,  depos i t ions
and a f f i d a v i t s  under oa th ,  provis ions  f o r  the  t r a n s c r i p t s  o f  the  formal
hea r in g ,  use and d i s p o s i t io n  o f  evidence and o th e r  f o r m a l i t i e s  necessary
fo r  f u l f i l l m e n t  of the  provis ions  o f  the  execu t ive  o rd e r .  The
r u l e s ,  as publi shed , were not e n t i r e l y  s a t i s f a c t o r y  to the commission's
General Counsel, Merle McCurdy. His o b je c t io n s  grew from commission
p r a c t i c e  and poin t  up a flaw in Ginsburg’s plan to  guarantee  no
s u rp r i s e s  in the commission's work. McCurdy noted t h a t  th e re  was no
prov is ion  in the  o f f i c i a l  ru les  f o r  a commission quorum a t  the  
12formal hear ings .  He wanted to e s t a b l i s h  a c r e d ib l e  bas is  f o r
a v a r i e ty  of  commission a c t io n s .  I t  was necessa ry ,  he s a id ,
to ag ree ,  before -hand, about the number o f  votes needed to open hearings
Vol. 32, #175, p. 12969. The ru l e s  took t h e i r  a u th o r i t y  from 
Executive Order 11365 and PL 90-61, 81 S t a t .  164, the  l a t t e r  being the 
s t a t u t o r y  a u th o r iz a t io n  fo r  the  commission " . . .  to i s sue  subpoenas 
r e q u i r in g  the  a ttendance  and test imony o f  witnesses  and the production 
o f  any evidence t h a t  r e l a t e d  to any m at te rs  under i n v e s t ig a t i o n  by the 
commission." (.81 S t a t .  164).
^^Memo McCurdy to Ginsburg and P a l im e r i ,  9 /11/67 ,  (Sub: Proposal
Guidelines fo r  the  Commission's Use in Implementary I t s  Rules and 
Procedures) and 10/31/67 (Sub: Proposed Quorum Rule) in General
Counsel F i l e ,  NACCD Papers, LBJ Library .
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to  the  press and/or  the pub l ic ,  to re lease  testimony to the p u b l ic ,  to 
approve and rece ive  depos i t ions  and a f f i d a v i t s  taken by the  s t a f f ,  to 
approve recommendations to be made by the commission and to approve the 
in t e r im  and f i n a l  r e p o r t s .  McCurdy's concerns were prompted by i n d i f ­
f e r e n t  commissioner a t t e n t i o n  to the hear ings ,  leaks  of  commission 
m a te r ia l  to  the  p re s s ,  and the increas ing  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  minori ty  
r e p o r t s  a n d /o r  "rump" sess ions  of  the  commissioners. The matte r had 
been a n t i c i p a t e d  and re so lved ,  to Ginsburg's  and K erner 's  s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  
by the e s tab l i shm en t  o f  the  unanimous approval r u le .  But, as w i l l  be 
seen,  t h a t  d id  not remove the t h r e a t  to the  commission's i n t e g r i t y  to
13
which McCurdy's memo speaks,
c.  Hearings
The White House wanted the public hear ings  to s e t  the subs tance ,  
design  and tone  of the  commission's r e p o r t ( s ) .  This plan was only 
p a r t i a l l y  su cce ss fu l ;  the  f i e l d  t r i p s  upon which Ginsburg i n s i s t e d  had 
a g r e a t e r  in f luence  on the commission's f in a l  product.  Through the 
hear ings  the commissioners heard about ghetto people and t h e i r  problems 
from knowledgeable persons,  ad m in is t ra t ion  sources and re p re se n ta t iv e s  
o f  groups who had developed an i d e n t i t y  by speaking f o r  the n a t i o n ' s  
urban black popula tion .  I t  was during the  f i e l d  t r i p s  t h a t  the  commis­
s ions  saw th e  damage done by the d iso rders  and met with  various l eade rs  
from the neighborhoods in which the  d is turbances  took place .  The f ina l  
r e p o r t  put a cons ide rab le  d is tance  between the  commissioners and some of
^^See Chapter  12,  pp. 449-455.
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the  ghetto  l e a d e r s  with whom they  t a l k e d ,  but  none o f  th e  Kerner group 
deny t h a t  th e  f i e l d  t r i p s  had the  g r e a t e s t  impact on the  r e p o r t  they 
s e n t  to the p r e s i d e n t  and the n a t i o n .  This and the  fo llowing two sec ­
t i o n s  cons ide r  the  importance o f  th e  Washington h e a r in g s ,  f i e l d  t r i p s  
and the  p r iv a t e  meetings of  the  commissioners.
The f i r s t  major dec is ion  o f  the  commissioners a t  t h e i r  Ju ly  27 
meeting was to e s t a b l i s h  the d a t e s  (August 1 and 2) and the  con ten t  
(hear ing  te s t imony  of D irec to r  o f  the Federal Bureau of  I n v e s t i g a t i o n ,
J .  Edgar Hoover on the consp iracy  i s sue )  of  t h e i r  f i r s t  formal
Washington h e a r in g s .  Their  next item of  bus iness  was to  accept  Ginsburg 's
14schedule  f o r  th e  r e s t  of the hear ings  and the f i e l d  t r i p s .  By
th e  end of  August the  e igh t  commissioner f i e l d  t r i p s  were completed,  the
Washington hear ings  in fu l l  swing and the major p a r t  o f  the s t a f f
r e c r u i t e d  and s e t  to work. With t h i s  f l u r r y  o f  a c t i v i t y  the commission
f u l f i l l e d  one o f  i t s  major r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ;  i t  convincing ly  showed the
congress  and th e  na t ion  t h a t  a p re s id e n t a l  adv iso ry  body had a c t i v e l y
15engaged a s e r i o u s  na t iona l  problem.
The hea r ings  produced l i t t l e  t h a t  the  commissioners could not 
have ob ta ined  by some o the r  means,  but they were impor tant  to the
^^Memo, Bohen to  C a l i f a n o ,  Ju ly  29, 1967, Commission on Civil  
Disorders ( 2 ) ,  Cal ifano (3).
^^By o f f i c i a l  reckoning, t h e r e  were 20 days o f  hear ings  s t r e t c h e d  
over the per iod  August through November in which a t  l e a s t  130 oersons 
were heard.  Report p. 319. McCurdy in h is  f i n a l  r e p o r t  to Koskinen 
mentions 19 days o f  hear ings  invo lv ing  167 w i tn e sse s .  See his memo 
o f  February 13,  1963, General Counsel F i l e ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ L ib ra ry .
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commissioners and t h e i r  in t e r e s t e d  publics  f o r  a v a r i e ty  of reasons 
F i r s t ,  th e  hear ings  allowed fo r  an immediate, r e l a t i v e l y  simple and 
inexpensive  means of g e t t i n g  to work, doing something impor tan t,  while 
the s t a f f  was being assembled and the budget being f ix e d .  F u r the r ,  
the  hear ings  were an impor tant s o c ia l i z a t i o n  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n  
device ;  the  commissioners and the sen io r  s t a f f  got to know each o th e r  
and the key a d m in i s t r a t io n  persons through whom they were going to  have 
to pass t h e i r  work; Wilkins noted in r e f l e c t i o n  t h a t  the  hearings  allowed 
them to develop a common sense of urgency about the t a sk  they had been 
given to do.^^ F in a l ly ,  the  hearings allowed the  commissioners to
develop an independence from the ad m in is t ra t ion  th a t  was d i f f i c u l t  fo r
18the White House to  ignore .  For the a d m in is t r a t io n ,  the  hear ings  
provided a forum fo r  p resen t ing  those parts  o f  i t s  record in domestic 
policy  i t  wanted before the public ;  second, the hear ings provided an 
oppor tun i ty  to boos t  programs th a t  were languish ing  before  the congress.  
Third,  th e  hear ings  provided a p r e s i d e n t i a l l y  approved forum fo r  hearing
^ \ i p s k y  and Olson, MSS, IV, pp. 23-25, have a s im i l a r  topology.
^^Wilkins, syndicated column t r a n s c r i p t ,  February 10-11, 1968,
Off ice  o f  Public Information F i le ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library .
1 8e .g .  Bohen in an August 24th memo to C al i fano ,  which was passed 
on to Johnson, made the  following comments about  commissioner behavior 
during th e  hear ing  on th e  Newark d i so rde rs  which he a t tended  fo r  the White 
House: " . . .  the  Commission i s  extremely s e n s i t i v e  now to  ' r a i l r o a d i n g '
by the A dm in is t ra t ion .  I missed W ir tz ' s  test imony . . .  but  he apparent ly  
l e f t  the impression t h a t  Vance had e a r l i e r  — t h a t  the  Admin is tra tion  
wanted th e  commission's  quick endorsement of h a s t i l y  drawn r e p o r t s  and 
s ta tem en ts .  When I re tu rn ed  to the meeting . . .  I l i s t e n e d  as almost 
every member expressed s e n s i t i v i t y  'between the l i n e s '  about serving as 
a rubber stamp. Kerner bare ly  got the watered down s ta tem en t  which 
Lindsay subsequently  k i l l e d ,  and he had to ignore de laying  motions ,  which 
had the vo te s ,  to  get  what he got,  however u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  i t  was . . . "
FG 690 ( l ) /N a t io n a l  Advisory Commission on C iv i l  D iso rde rs ,  11/23/67 - 
9 /30/67 ,  LBJ Library .
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s t a t e  and local o f f i c i a l s  w i thou t  d i r e c t l y  involving the p re s iden t  and /or  
19his s en io r  s t a f f ;  fo u r th ,  the  hear ings  provided a forum fo r  a v a r i e ty  
of e s t a b l i s h e d  p r iva te  i n t e r e s t  groups which had something important 
to say or from whom the a d m in i s t r a t io n  wanted to hear (as with the
p o l i t i c a l  e l i t e s ,  the a d m in i s t r a t io n  could hear which of  the p r iva te
20e l i t e s  i t  chose,  in a context  i t  c o n t r o l l e d ) .  F i f t h ,  in p a r t i c u l a r  
i n s t a n c e s ,  which will  be d iscussed  below, the  adm in is t ra t ion  was ab le  
to use the commission hear ings ,  and i t s  witnesses as a means of c o n t r o l l ­
ing informat ion being made a v a i l a b l e  to  congress.
For most o f  the  members o f  congress the commission hearings were
19e .g .  Gov. Rommey could be heard in th i s  con text without having 
to give  him the p o l i t i c a l l y  usefu l  ( to  him) vehic le  of a White House 
meeting.
20The decis ion  was made to  hear the  leaders  o f  the " rad ica l"  
groups by means of  deposi t ion  hear ings  r a th e r  than in the formal 
hear ing con tex t .  See the memo, Ginsburg to the Commissioners 
2 /21 /68 ,  Ginsburg f i l e s  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library ,  where the  executive  
d i r e c t o r  explained what the  s t a f f  had done to get  test imony from non­
es tab l i shm ent  blacks.  "Pursuant to your reques t  t h a t  the rep o r t  r e ­
f l e c t  a wide range of  views inc lud ing  those held by the various black 
n a t i o n a l i s t s  and black power advoca tes ,  I d i rec ted  the General Counsel 
to a rrange  f o r  the taking of  te s timony from the l a t t e r  through means of 
d e p o s i t io n ;  Ron Karenga, Char les  Evers, Floyd McKissick, Stockely 
Carmichael, Dick Gregory, Vernon Jordan (A t lan ta ) ,  Carl B. Stokes,  
Richard Hatcher."  These d epos i t ion  s e s s io n s ,  c a l l ed  "special  hear ings"  
in  th e  Report , were taken in person and by phone by s t a f f  members.
The t r a n s c r i p t s  of  these  "hearings"  were made av a i l ab le  to the  commis­
s i o n e r s ,  but i t  i s  doubtful  they  were read and they could not have had 
any e f f e c t  on the w r i t ing  o f  th e  Report which was e s s e n t i a l l y  f in i sh e d  
when the  deposit ions  were taken .  The t r a n s c r i p t s  now re s ide  in the  
custody o f  the  National Archives and Records s e rv ice  under m u l t i -y ea r  
embargo prov is ions ,  some extending to seventy-f ive  years .  The witnesses  
deposed in t h i s  manner a re  noted in the Report by the footnote  #1 by 
t h e i r  names which r e f e r s  the read e r  to a cap t ion ,  "Witnesses a t  Special  
Hearings ,"  Appendix E, pp. 300-302.
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welcome, bu t  not a l l  accepted  them f o r  the same rea so n s .  For those 
who were used to following executive  l e a d e r s h ip ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in t imes of  
c r i s i s ,  the  commission and i t s  hear ings  were a v a lu ab le  symbol t h a t  
the  p re s id e n t  was in c o n t r o l ;  they were c o n ten t  to l e t  the commission 
l i v e  ou t  i t s  l i f e  and respond to reques ts  f o r  congress ional a c t i o n  when 
they came. Some welcomed the  hear ings  as a way o f  f ix in g  blame on 
Johnson and his  Great  S o c ie ty  programs fo r  the d i s o r d e r s ;  they were 
c e r t a i n  t h a t  the  commission would excuse the p a r t i c i p a n t s  in the  d i so rd e r s  
and c a l l  f o r  g r e a t e r  expendi tures  o f  funds fo r  the  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  
domestic programs; the se  saw the McClellan committee as  the answer to 
t h i s  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  e f f o r t  to whitewash i t s  e r r o r s .
For th e  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n t e r e s t  groups with a s tak e  in the r e s o lu t io n  
o f  the problems causing and caused by the d i s o r d e r s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  the 
e s t a b l i s h e d  c i v i l  r i g h t s  groups,  the  hear ings  provided an oppor tun i ty  
f o r  t h e i r  l e a d e r s  to  be p ub l ic ly  heard and thereby  convince t h e i r  
fo llowers  t h a t  they were indeed consul ted  by the  White House in c r i s i s  
s i t u a t i o n s .  The b e n e f i t  f o r  the a d m in i s t r a t io n  was i d e n t i c a l  to  
t h a t  ob ta ined  when a forum was provided f o r  Governor Romney; persons 
could be heard wi thou t  involv ing the p r e s id e n t .  Through i t s  hear ings  the  
Kerner Commission served  a c l a s s i c a l  advisory  commission func t ion ;  i t  
was an e f f e c t i v e  p o l i t i c a l  buffer  between the  p r e s id e n t  and i n t e r e s t e d  
publics  d e s i r i n g  to p a r t i c i p a t e  in major p u b l i c - p o l i c y  d e c i s io n s .
Par t  o f  t h e  sense  o f  urgency f e l t  by th e  commissioners during the 
hear ings was the  c r e a t i o n  of  Ginsburg and McCurdy. With Ginsburg 's  
approval,  McCurdy c a r e f u l l y  s t r u c tu r e d  a s e r i e s  o f  hear ings  which moved 
the commissioners from a general c o n s id e ra t io n  o f  the d iso rde rs  to a
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p a r t i c u l a r  c o n s id e ra t io n  of the problems o f  Negro c i t i z e n s  in the 
n a t i o n ' s  urban c en te r s .  He began the  hear ings  with testimony from FBI 
D i rec to r  Hoover on the sub jec t  of  cr iminal conspiracy ,  then moved through 
a v a r i e ty  o f  f e d e r a l ,  s t a t e  and local  o f f i c i a l s  who had c a r r i e d  var ied  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  throughout the d i s o rd e r s .  By a l l  accounts the hear ings  
climaxed with  the  appearances of psycholog is t  Kenneth Clark and h i s ­
t o r i a n  John Hope Frankl in  who unfolded f o r  the commissioners the 
h i s t o r y  and c h a r a c t e r  o f  the l i f e  exper iences  o f  American Negroes in 
urban g h e t to s .  The hearings  were timed to  end c o i n c i d e n t i a l l y  with the 
completion of  the  s t a f f  f i e l d  t r i p s  when the commission was to begin 
w r i t in g  the  in te r im  r e p o r t  to the p re s id en t .
The audience Ginsburg and McCurdy had in mind in cons t ruc t ing  
the  hear ings  was the major in t e r e s t e d  e l i t e  p u b l i c s .  They were 
determined to inform those  e l i t e s  o f  is sues  underlying the  d isorders  
which they thought to be more ser ious  than the  immediate damage to 
the a f f e c t e d  c i t i e s .  For ins tance ,  e a r ly  in t h e i r  work the  sen ior  
s t a f f  members became convinced th a t  the p o l i c e  and the National Guard 
were major causes o f  the  r i o t s ;  they were equal ly  convinced th a t  
most members of  the e l i t e  audience the commission was s e lec ted  to  
reach did no t  share  t h a t  convic t ion .  I f  these  e l i t e s  could  be brought 
to  a common unders tanding of the causes o f  the  d i s o r d e r s ,  i t  was 
thought ,  they  then might be brought to a common level o f  support  
of  the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  e f fo r t s  a t  preventing them in th e  fu tu r e .
21McCurdy d e l i b e r a t e l y  b u i l t  a grand ju r y  tone into the hear ings .
21 Popper ,  The P r e s i d e n t ' s  Commission, p. 36.
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Criminal i n v e s t ig a t i o n  was the dominant theme o f  the  f i r s t  weeks o f  the 
hea r ings ;  McCurdy wanted to secure a commission indic tment  a g a in s t  those  
re spons ib le  fo r  the  d i s o r d e r s .  This f i t  the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  plan to 
ge t  a t  the h e a r t  o f  the  law and order  i ssues  through the  hear ings ;
Johnson wanted co u r t  conv ic t ions  to come from the i n v e s t ig a t i o n s  o f  the 
d i s o r d e r s .  But McCurdy had a broader ro le  in mind fo r  the  hear ings  and 
the  commission's  r e p o r t .  He wanted the r e p o r t  to bring the  f u l l  force  
of public  opinion on those  re spons ib le  fo r  the  d i s o rd e r s .  To accomplish 
t h i s  the  hear ings  had to br ing the commissioners to a common under­
s tanding which involved t h e i r  f e e l in g s  as well as t h e i r  minds. He 
conceived the impact of  the  hearings in symbolic terms. S ko ln ick ' s  
image of  publ ic  hear ings  as th e a t r e  comes c lo se  to the mark in desc r ib ing  
McCurdy and Ginsburg 's  design fo r  the  impact of  the  hear ings  on the 
commissioners :
Hearings a re  a form of  t h e a t r e .  Conclusions must be 
presented to evoke an emotional response in both the 
commissioners and the  wider audience.  In t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  
the  planners of  the  hear ings  can be l ikened to the au thor  
and d i r e c t o r  o f  a play with s t r a t eg y  s u b s t i t u t i n g  f o r  a 
p l o t . . .  the  ex p ec ta t ion  is  t h a t  s t a f f  and commissioners wi l l  
walk along f re sh  roads toge the r ,  reaching s im i la r  conc lus ions .  
This explana t ion  d e r ives  from the image of  a t r i a l .  Such 
an a d ju d ic a t io n  model must, however, be l a rg e ly  f i c t i o n a l .
The "judges" ,  the  commissioners, a l ready  have s trong views 
and p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s ,  though they a re  supposed to be 
n e u t r a l .  The s t a f f  to o ,  i s  supposed to  lack op in ions ,  even 
though i t  was s e l e c te d  because of p r io r  knowledge. Since 
s t r a t e g y  s u b s t i t u t e s  f o r  p lo t ,  t h e re  a re  only  th ree  poss ib le  
outcomes. The play may be a f l o p ,  t h a t  i s ,  the s t a f f  p e r ­
sp ec t iv e  i s  not communicated; or  the  pe rspec t ive  i s  com­
municated, but unemotional so as to merely make a record ;  or 
emotional engagement i s  achieved. Here socia l  sc ience  as 
t h e a t r e  reaches i t s  u l t im a te  a r t .  Commissioners a re  used to 
hear ings ,  a re  used to testimony and probably cannot be moved
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in any new d i r e c t i o n  un le ss  emotionally engaged . . .  commissioners 
a r e . . .  the  es tab l i shm en t .
The hear ings  were successfu l  in he lping to br ing the commissioners 
to  the  emotional commitment to the  problems underlying the d isorders  
t h a t  Ginsburg and McCurdy d es i r ed .  They f a i l e d  to meet the  other ob­
j e c t i v e s  f o r  two reasons :  in te rn a l  oppos i t ion  to the format and goals
o f  the  hear ings  and the d ec is ion  to conduct the  hear ings  in  executive 
s e s s io n s .  A major i n t r a - s t a f f  feud between Palmieri  and McCurdy ran 
the course o f  the commission's  l i f e  and had i t s  o r i g i n s  in a d ispute  
over the s t r u c t u r e  and conduct of the h ear ings .  In a s e r i e s  of memos, 
Palmier i  o u t l in e d  h is  unhappiness with the  hear ings  as planned by 
Ginsburg and McCurdy; he wanted the hear ings to  be more l i k e  a congress­
ional hear ing .  In keeping with his d e s i r e  to have a s ta f f -dominated  
commission r e p o r t ,  Palmieri  advocated a plan fo r  the  hear ings  which 
c a l l e d  fo r  the  s t a f f  to bu i ld  the "case" and p resen t  i t  to the commis­
s ioners  through the hear ings .  He was, in s h o r t ,  concerned fo r  more 
t r a d i t i o n a l  p lo t  in the  play.  He wanted the  c a s t  of the play to be 
composed o f  fewer s t a r s  in o rder  to make room fo r  the able  journeyman 
a c t o r s ,  who were more experienced and b e t t e r  able to bring out the 
s u b t le  and i n t r i c a t e  nuances o f  the p lo t .  His p o s i t io n  was s ta t ed  in 
an e a r ly  memo to Ginsburg in which can a l so  be found h in t s  of the 
beginnings o f  P a lm ie r i ' s  leade rsh ip  of the  ju n io r  s t a f f  opposit ion  to the 
l e ade rsh ip  o f  Ginsburg.  In t h i s  memo Palmieri  saw the  p o l i t i c a l  neces­
s i t y  fo r  having hear ings  such as those designed to hear Governor
^ "S k o ln i c k ,  The P o l i t i c s  of  P r o t e s t ,  p. 36.
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Romney, and the re p re se n ta t iv e s  o f  D e t ro i t  and Newark but went on to  say;
. . .  I hope we can avoid any more hear ings  o f  t h i s  t y p e . . .
The o b je c t iv e  now i s  to develop a plan f o r  the  hearings
through the end of the year .  The plan must be based on
a conception o f  the  i n i t i a l  repo r t .  That conception 
involves  the following elements:
1) The r i o t  scenar ios  and a r e s u l t i n g  " p r o f i l e ( s ) "
2) An a n a l y t i c a l  d iscuss ion  based on the  scenar ios
3) Recommendations fo r  immediate a c t i o n  programs, 
d i r e c t  and indi rec t ,gSimed a t  the preven t ion  and 
contro l  o f  v io lence .
Further,  he wanted the  hearings to contain the  a d d i t io n a l  elements;  
f i r s t ,  a comparative view o f  the sequence o f  the  d iso rders  taken from 
selec ted  c i t i e s ;  second, a s im i la r  view of the d i so rd e r  p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  
inc luding c o n s id e ra t io n  of the p e r t in e n t  s o c io lo g ica l  and psychological 
da ta ;  t h i r d ,  a c a r e f u l l y  drawn demographic p o r t r a i t  of se lec ted  c i t i e s
which experience d i s o rd e r s ;  four th ,  an " an a ly s i s  of underlying causa t ive
fac to rs  by exper ts  and local  p a r t i c ip a n t s  and o b se rv e r s ; "  f i f t h ,  
" p re sc r ip t io n s  f o r  immediate ac t ion  programs d i r e c t l y  and in d i r e c t l y
re la ted  to the p reven t ion  and contro l  of v io lence  by exper ts ,  inc luding ,
24again ,  indigenous exper ts  ( m i l i t a n t s ) . "  Two weeks l a t e r  Palmieri  
again ra i sed  the i s s u e ,  t h i s  time in  a more b e l l i g e r e n t  manner:
I t  i s  a b s o lu t e ly  v i t a l  t h a t  a l l  of the  hear ings  be 
s t ru c tu re d  in a way th a t  gives  the commission the best  
poss ib le  b a s i s  f o r  applying fac tual unders tanding to 
th e o r e t i c a l  formula t ions .  I t  seems to  me t h a t  they 
a r e  b e t t e r  prepared to do t h i s  i f  they f i r s t  hear from 
' the  people who a re  working in the f i e l d  d i r e c t l y  with 
the problems and then hear from the academic e x p e r t s . . .
‘■̂ Memo Palimeri  to  Ginsburg, 8 /31/67,  Palimeri  f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  
LBJ Library .
24 I b i d . ,  emphasis  added.
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He went on to  c r i t i c i z e  the  grand ju ry  atmosphere o f  the  hear ings by 
suggesting t h a t  w i tnesses  be in v i t e d ,  subpoenaed only i f  necessary ,  to 
come before the commission; he wanted some of the  hear ings  opened to
pc
the publ ic .  In h is  reply  McCurdy c o r r e c t l y  observed t h a t  Palmieri
was c a l l in g  fo r  an e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  type of hear ing  from t h a t  planned
and conducted to  d a te .^ ^  McCurdy and Ginsburg won t h i s  b a t t l e ;  the
hear ings were conducted a s  planned. P a lm ie r i ' s  c a l l  fo r  testimony from
"indigenous exper ts"  went unheeded. His sugges t ions  fo r  the  hearings
became the b a s i s  f o r  the  organ iza t ion  o f  the  work o f  the  s t a f f  and his
concerns saw the  l i g h t  o f  day in t h e i r  work. But t h a t ,  t o o ,  c rea ted
tens ion  within the s t a f f  and between the  s t a f f  and the commissioners;
27th e r e  too Ginsburg won a l im i ted  but important v i c to r y .
The d ec is ion  to hold a l l  the  hear ings  in execu t ive  sess ion  was
28the second major f a c t o r  l im i t in g  t h e i r  e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  In add i t ion  to 
the  des i re  to spend much of  the  hearing time on law and order  i s su e s ,  
the  commissioners had two major reasons f o r  c lo s in g  the hear ings  to the 
pub l ic .  F i r s t ,  th e re  was a fundamental d i s t r u s t  o f  the  press  among the
^^Memo Palmieri to McCurdy, 9 /11/67 , "Subjec t ,  Procedure fo r  
Conducting Hearings ,"  Palmieri f i l e ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library.
^Semo McCurdy to Pa lmier i ,  9 /14/67 , (Sub: Procedure fo r  Conducting 
Hearings),  Hearing Procedures f i l e ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library .
^^See the d i scuss ion  of the  "Harvest  of Racism" documents, pp. 445-459.
28 _Kerner and Harr is  were the only commissioners to vote  fo r  a
degree of openness.  They urged t h e i r  fe l low commissioners to use some 
o f  the  hearings as a means of educating the  public  in the t r a d i t i o n a l  
way of congressional in v e s t ig a t io n s .  See Lipsky and Olson, MSS, IV pp. 
34-36. As will  be seen a b i t  l a t e r  the re  was s e r ious  d i s ag r ee ­
ment with in  the commission over whether or not i t  had an educational 
func t ion .
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commissioners and the White House. There was a strong f e e l in g  in  both
q u a r t e r s  t h a t  the  press was p a r t i a l l y  r e spons ib le  fo r  the  i n t e n s i t y  
29o f  the  d i s o r d e r s .  Among the commissioners,  Paden and Thorton were the
most vocal and adamant in i n s i s t i n g  th a t  the press be excluded from the
hear ings  and be given only commission and wi tness  approved r e l e a s e s
about  the  s e s s io n s .  This,  of c ou rse ,  guaranteed leaks from commissioners
and s t a f f  members. Second, the  commissioners did not want to provide
a publ ic  forum f o r  p a r t i c u l a r  pub l ic  f i g u r e s ,  including persons from
the  Negro community, whom they knew they would be forced in to  hear ing i f
the  ses s ions  were opened.
The White House was in  complete agreement with the commission's
de c i s io n  to c lo se  the hearings to the  public  and the press ;  c losed
hear ings  made i t  a g rea t  deal e a s i e r  fo r  the  White House to monitor the
work o f  the  commission and to make s e l e c t i v e  use of the test imony given.
A White House a id e ,  usua l ly  e i t h e r  Larry Bohen or Matthew Nimetz, was
p re sen t  a t  each o f  the hear ings  and sen t  a w r i t t en  r e p o r t  o f  th e  sess ion  
30to  C al i fano .  Having the tes timony taken by the commission a v a i l a b l e  
to the White House was useful in preparing adm in is t ra t ion  o f f i c i a l s  to 
t e s t i f y  before  th e  McClellan Committee. The adm in is t ra t ion  cou ld ,  and 
d id ,  s e l e c t  from the testimony given to the  commission those da ta  which 
i t  wanted congress to have. The f a c t  t h a t  Senators Harris  and Edmund 
Musk ie  (Democrat, Maine) were w i l l i n g  to  cooperate  in  an e f f o r t  to
29See the d iscuss ion  of the  media conference,  pp. 398-403.
30See the  Bohen and Nimetz memos in the  f i l e  Commission on 
Civi l  Disorders  (1 ) ,  Califano 3, LBJ Library .  Complete t r a n s c r i p t s  were 
a l so  s e n t  to Cal ifano.
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undermine Chairman McClellan's  intended use of the committee hear ings
31made t h i s  t a sk  e a s i e r  f o r  the White House and the  commission.
Closing the hear ings  presented one other major problem which con­
t r i b u t e d  to t h e i r  l im i t ed  e f f e c t iv e n e s s .  I t  meant th a t  the  commission 
developed no on-going means o f  educating the general and e l i t e  pub l ics
to i t s  pe rcep t ion  o f  the  issues  underly ing the d isorders  and i t s
32proposed ways o f  address ing  them. Together wi th  Direc to r  o f  Informa­
t io n  Alvin Spivak, Ginsburg used a v a r i e t y  of loose ly  r e l a t e d  means of 
informing the pub l ic  o f  the progress o f  the  commission; they issued press 
r e l e a s e s  on the hear ings  and the c i t y  v i s i t s ,  and they arranged  f o r
33commissioners and key s t a f f  to give a number o f  in te rv iews and speeches.  
These e f f o r t s  were no t ,  however, p a r t i c u l a r l y  useful in developing the 
p u b l i c ' s  consc iousness  to a level where a broad base of support  e x i s t ed  
for  the con ten t  o f  the  f in a l  r e p o r t .  The commission's primary c l i e n t ,  
the p r e s id e n t ,  on the o th e r  hand, was kept well informed and was not sur-
31 See below, pp. 407-412, f o r  a d iscussion of the Harr is  -  Muskie 
coopera t ion .
32 Lipsky and Olson note t h a t  columnist  Roscoe Drummond warned of 
t h i s  danger in August. They found the  Drummond a r t i c l e  to be something 
of a s t im ulus  f o r  those  commissioners des i r ing  open hear ings .  See Lipsky 
and Olson, MSS, IV, p. 35. D irec to r  of  Information Alvin Spivak, argued 
the same po in t  in a memo to Ginsburg on August 29th,  and be fo re  the 
commission on September 13 (see McGrath "Minutes of the  Meetings o f  the 
Commissioners", 9 /13 /67 ,  McGrath F i l e s ,  NACCO Papers,  LBJ L i b r a r y . )  At 
the same meeting Represen ta t ive  Gorman a r t i c u l a t e d  the  p o s i t i o n  which he 
was to ho ld ,  and p e r f e c t ,  throughout tbe  l i f e  of the commission t h a t  the 
Kerner group did not have a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to educate the  p u b l ic .  I t s  
job was to ga the r  f a c t s  and draw conclusions :  answer the p r e s i d e n t ' s
ques t ions .  The d iv i s io n  of poin ts  of  view represented by Gorman and 
Spivak remained with the commission and not only q u a l i f i e d  the  success 
of the hear ings  but deeply inf luenced the  substance of the  f i n a l  r e p o r t .
33See Lipsky and Olson, MSS, IV, pp. 34-36 fo r  a more e la b o r a t e  
d i scuss ion  o f  the  means used by the  commission to  s tay  in the  pub l ic  eye.
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pr ised  by the Repor t . There is  reason to  b e l i e v e ,  however, t h a t  many 
members o f  the commission's key p u b l i c s ,  who could have been very he lp ­
ful  in th e  recep t ion  and a s s im i la t io n  of the Repor t , were su rp r ised  by 
i t s  tone  and substance.
In summary, the decis ion  to hold c losed hear ings  was c l e a r l y  in 
l i n e  with  Johnson 's  standard  policy regard ing the uses of ad hoc adv i ­
sory  groups.  The Kerner group f o r f e i t e d  the f u l l  educational value 
inhe ren t  in the  public  hearing format and adopted the ro le  of v i s i b l e  
but q u i e t  p r e s id e n t i a l  a d v i s e r . F u r t h e r ,  the  independent p o l i t i c a l  
s t r e a k  developed by the commission was not ev iden t  to the publ ic  un t i l  
the  p u b l i c a t io n  o f  i t s  r e p o r t  in March.
d. F ie ld  Trips
The f i e l d  t r i p s  were successful  in providing the commissioners 
with the  kinds o f  experimental data Ginsburg thought so necessary in 
the  development o f  the complete "case" on the  c i v i l  d i so rd e rs .  Unlike 
hearing te s t imony, viewing r i o t  to rn  c i t i e s  and holding d iscuss ions  with
e . g . ,  one cos t  to the public  was ignorance of the f a c t  t h a t  the  
commission was exposed to and ignored, in  l a r g e  p a r t ,  the kind of 
test imony found in a memo from Paul G. Bower to members of the s en io r  
s t a f f  da ted  10/26/57 which covered a copy of  a summary of the commission 
hear ings  of  9/21/67 done by Karen Krueger,  a research a s s i s t a n t  to  the 
s t a f f .  (Publ ic  Safe ty  F i l e s ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library).  She 
sa id  t h a t  the  wi tnesses  a t  t h a t  hear ing (J .  S tan ley  Sanders,  Los 
Angeles,  C a l i f o r n i a ;  Father James Groppi,  Milwaukee, Wisconsin, accompan­
ied by Fa ther  P a t r i ck  Flood, Dwight Banning and James Pierce;  Ernie W. 
Chambers, Omaha, Nebraska; P i r i  Thomas, New York City) claimed the  r i o t s  
were caused by ra c ia l  d i s c r im in a t io n ,  t h a t  whi te  people r e a l l y  were the 
problem, t h a t  the  d iso rde rs  were a means to ob ta in ing  recognit ion of 
e x i s t e n c e ,  t h a t  the  po l ice  were unsympathetic to the problems of urban 
Negroes, t h a t  the  commission must e x e r t  i t s  power to change the system 
and i f  t h e r e  were no change the re  would be a revo lu t ion .
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i n n e r - c i t y  r e s id e n t s  and leaders  were not  f a m i l i a r  a c t i v i t i e s  fo r  the
commissioners. The t r i p s  were well planned and organized by the e lec ted
and federa l  o f f i c i a l s  in the  given c i t i e s ,  bu t ,  personal responses to
these  new s e t s  o f  s t im ul i  could not be programmed. I t  was the c i t y
v i s i t s ,  more than any o ther  f a c to r ,  which moved the commissioners to
c o n s t ru c t  a r e p o r t  to  Pres iden t  Johnson which he regarded as unacceptable.
The f i e l d  t r i p s  were important to the f u l f i l l m e n t  o f  Ginsburg's
plans fo r  the  commission f o r  f ive  reasons .  F i r s t ,  they were idea l ly
su i ted  to provide the  commissioners with ano ther  common experience to
meld them in to  a cohesive  working u n i t  shar ing s im i l a r  views about the
problems with which they had to work. Second, the  t r i p s  forced the
commissioners to develop confidence in t h e i r  a b i l i t i e s  to generate
and e v a lu a te  t h e i r  own d a ta ;  the t r i p s  were taken during the time when
Ginsburg and Palmieri  were f i l l i n g  out the  s t a f f  and Ginsburg used the
t r i p s  to impress upon the commissioners the v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e i r  own 
35research e f f o r t s .  Third,  the t r i p s  were a very public  means of convey­
ing the  image o f  a working commission, without incu r r ing  the p o l i t i c a l  
l i a b i l i t i e s  of pub l ic  h e a r i n g s . F o u r t h ,  the  t r i p s  were an ideal way
In t h i s  a r e a ,  too ,  Palimeri r e s i s t e d  Ginsburg 's  e f f o r t s  and ad­
vanced a more t r a d i t i o n a l  ro le  fo r  the  s t a f f .  See his memo to Ginsburg 
dated 9/5/67: " . . .  these  t r i p s  should provide  both you and me with a 
continuing veh ic le  fo r  acqua inting the commissioners on an individual 
bas is  with the  progress  of our work and g e t t i n g  t h e i r  poin ts  of view." 
(Palimeri F i l e ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ L ibrary) .
^®See the l e t t e r  from John E. Hansen (Executive  D irec to r ,  Community 
Action Commission o f  Cincinnat i )  to T a l i a f e r r o  where he thanks the 
commission for the  v i s i t  and notes t h a t  " . . .  i t s  good to know th a t  
someone cares  about our problems." ( L e t t e r ,  Hansen to T a l i a f e r r o ,  9/1 /  
67, T a l i a f e r r o  F i l e ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ L ib ra ry ) .
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"to rub the  noses of  the  commissioners in  the  problem" ( a t  l e a s t  as the
c i ty  and fede ra l  o f f i c i a l s  saw the  problem). During each t r i p  the
commissioners were exposed to  the aftermath  of the  d i so rde rs  and to the
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  the  events  by loca l  leade rs  and by key local s t a t e
and federa l  o f f i c i a l s .  The adm in is t ra t ion  did no t  waste the  opportun i ty
to  se l l  the  commissioners on the Great Socie ty  programs and the  need to
expand them to  accommodate the  needs c rea ted  by the  d i s o rd e r s .  F in a l ly ,
the  commissioner reac t io n s  to  the f i e l d  t r i p s  provided an e x c e l l e n t
o r i e n t a t i o n  f o r  members o f  the s t a f f  to the th ink ing  of the  commissioners.
Eight s i t e s  of  c i v i l  d iso rders  were v i s i t e d  by the commissioners
during the  period August 16-30: Newark, D e t ro i t ,  New York, Tampa, Los
37Angeles, Milwaukee, Cincinnat i  and Cambridge (Maryland).  Each v i s i t
37 The following order  i s  t h a t  of the  v i s i t a t i o n  schedule .  An undated 
document (a copy i s  in possession of  the  author)  found in the  Kerner Com­
mission F ie ld  Tr ips F i l e ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ L ib ra ry ,  gives the  following 
data regard ing  the  da tes  o f  the t r i p s  o f  indiv idual commissioners :
August 16 
Newark-Lindsay
D e t r o i t  - Kerner, Peden, Thornton 
New York - Abel, Wilkins 
August 21
D e t r o i t  - Corman, McCulloch, Jenkins 
August 23
Newark - Abel, Jenk ins ,  Peden, Wilkins ,  Thornton 
August 25 
New York -  Brooke 
August 26 
Tampa - McCulloch, Corman 
August 28
Los Angeles -  McCulloch, Corman, Wilkins,  Thornton 
August 29
Milwaukee - Jenk ins ,  Harr is ,  Wilkins ,  Peden 
August 30 
C inc innat i  - Lindsay, Harris 
Cambridge -  Abel, Paden 
October 9 
D e t r o i t  - Brooke
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co n s i s t e d  o f  the  commissioners being b r i e f e d  by federa l  o f f i c i a l s  p r io r  
to  beginning the t r i p ,  a meeting in the  c i t y  wi th  the mayor, h is  key 
c a b in e t  members and local  federa l  o f f i c i a l s ,  followed by an auto tou r  
o f  the  c i t y  (one commissioner and a c i t y  and /or  federa l  o f f i c i a l  in 
each car )  w i th  s tops  a t  various  fede ra l  and local proverty  program c e n te r s ,  
a meeting with  local  Negro leaders  (u su a l ly  a t  a loca t ion  ou ts ide  of 
th e  Negro s e c t io n  o f  the  c i t y )  and a concluding press conference.  One 
commission s t a f f  person ass igned to the pa r ty  wrote an ex tens ive  summary 
o f  the  event fo r  the  commissioners who did  not make the t r i p  and the 
o th e r  members of  the  s t a f f .  All these  s t a f f  r epo r t s  r e f l e c t e d  su rp r i s e  
on the  p a r t  o f  the  v i s i t o r s  t h a t  the  p a r t s  o f  the  c i t i e s  they saw were 
no t  as damaged as they expected,  and commissioner d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  with 
the  format o f  the v i s i t s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  with "entrapment" by c i t y  
o f f i c i a l s  in the  o f f i c i a l  to u rs .
The exposure to the various le ad e rs  o f  the  Negro communities was 
o f  help in  educat ing the commissioners, but most of the meetings took 
place  in a con tex t  c rea ted  and c o n t ro l l e d  by local  o f f i c i a l s .  There 
was, however, a n o t iceab le  tension in the  meetings with black le ad e r s .  More 
than one p a r t i c i p a n t  in them a t t r i b u t e d  the  t ens ion  to a b i t t e r n e s s  on 
the  p a r t  of  the  leade rs  over the heavy emphasis the p res iden t  put on
The members o f  the s t a f f  had more oppor tun i ty  to see  the various  
c i t i e s  on t h e i r  own. The s t a f f  members did not tr ave l  with, the  o f f i c i a l  
commissioner par ty  to the var ious c i t i e s  v i s i t e d  ( the  commissioners who 
accompanied Thornton to D e t ro i t  did so on h is  p r iv a t e  plane) but r a th e r  
went by commercial a i r  l i n e  and t r a i n .  Consequently they saw a g rea t  
deal more o f  the c i t y  and i t s  c i t i z e n s ,  most of which was missed by the 
o f f i c i a l  p a r t i e s .  A v a r i e ty  of recommendations flowed from the s t a f f  
exper iences  in the c i t i e s  v i s i t e d ;  r e n t  c a r s ,  d r ive  unaccompanied 
through the  c iv i l  d i so rd e r  a rea ,  take walking t o u r s ,  e tc .
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law and order  in his mandate to  the  commission. Despite  the b i t t e r n e s s ,  
severa l  common themes were discussed in these  meet ings:  the  inadequacy
of  the  Great Socie ty  programs designed to help them, the f a i l u r e  o f  the 
b a s ic  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  the  c i t y  to serve the bas ic  human and social 
needs o f  the  Negro community, complaints a g a in s t  the  p o l i c e ,  the u n ­
r e l e n t i n g  presence o f  whi te  racism.
The v i s i t  to C inc innat i  was the major except ion  to t h i s  common 
p a t t e r n .  S i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  i t  was made by the two commissioners (Lindsay
and Harr is )  who led what became known as the " l i b e r a l "  block within the 
39commission. The v i s i t  to C in c in n a t i ,  one of  the l a s t  o f  the s e r i e s ,  
ben e f i t ed  from the problems and mistakes of  the  o th e r  commissioner f i e ld  
t r i p s ;  i t  was s t ru c tu re d  d i f f e r e n t l y  from the  o t h e r s .  Charles (Chuck) 
W i l l i s ,  a member of Mayor Lindsay 's  New York s t a f f ,  who, because he  had 
worked in Cincinnati  was employed as a c o n s u l t a n t ,  spen t  th ree  days in  
Cinc innat i  preparing f o r  the  v i s i t  by the  two commissioners.  As p a r t  
of t h e i r  p repa ra t ion  H ar r i s  and Lindsay were b r i e f e d  by the  FBI on the 
persons they were to meet.^^ W il l i s  arranged f o r  them to meet a type of
'59The w r i t t e n  record  of the  Cincinnati  f i e l d  t r i p  was made by 
"Boots" T a l i a f e r r o  and s e n t  to the  o th e r  members o f  the s t a f f  in a memo 
dated September 19. ( T a l i a f e r r o  to Senior S t a f f ,  9 /19 /57 ,  in Cincinnati 
Tr ip  f i l e ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ L ibrary .
^^This was done as  a r eg u la r  p a r t  of the b r i e f i n g s  before each 
v i s i t .  The FBI documents always contained c o n f id e n t i a l  information on 
the degree of suspected criminal involvement o f  the  persons with whom the 
commissioners were scheduled to  meet. Of i n t e r e s t  here i s  a r e t ro spec ­
t i v e  account by Senator Harr is  of  some of the p o l i t i c a l  f a l l - o u t  from 
t h i s  v i s i t .  In r e f l e c t i o n s  on h is  c lo se  a s s o c i a t i o n  with Lindsay and 
the p o l i t i c a l  damage i t  caused him with Johnson, Harr is  t e l l s  of a White 
House meeting in which the  p res iden t  chas t i s ed  him fo r  the  r e la t io n sh ip .  
Harr is  t o ld  Johnson o f  the recen t  t r i p  to C inc inna t i  and i t s  impact on 
him and Lindsay, p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e i r  conclusion t h a t  th e re  was no consp iracy  
involved in t h a t  c i t y .  Johnson asked i f  Harr is  had read the FBI r e p o r t s .
He r e p l i e d  "no" but s a id  some s t a f f  members had and a l l  the  commissioners
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l o c a l  Negro l e a d e r  u n l ik e  those  with  whom commissioners met in the 
o t h e r  c i t i e s .  These were persons o u t  of favor with the  local  o f f i c i a l s ,  
bu t  n e v e r th e l e s s ,  l e a d e r s  wi th  enough of a fo l lowing  to  hones t ly  dese rve  
t h e  t i t l e  in t h i s  c o n tex t .  They were young, w e l l - e d u ca te d  (most had 
p o s t -g ra d u a te  degrees)  and were a l l  products o f  the  n o n -v io len t  c i v i l  
r i g h t s  movement. The meeting was unprecedented in an o th e r  way, to o ;  i t  
was held in  the  Avondale Community Center ,  in the h e a r t  o f  the area  
h a rd e s t  h i t  by the  d i s o r d e r s .  The meeting began and ended in a very 
te n se  atmosphere ( T a l i a f e r r o  used the  phrase,  " in t e n s e ly  b i t t e r " ) ;  the  
b lack  l e a d e r s  re fu sed  to shake hands with the commissioners.  Lindsay and 
H arr is  became, in  T a l i a f e r r o ' s  words,  "personal t a r g e t s  f o r  hate and 
f r u s t r a t i o n . "  Unlike the  o th e r  v i s i t s  the commissioners ended the  C inc in ­
na t i  t r i p  with a meeting with  c i t y  o f f i c i a l s .  "The two commissioners 
desc r ibed  what they had seen and heard.  The c i t y  o f f i c i a l s  appeared
Alto  l i s t e n  and be somewhat stunned . The meeting ended on t h a t  n o t e . "
Some members o f  the  s t a f f  had such meetings with  indigenous  black l e a d e r s  
in some o f  the  c i t i e s  they v i s i t e d ,  but  such events  remained o u t s id e  the  
exper iences  of the  o th e r  commissioners.
had heard the  tes t imony o f  D i rec to r  Hoover. Johnson i n s i s t e d  t h a t  H arr is  
read the FBI r e p o r t s .  The senator did and he r e p o r t s  t h a t ,  "They tended 
to  in d i c a t e  t h a t  ' o u t s i d e  a g i t a t o r s '  helped cause th e  r i o t s  and they 
amounted to  the  most sloppy mess o f  r ep o r t in g  I had ever  seen,  and I 
t o ld  (Marvin) Watson (a Johnson White House a id e )  so" (Potomac Fever,  
p. I l l )  H a r r i s ,  in  a l l  a ccoun ts ,  was sever ly  c r i t i c a l  of the  FBI work he 
saw, but here  h i s  memory and /o r  notes  f a i l e d  him, o r  th e re  was more than 
one s e t  o f  c o n f id e n t i a l  FBI r e p o r t s  of  the C inc inna t i  c i v i l  d i s o r d e r s ,  
one fo r  the  White House and ano ther  fo r  the commissioner ' s  b r i e f i n g s .  
Johnson 's  use o f  ano ther  s e t  of  FBI r epo r t s  with H a r r i s  i s  a o i s t i n c t  
p o s s i b i l i t y  given the f a c t  t h a t  the  p re s id en t  knew of  the  d e t a i l s  o f  the  
C inc inna t i  v i s i t  be fo re  t a lk in g  to H ar r i s ;  he had access  to T a l i a f e r r o ' s  
r e p o r t  on the  t r i p .  See pp. 297-298 , below.
41 Q uota t ions  from th e  Cinc innat i  meetings a r e  taken from 
T a l i a f e r r o ’ s 9/16 /57 memo to the members of  the  s e n i o r  s t a f f .
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The Cinc innat i  v i s i t  made deep impressions and wrought profound 
changes in  a t t i t u d e s  in the two commissioners and t h e i r  col leagues  
who made the  t r i p ,  but not so profound as to change the  way the com­
mission s t a f f e d  i t s e l f  and went about doing i t s  bus iness .  I t  has been 
noted t h a t  th e re  was d iscuss ion  among the commissioners and the sen io r  
s t a f f  about the  wisdom and the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of employing persons with
re c en t  exper ience  l i v in g  and working in one or more of  the n a t i o n ' s  urban 
42r a c i a l  g h e t to s .  The Cincinnat i  t r i p  presented the  commission with 
exposure to persons who had the same basic q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  employment 
possessed by a l l  o f  the  j u n io r  members o f  the s t a f f  (pos t -g radua te  
degrees and urban work exper ience) but who had the  add i t iona l  q u a l i f i c a ­
t io n s  of being ghetto r e s id en ts  with local  le adersh ip  c r e d i b i l i t y .  I t  
would, no doubt,  have been p o l i t i c a l l y  unacceptable to t ry  to employ 
one or  more of  the  young black leaders  with whom Lindsay and Harr is  had 
met. However, i t  is  conceivable  t h a t  o the r  such persons could have 
been turned up in o th e r  c i t i e s  and secured for the  commission. The only 
e f f o r t  to  change the make-up of the  commission s t a f f  following the 
c i t y  v i s i t a t i o n s  cons i s ted  o f  Harr is  and Lindsay's recommendation t h a t  the 
commission take on W il l i s  as a member o f  the s t a f f .  But W il l i s  came 
to  the commission d i r e c t l y  from Lindsay 's  s t a f f  and h is  appointment,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  has to be seen as  much as  a commission-style patronage a c t  
a s  an a t tem pt  to f i l l  out the  s t a f f  with " s t r ee t -w ise "  urban b lack s .
Copies of  a l l  the  s t a f f  summaries and c r i t i q u e s  of the  commissioner 
f i e l d  t r i p s  went to the  White House for  review. Califano passed them to 
the  p re s id en t  with notes ind ica t ing  the sections  he f e l t  to be of
42pp. 248-249.
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i n t e r e s t  to Johnson. Califano marked with  specia l  care the  sec t ions  
o f  T a l i a f e r r o ' s  summary desc r ib ing  the meeting of  Harris and Lindsay 
with the  young black leade rs  in the C inc inna t i  community cen te r .
A considerab le  amount of s t a f f  time was consumed in f i e l d  resea rch  
e f f o r t s  in the  ea r ly  weeks of the  commission's l i f e .  The o r ig ina l  
Ginsburg plan c a l l ed  fo r  the  commission to  l e t  a con t rac t  fo r  the  
systemat ic  f i e l d  s tud ies  thought necessary  to f u l f i l l  the p re s id e n t i a l  
mandate to in v e s t ig a te  and repo r t  on evidence of conspiracy and to 
compare the c i t i e s  which experienced d i so rd e r s  with each o the r .
I t  was decided ,  however, t h a t  the  use o f  commission s t a f f  fo r  the  work 
would produce b e t t e r  r e s u l t s ,  allow fo r  c lo s e r  coordination  of the  
various  f i e l d  in v e s t ig a t io n s  being done under the aegis o f  the com­
mission with the evolving purposes o f  the  commission, and would be 
p o l i t i c a l l y  helpful by allowing the commission to  h i r e  a r e l a t i v e l y  la rge  
number o f  the  app l ican ts  f o r  s t a f f  p o s i t io n s  i t  had received.
But the  s t a f f  f i e l d  research  e f f o r t s  did no t  produce a q u a l i ty  
product equ iva len t  to the e f f o r t  inves ted .  Time p ressures ,  m isd irec ted  
e f f o r t s  pursuing the answer to Johnson 's  comparative c i t i e s  question  
(an e s s e n t i a l l y  unanswerable q ues t ion ) ,  and problems inheren t  in the  
American federa l  p o l i t i c a l  system q u a l i f i e d  the s t a f f  f i e l d  research 
e f f o r t s  to the  point where they co n t r ib u ted  l i t t l e  to the f ina l  r e p o r t .
Califano to the P res id en t  10 /6 /67 ,  Ex HU2/FG690/LG/Cincinnati; 
"P re s id en t i a l  Memoranda," LBJ Library.  There i s  an ind ica t io n  on the 
document t h a t  Johnson read i t .  I t  would appear from these data t h a t  
Johnson knew more about the  Cincinnati  t r i p  and Harr is '  r e l a t i o n s h ip  
with Lindsay than the senator knew.
^^^ee poin t 2 o f  the  mandate ( Repor t , p. 396) and p. 2 of the  
His tory  of the Commission, NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library.
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Lipsky and Olson, in developing t h e i r  "commission problem" id e a ,  note
t h a t  the  p re s su res  wrought by shor tness  o f  time did not al low the Kerner
group to develop much in the way of  a t h e o r e t i c a l  framework o r  a
45systematic  approach to t h e i r  work.
S t a f f  members made independent and ind iv idua l  v i s i t s  to c i t i e s  
not on the  " o f f i c i a l " sample o f  c i t i e s  to be s tu d ie d .  In a d d i t i o n ,  
s t a f f  members were s en t  to a l l  the major p ro fess iona l  academic meetings 
held in l a t e  1967 and ear ly  1968 to l i s t e n  to what was being said  about  
the  commission, c i v i l  r ig h t s  and c i v i l  d i s o rd e r  problems. S im i la r  f o r ­
ays were made to the known meetings of black  n a t i o n a l i s t  and black 
power groups as a means of  ob ta in ing  informat ion and keeping a f in g e r  
on the pulse o f  the  black movement. All o f  the  s t a f f  f i e l d  t r i p s  
suf fe red  from the same problems exper ienced by the  commissioners on 
t h e i r s :  c o -o p ta t io n  by s t a t e  and local  o f f i c i a l s ,  r e s i s t a n c e  from
black l e ad e rs  because of a basic  d i s t r u s t  and f e a r  of the commission's 
purpose,  and lack o f  time and resources  to  do an adequate jo b .  Much 
e f f o r t  was given to f i e l d  research with meager amounts of new data  o r  
i n s ig h t s  r e s u l t i n g .  The v i s i t s  d id ,  however, provide a valuable  se rv ice  
to the p re s id e n t .  They displayed to s t a t e  and local  o f f i c i a l s  a deep 
enough level  of p re s id en t i a l  concern in t h e i r  problems to inves t  t ime,  
personnel and money in to  securing in format ion  which may lead  to answers.  
The v i s i t s  had the  add i t iona l  advantage o f  he lp ing these same o f f i c i a l s  
r e in fo r c e  what had become a na tu ra l  p o l i t i c a l  re ac t ion  fo r  most o f  them - 
de fe r  to the  national government on po l icy  matters  in which the  White
^^See Lipsky and Olson, MSS, V, pp. 31-34 and the s ta tement  about 
methodology found in the Repor t , p. 320.
House shows a keen i n t e r e s t
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e) Meetings of th e  Commissioners
The commissioners met fo r  a to t a l  of f o r ty - f o u r  days,  excluding time
47spent on c i t y  v i s i t a t i o n s .  I t  was the  t ime and e f f o r t  given to  these
pr iva te  sess ions  which earned the Kerner Commission the  re p u ta t io n  of
being a "working commission." In the  meetings of the commissioners the
work of the  s t a f f  was minute ly  reviewed, a v a r i e ty  of "experts"  were
in terviewed, f i lms  were seen ,  books and papers sent by Ginsburg
discussed and ideas  s h a r e d . T h e s e  meetings were very p r iv a t e  a f f a i r s ,
49only the commissioners and invited  o the rs  were p resen t .  Ginsburg was 
always p resen t  and served as  the  le ade r  of the  commissioners.
Ginsburg's  le ad e rsh ip  r o l e  in these  c ru c ia l  meetings was based on 
two f a c t o r s :  he was respec ted  by the  commissioners as a good and
f a i r  a d m in i s t r a to r ,  and accepted as the " p r e s id e n t ' s  man" on the
I t  i s  well  to c a l l  a t t e n t i o n  again  to the ghetto  v i s i t s  by mem­
bers of the  White House s t a f f  discussed above, p. 179. Those v i s i t s  
were an independent source of  information f o r  Johnson and a l so  served 
the o the r  general  purposes discussed here .
^^Report , p. 320.
4 0
e .g .  the  meetings o f  November through December 12 were devoted 
to work on the various  d r a f t s  of the  R epor t ; on October 29 the  commis­
s ioners  had d inner  with the  heads o f  the  t h r e e  t e l e v i s io n  news n e t ­
works; on November 3 they saw the f i lm "The Jungle" produced by a group 
of  Ph i lade lph ia  i n n e r - c i t y  young persons.
^^McGrath was p re sen t  a t  al l the meet ings.  See p. 259 fo r  a d i s ­
cussion o f  h is  r o le  as Kerner 's  a id e  on the  commission.
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50commission. Ginsburg pushed the  commissioners to  achieve the unanimity 
th ey  agreed to  reach before sending any major recommendations to th e  
p r e s id e n t .  He chided them when they neg lec ted  the hearings and went to 
g r e a t  lengths  to  keep them u p- to -da te  with each o th e r .  He was in re g u la r  
c o n t a c t  with the  White House on a v a r i e ty  o f  matters  involving the  com­
m ission  and the o th e r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  he c a r r i e d  f o r  the a d m in is t r a t io n ;  
he used these  occasions  to  ob ta in  and convey useful information to  and 
from the ad m in is t r a t io n  and the  commission. Lipsky and Olson accep t  a t  
f a c e  value Ginsburg 's  modest r e p o r t  t h a t  he only spoke to the p re s id en t
th r e e  or  four times about the commission and i t s  work during his tenure
51as executive  d i r e c t o r .  But Ginsburg did  not have to re ly  on face  to 
f a c e  meetings with  Johnson to ge t  his  p o in t  of view through to  the  p r e s i ­
d e n t .  He had th e  confidence of the key White House a id e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
C a l i fano .  He had d a i ly  conversa t ions  and memo exchanges with c a b in e t  
o f f i c e r s ,  s en io r  White House a ides  and o th e r  key adm in is t ra t ion  persons.  
An examination o f  C a l i f a n o 's  o f f i c i a l  f i l e s  on the  Kerner Commission 
r e v e a l s  many ins tances  of h is  sending a Ginsburg memo to Johnson
52s p e c i f i c a l l y  c a l l i n g  a t t e n t i o n  to r epo r t s  from the executive d i r e c t o r .
Kerner, by a l l  accounts ,  while c lo s e  to the White House, was a 
weak leader and served the  commission b e s t  as i t s  voice before the  p re s s ,  
t h e  publ ic  and congress .  Kyran McGrath, K erner ' s  "ears" on the s t a f f ,  
became in c reas in g ly  concerned about the  e c l i p s e  of  his  boss by Ginsburg 
and (e s p e c i a l l y )  Lindsay, but to no a v a i l .  See his  memo to Kerner 
1 /15 /68 ,  McGrath f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library .
S^MSS, IV, p. 31.
52A number of  examples have been c i t e d  in t h i s  study. Many more 
e x i s t  in the National Advisory Commission on Civil  Disorders f i l e s  in 
th e  papers of  Joseph Cal i fano ,  LBJ Library .
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Ginsburg 's  c lose  r e l a t i o n s h i p  with the White House caused i n i t i a l  concern 
among some o f  the commissioners, e sp ec ia l ly  the  Republicans,  but his 
evenhanded performance and his  a b i l i t y  to communicate well between the 
White House and the commission, won him p ra i se  from a l l .  The commis­
s io n e r s  accepted the f a c t  t h a t  they were members of  a p r e s id e n t i a l  
advisory  commission and consequently valued the  func t ion  Ginsburg pe r ­
formed fo r  them with th e  White House.
Leadership among the  commissioners e a r ly  s l ipped from Kerner to 
53Lindsay. Lindsay's na t iona l  prominence and his easy access to the 
New York based media and research resources were useful and were appre­
c i a t e d  by most of the commissioners, but not by the White House. Adminis­
t r a t i o n  re se rva t ions  about the commission's work increased  in d i r e c t  
propor tion  to i t s  percep t ion  of Lindsay 's r i s e  to prominence as a 
l e ad e r .
A typ ica l  meeting of  the commissioners cons is ted  of  the  following
elements ( l i s t e d  in o rd e r  of  time devoted to them). F i r s t ,  review and
re v is e  the  work o f  the  s t a f f  and the co n su l t an t s .  This cons is ted
o f  reading and d i scuss ing  d r a f t s  of  chap te rs ,  and con s id e ra t io n  of
research  papers which might become the basis  for f u tu r e  chap te rs .
I t  was common fo r  ind iv idua l  commissioners to produce a paper on an
area of personal e x p e r t i s e  fo r  a p a r t i c u l a r  work sess ion  s e t  to
54deal with t h a t  problem. Consistent with t h e i r  agreement t h a t
CO
The White House became concerned about Lindsay 's  aggress ive  
s t y l e  on the commission soon a f t e r  his appointment.  Harris  describes  
Johnson 's  concern over the mayor 's  r i s e  to dominance in Potomac 
Fever pp. 106-113.
^^e .g .  A be l - labor ,  Jenk ins -po l ice ,  Lindsay-urban problems, Kerner-
n a t io n a l  guard.
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a l l  documents d e s t in ed  fo r  public review had to have unanimous commis­
s io n e r  endorsement,  they read the various  d r a f t s  of  the  chapte rs  
to  each o th e r ,  agreeing on every word and tu r n  o f  phrase which were 
even tua l ly  publ ished .  They began these  work sess ions  ea r ly  in December, 
a month following th e  end of the Washington hear ings  and the s t a f f  
f i e l d  t r i p s  and th ree  months p r io r  to the scheduled publ ica t ion  da te  fo r  
th e  in te r im r e p o r t .  They scheduled themselves to deal with the 
most press ing  problems f i r s t , s p e c i f i c a l l y  the conspiracy issue  and, 
m at te rs  of public  s a f e ty  and then moved to long-range recommendations.^^ 
Present  a t  th e se  review sess ions  were the commissioners,  the senio r  
s t a f f ,  commissioner a ides  ( i f  needed) and in v i t e d  members of the 
p ro fess iona l  s t a f f .
Lunch time was given over to a f r ee  exchange of ideas between 
one or two inv i ted  members of  the p rofess ional  s t a f f  and the commis­
s io n e r s .  These were wide-ranging sess ions  in  which the p a r t i c ip a n t s  
"got a f e e l "  f o r  each o the r  and were useful in helping to  e s ta b l i sh  
the  boundaries with in  which the r e p o r t  could be w r i t t en  and published.
ir c
Senator H a r r i s ,  in h is  r e f l e c t i o n s  says the commissioners decided 
e a r ly  th a t  th e r e  was no shor t - run  so lu t ion  they could responsibly  en­
dorse and thereby turned t h e i r  a t t e n t i o n  to long-run problems and funda­
mental reforms of the  urban policy making system. As mentioned above,
(FN #3, p. 274) th e  evidence does not s u b s t a n t i a t e  H ar r i s '  r e c o l l e c t i o n s .
^^e .g .  th e  December 7-9 meeting was given over to  d iscuss ions  of 
conspiracy and publ ic  s a fe ty  (p o l i c e ,  f i r e  and national guard recom­
mendations) and quest ions  of  racism. The meeting o f  January 11 and 19 
were devoted to  d iscuss ions  o f  long-range recommendations. See, Mc­
Grath "Minutes of the  Meetings of the  Commissioners" f o r  those meet ings.
57Usually  persons who had a hand in producing the document to  be 
considered by the commissioners a t  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  sess ion .  The r e ­
mainder of the s t a f f  was kept informed of th e  commissioner 's  work by 
the  notes made by Kyran McGrath.
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Sapper se s s io n s  were devoced to s t a f f  p r e s e n ta t i o n  o f  work in 
p ro g re s s .  Here the  s t a f f  members got c l e a r  po l icy  g u id e l in e s  from the  
commissioners and the  commissioners a ttempted to p r o t e c t  themselves 
from being su rp r i s e d  by the  s t a f f  work.
These work p a t t e r n s  of the commissioners were designed to impress 
upon themselves and the  members o f  the  s t a f f  t h a t  i t  was they who were 
u l t i m a t e l y  r e sp o n s ib le  to the p re s id en t  f o r  the  f i n a l  r e p o r t ,  and they 
who would produce i t .  Much o f  the  c o n f l i c t  between the commissioners 
and the  s t a f f  grew from confusion on the p a r t  o f  che s t a f f  over t h i s  
p o in t .  The commissioners,  s t ro n g ly  supported by Ginsburg,  i n s i s t e d  
and main ta ined the p o s i t io n  t h a t  they ,  not the  s t a f f ,  were the commis­
s io n .  Fur ther  d i s cu s s io n  o f  the major problems a r i s i n g  from t h i s  con­
f l i c t  can be found below.
f )  Organiza t ion  of  the  S t a f f
The ten s t a f f  departments were designed to a s s i s t  the commissioners 
in f u l f i l l i n g  the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  mandate(s ).  Each had a s e t  o f  re sp o n s i ­
b i l i t i e s  designed to address  one or  more o f  i t s  p a r t s .  A d i s cu s s io n  
o f  the  work o f  each o f  the  s t a f f  departments fo l lo w s .
1.  Public Safe ty
Public  s a f e ty  was the most p o l i t i c a l l y  s e n s i t i / e  s u b j e c t  under­
taken  by the commission. Every major i n t e r e s t  group with a s take  in the 
r e s o l u t i o n  o f  the  problems c rea ted  by the  c i v i l  d i s o r d e r s  ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  
the  p o l i c e ,  f i r e f i g h t e r s  and the nat ional guard) cen te red  i t s  a t t e n t i o n  
or. how the commission handled t h i s  problem and on the  work of  i t s  
Public  Safe ty  Department (Arnold Sagalyn, D i r e c t o r . )
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Five key f a c to r s  in the p o l i t i c a l  environment in which the 
commission ex is t ed  forced the matte r  of pub l ic  s a f e ty  to the top of 
i t s  agenda: the  mandate, the  "commission problem," congress ional
i n t e r e s t ,  t h e  quickly  developed and s t rong ly  held convic t ion  by the 
commissioners and s t a f f  members t h a t  in the  event o f  another wave of  
urban c i v i l  d iso rde rs  the s a f e ty  of the urban public  could not 
be guaranteed,  and the p e r s i s t e n t  e f f o r t s  by some o f  the commissioners 
and sen ior  s t a f f  members to  broaden the mandate of the commission to 
include some of the unresolved issues  r a i s ed  by the Katzenbach (Crime) 
Commission. These f a c to r s  w il l  be addressed throughout t h i s  d iscuss ion  
of public s a f e ty .
Ginsburg and the  commissioners a lso  had to deal with th ree  impor­
t a n t  procedural  quest ions  while deal ing  with these  p o l i t i c a l l y  explosive  
problems o f  public s a f e t y .  F i r s t ,  which o f f i c i a l  o r  p r iv a te  o rgan iza-  
t i o n ( s )  was a d m in i s t r a t iv e ly  and p o l i t i c a l l y  capable of car ry ing  out 
the necessary  s tud ie s  of the  p o l i c e ,  f i r e f i g h t e r s  and the  na tiona l 
guard? Second, how should the  commission deal with the p o l i t i c a l l y  and 
l e g a l l y  d i f f i c u l t  problems of f e d e r a l - s t a t e  r e l a t i o n s  ra ised  by i t s  
public  s a f e t y  mandate? Third ,  what ro le  should the commission play in 
the unass igned,  but r e l e v a n t ,  po l icy  areas  o f  gun control  l e g i s l a t i o n  
and a d m in i s t r a t iv e  re o rg a n iz a t io n  o f  the p o l i c e ,  f i r e  departments and 
the  na t iona l  guard? The t e x t  of  t h i s  s ec t io n  descr ibes  and analyzes 
the ways in  which the commission d e a l t  with these  p o l i t i c a l -p ro c e d u ra l  
problems.
The f e a r  the p re s id en t  and members of  the  sen io r  White House 
s t a f f  f e l t  in facing another  summer of d i so rd e r s  with a na t iona l  guard 
which had performed badly in deal ing  with those of  1967 was impressed
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upon the commissioners and t h e i r  execu t ive  s t a f f  immediately a f t e r  
t h e i r  appointment. In h is  speech of  July  27 Johnson sa id ;
I have d i r e c t e d  the  Sec re ta ry  o f  Defense to i s sue  new 
t r a i n i n g  standards  fo r  r i o t  control  procedures immediately 
to  National Guard u n i t s  ac ross  the  country .  Through the 
Continental  Army Command, t h i s  expanded t r a i n i n g  w il l  begin  
immediately.  The National Guard must have the a b i l i t y  to  
respond e f f e c t i v e l y ,  qu ick ly  and a p p r o p r i a t e ly ,  in cond i t ions  
o f  d i so rd e r  and v io lence .
With the aid of members of the White House s t a f f ,  the commission wrote 
a l e t t e r  to Johnson on August 10 recommending th ree  actions  be taken to 
b e t t e r  equip the na t iona l  guard to  ca r ry  o u t  i t s  fu tu re  c iv i l  d isorders  
r e s p o n s ib i l i  t i e s  :
"1) Increase s u b s t a n t i a l l y  the  rec ru i tm en t  of Negroes 
in to  the Army National Guard and the  Air  National 
Guard. . .
2) Improve and expand r i o t  control  t r a i n i n g  of the 
Army National Guard and the  Air  National Guard . . .
3) Review by Federal and S t a t e  o f f i c i a l s  of the 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  and performance of a l l  o f f i c e r s  in 
the Army National Guard and the  Air National Guard.
The Department o f  Defense should a l s o  review federal  
r ecogn i t ion  s tandards  and procedures to insure  th a t  
they a re  adequate to prec lude  the aggointment and 
promotion o f  substandard  o f f i c e r s . "
Reaction was quick in coming from members o f  congress ,  governors and 
var ious  p r iv a te  i n t e r e s t  groups.  Represen ta t ives  F. Edward Hebert  and 
Handel 1 Rivers ,  s en io r  members o f  the  m i l i t a r y  es tab li shment of the 
House of Represen ta t ives  and experienced p ro te c to r s  of the na t iona l
^^Report , p. 297. 
S ^ Ib id . ,  p. 318.
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guard heatedly  con tes ted  the commission's recommendations. Hebert 
did not s e t t l e  f o r  a verbal b l a s t  a t  the  commission and the  White 
House. On August 23 he wrote a l e t t e r  to Governor Kerner asking fo r  
access to the data  upon which the commission's recommendations were 
based. The in format ion  would be u s e f u l ,  he s a i d ,  to a spec ia l  sub­
committee of  the House Armed Serv ices  Committee which he was e s t a b l i s h ­
ing to look in to  the  q u a l i t y  o f  the  c i v i l  d i so rde r  t r a i n i n g  being 
received by th e  n a t io n a l  guard. Ginsburg,  rep ly ing  f o r  the  commission, 
said t h a t  he would br ing  the matter to  the a t t e n t i o n  o f  the  commissioners. 
He added, "I hope very much, i n c i d e n t a l l y ,  t h a t  the m a te r i a l s  submitted 
to your Special  Subcommittee will  be av a i l ab le  to t h i s  Commission for 
i t s  fu tu re  d e l i b e r a t i o n s . " ^ ^  The o f f e r  was not taken up by Hebert .
Johnson and Cal ifano  paid p a r t i c u l a r  a t t e n t i o n  to  a l e t t e r  from 
Governor Dan K. Moore of North Carolina .  Moore's was r e p r e s e n ta t i v e  of 
much of the  o p p o s i t io n  d i r e c t e d  a t  the  commission's p o s i t io n  on the 
national g u a r d . Monre expressed concern over a r e p o r t ,  brought to him 
by his Adju tant Genera l ,  Major General Claude T. Bowers, of a recen t
CO
three  day conference on the na tional guard. The p a r t i c i p a n t s  in
^^Chicago T r ibune , 8/15/67.
^^Ginsburg to  Hebert  8 /30/67 , Ginsburg f i l e ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ 
Library.
3^See Cal ifano to the P res id en t ,  8 /25/67 , covering  Moore's l e t t e r ,  
National Advisory Commission on Civ i l  Disorders (1 ) ,  Cal ifano 3,  LBJ 
Library.
C O
Knowledge o f  t h i s  impending meeting was one o f  the  f a c t o r s  
determining the  commission 's  sending the August 10 l e t t e r  to the  pres ident 
on the na t iona l  guard.
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the  Washington meeting d iscussed  the d i so rd e r s ,  r e o rgan iza t ion  of the 
n a t iona l  guard and the  recommendations o f  the  Kerner Commission. Moore 
shared Bower's concern t h a t  the  commission's recommendations and the 
re o rg a n iz a t io n  being proposed would have an adverse e f f e c t  on the morale 
o f  the  national guard.  Moore's s p e c i f i c  concern was over,
. . .  the  means t h a t  w i l l  preva i l  in obta in ing a sub­
s t a n t i a l  increase  of  Negroes in the Guard. The success 
o f  the National Guard system l i e s  in i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  ro le  
as a voluntary o rg a n iz a t io n  and i t s  high en l i s tm en t  r e ­
quirements.  This has allowed the Guard to f i l l  i t s  ranks 
with i n t e l l i g e n t  in d iv id u a ls  with high moral s tanda rds .
No a ttempt  to reduce the  mental ,  moral and physical  
s tandards  fo r  e n l i s tm en t  should be made. To do th i s  
would g re a t ly  reduce the overa l l  s tandards  of  the  Guard.
I t  would even tua l ly  change the complexion of the  
National Guard and des t roy  the pos i t ion  i t  enjoys tg^ay 
as a respected  o rg a n iz a t io n  in the local  community.
Another negat ive r e ac t io n  came from James F. Cantwel l ,  Pres ident  of
65the National Guard Assoc ia t ion  of  the United S t a t e .  The issue  became 
so p o l i t i c a l l y  charged t h a t  Ginsburg accepted the recommendation 
o f  Cyrus Vance t h a t  t h e i r  mutual f j i en d  Stephen Ailes  (a former 
S ec re ta ry  o f  the Army) be used as a knowledgeable and mutually 
re spec ted  o u ts id e r  through whom fu r th e r  commission recommendations 
about the  guard could be f i l t e r e d .  Ailes provided the Commission with 
a means f o r  pu t t ing  d i s t a n c e  between i t ,  the  White House and h o s t i l e  
p ro -na t iona l  guard p o l i t i c i a n s  and i n t e r e s t  groups on t h i s  i s sue .
The time component of the  "commission problem" forced the  com-
^ ^ a l i f a n o  to  th e  P r e s id e n t ,  8 /25 /67  (see  Fn #62, p. 307).
°^Ginsburg to Cantwell ,  8/21/67, Ginsburg F i l e s ,  NACCD Papers, 
LBJ Library .
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missioners  to  make recommendations on the na t iona l  guard e a r l i e r  than 
they d e s i r e d .  The adm in is t ra t ion  had a l a rg e  body o f  data s u b s t a n t i a ­
t ing  p re d ic t io n s  of the i n a b i l i t y  of the  guard to deal with any new 
c iv i l  d i so rd e r s .  Once the commissioners saw the  case  a g a in s t  the 
na t iona l  guard b u i l t  by the adm in is t ra t io n  they agreed th a t  the  r e ­
commendations must be made public  well before  the  summer i f  the muta ily 
agreeable  changes in  policy  were to be r e a l i z e d .  I f  t r a in in g  procedures 
were to  be changed before the onset  o f  the  next " r i o t  season" the  t a sk  
had to  begin in the  l a t e  summer of  1967, Cal ifano to ld  Secre ta ry  
McNamara t h a t  the  na t iona l  guard recommendations of the Kerner 
Commission were high on the p r e s i d e n t ’s p r i o r i t y  l i s t ;  t h e r e f o r e ,  the  
Department o f  Defense gave them fu l l  a t t e n t i o n .
The national guard was being charged by the White House with 
having an inadequate plan fo r  r i o t  duty and inadequate personnel fo r  
doing the  job even i f  an acceptable  plan were developed; the indic tment 
charged t h a t  na tional guard u n i t s  used in the  d iso rders  of 1967 behaved 
as i f  they were indiv idual po l ice  o f f i c e r s ,  no t  members of m i l i t a r y  u n i t s  
with a u n i f i ed  command opera ting  under a predetermined plan of  a c t i o n .
The mayors o f  the  c i t i e s  experiencing d i so rd e r s  reported  the  guard 
performance as i n e p t  a t  b e s t .  Commissioners expressed concern over the 
f a c t  t h a t  too many members o f  the  guard were white and had chosen s e r ­
vice in the  guard as  a means of avoiding re g u la r  m i l i t a r y  duty.
A s e r i e s  of events beginning in December re in forced  the  sense 
of  urgency o r i g i n a l l y  f e l t  in the l a t e  summer by th e  commissioners and 
the  top  White House a d v i s e r s .  At a seminar on c i v i l  emergencies,  General 
J.C. Baker, Vice Chief o f  S t a f f  to Governor R ocke r fe l le r ,  announced . that  
his  o f f i c e ,  with the  cooperation of  New York c i v i l i a n  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  (and
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he implied the  permission and /or  th e  knowledge o f  the  Kerner Commission) 
was working on a plan which would allow th e  na tiona l guard to  en te r  Negro 
s ec t io n s  o f  c i t i e s  p r i o r  to the ou tbreak  of  a d i so rd e r ,  o s t e n s ib ly  to  
p r o t e c t  l i v e s  and p r o p e r t y . T h e  u n r e s t  c rea ted  by t h i s  proposal,  which 
had no bas is  in f a c t  as f a r  as the  commission was concerned, was 
cons ide rab le  in New York and in the Department of  J u s t i c e ;  the  in c id e n t  
again  impressed on the  commissioners the  enormity o f  the ta sk  they had 
to  do and the  small amount of t ime in  which they had to do i t .
Recommendations to reorganize  the  na tional guard,  r a i s e d  in the  
commission and elsewhere in the  a d m in i s t r a t io n  brought f o r t h  a v a r i e t y  
o f  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  ques t ions .  The commission was asked by the Department 
o f  Defense to  recommend th a t  th e  command s t r u c tu r e s  o f  na t iona l  
guard b a t t a l io n s  not be l im i ted  to  ind iv idua l  s t a t e s ;  t h i s  proposal 
was intended to enable the federa l  government to c a l l  guardsmen 
from a wide a rea ,  inc luding surrounding s t a t e s ,  to duty in case of 
f u t u r e  d i so rd e r s .  As an a l t e r n a t i v e ,  Kerner proposed t h a t  the commission 
recommend mutual a id  pacts  between the s t a t e s  fo r  the purposes of con­
t r o l  of d iso rde rs .  The Department of  J u s t i c e  took a dim view of the  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  of  these  p roposa ls .  In i t s  f in a l  r e p o r t  the commission 
y ie lded  to the Department of J u s t i c e ' s  concerns.  I t  did not look favorably  
on s p l i t t i n g  b a t t a l i o n  commands between s t a t e s  and recommended " . . .  t h a t  
the  Department o f  Defense r e c o n s id e r  t h e  alignment of u n i t s  between 
s t a t e s  in order  to ensure t h a t  s t a t e  needs fo r  un i f ied  command and
^^Le t te r  and a ttachments ,  Roger Wilkins (Department of  J u s t i c e )  to  
Ginsburg,  12/21/67, Department of  J u s t i c e  F i l e s ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ 
Li b rary .
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67contro l  in r i o t  o pe ra t ions  are  f u l l y  taken in to  account ."  The
commission took no ac t io n  on the  l e g a l l y  and p o l i t i c a l l y  more d i f f i c u l t  
sugges tion  o f  Kerner.
P res id en t  Johnson was deeply committed to a law and order  approach
to  the  problems of  public  s a f e ty ;^ ^  the congress  was equal ly ,  i f  not
more, determined. Arnold Sagalyn, r e f l e c t i n g  the  views of his s t a f f ,
s a r d o n ic a l ly  remarked a t  a meeting of  the  commissioners t h a t  "After 90
years  o f  po l ice  exper ience ,  the most important  problem facing the
59na t ion  next summer is  po l ice  p r o t e c t i o n . "
Sagalyn and h is  s t a f f  had f i v e  major sources o f  information on 
po l i c e  and f i r e  depar tments.  F i r s t ,  the  commissioners were an un­
u su a l ly  r i c h  source o f  da ta .  J en k in s ,  Lindsay and Kerner had f i r s t ­
hand ad m in i s t r a t iv e  exper ience with  both kinds o f  departments and, 
acco rd ing ly ,  each had f i rm ideas on the su b jec t .  Wilkins and Brooke 
spoke fo r c e f u l ly  about t h e i r  unders tanding o f  Negro American a t t i t u d e s  
toward law enforcement and f i r e  depar tments.  In a l e t t e r  to Ginsburg,  
Jenkins  e s tab l i sh ed  the  public  s a f e t y  chap ters  of  th e  f ina l  r e p o r t  
as h is  primary concern and s e t  ou t  problem a reas  and po ten t ia l  sources 
o f  help fo r  the commission, each o f  which he would re tu rn  to again and 
again:
^^Report , p. 276.
^^See the d iscu ss io n  of h i s  speech to the In te rna t iona l  Associa­
t io n  o f  Chiefs of Po l ice  in Kansas City on September 14, 1967, p. 315.
^SlcGrath Minutes o f  Commissioners'  Meeting,  12/8/57. The Kerner 
Commission was the second of  th r e e  success ive  p r e s id e n t i a l  advisory 
commissions to speak to police-community r e l a t i o n s  problems.
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I b e l iev e  t h a t  the  g r e a t e s t  need i s  fo r  the adopt ion of 
na t iona l  po l ice  s ta n d a rd s ,  p o l ic e  recru i tment ,  p o l ice  
t r a i n i n g ,  pol ice  pay, po l ice  superv is ion  and e s p e c i a l l y  
p o l ice  community r e l a t i o n s .  Once such s tandards  a re  
adopted ,  the  c i t i e s  must have considerable  f i n a n c ia l  
a s s i s t a n c e  to meet th e se  s tandards .
The p repa ra t ion  o f  such s tandards  and the enforcement 
o f  them wil l  be the  most d i f f i c u l t  t a sk .  I t  might be 
d e s i r a b l e  to ask the In te rn a t io n a l  Associa tion o f  Chiefs 
o f  Po l ice  to prepare the  s tandards .
Jenkins  saw the public s a f e t y  mandate in terms o f  two i n t e r r e l a t e d  
problem a re a s  common to a l l  l a rg e  American c i t i e s :  poverty and the
p o l i c e .  Poverty  i s  a major cause of  the  r i o t i n g  which in turn c re a te s  the 
unacceptable  circumstance o f  the p o l ice  having to a c t  as an un inv i ted ,  
unwanted ( e s s e n t i a l l y  fo re ign )  occupying force  in the  urban black 
g he t to s .
Lindsay brought to the  task a seasoned commitment to the need fo r  
c i v i l i a n  review boards o f  po l ice  work and a h o s t i l i t y  toward f i r e f i g h t e r ' s  
a s s o c i a t i o n s .  Wilkins and Palmieri  were a lso  s t rong advocates of a 
c i v i l i a n  p o l i c e  review system. Jenk ins ,  on the o th e r  hand, opposed the 
inc lu s ion  o f  a recommendation fo r  c i v i l i a n  review boards in the f ina l  
r e p o r t .  J en k in s '  p o s i t io n  p reva i led .
Brooke and Wilkins, jo ined  by Corman, were vigorous advocates
Jenk ins  to Ginsburg,  8/17/67, Ginsburg f i l e ,  and McGrath to Ker­
ner 11 /29/67 ,  McGrath f i l e ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ L ib rary .  Jenkins '  
recommendation of the I n t e rn a t io n a l  Assoc ia tion of Chiefs of  Police  
r a t h e r  than the FBI was based on a p ro fes s io n a l ly  developed sense o f  d i s ­
t r u s t  of t h e  a b i l i t y  of t h e  federa l  agency to do an ob jec t ive  job .  He 
e n t e r t a i n e d  no i l l u s io n s  about  the  a b i l i t i e s  of the  In te rna t iona l  Associa­
t io n  of  Chiefs  of Police to  be very o b je c t iv e .  The choice fo r  him was 
between the  l e s s e r  o f  two e v i l s .  He thought t h a t  i t  would be p o l i t i c a l l y  
impossible  fo r  the commission not to use one of these  organ iza t ions  as 
the job was too la rge  f o r  the  commission s t a f f  to do without  help.
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of  the inc lu s ion  o f  recommendations to  l i m i t  the  types of  weapons 
permitted the p o l i c e  fo r  use in c o n t r o l l i n g  c i v i l  d i so rd e rs .
Kerner and Lindsay, of ten  j o in e d  by Corman, wanted to qua l i fy  
Jenkins '  e f f o r t s  to have the commission endorse police management of 
the  re format ion o f  t h e i r  p ro fes s ion .  They wanted to aim the recommenda­
tions  on the  p o l i c e  a t  mayors and po l ice  c h ie f s  in o rder  to s t reng then  
the hands o f  local  o f f i c i a l s  in p o l i c e  m a t t e r s ,  p a r t i c u l a r ly  in t r a in in g  
fo r  contro l  of  c i v i l  d i so rde rs .
Wilkins and Lindsay and Jenkins  were energe t ic  in contending th a t  
f i r e  departments were the most r e c a l c i t r a n t  o f  the public  s a f e ty  groups 
with which the  commission had to d e a l .  Jenkins  wanted to inc lude  a 
recommendation t h a t  f i r e  departments develop t h e i r  own means of p ro tec ­
t in g  themselves in c i v i l  d i s o r d e r s ,  but t h a t  was re j e c te d .  New York 
City co n t r ib u ted  a l a rg e  amount o f  data on f i r e  departments and c iv i l
d i so rde rs  and they formed the b a s i s  fo r  the  s ec t ion  in the rep o r t
17deal ing  with t h a t  su b jec t .
The second source  of data f o r  the s t a f f  working on the public 
s a f e ty  sec t ion  of the  r e p o r t  was the federa l  bureauaracy. The Depart­
ment o f  J u s t i c e  provided a vas t  amount of da ta  about the  s t a t e  of 
readiness  o f  var ious  po l ice  departments to deal with fu tu re  d i so rd e r s .  
The p ic tu re  pa in ted  was not a b r i g h t  one. S t a f f  members of the Depart-
See McGrath, Minutes, 12 /8 /67 ,  and Repor t , pp. 9 and 176; a l so  
see the  d i scuss ion  of  consu l tan t  O.W. Wilson's opinion on t h i s  i s su e ,  
pp. 322-323.
^^See McGrath, Minutes, 12/8/67 and the l e t t e r  Jay Kriegal 
to Palmieri  and Sagalyn 1/3 /68,  Palmier i  f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library 
toge ther  with a r e p o r t  from Kriegal about the  New York Fire  Department. 
See a l so  Report pp. 272-274.
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ment o f  J u s t i c e  a ided the commission s t a f f  in d r a f t i n g  the  following 
commission l e t t e r  to the p res iden t ;
The National Advisory Commission on Civil D iso rders ,  on
the b a s i s  of testimony thus  f a r  received ,  recommends t h a t
you d i r e c t  the Department of J u s t i c e  to  conduct a s e r i e s  
o f  i n t e n s iv e  t r a i n i n g  conferences th i s  w in te r  f o r  govern­
mental and p o l i c e  o f f i c i a l s .  The s e r i e s  would focus on 
e f f e c t i v e  measures fo r  the  maintenance of  law and order  
and on programs to improve police-community r e l a t i o n s .
We emphasize t h a t  knowledge and programs in  th e se  areas  
a re  no t  s u b s t i t u t e s  for  so lu t ions  to the problems of 
r a c i a l  d i s c r im in a t io n ,  a l i e n a t io n  and pover ty ,  as r e ­
f l e c t e d  in such areas  as  employment, education and 
housing. But th e re  is a need fo r  c i t i e s ,  as soon as
p o s s ib le ,  to share  the knowledge t h a t  has been gained
in methods fo r  maintenance of  law and order .
Some sev en ty - f iv e  w i tn e sse s ,  inc luding mayors, c h ie f s  
o f  p o l i c e ,  o th e r  s t a t e  and local o f f i c i a l s ,  r e p r e s e n ta t i v e s  
o f  federa l  departments and agencies,  and r e s id e n t s  of 
d i s o rd e r  areas  have now t e s t i f i e d  before the Commission. 
Many o thers  w i l l  be heard.
The testimony to  date  convinces the  Commission t h a t  a 
s u b s ta n t i a l  body o f  knowledge now e x is t s  in the  f i e l d s  
of  prevent ion and con tro l  of c iv i l  d isorders  t h a t  could 
p r o f i t a b l y  be communicated through t r a in in g  conferences  
under the  auspices  of  the  Department o f  J u s t i c e .  Of 
course ,  we a re  aware t h a t  a number of va luable  meetings 
and programs f o r  local  law enforcement o f f i c i a l s  a re  
under way. But these  meetings we be l ieve  can be s i g n i ­
f i c a n t l y  supplemented by a conference of broader scope 
and longer dura t ion  such as t h a t  we here propose.
The p rec ise  format of t h i s  conference and the c i t i e s  
to be involved would, o f  course,  be determined by the  
J u s t i c e  Department. The conference could be conducted 
here in Washington or on a regional b a s i s ,  perhaps in 
coopera t ion  with  c o l le g e s  or u n i v e r s i t i e s .  A s h o r t  
program might be a pp rop r ia te  fo r  key s t a t e  and muni­
c ipa l  o f f i c i a l s ,  a s l i g h t l y  longer one f o r  p o l i c e  
c h i e f s ,  and a more ex tens ive  one fo r  o th e r  pub l ic  s a f e ty  
and government personnel.  Subjects to be covered p re ­
sumably would include decis ion  planning; contro l  
techniques ;  communications systems; dec is ion  making 
during d i s o rd e r s ,  jo in in g  opera tions  with  neighboring 
p o l i c e ,  s t a t e  p o l ic e ,  the National Guard and Army; 
community r e l a t i o n s  and e f f e c t iv e  means of  dea l ing
73with c i t i z e n s '  g r ievances .
The Off ice  o f  Law Enforcement of  the  Department of J u s t i c e  worked 
c l o s e l y  with the  commission s t a f f  in s t ru c tu r in g  the testimony of 
hear ing w i tnesses  and ga ther ing  o the r  forms of evidence ( i n t r a - d e p a r t -  
ment s t u d i e s ,  t a sk  fo rce  r e p o r t s ,  e t c . )  necessary in prepar ing  the 
commissioners fo r  making t h e i r  recommendations on po l ice  r i o t  t r a i n i n g .
The p u b l i c a t io n  o f  these  recommendations fo r  po l ice  t r a in in g  
was a c c e l e r a t e d  by the  speech Johnson gave to the In te rn a t io n a l
75Assoc ia t ion  o f  Chiefs o f  Pol ice  in Kansas City on September 14.
The commission was kept informed of  the  evolu tion o f  the  speech and 
th e  sen io r  s t a f f  agreed with the White House and the Department 
o f  J u s t i c e  on the  need to move quickly  to re in fo rce  those  pa r t s  
which c a l l e d  f o r  po l ice  t r a i n i n g ;  a l l  feared t h a t  Johnson’s tough law 
and order  r h e t o r i c  in the  Kansas City speech would be the only th ing 
heard by the  p o l ic e  c h ie f s  and repor ted  in the p re s s ;  they wanted to 
remove the  f e a r  o f  po l ice  rep re ss ion  and b r u t a l i t y  from the minds of 
urban Negroes by recommending community r e l a t io n s  as well as r i o t  
control  t r a i n i n g .
The O ff ice  of  Economic Opportunity presented the commission with a 
plan fo r  a J u n io r  Cadet Corps which Sargent Shr iver  (D irec to r  of OEO) 
reasoned would be a useful component in a comprehensive police-community
^'^R e p o r t , p. 318.
^^Palmier i  to McCulloch 9/1 /67 and Ginsburg to Commissioners 
9/20/67, Ginsburg,  Public Safe ty  f i l e ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library.
P r e s id e n t ,  Public Papers of the P r e s i d e n t s , Lyndon B. 
Johnson, 1957, pp. 831-836 and 839-841.
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r e l a t i o n s  program.^^ Jenkins  and Lindsay supported t h i s  recommendation 
and added another  f o r  community r e l a t i o n s  o f f i c e r  programs s i m i l a r  to 
those which had been so successfu l  in A t l a n t a .
Th i rd ,  a v a r i e t y  of  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  and ind iv idua l  c o n su l t an t s  
aided Saga lyn 's  people in c o l l e c t i n g  and analyz ing  pub l ic  s a f e ty  
da ta .  Three i n s t i t u t i o n a l  resources  were used: the  Michigan S ta te
U n iv e r s i ty  School o f  Po l ice  A dm in is t ra t ion ,  the  I n t e rn a t io n a l  Associa ­
t io n  o f  Chiefs o f  Po l i ce  (lACP), and th e  Federal Bureau o f  I n v e s t i g a ­
t i o n  (FBI).
The data  supp l ied  Saga lyn 's  s t a f f  by Michigan S ta te  U n i v e r s i t y ' s  
School o f  Po l ice  A dm in is t ra t ion  complemented t h a t  obta ined by 
commissioners and s t a f f  members in t h e i r  d i scu ss io n s  with Negro le ad e rs  
during the  f i e l d  t r i p s  and th e  hear ings ;  in both the p o l ice  departments  
in the  c i t i e s  in  which the  d iso rde rs  o ccu r red  were desc r ibed  as more 
i n c l in e d  and b e t t e r  equipped to  r e p re s s  than to prevent d i s o r d e r s .  The 
Michigan c o n su l t a n t s  made a p a r t i c u l a r l y  important a t tem p t  to c o n t r i ­
bute to  the  public  s a f e t y  s e c t io n  by showing how the Katzenbach (Crime) 
Commission had been weak and how the Kerner Commission might succeed 
where i t s  p redecesso r  had f a i l e d .  Robert  Wasserman of  Michigan S t a t e ,  
who had worked fo r  the  Crime Commission on problems of  r i o t  c o n t r o l ,  
urged th e  Kerner Commission to  be s p e c i f i c  in  i t s  recommendations on 
police-community r e l a t i o n s  in order to b ea t  down the  r e s i s t a n c e  p o l ice
^^L et te r s  S h r ive r  to  Ginsburg,  S/14/67 and 9/7/67, OEO f i l e ,  
NACCD Papers ,  13J Library .
^^L e t te r  Kriegal to Kruzman 11/22 /67 ,  Public Safe ty  f i l e ,  NACCD 
Papers ,  LBJ L ibrary .
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departments would c r e a t e  to the  commission's  r e p o r t ,  and to  a id  community 
o f f i c i a l s  in t h e i r  e f f o r t s  to  bring the  po l ice  in to  th i s  r e l a t i v e l y  new 
a rea  of  work.
I would suggest  t h a t  you consider  the  development of 
ac t ion  models, e s p e c i a l l y  in the  a rea  o f  p o l ic e -  
community r e l a t i o n s  and pol ice  t a c t i c a l  opera t ions .
Such ac t ion  models could be published as an appendix 
to your r e p o r t  o r  could be included in each re levan t  
sec t ion .  The important poin t  to be considered is t h a t  
every recommendation should have a model or simple pro­
cedure -  t h i s  i s  one area where the  National Crime Com­
m iss ion 's  work was weak.
Police o f f i c i a l s  a re  defensive  and r e s i s t a n t  to  change; 
to force  the o rgan iza t ion  change necessary to a productive 
program in p o l ice  community r e l a t i o n s  will  requ ire  de­
t a i l e d  exp lana t ion  of the  problems, recommendations fo r  
action and d e t a i l e d  i n s t r u c t io n s  as to how to implement 
those recommendations. Without the  l a t t e r ,  your work 
wil l  have l i t t l e  e f f e c t .
F in a l ly ,  the community can fo rce  change. P u b l i c i ty  
given the  f a c t  t h a t  the commission recommended models can 
cause the  sgmmunity power s t r u c t u r e s  to demand th e i r  imple­
menta tion.
The commission's recommendations on the  pol ice  were aimed in th e  d i r e c ­
t io n  Wasserman poin ted ,  but the "commission problem" again thwarted 
the  e f f o r t ;  in  t h i s  in s tance  the combination of s c a r c i t y  o f  t ime and 
the  necessary s t a f f  ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  a f t e r  the dec is ion  to publish only 
one repor t )  forced  the  commissioners to  be f a r  more general in the p o l ice  
chap te r  than most of  them d es i red  to be.
The In te rn a t io n a l  Associa tion o f  Chiefs o f  Po l ice  (lACP) was the  
major ou ts ide  consu l t an t  fo r  the  commission in i t s  e f fo r t s  to ge t  data  
on the s t a t e  of  c i v i l  d i so rd e r  preparedness of the  n a t io n ' s  major p o l ice
' ^ L e t t e r ,  Robert Wasseman to Kruzman, 9 /27/67, Public Safety 
F i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library .
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fo rce s .  The commissioners and s t a f f  members most knowledgeable in
po l ice  m at te rs  wanted the FBI to  take  on t h i s  t a s k ,  b u t  when the  bureau
turned the  commission down Sagalyn turned to the  lACP a f t e r  sounding
79out  a number of  persons w i th in  and o u ts id e  the  commission.  The 
c o n t r ib u t io n s  of  the  lACP, l i k e  those  of the  FBI, were received and 
used very c a u t i o u s ly .  Sagalyn i n s i s t e d ,  as a p a r t  o f  the  c o n t r a c t ,  on 
the r i g h t  to confer  with the  lACP during the  s tudy ,  and to  review i t s
o n
work before  accep t ing  i t s  f i n a l  r e p o r t  to the  commission.
The research  e f f o r t  by the  lACP cons is ted  of " . . .  determining the  
cu r r e n t  c a p a b i l i t i e s  of  s t a t e ,  county and local law enforcement agencies  
to prevent and con tro l  c i v i l  d i s o r d e r s . T h i r t y  major popula tion 
cen te r s  of the  country  were examined and eva lua ted  in e ig h t  areas  of 
c i v i l  d i s o rd e r  p rep a ra t io n :
"1) Plans f o r  m o b i l i z a t io n  o f  resources  to meet the  
emergencies o f  c i v i l  d i s o r d e r s  and d i s a s t e r s  inc lud ing  
l i a i s o n  with o th e r  r e l a t e d  agencies .
"2 )  Training programs e s p e c i a l l y  cons t ruc ted  to p repare  
personnel fo r  both th e  p reven t ion  and con t ro l  o f  c i v i l  
d i s o rd e r s .
"3) Formalized l o g i s t i c a l  and contingency p lann ing .
Sagalyn to  Ginsburg 9 /29 /67 ,  Public Safe ty  F i l e s ,  NACCD, LBJ 
Library .  Jenkins  gave h i s  approval when the  FBI tu rn ed  the  commission 
down. Other persons with t i e s  to the  po l ice  community doubted the  capa­
c i t y  of  the lACP to  do th e  job in the  time frame a l l o t e d ;  o th e r s  questioned 
i t s  a b i l i t y  to  be " o b je c t iv e " ;  but a l l  agreed t h a t  i f  the  FBI would not 
do t h i s  work then the  lACP should be allowed to t r y .
^^ Ib id .  See a l so  Bower to  Ginsburg 11 /1 /67 ,  Public  S a fe ty ,  NACCD 
Papers,  LBJ L ibrary .  Bower wanted Ginsburg and Palmieri  to read the d r a f t  
o f  the f i r s t  phase of  the lACP s tudy " . . .  to de te rmine  whether the  r e p o r t  
wi l l  c r e a t e  any po l icy  problems f o r  the commission."
^^Quinn Tamm (Executive  D i re c to r  of the  lACP) to  Sagalyn 9 /27 /67 ,  
Public S a fe ty ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library.
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"4) The development of command and contro l  systems.
"5) The planning and development o f  s t r a t e g y  and t a c t i c a l  
ope ra t ions  fo r  preventing,  conta in ing  or  coping with such 
d i s o rd e r s .
"6) The es tab l ishment  of p e r t in e n t  i n t e l l i g e n c e  systems.
"7) The a v a i l a b i l i t y  of legal t o o l s ,  spec ia l  equipment and 
weapons.
"8) The e f f e c t  of l eg a l ,  economic, p o l i t i c a l  and soc ia l  gg 
r e s t r a i n t s  upon police  e f f o r t s  before  and during d i s o r d e r s . "
The commissioners adopted Sagalyn 's  cautious  approach to the 
lACP c o n t r a c t .  The lACP rep o r t  was c a r e f u l l y  read by the public  s a f e ty  
s t a f f ,  Ginsburg, Palmieri and Chief Jenk ins ,  with the  commissioner having 
v i r t u a l  veto power over which par ts  o f  the  r e p o r t  were d i r e c t l y  incorpora­
ted in to  the commission's f ina l  s ta tements  about the p o l i c e .  S p e c i f i ­
c a l l y ,  with the  key White House a id e s ,  the  Department of  J u s t i c e ,  Jenkins ,  
most o f  the  commissioners,  and the  executive  s t a f f  o f  the  commission in 
agreement t h a t  po l ice  p rac t ices  were in p a r t  re sponsib le  f o r  the d i s o rd e r s ,  
the publ ic  s a f e t y  s t a f f  d ra f ted  a s e t  of recommendations, t r u e  to the 
evidence before  them and reasonable  in substance and tone to  everyone
except the p re s id e n t ,  the ha rd - l in e  law and order supporte rs  in congress 
83and the  p o l ic e .  The recommendations had l i t t l e  e f f e c t  on the n a t io n ' s  
p o l ice  departments.  New t r a in in g  e f f o r t s  concentra ted  on the  
suppress ion o f  d i so rd e r s ,  not on t h e i r  prevention .  In add i t io n  to 
the "commission problem", two reasons stand ou t  to expla in  the f a i l u r e
Ĝ Ibid.
go
Johnson was supportive  of the requests  fo r  more emphasis on police  
c i v i l  d i so rd e r  prevention and contro l  t r a i n i n g .  Is is  doubtfu l ,  however, 
t h a t  he was w i l l in g  to give any support  to public  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of the 
po l ice  as causal  f a c to r s  in the d i so rd e r s .
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of  the  commission to achieve i t s  goal o f  changing pol ice  behavior .
F i r s t ,  the  commission was the only h igh ly  v i s i b l e  nat ional  body
at tempt ing  to g ive  t h i s  type o f  moderate le ad e rsh ip  to the problems
o f  publ ic  s a f e ty  and c iv i l  d i so rd e rs .  The p re s id e n t  and congress were
c o n te s t in g  fo r  l e ad e rsh ip  of  the  h a r d - l i n e  law and order movement which
obviously  had a good deal of  public  support  behind i t .  In such a
p o l i t i c a l  environment a p re s id e n t i a l  advisory  commission's recommendations
have l i t t l e  chance o f  achieving much success .  Second, the proven
a b i l i t y  of  the n a t i o n ' s  po l ice  departments to t r a n s l a t e  c i t i z e n  p ro te s t s
a g a in s t  perceived governmental oppress ion in to  g re a te r  amounts of l e th a l
. 84weaponry again  p reva i led .
The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the FBI and the  commission can b e s t  be 
descr ibed  as cau t io u s  and proper.  The commission had to deal with the 
FBI on the  conspiracy  is sue  because the p re s id en t  had s p e c i f i c a l l y
85vested the  bureau with r e s p o n s ib l i t y  f o r  in v e s t ig a t i n g  the m a t te r .  Thus 
D i rec to r  Hoover was the f i r s t  witness heard a t  the  hearings and he was 
consu l ted  and informed, d i r e c t l y  and through the  commission-FBI l i a s i o n  
o f f i c e r ,  o f  the  development o f  the commission's  recommendations as l a t e  as 
two days before  the f ina l  r ep o r t  was pub l i shed .  On al l  o the r  i ssues  the 
commission kept the FBI a t  a r e spec t fu l  d i s t a n c e ,  accepting i t s  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of  the  various problems be fo re  i t  as no l e ss  a u t h o r i t a ­
t i v e  than the o th e r s  i t  was rece iv ing  from a v a r i e ty  of government 
depar tm ents /agenc ies .
OA
For ano ther  d iscuss ion  of t h i s  po in t  see pp. 325-329.
^^See Johnson’ s Executive Order 11365 and the  speeches he made a t  
the  time of  the  commission's appointment.  Repor t , pp. 295-298.
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Three in d iv id u a ls  made s i g n i f i c a n t  c on t r ibu t ions  to the  commis­
s i o n ' s  pub l ic  s a f e ty  recommendations: Adam Yarmolinsky o f  the  Harvard
Law School,  O.W. Wilson, former Super in tendent  of  Po l ice  f o r  the  City 
o f  Chicago and Anthony Downs, Vice P r e s id e n t  of  the Real E s t a t e  Research 
Cooperat ion of Chicago.
Ginsburg tu rned  to Yarmolinsky f o r  names o f  persons from whom the 
commission could secure  in form at ion  on the public  s a f e t y  q u e s t io n s  i t  
had s e t  o u t  to a n s w e r . Y a r m o l i n s k y  suggested th ree  types  o f  persons 
to  br ing  before  the  commission as w i tn e sse s :  po l ice  o f f i c i a l s ,  academic
07
o b s e r v e r s ,  and local  ghetto  l e a d e r s .  ' In the f i r s t  two c a t e g o r i e s  he 
made s p e c i f i c  recommendations o f  persons to be con tac ted :  nine  p o l ice
o f f i c i a l s  from around the  n a t io n  and seven academic s p e c i a l i s t s  in 
p o l i c e  p r a c t i c e  and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  toge the r  with the  names o f  two
G O
persons from the Katzenbach (Crime) Commission. In s te a d  o f  l i s t i n g  
names of local  ghe t to  l e a d e r s ,  Yarmolinsky recommended t h a t  Ginsburg 
c o n t a c t  t h r e e  persons whom he thought had good con tac ts  with  the  
indigenous  Negro l e a d e r s h ip  in a «umber of  key c i t i e s :  John Spiegel
o f  Brandeis  U n ive rs i ty  who had been doing research Involv ing  ghe t to  
l e a d e r s ,  Kenneth Clark  of the  Metropol i tan  Applied Research C en te r ,  I n c . ,
Yarmolinsky was one o f  a group of Harvard p r o f e s s o r s  -  Abraham 
Chayes and Richard Neustadt being the  most important-who served  as con­
s u l t a n t s  fo r  the  commission. While Ginsburg did  not l i m i t  h im se l f  to 
t h i s  group o f  c o n su l t a n t s  Yarmolinsky and his co lleagues  did serve  as 
primary ga tekeepers  through which v i t a l  information about pe rsonnel ,  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  resources  and pub l ic  p o l ic y  matters  in  general  flowed 
through Ginsburg to  the commissioners.
07
Yarmolinsky to Ginsburg,  9 /1 /6 7 ,  Ginsburg f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers ,  
LBJ L ib ra ry .
GGlbid.
321
(MARC) in New York, with whom the commission was well acqua in ted ,  and
go
Noel Day of  Boston. Yarmolinsky observed t h a t  na tional c i v i l  r i g h t s
l e a d e r s  were no t  the  b e s t  source of  in format ion  about local  Negro
90le a d e r s h ip .  His advice  was obvious ly  no t  followed. Only na t iona l  
c i v i l  r i g h t s  l e a d e r s  were heard a t  the commission hear ings .  Others
91were heard by one of  the  o the r  means developed fo r  taking tes timony.
O.W. Wilson,  former ly  o f  the  U n iv e r s i ty  o f  C a l i fo rn ia  and Super­
in te n d a n t  o f  Po l i ce  f o r  the  City of  Chicago, jo ined forces  with  Jenk ins  
in p re s en t in g  the  commissioners with  an argument a g a in s t  w r i t in g  any 
recommendations which could be i n t e r p r e t e d  as support ing the e x c lu s iv e  
use of  the  p o l i c e  in suppress ing d i s o r d e r s .  Wilson was f i rm ly  in favor  
o f  us ing  the  p o l i c e  as agents of c i v i l  d i s o r d e r  p reventive  maintenance.
In h i s  tes t im ony ,  and h is  w r i t t e n  review o f  the f i r s t  d r a f t  o f  the  p o l i c e  
c h a p t e r s ,  Wilson s t ro n g ly  endorsed police-community r e l a t i o n s  as the 
primary p o l i c e  c o n t r ib u t io n s  to th e  p reven t ion  of d i s o r d e r s .  He was 
very c a u t i o u s  about  endorsing recommendations which might be i n t e r p r e t e d  
as approval o f  p o l ice  use of a v a r i e t y  o f  kinds of weapons in  c o n t r o l l i n g  
d i s o r d e r s .  Throughout,  Wilson supported those  on the  commission who 
i n s i s t e d  t h a t  tne  p o l ice  were more a p a r t  o f  the  problem than the 
s o l u t i o n  to the  urban d i so rd e r s ;  he agreed t h a t  the law enforcement 
agenc ies  had a h i s t o r y  and a p o t e n t i a l  f o r  being se r io u s  p e r p e t r a t o r s
o q
Ginsburg c lea red  Yarmolinsky's l i s t  of names with Paul Y lv isaker  
and James Vorenberg,  executive  d i r e c t o r s  r e s p e c t i v e l y  o f  the  New J e r s e y  
r i o t  commission and the  Katzenbach (Crime) Commission. All p ro sp ec t iv e  
w i tnesses  were c l ea re d  by the i lh ite  House befo re  being in v i t e d  by the  
commission to  t e s t i f y .
^^Yarmolinsky to Ginsburg,  9 /1 /57 .
91
• D iscussed  in  Sec t ion  C. pp. 279-291.
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of i n j u s t i c e .
The in f luence  o f  Anthony Downs on the f in a l  r e p o r t  of  th e  Kerner
Commission was g re a t  and h i s  work on the  public s a f e ty  chap te rs  was among
92his  most important  c o n t r ib u t io n s .  Downs in jec ted  in to  the work on public 
sa f e ty  a s trong note  of p o l i t i c a l  realism. He placed heavy s t r e s s  on 
an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  public  opinion da ta  which p ic tu red  inc reas in g  
percentages  of the  popula tion moving toward demands t h a t  the p o l ice
control  the u n re s t  in  the Negro ghettos and t h a t  fu tu r e  d i so rd e r s  be
93quickly suppressed.  Downs' realism had the e f f e c t  of reminding the 
s t a f f  and the  commissioners t h a t  th e i r  recommendations s e t  f o r th  in the 
pol ice  sec t ions  of t h e i r  f in a l  report  were counter to  a s t rong  cu r ren t  
of public opinion running through th e  na t ion  a t  the t ime.
The f i e l d  t r i p s  were the fourth source  of  public  s a fe ty  data fo r  
the  commission. Recognition th a t  th e  r e s id e n t s  of the  urban ghettos  
viewed the  p o l ice  and the  national guard as an enemy force  grew gradually  
in the consciousness  of the  commissioners. I t  was the  r e s id e n t s  themselves 
who to ld  them the same th ing  in v i s i t  a f t e r  v i s i t :  the re  had been o f f i c i a l
in d i f f e r en c e  to  t h e i r  needs fo r  basic po l ice  s e rv ice s  p r io r  t o ,  and r e p re s ­
s ive  po l ice  a c t i o n s  during the disorders .  Not a l l  the commissioners adopted 
t h i s  p os i t ion  as t h e i r  own; however, most understood i t  even i f  they did not 
be l ieve  i t  to be t r u e .  The question o f  what to do with and about th i s  
a t t i t u d e  o f  urban ghe t to  blacks became a bone o f  con ten t ion  among the  
commissioners and between them and the s t a f f  as the  publ ic  s a f e ty  chapters  
were w r i t t e n .
9?Many o f  h i s  con tr ibu t ions  t o  the  commission wil l  be d iscussed  in 
s e c t io n  F, 10, pp. 369-375, and Section F, 11, a ,  pp. 375-384.
^^See McGrath Minutes f o r  9 /13/67.
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The D e t r o i t  and Cincinnat i  f i e l d  t r i p s  were d e f i n i t i v e  fo r  the 
commissioners and s t a f f  in bringing them to f u l l  understanding of th is  
Negro a t t i t u d e  toward the  police .  The in te rv iews conducted during 
these  c i t y  v i s i t s  exposed them to the un re s t ra ined  f e a r  and hatred 
o f  the po l ice  possessed by e s tab l i shed  and rad ica l  b lack  leadership  
a l i k e .  The commissioners expected to hear rad ica l  pos i t ions  a r t i c u l a t e d  
by the leade rs  Harr is  and Lindsay met in C in c in n a t i ,  but i t  was the 
testimony of the  D e t ro i t  black leaders  which shocked the  commissioners 
the  most. In D e t ro i t ,  the  local  Negro leade rsh ip  was as moderate and 
e s s e n t i a l l y  co nse rva t ive  as expected un t i l  the  topic  of  the po l ice  
was ra i s e d ;
The ex is t en ce  o f  po l ice  b r u t a l i t y  w i l l  no t  be accepted 
by the  community. We are t e r ro r i z e d  by i t .  The answer 
to  t h i s  problem has been re jec ted  across  the country  by 
the  White po l ice  departments.  We need C iv i l i a n  Review 
Boards with  power.
I t  i s  more than b r u t a l i t y .  The po l ice  do not do the 
th ings  they could; around Northern High School the re  
a r e  drugs being pushed, sometimes by the p o l i c e ,  and 
they get t h e i r  c u t .  There i s  organized cggme and 
G ira rd in  says t h a t  he is not aware of  i t .
At the  same time the Urban League of D e t ro i t  was conducting a survey 
o f  Negro a t t i t u d e s  which id e n t i f i e d  po l ice  p r a c t i c e s  and ghetto housing 
as the p r in c ip l e  causes of the 1967 d i s o r d e r . T h e  b i t t e rn e s s  which
Testimony o f  Reginald Wilson, DESAGE, found in notes taken during the  
8 /21/67 commissioner 's  D e t ro i t  Fie ld  t r i p .  D e t ro i t  F ie ld  Trip F i l e ,
NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library  emphasis in the  o r i g i n a l .
og
 ̂ I b i d . ,  te s t imony of  Charles Colding.
^^The data  produced by th i s  study were l a t e r  used by the 
commission.
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Harris and Lindsay repor ted  a f t e r  t h e i r  C inc inna t i  v i s i t  confirmed t h a t  
t h i s  a t t i t u d e  toward the police  was not l im i t ed  to  one c i t y  o r  type 
o f  Negro le a d e r .
Some commissioner r e s i s t a n c e  to adoption o f  t h i s  poin t  of view 
about the  po l ice  can be traced to i t s  vigorous endorsement by the  
j u n io r  members o f  the  s t a f f  who made t h e  t r i p s  with the commissioners 
and those who p a r t i c ip a t e d  in the s t a f f  f i e l d  t r i p s ;  they mounted 
cons ide rab le  p ressure  on the commissioners to i d e n t i f y  the po l ice  as one 
o f  the  major causes o f  the r i o t s .  The climax o f  th i s  s t ru g g le  came in 
e a r ly  December when chap ter  d r a f t s  were c i r c u l a t e d  fo r  s t a f f  c r i t i ­
cism p r io r  to t h e i r  submission to the commissioners.  The general  s t a f f  
c r i t i q u e  was t h a t  the  d ra f t s  did not r e f l e c t  the  Negro b i t t e r n e s s  e x p e r i ­
enced dur ing a l l  the  f i e l d  t r i p s ;  Paul G. Bower (Ass is tan t  D irec to r  o f  the  
Department o f  Public Safe ty ) ,  fo r  i n s t a n c e ,  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  the commission
could not s e t t l e  f o r  simple re s ta tem en ts  of  the  f indings  of the Katzenbach
97(Crime) Commission on police  p r a c t i c e s .  Dennis T. B a r r e t t ,  a f i e l d  
team l e a d e r ,  was commissioned by his  f e l lo w  f i e l d  team members to send 
a d r a f t  h igh ly  c r i t i c a l  of the  police-community r e l a t io n s  s ec t io n  o f  the 
f i r s t  s t a f f  a t tempt to  write  a summary o f  the  f ina l  repor t .  He s a i d ,  
in pa r t :
As one of  our team members pu t  i t ,  "I can see some 
p r a c t i c a l  reasons fo r  saying nice  th in g s  about the 
cops in an a ttempt  to make the  ha rsh  th in g s  more pa la ­
t a b l e ,  to  them, but i t  i s  too l a t e  fo r  winning f r i e n d s . "
From a s t r u c t u r a l  point  o f  view, the  t r a n s i t i o n  from 
the o f t e n  b ru ta l  ro le  of the p o l i c e  during the r i o t s  to the  
apology fo r  t h e i r  l ives  and a c t i o n s ,  then back to t h e i r
^^Memo, Bower To Ginsburg,  and P a lm ie r i  and Sagalyn,  1 2 /1 1 /6 7 ,
Public S a fe ty ,  NACCD Papers, LBJ L ibrary .
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b r u t a l i t y  is  j u s t  too abrup t .  What White American is  
unaware of  is  the  e n t i r e  range o f  p o l ice  misconduct which is  
the  d a i l y  f a c t o r  in  th e  l i f e  of the ghetto  r e s i d e n t :  
a c tua l  b r u t a l i t y ,  rough t rea tm en t ,  u n j u s t i f i e d  stopping 
on the  s t r e e t  accompanied by a rough and degrading f r i s k ,  
d a i ly  i n s u l t s .  I f  we sugarcoat the compla in ts ,  we have 
f a i l e d  in our ta sk  of a l e r t i n g  the  country  to  the  t ru e  
s t a t e  o f  f a c t s .  The f a c t  th a t  the  Cinc innat i  p o l ice  did 
not shoot anyone by i t s e l f  dogs not prove t h e i r  day-to-day 
methods a re  more en l igh tened .
Pred ic tab ly ,  the  j u n i o r  s t a f f  members l o s t  t h i s  s t r u g g l e .
Most pol ice  o f f i c i a l s  reacted nega t ive ly  to  the c r i t i c i s m s  of  them 
and th e i r  work which the commissioners f i n a l l y  approved fo r  inc lus ion  
in the f in a l  r e p o r t .  The commissioners r e j e c t e d  a l l  the  at tempts to 
r a d i c a l i z e  the  chap ters  on the  po l ice ;  they produced in s tead  moderate 
c r i t i c i s m  o f  and recommendations for the major pub l ic  s a f e t y  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
of  the na t ion .  In doing so they stayed c lose  to the advice of  Anthony Downs 
and wrote a s ta tement  t h a t  could be read and understood by the 
average c i t i z e n  in  the h a rd - l in e  law and order  c l im a te  developing in 
the country.
The o th e r  major source o f  information fo r  the  commission in 
developing the po l ice  chap te rs  was da ta  produced by previous r i o t
go
Memo, B a r r e t t  to  Nelson, "Re: Draft  Comments on Shallow Paper,"
12/5/67, p. 2 . ,  Department of Research, NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library,  On the 
same page B a r r e t t  added th e  following foo tno te :  "An informal poll of  a l l
team le ad e rs  shows t h a t ,  in  t h e i r  op in ion ,  p o l i c e  m a lp rac t ice  was the 
major complaint  in  a l l  o f  the 23 c i t i e s  v i s i t e d .  In 7 more c i t i e s  i t  
was a secondary bu t  s t i l l  important complaint .  In only f iv e  c i t i e s  did 
the Team Leaders fee l  i t  was of l i t t l e  s i g n i f i c a n c e . "  (FN#1) When cons i ­
dera t ion  i s  given to the  f a c t  th a t  th e  document under cons ide ra t ion  here 
(the "Shallow Paper") was the  infamous, fo r  most of the commissioners 
and Ginsburg a t  l e a s t ,  "Harvest of Racism" paper which was re j e c te d  ou t  of 
hand by the  commissioners and Ginsburg as being too r a d i c a l ,  one begins to 
see how wide the gap between the two groups was.
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commissions, o th e r  p r e s id e n t i a l  advisory commissions and task fo rces .
From t h i s  r i c h  r e s e r v o i r ,  the  kerner resea rchers  s e l e c ted  for carefu l 
examination the r e p o r t  of the  East  S t .  Louis r i o t  commission, 
the  Crime Commission, and the  various  Johnson s e c r e t  ta sk  forces  charged 
with the s tudy of  p o l ice  and crime r e la t e d  problems.
Ginsburg,  Sagalyn and the  o th e r  members o f  the  s t a f f  working on 
these  i s sues  were keenly aware t h a t  c l e a r  o b je c t iv e  repor t ing  by r i o t  
commissions of  r i o t  provoking and of ten  bru ta l  behavior by the police  
most of ten  r e s u l t e d  in more money f o r  pol ice  departments which in turn  
produced more personnel and b e t t e r  armed pol ice  fo r ce s .  The h i s to ry  
o f  p o l ice  methods o f  deal ing with c iv i l  d i so rde rs  seemed, t h e re fo re ,  
to  be one o f  providing incen t ives  fo r  the  p o l ice  to maintain t h e i r  past  
behavior p a t t e r n s .  The Kerner personnel were aware o f  th i s  p a t t e r n ,  
in p a r t i c u l a r  of  th e  h i s to r y  o f  the East St.  Louis and Chicago r i o t  
commissions; t h a t  accounts in p a r t  fo r  the r e j e c t i o n  of  the more rad ica l  
options  with which the  s t a f f  presented them and the  moderate tone of the 
f in a l  r e p o r t .  Some aspec ts  o f  the recen t  h i s to r y  of  pol ice  behavior 
a l so  inf luenced th e  tone o f  th e  f ina l  r e p o r t .  Consultant James Q. Wilson, 
P rofessor  o f  Government a t  Harvard Univers i ty ,  repor ted  th a t  the re  had 
been a reduc t ion  in the uses o f  massive fo rce  a g a in s t  d isorders  by the 
po l ice  because o f  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s t r a in t s  which had developed, p a r t i c u l a r l y  
in northern  c i t i e s ,  in the p a s t  t h i r t y  y ea r s .
. . .  we note a s i g n i f i c a n t  reduction in the w i l l ingness  of 
those who command the po l ice  to use them with  maximum vigor 
in suppress ing  d i so rd e r .  The a t t e n t io n  given of l a t e  to 
rea l  and imagined cases o f  "police  b r u t a l i t y "  has obscured the
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f a c t  t h a t ,  compared to th e  p o l i c e  response  to  labor v io lence  
even 30 years  ago, most big c i t y  p o l i c e  depar tments ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
in the North, have re c en t ly  been le s s  in c l in e d ,  pr im ari ly  
f o r  p o l i t i c a l  reasons ,  to use i n s t a n t  and massive r e t a l i  tory  
t a c t i c s  a g a in s t  any in c i p i e n t  d i s o r d e r .  I t  would appear t h a t  
t h i s  i s  one reason the m ajo r i ty  of  se r ious  r i o t s  have occurred  
in the North, not the South- in  th e  l a t t e r  regagnai p o l i t i c a l  
c o n s t r a i n t s  on the po l ice  a re  l e s s  e f f e c t i v e .  "
Wilson 's  p o in t ,  t h a t  i f  w i l l in g  the  p o l i c e  can make the c o s t  of c i v i l  
d i s o r d e r s  too high fo r  the would-be p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  was n e i th e r  l o s t  on 
or ignored by the commissioners and th e  sen io r  s t a f f .
E labora te  use o f  the work o f  p receding  commissions and task  
fo rces  was expected of any u n i t  of  th e  Johnson ad hoc advisory system.
A major reason fo r  appoin ting the Kerner Commission was to provide the 
White House with  a means of bringing to publ ic  a t t e n t io n  a v a r i e t y  o f  
ideas  developed by various  o th e r  commissions and task  fo r ce s .  Ginsburg 
and Sagalyn were very carefu l  to expose the commissioners to  r e l e v a n t  
s ec t io n s  of the  r e p o r t s  of the  annual ta sk  forces  on c iv i l  r i g h t s ,  the 
task  fo rce  on the  c i t i e s  and the  Katzenbach Commission. Most o f  t h i s  
m ate r ia l  was worked in to  the chap te rs  on public  s a f e ty  of the  commission's  
f i n a l  r e p o r t .
Data on the compliance o f  p o l i c e  depar tments  with the recommenda­
t io n s  o f  the  Katzenbach Commission, c o l l e c t e d  by the White House, 
in d ica ted  t h a t  only a few of the  l a r g e s t  departments even a t tempted  to 
implement them. Smaller departments were found to  be unable,  even 
when w i l l i n g ,  co implement the  recommendations because of small budge:s 
and number o f  personnel.  This informat ion c rea ted  concern in the s t a f f
' ^ J .Q .  Wilson, "Why Are We Having A Wave o f  Violence?" New York 
Times, May 19, 1968, VI, 24,
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o f  the Kerner Commission because o f  what i t  portended fo r  i t s  recom­
mendations.  In the  end, the commissioners s e t t l e d  fo r  a res ta tem en t  of  
th e  Katzenbach Commission's recommendations fo r  two basic  reasons.  F i r s t ,  
the  time problem, coupled with the  p o l i t i c a l  s e n s i t i v i t y  of the 
i s s u e ,  forced the commission to put fo r th  recommendations which were 
known to the  adm in is t ra t ion  and the po l ice  community, accepted by the 
former ,  and by enough o f  the l a t t e r  to provide some hope of t h e i r  being 
b e t t e r  received the  second time around. Second, as noted above, the  
commission was not happy with the  work of the  In te rna t iona l  Associa tion 
o f  Chiefs o f  Police  and used l i t t l e  of  i t  in the  f ina l  r ep o r t .  With 
l i t t l e  in the  way of  o r ig ina l  resea rch  to c a l l  upon i t  is  th e re f o r e  not 
s u rp r i s in g  t h a t  the  commission turned to the  work of i t s  p redecessor.
There was a st rong d e s i r e  among some members of  the s t a f f  to  
a t tem pt  to secure Kerner Commission endorsement for a v a r ie ty  of  o th e r  
concerns r a i s ed  by some o f  the task  forces  and the Katzenbach Commission. 
The is sue  which received the most a t t e n t i o n  by Sagalyn and his co l leagues
A glance a t  a summary of  the  Crime Commission's police  recom­
mendations shows how c lose ly  the Kerner group followed t h e i r  predecessors  
l ead .  The sec t io n  of the Crime Commission rep o r t  headed "The Challenge 
o f  Crime in a Free Socie ty" had ten su b jec t  heads under i t :  1) S ta tu ­
to ry  Guidelines fo r  Stopping and Questioning; 2) Police P a r t i c i p a t i o n  in 
Community Planning; 3) Community Relations  Programs; 4) Establishment of 
C i t i z e n ' s  Advisory Committees (P re c in c t  Leve l) ;  5) Recruitment and Promo­
t io n  of Minority Group Policeman; 6) Community Relations Tra in ing ;  7) 
Behavior o f  Police  O ff i ce r s ;  8) Procedures fo r  Hearing Cit izen  Grievances;  
9) Police  Department P o l i c ie s  fo r  Exercise of  Police D iscre t ion ;  10)
Use of  Firearms; 11) Other Recommendations. See memo, Paul Bowers to 
Ginsburg,  Palmieri  and Sagalyn, "RE: Crime Commission Recommendations on
Police-Community Relat ions"  9 /27/67 , Public Safe ty ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ 
L ibrary .  One study prepared f o r  the  Crime Commission was p a r t i c u l a r l y  
useful to the  commission in developing i t s  recommendations: Civic  
A ccoun tab i l i ty  o f  the  Pol i c e : A Proposal f o r  Police Procedures , by A. J .
Reiss ,  J r .  o f  the  Univers ity  o f  Michigan. Reiss '  paper can be found in 
Public Safe ty  Papers o f  the  NACCD, LBJ Library .
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was gun c on t ro l .  The time was r i g h t  fo r  such co n s id e ra t io n .  The 
p res iden t  was beginning a s i g n i f i c a n t  p u b l i c i t y  e f f o r t  aimed a t  s ecu r ­
ing passage of  f ir earms contro l  l e g i s l a t i o n . S e v e r a l  key commis­
s ioners  were known to favor national contro l  of  f i r ea rm s .  The members 
o f  the  sen io r  s t a f f  favored such l e g i s l a t i o n .  However, gun contro l  
was no t  a s p e c i f i c  p a r t  o f  the p r e s id e n t ' s  mandate to the commission.
102The commissioners did d iscuss  the problem a t  some length  in December.
Jenk ins ,  Lindsay, Kerner and Corman supported some form of  na tional gun
c o n t ro l .  A month e a r l i e r  Jenkins urged his  co l leagues  to endorse the
103Federal Firearms Control Act, a p os i t ion  Ginsburg r e s i s t e d .  Consi­
derable  s t a f f  t ime was spen t  in d iscuss ions  with r e p re se n ta t iv e s  o f  the 
major gun manufacturers about the f e a s i b i l i t y  of the  commission's sponsor­
ing a study of the  uses of  f irearms in the  1967 c i v i l  d i so rd e r s .  When 
the manufacturers  learned  o f  the  commission's dec is ion  to is sue  one 
re p o r t  in March they, with Ginsburg and Sagalyn, concluded t h a t  the  time 
and budget c o n s t r a in t s  precluded commission p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in the  study.
The c o n t ra c t  f o r  the study was turned over to the Stanford Research 
I n s t i t u t e  with the b le s s in g  of the c o m m i s s i o n . F i r e a r m s  control  then
^^^U.S. P re s id e n t ,  Public Papers of  the  P r e s id e n t s , Lyndon B. 
Johnson, 1967, pp. 831-336.
TO^McGrath, Minutes, 12/18/67.
^^^Letter  McGrath to  Kerner 11/29/67, McGrath f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  
LBJ Library.
T^^See memo, Miskovsky to Chambers 10/11/67, covering a l e t t e r  from 
William A. Durbin o f  Hill  and Knowlton, Inc.  ( the  public r e l a t i o n s  fi rm 
fo r  Winchester and Remington). Also see memo, Miskovsky to Ginsburg "RE: 
Stanford Research I n s t i t u t e  Study on Role o f  Firearms in Civil  Disorders" .  
1/11/68, Off ice  of In v e s t ig a t io n ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library .
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was forced into  being a b o rd e r - l i n e  i s sue  fo r  the  commissioners;  they 
endorsed the  s tu d i e s  done by the  Katzenbach Commission on the r e l a t i o n ­
sh ips  between crime and the  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  f i r e a r m s ,  supported the 
p r e s i d e n t ' s  c a l l  f o r  fede ra l  l e g i s l a t i o n  and c a l l e d  fo r  the type of  
s t a t e  and local l e g i s l a t i o n  advocated in  the  Crime Commission repo r t .
This s o lu t io n  to the  f irearms contro l  i s su e  was symtomatic of the  
way the commission was fo rced  by p o l i t i c a l  and t ime p ressu res  to handle 
a l l  of i t s  publ ic  s a f e ty  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ;  a g r e a t  deal o f  s t a f f  work 
was inves ted  in c o n s u l t a t i o n ,  research  and w r i t i n g ,  but the  f ina l  r e p o r t  
turned ou t  to be p r im ar i ly  a c o l l e c t i o n  o f  i n s i g h t s  and recommendations 
o f  previous commissions and t a sk  f o r c e s . T h e  r e s u l t  o f  the work of 
Sagalyn 's  department was Chapters 11 and 12, Pa r t  IV o f  the  f inal  
r e p o r t ,  the  l e t t e r s  to Johnson about p o l i c e  and n a t io n a l  guard t r a in in g  
programs and th e  meetings t h a t  r e s u l t e d  from those  communications. In 
public and p r iv a te  tes t imony,  members of  the  commission and i t s  s t a f f  i n ­
s i s t e d  t h a t ,  d e s p i t e  i t s  lack  o f  o r i g i n a l i t y ,  the publ ic  s a f e ty  part s  o f  
the  Report did ge t  the  a t t e n t i o n  of the  general  pub l ic  and, more impor­
t a n t l y ,  the  spec ia l  audience toward whom i t  was d i r e c t e d :  the  po l ice ,
f i r e  departments and the  na t iona l  g u a r d . I n  th e  l a s t  an a ly s i s .
^^^Repor t , p.  289. See a l so  McGrath, M inu tes , 1 /19/68 .  The 
p o s i t io n  adopted was f i r s t  presented by Kerner.
^^^For a harsh c r i t i c i s m  of t h i s  see Edward C. B anf ie ld ,  "Some 
'Do 's '  and 'D o n ' t s '  o f  Riot  Control:  A Statement to  Supplement by
a Consultant to  a Consu l tan t . "  Harvard Review IV (Second Quarter,  
1968);41.
^^^See G in s b u r g ' s  t e s t im o n y ,  Kennedy H earn ings ,  p. 18.
331
however, i t  must be sa id  t h a t  the  recommendations which were made had 
been a l ready  r e j e c t e d ,  or  ignored in l a r g e  p a r t  by the  n a t i o n ' s  public  
s a f e ty  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and what new ideas the Kerner Commission put f o r th  
( l a r g e l y  recommendations about t a c t i c s  and con t ro l  made by the  lACP) 
were submitted by the p o l ice  themselves.
2.  Research
a .  Department of  Research 
The Department o f  Research,  headed by Robert Shallow, was r e s p o n s i ­
b le  fo r  the c o l l e c t i o n ,  re finement and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  most of the
108a n a ly t i c a l  da ta  conta ined  in the  commission's r e p o r t .  As with a l l
the  s t a f f  depar tments,  the  assigned work changed as the commission
accommodated i t s e l f  t o  i t s  changing p o l i t i c a l  environment. Shallow's
primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  was to desc r ibe  f o r  the  commission p a t te rn s
in the d i so rd e r s  which might be helpful in answering the p r e s i d e n t ' s
q ues t ions .  The scheme fo r  accomplishing t h i s  involved f i r s t ,  the
c o n s t r u c t io n  o f  a t h e o r e t i c a l  framework, w i th in  which the necessary
resea rch  could be conducted: second, f i e l d  re sea rch  by the commission
s t a f f ;  t h i r d ,  a n a ly s i s  of  data  generated by the s t a f f ,  government
109departments and p r iv a t e  agenc ies .  To accomplish th i s  in the time
1 no
A b r i e f  d i s cu s s io n  o f  s im i l a r  s t a f f  resea rch  conducted inde­
pendent of  Shallow's  o f f i c e  can be found fo llowing t h i s  s e c t io n ,  pp. 
339-343, "Program Research". A specia l  s ec t io n  has been re served  f o r  a 
d iscuss ion  o f  the  "Harvest  o f  Racism" paper in Chapter 12, pp. 445-459.
^^^See Shallow, "Social S c i e n t i s t s  and Social  Action ,"  pp. 209-210 
and the  memo. Shallow to Pa lm ier i ,  1 /17/68 ,  "Re: Summary of  the A c t iv i ­
t i e s  o f  the  Off ice  o f  the  A ss i s t a n t  D i rec to r  of  Research",  Department of 
Research,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library .
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o r i g i n a l l y  p ro j e c t e d .  Shallow divided the work time o f  Kis department
in to  two par^s .  F i r s t ,  during th.e month o f  September he r e c r u i t e d  s t a f f
and c o n su l t an t s  and s e t  ou t  to develop a systematic  plan fo r  c o l le c t in g
data from the  r i o t  c i t i e s .  "Disturbances were ordered in to  f i v e  l e v e l s ,
based on t h e i r  du ra t ion ,  es timated  number of  p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  e x te n t  of
damage, and th e  level of  the  enforcement r e s p o n s e . T w e n t y - s i x
c i t i e s  were s tu d ie d  by f i e l d  teams which produced approximately 20,000
pages of  m ate r ia l  which became the "hard da ta"  base f o r  the work of
Shallow's s t a f f . S e c o n d ,  from October to December, the department
produced nine s t a f f  papers,  s tud ie s  of c o l l e c t i v e  behavior ,  leadersh ip
s t r u c t u r e s ,  and bargaining processes and general soc ia l  psychological
112f a c to r s  ope ra t in g  during the  d i so rd e r s .
The major e f f o r t  to take these  data  and apply them to the th e o re t ic a l  
co n s t ru c t s  Sha l low 's  s t a f f  was developing (white rac ism, the  movement 
toward two s o c i e t i e s ,  e t c . )  was aborted with the r e j e c t i o n  of the
113"Harvest o f  Racism" paper and the  reduction in the s i z e  of the  s t a f f .
The shelving o f  the  data c o l l e c te d  by the f i e l d  teams produced the most 
obvious weaknesses in the repor t  and became the bas is  fo r  most of  the 
c r i t i c i s m  leve led  a t  the commission. These data presented  evidence o f  
Negro h o s t i l i t y  toward the  p o l ice ,  toward many of the  Great Society 
programs and toward the  e s ta b l i sh e d  black le ad e r s h ip ;  they a lso  showed
TT ° ib id . ,  p. 209.
^^^See memo. Shallow to Palmieri  1 /17/63 .
112Ginsburg to Commissioners 10/31/67, "Summary of Commission 
Research Programs," Department o f  Research, NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library.
^^^See Chapte r  12, pp. 459-463.
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cons iderab le  suppor t  f o r  the  emerging black leaders  and t h e i r  goals of 
black power and black, na t iona l ism .  The commission leadersh ip  ignored 
these  data because they regarded t h e i r  source with p o l i t i c a l  su sp ic ion ,  
t h e i r  s t a t u s  as incomplete,  and knew th a t  the commission would have 
n e i th e r  t ime, money or  manpower to go to the f i e l d  again and s u b s t a n t i a t e  
the conclus ions  the  s t a f f  was reaching. Many of the conclusions  the 
s t a f f  reached on the b a s i s  of  the  f i e l d  team data and which the commis­
s ion leade rsh ip  r e j e c t e d  were su b s ta n t ia te d  in la rge  p a r t  by the 
supplemental s tu d ie s  which the commission sponsored but which were not 
published u n t i l  four  months a f t e r  i t  went out of ex is tence .
The commissioners and Ginsburg did not e n t r u s t  a l l  r e sea rch  e f f o r t s  
to Shallow and h is  s t a f f .  Late in September, Ginsburg i n i t i a t e d  formal 
con tac ts  w i th ,  among o t h e r s ,  Richard Neustadt (Harvard),  Harry Rowen 
(RAND Corpora t ion) ,  Kermit Gordon (Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n )  and Francis
Bator (Harvard) seeking s u b s ta n t i a l  research help for the commission's 
115work. S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  Ginsburg wanted the s t a f f s  of these  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
to p ro je c t  sh o r t - r u n  (through 1985) recommendations in response to the 
following ques t ions  and req u es t s :
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders ,  Supplemental 
Studies For the  National Advisory Commission on Civil D iso rd e r s , ( l /ashington, 
D.C.: Superin tendent o f  Documents, 1968).
^T^See f o r  example Ginsburg 's  l e t t e r  to Neustadt of 9 /28 /67 ,
Ginsburg F i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library.  I t  is  i n t e r e s t i n g  to note t h a t  
Ginsburg approached some of  the same persons and i n s t i t u t i o n s  used by 
Califano in his annual v i s i t s  to  the  research community of  the  na tion in 
a search fo r  new ideas  f o r  the Great Society programs (pp. 177-179)
Ginsburg, however, l im i ted  himself  to the "Harvards"; he did not seem to 
fee l  ob l iga ted  to go to the l e s s e r  known cente rs  of research  fo r  his 
advice.  I t  would appear,  then,  t h a t  he did not seek the approval o f  the  
White House fo r  t h i s  procedure fo r  obta ining ad hoc research a s s i s t an c e  
and advice.
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"How much w i l l  our so c ie ty  have to d ispose  from economic 
growth a f t e r  o th e r  important  needs a re  met to l i f t  up the 
d isadvan taged  and r e s to r e  our c i t i e s ?
What would t h i s  cos t?  ( i f  p o s s ib le  by major s ec to r s  of 
p r i v a t e  and so c ia l  a c t ion )
How should the  necessary  revenues be r a i s e d  and disposed?
We'd a l so  l i k e  to  quan t i fy :
The c o s t  of poverty ,
The c o s t  of r a c i a l  d i s c r im in a t io n ,  and i f  p o s s ib le ,
The c o s t  of c i v i l  d i so rde rs
In October ,  Ginsburg t r a v e le d  to  Cambridge to meet with a group of
scho la rs  whom Neustadt had in v i t e d  to d iscuss  these  questions
He came away d i s ap p o in ted ;  the academics tu rned  down his r e q u e s t s .
118Through Neustadt they gave four reasons f o r  t h e i r  a c t i o n s .  F i r s t ,  
the economic i s s u e s  as  presented  were not of  g r e a t  i n t e r e s t  to  th e  group. 
Second, the  academic group was no t  ab le  to move quick ly  enough to  be 
o f  use to the  commission; previous research commitments, t eaching  r e ­
quirements and o th e r  u n i v e r s i t y  o b l ig a t io n s  precluded t h e i r  moving 
d i r e c t l y  to add ress  Ginsburg 's  questions  even i f  they found them within  
the realm o f  p ro fe s s io n a l  i n t e r e s t  and competence.  There fore ,  they
TT̂ibid.
•J 1 “7
'Those i n v i t e d  were: John Kain (Harvard),  Otto Eckste in  (Harvard),
Les te r  Thurow (Harvard),  Ray Vernon (Harvard),  John Meyer (Harvard),
Richard Musgrave (Harvard),  Robert Solow (MIT), James Tobin (Y a le ) ,
Francis  B a r t e r  (Harvard),  Carl Kaysen ( I n s t i t u t e  for Advanced S tu d ies ,  
P r in ce to n ) .  See Neustadt  to  Kain (cc Ginsburg) 10 /2 /57,  Ginsburg 
F i l e s ,  NACCD Papers ,  L3J Library .
^^^Neustadt to Ginsburg 10/15 and 10 /25/67 ,  Ginsburg F i l e s ,  NACCD 
Papers,  L3J L ibrary .
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d i r e c te d  him to the  Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n  as " the  most e f f i c i e n t  i n s t r u -
119ment f o r  your immediate re sea rch  purposes."  Th i rd ,  Ginsburg a p p a r e n t ly  
f a i l e d  to  communicate to the  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  the  persons a t  the  meeting 
the  s p e c i f i c  c h a r a c t e r  of what he was req u es t in g  of them. Neustadt 
i n d ic a te d  in h is  October 25 l e t t e r  t h a t  Tobin and Solow probably would 
be w i l l i n g  to help th e  commission r e c r u i t  o th e r s  from the academic com­
munity t o  be o f  a id  i f  they knew c l e a r l y  what i t  was t h a t  Ginsburg was
r e q u e s t in g .  F i n a l l y ,  th e re  was in the group c o n s id e ra b le  " . . .  d i f f i d e n c e
1 ?0about  th e  immediate u t i l i t y  of  the  p a r t i c u l a r  j o b s . . . "  " being r e q u e s te d .
S im i la r  e f f o r t s  d i r e c t e d  a t  the  RAND Corpora t ion  and the Nat ional 
Planning A ssoc ia t ion  were no more s a t i s f a c t o r y .  In rep ly ing  to a l e t t e r  
from Ginsburg,  Henry Rowen of  the  RAND Corpora tion  sa id :
. . .  with r e s p e c t  to the  p rep a ra t io n  o f  an o v e r a l l  e s t imate  
o f  the  needs of  the  c i t i e s  and the cos^s o f  meeting these  
needs ,  I d o n ' t  see  how we can do i t .
He added t h a t  h is  company could help in the s tudy  o f  poverty (which i t  
did) by e v a lu a t in g  t h e  methods of the  O ff ice  o f  Economic Opportunity 
in  i t s  a t tem pts  to  reach  i t s  o b je c t iv e s  in the War on Poverty.  He a lso  
noted t h a t  RAND had r e c e n t l y  reached an agreement with Mayor Lindsay to 
c a r ry  o u t  some broad s tu d ie s  on problems fac ing  the  c i t y  of New York.
John M i l l e r ,  A s s i s t a n t  Chairman and Executive S e c re ta r y  o f  the  Nat ional
' ^^Neus tad t’s 10/25/67 l e t t e r .
TZOibid.
L e t t e r ,  Rowen to Ginsburg 10/15/67, Ginsburg F i l e s ,  NACCD Papers ,  
LBJ Library .
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Planning A sso c ia t io n ,  t o l d  Ginsburg:
Within the  l i m i t s  of  time i t  i s ,  I f e a r ,  obvious t h a t  
no one can give  you a s c i e n t i f i c  answer to the ques t ions  
f o r  which you need answers.  There does not e x i s t  a c l a s s ­
i f i c a t i o n  of  the  public  and p r iv a t e  expendi tu res  which 
s ep a ra te s  those d i r e c t l y  r e l e v a n t  fo r  the  i n h a b i t a n t s  of  
th e  c en te r s  o f  t h e  c i t i e s  from o the r  r e l a t e d  o b j e c t i v e s .  
. . .  There i s  no o b j e c t i v e  way of  de f in ing  the  "needs" 
which must be met to  improve l i v in g  and earn ing  co n d i t io n s  
w i th in  these  c e n t e r s .  Nor i s  th e re  any o b j e c t i v e  way of  
decid ing  on p r i o r i t i e s  among various na t iona l  goa ls  -  even 
i f  we do not c o n s id e r  the  u n c e r t a n i t i e s  of  the  South East  
Asia c o n f l i c t .
U l t im a te ly ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  the  answer to your q u e s t io n  must be 
based to a l a r g e  e x ten t  on judgment, r e p re s e n t in g  the con­
v i c t i o n s  of th o se  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  your r e p o r t .
Thus Ginsburg in h is  a t tem pt  to o b ta in  answers to h i s  ques t ions  ran 
aground on the  same problem t h a t  would s t i f l e  S ha l low 's  e f f o r t s :  the
"commission problem" o f  lack  of  t ime and a v a i l a b l e  re sources  to do the 
jo b .  I m p l i c i t  a l so  i n  t h i s  dilemma was the f a c t  t h a t  the  da ta  which 
e x i s t e d  were a l l  d i r e c t e d  a t  ques t ions  d i f f e r e n t  than the  ones the  com­
mission was t r y i n g  to  ask .  The commission r e s e a r c h e r s  were beginning to  
be ab le  to  r a i s e  new ques t ions  on the basis  of the f in d in g s  o f  the f i r s t  
f i e l d  t r i p s ,  but those  ques t ions  and the answers,  a t  l e a s t  as f i r s t  
phrased,  were not  a c c e p ta b le  to Ginsburg and the  commissioners ,  and th e re  
was no t ime to  do much in  the  way of  t ry ing  ag a in .  Ginsburg was v a s t l y  
d isappo in ted  in the  r e s e a r c h  e f f o r t s  connected with  th e  commission's 
work. He was not a b le  to  uncover the  "hard da ta"  he thought 
needed to answer h is  q u e s t io n s ,  the  case which Ginsburg wanted to  make
^ ^ " L e t t e r ,  M i l l e r  to Ginsburg,  10/19/67, Ginsburg F i l e s ,  NACCD 
Papers ,  LBJ L ibrary .
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to the  p r e s id e n t ,  congress and the  nation could not be made w i thou t  
the  data  reques ted .  To ask new quest ions  o f  data s e t s  compiled with 
o th e r  ques t ions  in mind l e f t  him with the  same problems faced by Shallow; 
without being able  to e x p lo i t  the  leads uncovered in the f i e l d  research  
of  Sha l low 's  s t a f f  the  case was to  remain a weak one for the fo llowing 
reasons .  F i r s t ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  from the responses  of Neustadt and the  
o the rs  to whom Ginsburg f i r s t  turned t h a t  the  data  sought were non­
e x i s t e n t .  They had quest ions  fo r  which t h e r e  was no extant "hard data" 
upon which to  base an answer. The f r u s t r a t i o n  produced by the  lack  
of adequate social-economic data led to a recommendation to th e  Bureau 
of the  Census fo r  a mid-decade census.  The Kerner s t a f f  endorsed 
the idea and worked with the  bureau s t a f f  to  secure outs ide  suppor t
fo r  t h i s  innovation by noting the needs l e f t  u n f u l f i l l e d  by th e
123e x i s t i n g  census data .  The second reason fo r  the f a i l u r e  o f  
much of the  research e f f o r t  r e s id e s  in th e  now of ten  mentioned "commission 
problem" i d e n t i f i e d  by Lipsky and Olson — time being the primary problem. 
Research of  the scope Ginsburg was reques t ing  in September could  not be
123 D irec to r  of Research Serv ices ,  Melvin L. Bergheim in  a memo to 
Koskinen (2 /2 /5 8 ) ,  in which he d e ta i l ed  and c r i t i c i z e d  the re sea rch  e f f o r t s  
of the  commission, noted t h a t  no real  body o f  up- to -date  s e t  o f  compre­
hensive ,  c o n s i s t e n t  da ta  e x i s t ed  to  aid the  commission in exp lor ing  the 
causes o f  th e  c i v i l  d i s o rd e r s ;  the  1960 census did include neighborhood 
s t a t i s t i c a l  da ta ,  and they were th e  only such data  a v a i l a b le ;  they were 
inadequate ,  however, fo r  the  commission's purposes.  For him, t h i s  handi­
capped th e  commission and the  o th e r  government agencies working in the 
a r e a ,  more than any o th e r  f a c t o r  in t h e i r  a t tempt to answer th e  p r e s i ­
d e n t ' s  q ues t ions .  He recommended th a t  the  BOB make a comprehensive 
na tiona l review of a l l  government s t a t i s t i c a l  programs th a t  provide 
socia l-economic  information so t h a t  ques t ions  growing from the  work of  
the commission might he answered in the f u t u r e  from a more adequate  
data  base ,  Bergheim f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library.
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completed by J u ly ;  t ime was the enemy of  the  commission, not a lack  o f  
money o r  personnel.  As with  most commissions, the  Kerner group had 
time on ly  to po in t  th e  way, not l e ad .  To c r i t i c i z e  i t  for f a i l u r e  to 
provide new data and methods is  to f a u l t  i t  f o r  being unable to achieve  
the impossib le .  The t h i r d  reason f o r  the  f a i l u r e  of the  t o t a l  re sea rch  
e f f o r t  i s  the  r e s i s t a n c e  o f  the  commissioners and the execut ive  s t a f f  
to use o f  da ta  they had. I f  th e re  had been a g r e a t e r  w i l l in g n ess  to 
e x p l o i t  the data  acqu ired  in the f i e l d  team e f f o r t s ,  the  s t a f f  could 
have been reorgan ized  a f t e r  the  d e c i s io n  to publish one r e p o r t  and s e n t  
back i n to  the  f i e l d  to g a th e r  a d d i t io n a l  da ta  to confirm o r  deny the 
f in d in g s  of  the f i r s t  t r i p s .  The commissioners and the  execu t ive  s t a f f ,  
as we have seen, had a penchant f o r  e s t a b l i s h e d  sources of in fo rm at ion ;  
to have leaned too h e a v i l y  on th e se  new sources  o f  da ta  would have 
committed them too c l o s e l y  to ideas  and groups which the p r e s id e n t ,  and 
obvious ly  the  commissioners,  wanted to  avoid .
b.  Program Research 
The re sea rch  e f f o r t s  desc r ibed  in the preceding sec t io n  were 
in tended to undergird  th e  long-range recommendations o f  the commission's  
f in a l  r e p o r t .  Until  the  December 13 s h i f t  in p lans ,  the commission 
agenda c a l l e d  f o r  th e  in t e r im  r e p o r t  to con ta in  a s e r i e s  of  sh o r t - r an g e  
recommendations which would be formula ted by a s t a f f  group headed by
1 pd
Richard Nathan.
Nathan s t ru c tu re d  h i s  department along l i n e s  he pe r fec ted  as
• 1 94“ Nathan began as the D i rec to r  of Short-Term Programs but his  
t i t l e  was changed to Assoc ia te  D i rec to r  o f  Program Research.
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d i r e c t o r  of program research  fo r  Governor Nelson R ocke fe l le r  in his 
1954 p r e s id e n t i a l  campaign. He secured a small group (seven recent co l lege  
graduates) o f  resea rch  g e n e r a l i s t s  to whom he ass igned  the  re s p o n s ib i l i ty  
o f  producing an inventory of  e x i s t in g  federa l  and s t a t e  programs and 
whatever " ac t ion  program" (sho r t - run  policy sugges t ions )  could be found 
by interviewing p o l i t i c a l l y  knowledgeable persons in or  c lo se  to the 
commission. His scheme next c a l l ed  for  t h i s  group to produce papers 
summarizing t h e i r  resea rch  which in turn would be reviewed by policy 
s p e c i a l i s t s  before  submission to the commissioners. He planned, too ,  
to make his s t a f f  o f  g e n e r a l i s t s  a v a i l ab le  to quickly  respond to 
developing commission research  needs.
Nathan 's  s t a f f  produced papers on a l l  the themes touched in the 
p r e s id e n t ' s  mandate, on top ics  introduced by the commissioners,  w i t ­
nesses and ideas  developed by the f i e l d  teams. Nathan summarized the 
work o f  his  s t a f f  in to  one paper, Proposed Short-Term Domestic Program 
Options (12 /11 /67) ,  which ca l l ed  fo r  commission endorsement of $4.5 
b i l l i o n  in sh o r t - t e rm  program development, f inanced by a proposed emer­
gency tax program. Nathan's  proposals never reached the  commissioners. 
Ginsburg and Palmieri  r e j e c t e d  them out of  hand as being p o l i t i c a l l y  
unacceptable.  Regardless of  the merits  o f  t h a t  charge ,  Nathan became 
another v ic tim of Ginsburg 's  i n a b i l i t y  to adequate ly  and cons is ten t ly  
a r t i c u l a t e  to h is  s t a f f  th e  type of research he wanted.  Lipsky and 
Olson n ea t ly  summarize the  dilemma in which Nathan found himself.
. . .  Ginsburg and Palmieri  were d isappoin ted by the  s t a f f  
document. The e a r ly  basic  program inven to r ie s  were 
d i s m is s e d . . .  The summary of  these  documents prepared by 
Nathan was s im i l a r l y  r e j e c te d .  Ginsburg and Palmieri
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had been t rapped  by t h e i r  own e x p e c ta t io n s ,  t h e i r  
i n a b i l i t y  to  communicate t h e i r  c o n s ta n t ly  evolv ing  
requirements  to  the  s t a f f ,  and the l i m i t s  of  the  
e a r l y  s t a f f  p a t t e r n s  which they app ro v ed . . .  the  
f a i l u r e  o f  th e  sh o r t - t e rm  program e f f o r t  c o n t r i b u t e d  
to  the  commission 's  d ec is ion  to abandon the i n t e r im  
r e p o r t  and tak e  more time to produce a s i n g l e  r e p o r t  
i n  a few m o n th s . . .  With the dec is ion  to change the  
commission 's  schedu le ,  condense the two r e p o r t s  to one 
scheduled f o r  p u b l i c a t io n  a t  a l a t e r  d a t e ,  and with  
r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  
between long and s h o r t  term changes,  the  Nathan s t a f f  
became expendable .  ^
Thus a fou r th  reason  f o r  the  f a i l u r e  of  s t a f f  r e s e a rc h  e f f o r t s  can be
i d e n t i f i e d :  G insburg ' s  i n a b i l i t y  to  communicate to the  s t a f f  the
commission 's  needs.  His consequent development o f  a small panel
o f  Washington-experienced socia l  s c i e n t i s t s  to produce the kind of
document he thought  the  commissioners would accep t  w i l l  be d iscussed  in
1 26some d e t a i l  below.
One reason f o r  Ginsburg 's  uneas iness  with th e  product o f  Nathan's  
o f f i c e  lay  in the  s t a f f ' s  w i l l in g n ess  to cha l lenge  the  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n ­
t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  th e  i l l s  underly ing the domestic d i s o r d e r s  being
1exper ienced  in 1967. Myron J .  Lefcowitz,  ' f o r  in s t a n c e ,  saw ser ious  
dangers  in  what he c a l l e d  the t r a d i t i o n a l  l i b e r a l  approach of the 
commission to the causes  o f  the c i v i l  d i s o rd e r s ;  t h e r e  was a danger,  
he though t ,  in promising too  much, in c r e a t in g  a c l im a te  o f  u n f u l f i l l e d
^^^Lipsky and Olson, MSS, V, p. 55-56.
T'^^pp. 376-384.
' ^ ^ C o -d i rec to r ,  f o r  a sh o r t  t ime, with Nathan of  s t a f f  s tu d ie s  
on s h o r t  and long term programs. He came to the commission from being 
A s s i s t a n t  D i r e c to r  of the  I n s t i t u t e  fo r  Research on Poverty a t  the 
U n iv e r s i ty  o f  Wisconsin.
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ex p ec ta t io n s .  He proposed t h a t  the  commission recommend a s e t  of  l im i t e d  
o b je c t iv e s  f o r  federa l  domestic programs from which s a t i s f a c t i o n  could 
be re a l i z e d  by the intended b e n e f i c i a r i e s  of  the programs as well as the 
p o l i t i c i a n s  who c rea ted  and implemented them. Th is ,  he reasoned, would 
produce more soc ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  b e n e f i t s  sooner than could be 
expected from the t r a d i t i o n a l  p a t te rn s  o f  New Deal Great /Socie ty  p o l i c y ­
making.
Nathan 's  proposals f o r  domestic po l icy  change were c lo se r  to 
e x i s t i n g  a d m in i s t r a t io n  po l icy  but no l e s s  th rea ten ing  than those 
proposed by Shal low 's  group. Nathan i n s i s t e d  t h a t  b e t t e r  a d m in is t r a t io n  
o f  e x i s t in g  domestic programs could become a ser ious  d e te r r e n t  to f u t u r e  
d i so rd e r s :
. . .  the  problem is not so much a need fo r  b e t t e r  policy 
and l e g i s l a t i o n  as a need to do the  job b e t t e r  under the 
many p o l i c i e s  and Acts of  Congress which now e x i s t .  The 
groundswell o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  on Civil  Rights up to 1964 and 
on domestic programs in  1965 has given the government powers 
and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  in  many a re a s .  The questions  today a re  
i n c re a s in g ly ,  not what needs to be done^gbut how to do 
b e t t e r  th e  jobs  we a re  a l ready  d o i n g . . .
He a lso  warned of  the  dangers of w r i t ing  a r e p o r t  which might y i e ld  to 
the  tempta tion of fe red  by the  h a r d - l i n e  law and order pos i t ion  of 
al lowing the  r i o t s  to become an excuse fo r  undercutt ing  the e f f e c t i v e ­
ness  of those  e x i s t in g  programs which were designed to  c o r r e c t  the
Memo, Nathan to Palmieri  10/1 /67, Program Research f i l e s ,  NACCD 
Papers ,  LBJ L ib rary .  See a l so  Lipsky and Olson, MSS, V, pp. 53-54. This 
idea was not very well received by Ginsburg,  on beha l f  of  the White 
House, but Nathan argued t h a t  i t  was c o n s i s t e n t  with the p r e s i d e n t ' s  own 
p o s i t io n  as a r t i c u l a t e d  in his  message, "Special Message to the Congress: 
The Quality o f  American Government." U.S. P r e s id e n t s ,  Public Papers of 
th e  P r e s i d e n t ' s ,  Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, pp 358-368.
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129th e  i n j u s t i c e s  of  the  350 year  h i s to r y  of Negroes in America.
Nathan was a l so  one of  the  s t a f f  members who voiced misgivings 
about the e s t a b l i s h e d  p o l i t i c a l  o rde r .  He questioned whether Negro 
Americans could ever have adequate  rep re sen ta t io n  in the public  policy  
dec is ions  which a f f e c t e d  them without  se r ious  changes in the way public  
r e p re se n ta t iv e s  a re  s e l e c t e d .  He ca l led  f o r  the commission to give 
a t t e n t i o n  to  t h i s  m a t te r ,  a f f i rm ing  th a t  such a study could have as 
major an impact on race  r e l a t i o n s  in 1967 as the Negro family i s sue
130introduced by the Moynihan study had in the Kennedy a d m in i s t r a t io n .  
Nathan's suggestions  were uniformly ignored. The White House made i t  
c l e a r  to Ginsburg t h a t  the  commission's e f f o r t s  were to  be suppor t ive  
o f  the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  1968 domestic policy  program.
3) Office o f  the  General Counsel
Merle McCurdy's o f f i c e  was responsib le  fo r  the o rgan iza t ion  and
conduct of  th e  formal hea r in g s ,  f o r  the tak ing  of a l l  test imony from
witnesses  and the  c o r r e l a t i o n  o f  w i tnesses '  test imony with the c i t y
131p r o f i l e s  developed by the  s t a f f  f i e l d  teams. McCurdy's o r ig i n a l  plan
was to have two s e t s  of  formal hear ings ,  one fo r  each of the r epo r t s
132expected of the commission. The f i r s t  s e t  of  hear ings was f in i sh ed  
before  the dec is ion  was made to j e t t i s o n  the in te rim re p o r t .  There fore ,
^^^Memo, Nathan to Palmieri  10/16/67, Nathan f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ
Library.
^^^Memo, Nathan to  Ginsburg 12/4/67, Nathan f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ 
Library.
^^^See pp. 279-291 f o r  the  d iscuss ion  of the hear ings .
^^^McCurdy to Ginsburg 8 /25 /67 ,  General Counsel f i l e s ,  NACCD 
Papers, LBJ Library .
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matters  of  immediate concern,  the conspiracy ques t ion  and the in v e s t ig a ­
t ion  of why p a r t i c u l a r  c i t i e s  had d i so rde rs  and o the rs  did not,  dominated 
the hear ings  held and consequently the f ina l  r e p o r t .
McCurdy's s t a f f  thoroughly prepared fo r  each hear ing;  f i e l d  
in terviews were conducted by s t a f f  members, the  wi tnesses  were c a r e f u l ly  
questioned before  the hear ings along the  l in e s  the questioning in the 
formal ses s ions  was expected to take,  and each commissioner was given
a comprehensive summary o f  a l l  these  in te rv iew s ,  inc luding a summary of
1 33prepared s ta tements  by the  witnesses .
His o f f i c e  was a l so  responsib le  fo r  studying the  c i t y  p r o f i l e s  
produced by the  s t a f f  f i e l d  teams, " . . .  to determine the bas is  fo r  each 
materia l  a l l e g a t i o n ,  f a c t  and conclusion s e t  f o r t h .  Those not supported 
by sworn testimony o r  da ta  on which the  commissioners could take 
' j u d i c i a l  n o t i c e '  were i s o la ted  and ve r i fy ing  w i tnesses  i d e n t i f i e d .  
Considerable time was given to gather ing sworn testimony in the f i e l d  
ve r i fy ing  the  conclusions a r r ived  a t  in the c i t y  p r o f i l e s .  Robert Conot, 
who was re spons ib le  fo r  the  ed i t ing  of  the f i n a l  r e p o r t ,  worked with 
the General Counsel 's  o f f i c e  in reconc i l ing  the  f i e l d  deposi t ions  with 
the p r o f i l e s  and the hearing t r a n s c r i p t s .  When t h i s  was f in i shed  they 
c e r t i f i e d  t h e i r  a u t h e n t i c i t y  fo r  Ginsburg who in turn  assured the 
commissioners t h a t  th e re  were no s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r a d ic t io n s  in these  
various records .  This carefu l  c o a l i t i o n  of a l l  these  m a te r ia l s  was
See, fo r  example, memo, McCurdy to commissioners,  10/14/57 "Re: 
Views of  Prospective  Witnesses in the Commission Hear ings,"  General 
Counsel F i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library.
^^^Memo, McCurdy to Koskinen 2/13/68, "Re: Methodological Sec t ion ."  
General Counsel F i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library .
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necessary ,  McCurdy was convinced, to cushion the  shock the commissioners
135were going to r ece ive  when they read the  c i t y  p r o f i l e s .
McCurdy a l so  sent h is  s t a f f  to meetings of groups from whom he
1 ng
thought the  commission could ob ta in  useful information.  As d iscussed
above, McCurdy was unsuccessful  in g e t t in g  any personal test imony
before  the  commission o f  the  various  spokespersons of the  emerging black 
137i n t e r e s t  groups.
4) Off ice  o f  Investigat ion^
The task  o f  providing the commissioners with informat ion on the
p o l i t i c a l l y  s e n s i t i v e  conspiracy quest ion was en trus ted  to the Off ice  o f
In v e s t ig a t io n s  under the leadersh ip  of Milan Miskovsky. Ginsburg took
the  White House's concern over the  conspiracy issue  so s e r io u s ly  t h a t  he
d i r e c te d  Miskovsky to r e p o r t  d i r e c t l y  to him ra th e r  than to  P a lm ie r i ,
139f o r  which the o r ig in a l  o rgan iza t ion  o f  the s t a f f  c a l l ed .
Memo, McCurdy to Ginsburg 10/27/57, General Counsel F i l e s ,  NACCD 
Papers ,  LBJ L ibrary .  There were n ine ty  persons deposed in t h i s  manner. In 
a d d i t io n  to  t ak ing  sworn testimony, each wi tness  was engaged in an ex ten s iv e  
p re - in te rv ie w ,  usua l ly  by phone. There were 167 witnesses heard by the  
commission in the  formal hea r ings ,  which extended from August u n t i l  
November.
1 lASee f o r  in s tance ,  memo, N.R. Jones to McCurdy on Jo n es '  r e p o r t  
on his a t tendance  a t  the  National Conference of Negro Elected O f f i c i a l s  
10/3/57.  General Counsel f i l e ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library.
1 37 See pp. 281-282 fo r  a d iscuss ion  o f  how testimony was taken from 
some o f  these  persons.  See a lso  pp. 350-351, 403-406, below.
1 lAMost o f  the  information of the  workings o f  t h i s  o f f i c e  has as 
i t s  source the  memo Miskovsky to Ginsburg, "Final Report o f  Off ice  o f  
In v e s t ig a t io n  3 /25 /68 ,"  Office o f  In v e s t ig a t io n  f i l e ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ 
Library .
^^^Ginsburg was w i l l i n g  to accept the s t a f f  tensions  r e s u l t i n g  
from t h i s  change in exchange fo r  contro l  over those par ts  o f  the  com­
m is s io n 's  work about which the White House f e l t  the s t r o n g e s t .
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Ginsburg and Mayor Lindsay o f f e re d  Miskovsky the p o s i t io n  of ch ie f  
i n v e s t i g a t o r  l a t e  in September and he began work on October 4. The 
schedule he o r i g i n a l l y  accepted c a l l e d  fo r  h is  work to be completed by 
August 1,  1968. That d a te  was subsequently  changed tw ice ,  to May 1 
and f i n a l l y  to  March 1, in  response  to the  budget adjustments  and the  
dec is ions  to  i s sue  only  one r e p o r t .  The public  charge to Miskovsky was to 
answer the p r e s i d e n t ' s  questions  concerning a consp iracy by working 
c lo se ly  with the FBI. P r i v a t l y ,  h is  o f f i c e  was expected to aid the 
commission in developing a s ta tement  on the conspiracy i s sue  which had 
c r e d i b i l i t y  independent o f  the  FBI's  p o s i t io n .  The d i s t r u s t  o f  the  FBI 
by Ginsburg and most o f  the  commissioners was undisguised .  For them, 
t h e i r  work on the conspiracy i s su e  had to stand on i t s  own i f  i t  was 
to  be accepted o u ts id e  the  p o l ic e  community.
Fa i th fu l  to h is  charge Miskovsky turned f i r s t  to  the FBI to
ob ta in  i t s  information on the  e x i s t en c e  o f  a na t iona l  conspiracy before
assembling h is  s t a f f  or developing a s p e c i f i c  work program for  his o f f i c e .
Here Miskovsky was fo llowing the  lead  o f  Ginsburg who had arranged fo r
J .  Edgar Hoover to be the  f i r s t  w itness  before  the commissions. Robert
Haynes was ass igned by the bureau as the  commission's  l i a i s o n  person.
After  a slow beginning,  a t t r i b u t a b l e  by Miskovsky to the FBI's
u n f a m i l i a r i t y  with the  data being requested by h is  o f f i c e ,  the coopera- 
140t io n  was good.
Miskovsky kept the s e n io r  s t a f f  informed of the content o f  the 
FBI information passed to h is  o f f i c e ;  e . g .  h is  11/6/67 memo to Ginsburg 
in which he to ld  of a FBI r e p o r t  on a r a l l y  a t  the Abyssinian B ap t i s t  
Church in New York to support  Represen ta t ive  Adam Clayton Powell a t  which
H. Rap Brown spoke. The r e p o r t  a l so  had informat ion on Martin Luther King's 
plans to march on Washington. Off ice  on In v e s t ig a t io n ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ 
Library.
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Miskovsky sought and received  help from a v a r i e ty  of  o th e r  sou rces .
In the  Department o f  J u s t i c e  Warren C hr is tophe r ,  John Doar, Walter 
Yagley and Fred Vinson were o f  g r e a t  a s s i s t a n c e ,  with Chris topher and 
Doar being o f  the  most value. Each o f  these  men encouraged Miskovsky 
to d i r e c t  his in v e s t ig a to r s  toward the  urban ghe t to s ,  away from 
r e l i a n c e  s o l e l y  on information accumulated by o the r  federal  agenc ies .  
Chris topher  " . . .  emphasized the  need f o r  our s t a f f  to l i v e  in the  ghe t to  
a r e a s ,  to ge t  the  fee l  of the  ghe t to  as well as information from the 
ghe t to  r e s i d e n t s  t h e m s e l v e s . D o a r  s t r e s s e d  the need to ob ta in  as 
much informat ion as possib le  from w i th in  the  ghetto  about organized 
a c t i v i t y  in the  c i v i l  d i so rd e r s .  Others in the Department of J u s t i c e  
s t r e s s e d  the need to  i n v e s t ig a te  and s t a t e  c l e a r l y  any l inks  between 
the  d i so rd e r s  and organized crime in  the  United S ta tes  - an a rea  of 
i n v e s t ig a t i o n  in  which the FBI was n o to r io u s ly  weak. Miskovsky 
asked the CIA f o r  information on fo r e ig n  involvement in the urban d i s ­
o rders  and th e  In te rna l  Revenue Serv ice  (h is  "home" agency) f o r
142advice  on i n v e s t i g a t i n g  techniques .  Contact  was a lso  made with the
Department o f  Defense and arrangements were made to use t h e i r  computer f i l e s
143on domestic m i l i t a n t  groups and persons.  Lindsay arranged with
^ M e m o , Miskovsky to Ginsburg 3 /25 /68 ,  Office of I n v e s t ig a t io n ,  
NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library.
142 The concern in the a d m in i s t r a t io n  and congress over Cuban i n ­
volvement in the d iso rders  was g r e a t .  The CIA supplied Miskovsky's o f f i c e  
with tw en ty -e igh t  repor ts  p e r t a in in g  to the  e x ten t  o f  such involvement,  
with the  proviso  t h a t  the agency no t  be i d e n t i f i e d  as the source of  the  
in format ion in  the commission's f i n a l  r e p o r t .  These data were shared with 
the  FBI and the  White House.
Memo, Miskovsky to Ginsburg 11/7 and 12/5/68. Miskovsky f i l e s ,  
NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library.
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Miskovsky to t a l k  with  Commissioner Howard R. Leary of  the  Mew York 
Po l ice  Department from whom he obtained d e t a i l e d  information on 
p a r t i c u l a r  black m i l i t a n t s .  F i n a l l y ,  he touched base with Quinn Tamm 
o f  the  lACP, hoping to  secure his  good o f f i c e s  when his  s t a f f  i n v e s t i ­
g a to rs  had need to approach and work c lo se ly  with the po l ice  departments 
o f  the  key c i t i e s .
A f te r  having e s t a b l i s h e d  co n tac t  with the  federa l  agenc ie s ,
Miskovsky s e t  out to  name his s t a f f .  He and Ginsburg agreed t h a t  i t
should be r e l a t i v e l y  small .  His o r ig in a l  p lan ,  based on the August 1
dead l in e ,  was to work from October through December developing data on
Negro and white m i l i t a n t  groups which would become the bas is  fo r  f i e l d
in v e s t i g a t i o n s ;  a t  the  same time he proposed securing informat ion from
two or  th r e e  black in v e s t ig a to r s  who would ga ther  informat ion by l iv in g  fo r
severa l  months in major ghetto  a r e a s .  The Washington D.C. o f f i c e  was to
be s t a f f e d  by a small group o f  lawyers who would be re spons ib le  fo r
c o r r e l a t i n g  the  da ta  from agencies and the f i e l d  and w r i t in g  repo r t s  fo r
the commissioners. This plan was scrapped with the August 1 r e p o r t .
The s ize  o f  the  s t a f f  on which he and Ginsburg agreed was p red ica ted  on
a May 1 r ep o r t in g  d a t e .  I t  was composed o f  t h i r t e e n  f u l l - t i m e  persons.  A
former CIA i n t e l l i g e n c e  o f f i c e r ,  an FBI agen t  and a Secre t  Serv ice
agent ( a l l  "on loan" from t h e i r  agencies)  formed the nucleus of  the
group which did  t h e  a n a ly t i c a l  work on a p a r t - t im e  b a s i s .  Three p a r t -
144time co n su l t an t s  were a l so  employed.
^^^The s t a f f i n g  was not completed u n t i l  November 13. In addi t ion  
to Miskovsky the  f u l l - t i m e  s t a f f  cons is ted  o f  Stanley P. Herber t ,  Sarah 
C. Carey, Martin J .  Connell ,  Harold H. H a ir ,  Haywood L. Perry ,  Norbert
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F ie ld  i n v e s t ig a t io n s  were launched in the twenty-s ix  t a r g e t  c i t i e s .  
They began in November in New Je r sey ,  Miskovsky repor ted  good coopera t ion  
from ghe t to  r e s id e n t s  and the  p o l i c e ,  but he was not so p o s i t iv e  about 
the  coopera t ion  with the commission f i e l d  teams. The f i e l d  team members 
and th e  in v e s t ig a t i v e  s t a f f  were mutually suspic ious  o f  each o th e r .
Ne i ther  was convinced of  the  legit imacy of  the o t h e r ' s  ass ignment,  
f e e l i n g  t h a t  th e  o t h e r ' s  opera t ion  threatened the i n t e g r i t y  of the  
commission's  f in a l  r e p o r t .  "After a g rea t  many conferences with f i e l d  
team re p r e s e n ta t i v e s  and meetings with a l l  members of  the  teams, we 
were ab le  to convince them of  the  legit imacy of our ope ra t ion .  While
145we never did r ece ive  f u l l  cooperation ,  we were able to  work to g e th e r . "
In the middle of November, Miskovsky was asked to produce a 
sta tement  on conspiracy fo r  the in te r im re p o r t .  His department was not 
s t r u c t u r e d  f o r  t h a t .  "I  agreed to put down in  some fashion some of the  
in format ion t h a t  was emerging but a l so  made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  the support  
f o r  any conclusions  was not t h e r e . H e  r a th e r  a r b i t r a r i l y  s e le c ted
C. Rayford,  Salvador A. Romero, John K. Sca les ,  Kathleen M. Alder,  
Annie C. Clay and Ruth A. F isher .  John Lynch was secured as a 
c o n su l t a n t  charged with, developing contac ts  with b lack  m i l i t a n t s .  
Byron Morgan (consu l tan t )  was re sponsib le  fo r  p repara t ion  of the  
p re s e n ta t io n  o f  data  to the  commisssioners. The Navy provided 
Louis Brickman as a p a r t - t im e  s e c u r i t y  consu l tan t  and Lt. Luis 
Guinot as a da ta  a n a ly s t .  Off ice  of In v e s t ig a t io n ,  NACCD Papers ,  
LBJ Library .
^^^Memo, Miskovsky to Ginsburg,  3/25/68,  Off ice  of I n v e s t i ­
g a t io n ,  NACCD Papers, LBJ Library .
T̂ Îbid.
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f i v e  c i t i e s  ( .Detro it ,  Newark, New Haven, Milwaukee and C inc inna t i )  
as a data base fo r  t h e  work he was to do fo r  the in te r im repor t  and 
sen t  his i n v e s t i g a t o r s  the re .  Because of the lack  of t ime ,  they had 
to depend almost t o t a l l y  on the  pol ice  and local  r e s id e n t s  fo r  informa­
t i o n ,  " . . .  the r e s p o n s ib le  o f f i c i a l  in  the p o l ice  departments surveyed 
a l l  ind ica ted  no consp iracy .  These conclusions were backed-up — perhaps 
not too s c i e n t i f i c a l l y ,  I suppose — by readings we were g e t t in g  from 
our  in v e s t ig a to r s  probing  the g h e t t o s . T h i s  in te r im  e f f o r t ,  which 
became the f ina l  one of the Off ice  of In v e s t ig a t io n ,  meant t h a t  most 
o f  the s t a f f  did f i e l d  work only in those f ive  c i t i e s .  Their  work and 
i t s  c o r r e la t io n  with  the data secured from the var ious federa l  agencies 
became the sole b a s i s  f o r  the commission's answers to t h e  p r e s i d e n t ' s
quest ions  on conspiracy .  On December 6,  Ginsburg to ld  Miskovsky
148t h a t  th e re  would be no in te r im  repo r t .  This meant t h a t  the e f f o r t s  
to t ra ce  leads  on c o n sp i r ac ie s  found in the i n i t i a l  v i s i t s  to the  
twenty-s ix  c i t i e s  would have to be dropped. Another casu a l ty  was 
Miskovsky's e f f o r t s  to develop meaningful con tac ts  with black m i l i t a n t  
groups.
I t  was c lea r  t o  me from the beginning t h a t  we had to 
get  informat ion from the m i l i t a n t s  themselves. I was 
advised a g a i n s t  t h i s  course by various members of the 
s t a f f  of the commission. On the o ther  hand, Mr. (Warren) 
Chris topher,  among o th e r s ,  advised s t rong ly  th a t  i t  was
1 4 8 Ib id .  This  is  the only documentary evidence which suggests tha t  
p r io r  to i t s  December 12 meeting Ginsburg was aware t h a t  the  commission 
was going to change i t s  schedule.
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e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  we t a l k  to the m i l i t a n t s . . .  In November
I.had pe rsonal ly  made c on tac t  with severa l  Black m i l i t a n t s  
. . .  andqhad in f a c t  b u i l t  a very good r e l a t i o n s h i p  with 
them.
Miskovsky's e f f o r t s  to have the commission o f f i c i a l l y  sponsor a
150conference with  black m i l i t a n t s  was abor ted .  Miskovsky lamented these
lo s se s ;  " . . .  in a l l  honesty,  I be l ieve  the commission's  e f f o r t  su f fe red  
151as a r e s u l t . "  Miskovsky's was perhaps the  most s i g n i f i c a n t  a t tempt to
involve le ad e r s  of emerging non-establi shment black groups in the
d e l i b e r a t i o n s  o f  th e  commission; i t ,  too ,  was thwarted by the  l e ade rsh ip  
152o f  the commission.
5) F ie ld  Trips
The s t a f f  f i e l d  t r i p s  were developed to complement those  undertaken 
by the commissioners. Their  purpose was to provide the commissioners 
and a l l  the  s t a f f  departments with new in te rv iew da ta  on urban black 
a t t i t u d e s .
The f i e l d  teams o r i g i n a l l y  planned two rounds o f  data  ga ther ing 
in the t a r g e t  c i t i e s .  This plan,  too ,  f e l l  v ic tim to the decis ion  to
149 I b id .  emphasis added.
^^^The MARC conference .  (See pp. 403-406)
^^^Memo, Miskovsky to Ginsburg,  3/25/68.
1 Another neglec ted  proposal by Miskovsky's s t a f f  was i t s  e f f o r t  
to  e s t a b l i s h  some type of pol ice  ear ly  warning system to check out rumors 
of  v io lence  which in e v i t a b ly  occurred p r io r  to the  outbreak of  the 1967 
d i s o r d e r s .  Miskovsky's idea was to develop a means of  keeping rumors 
from genera t ing  in to  f a c t  by means of an e la b o r a te  communication system. 
No po l ice  department s tud ied  had the resources  f o r  car ry ing  out the 
idea.  See Miskovsky to Ginsburg 11/22/67, Off ice  o f  In v e s t ig a t io n ,
NACCD Papers.
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i s sue  one r e p o r t .  Consequently,  those data secured in what had been 
planned as a f i r s t  cu t  of the  research  population became the t o t a l  f i e l d -
1 r o
based da ta  re sou rce .  One in te rv iewee opined t h a t  the  budget could
have been juggled  and add i t io n a l  f i e l d  t r i p s  might have been attempted
a f t e r  the  December d ec i s io n ,  i f  c o n su l t an t  Richard Scammon o f  the  Bureau
of  the Census had not convinced Ginsburg and Palmieri  t h a t  add i t io n a l  c i t y
v i s i t s  would not add much to the  data a lready c o l l e c t e d .  Scammon argued
t h a t  the  in format ion  a v a i l a b l e  from the cheaper da ta  sources a v a i l a b l e  in
Washington was an adequate r e f l e c t i o n  o f  the urban c en te r s  undergoing
d iso rd e r s  and t h a t  the  f i e l d  t r i p s  a l ready  undertaken had secured adequate
supplemental d a t a .  This d ec i s io n  was no t  welcomed by members of  the
s t a f f ,  some of whom thought the  census data  were completely unable to
154-answer the  major quest ions  the  commission had to ask.
Charles N e lson 's  f i e l d  teams were fu l ly  ope ra t iona l  by the f i r s t
of October and th e  plan which he developed c a l l e d  fo r  the f i r s t  round
of research  t r i p s  to be completed by November 15 to g ive  his  o f f i c e  ample
155time to compile t h e i r  f ind ings  fo r  the scheduled in te r im  re p o r t .
The t r i p s  were designed to a id  not only in the development of the in te r im 
r e p o r t ,  but  a l so  to supplement the da ta  resources of the  various  execu­
t i v e  agencies having an i n t e r e s t  in the  twenty-s ix  key c i t i e s .  Nelson
^^^Lipsky, "Social S c i e n t i s t s  and the Riot Commission," p. 78.
^^^For ano ther  d i scuss ion  of t h i s  matter see  pp. 338.
^^^The o u t l i n e  fo r  the  f i e l d  team's work which follows is  taken
from a s t a t u s  r e p o r t  on h is  work f i l e d  with Kruzman on 9 /28 /67 ,  Field
Teams, NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library,
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1 56had as  many as  f iv e  teams of  s ix  s t a f f  persons each in the f i e l d .
His plan c a l l e d  fo r  f i e l d  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  seventeen of the twenty -s ix
c i t i e s  des igna ted  as key by th e  execu t ive  s t a f f .  The two c i t i e s  which
had u n i v e r s i t y  campus d is tu rbances  in 1967 were i so la ted  fo r  a spec ia l
c o n t r a c t  s tudy by the Center f o r  Community Studies  in Nashvi l le ,  Tennessee,
Each team had two days' p repa ra t ion  in  Washington during which persons
from a v a r i e t y  of  federa l  agencies  b r i e f e d  them on the c i t y  they were to 
157v i s i t .  Two to f iv e  days were spen t  in the  t a r g e t  c i ty  in te rv iew ing ,  
observ ing  and c o l l e c t i n g  "hard" d a ta .^ ^ ^  The teams spent th ree  days 
in Washington w r i t ing  t h e i r  r e p o r t s  which cons is ted  of the development 
of  a c i t y  p r o f i l e  and a d i so rd e r  s c e n a r io ,  and being debriefed by the
1 GO
agencies  which prepared them f o r  the t r i p s .  Normally, the  f u l l  r e p o r t  
of  each team was reviewed by the  s t a f f  o f  th e  research  department and 
d i s s e c t e d  f o r  da ta  useful to s ec t io n s  o f  the  f i n a l  repor t  o the r  than the 
proposed c i t y  p r o f i l e s  and d i s o rd e r  s c e n a r i o s . E a c h  team member made 
a t  l e a s t  two f i e l d  t r i p s .
^^^They used two of the spec ia l  a s s i s t a n t s  to the commissioners and 
two persons from the s t a f f  o f  the  genera l  c o u n s e l .
T^^See Nelson to Kruzman 9 /28 /67 ,  Nelson F i l e s ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ 
L ib rary ,  fo r  a l i s t  o f  the key persons in the various federa l  agencies  
who were designated  to  give th e se  b r i e f i n g s .
^^^The o r ig ina l  plan c a l l e d  f o r  a s e r i e s  o f  follow-up v i s i t s  by 
s p e c ia l i z e d  re sea rchers  to v e r i f y  the  data generated.
^^^The d r a f t  scenario fo r  each c i t y  was w r i t t en  by David DeLo, 
a f t e r  th e  d e b r ie f in g  process was f i n i s h e d .
p a r t  of  the  e f f o r t  to share  and r e t a i n  the generated data 
fo r  f u t u r e  u s e ,  a verbal data memory bank was developed by tap ing  the 
b r i e f i n g  and d eb r ie f ing  s es s io n s .
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Ginsburg in s i s t e d  on s t r i c t  p o l i t i c a l  contro ls  on the f i e l d  teams.
He made the  f i r s t  contac t  with the  c i t y  to be v i s i t e d  by c a l l i n g  the 
mayor and in troducing the team members and ou t l in ing  the purpose o f  the 
v i s i t ,  the  planned scope of  the  re sea rch  e f f o r t  and the proposed used 
of  the  data generated.  Team members were under s t r i c t  orders  to r e f r a i n  
from any c o n tac t  with the t a r g e t  c i t y  u n t i l  Ginsburg's  c a l l  was made and 
to check with h is  o f f i c e  before  major devia t ions  from the announced re ­
search e f f o r t  were made.^^^ Ginsburg 's  o f f i c e  also kept t i g h t  p o l i t i c a l  
con tro l  over the d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  f i e l d  team generated da ta  to any non­
execut ive  branch agency. He did not want the information to ge t  in to  
the  p r e s s ,  o r  to  congress,  and become publ ic  before the commission was 
ready to r e l e a s e  i t ;  such premature d i sc lo su re s  obviously could cause 
se r ious  p o l i t i c a l  embarrassment to the  commission and the  p re s id e n t .  
Fur ther  he ordered th a t  h is  pledge to the McClellan Committee to share
informat ion be honored only a f t e r  every word of  the p r o f i l e s  and scenar ios
162o f  each c i t y  was c a re fu l ly  reviewed by the executive s t a f f .
6) Operations
Stephen Kruzman's Office  o f  Operations was respons ib le  f o r  four 
s p e c i f i c  areas  of the commission's  work. F i r s t ,  agency l i a i s o n ,  
wherein a person(s) in each f ed e ra l  agency was i d e n t i f i e d  as one to whom
^^^Memo, Nelson to  Team Leaders,  9/25/67, Field Teams, NACCD 
Papers,  LBJ Library.
^^^Memo, Ginsburg to Nelson 10/6 /67,  Ibid.
^^^Memo, Kruzman to  Ginsburg  9 /2 9 /5 7 ,  Ib id .
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the  s t a f f  could tu rn  to secure or share i n f o r m a t i o n S e c o n d ,
Kruzman was i n i t i a l l y  responsib le  fo r  coord ina t ion  of the various f i e l d
165team o p e ra t io n s  o f  the  commission. Th i rd ,  h is  o f f i c e  was assigned 
the ta sk  of producing the  scenarios  of the  d i s o rd e r s .  This assignment 
became more modest with the change in the commission's schedule,  but 
Kruzman spen t  much o f  h is  time in January and February working over the  
d i s o rd e r  scen a r io s  with. Conot and the o th e r  s en io r  members of the s t a f f .  
Four th ,  Kruzman's s t a f f  was assigned the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of recording and 
main ta in ing  a c i t y  by c i t y  f i l e  of the various  data  co l lec ted  by the s t a f f .  
In October Palmieri  was successful  in secur ing  more of Kruzman's time fo r  
general  a d m in i s t r a t iv e  work.^^^ From the previous discussion of the work
Agency l i a i s o n  persons a lso  served as funnels  fo r  information 
about commission work to t h e i r  depar tments ,  a device  useful in avoiding  
d u p l i c a t i o n  but  a l so  troublesome to the  commission when the various agenc­
ies  engaged in a v a r i e ty  of defens ive t a c t i c s  designed to avoid commission 
pre-emption o f  what each regarded as i t s  a rea  o f  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  in c i v i l  
d i so rd e r  po l icy  development. See Lipsky and Olson, MSS, IV, pp. 25-27.
^®^See th e  d iscussion o f  f i e l d  teams, above pp. 351-354.
1
See pp. 253 f o r  another d i scuss ion  of t h i s  change in d u t i e s .  On 
October 2 he ass igned Kruzman to general adm in is t ra t io n  of s t a f f  a f f a i r s .  
Later t h a t  month Kruzman was assigned the  fo llowing:
"1. All l i a i s o n  and coord ination of a c t i v i t i e s  associa ted  with 
the  budget p resen ta t ion .
"2. Continuing follow-up on the program l e a d e r s . . .  r e p o r t -----
e x a c t ly  what t h e i r  s t a tu s  i s  and whether t h e i r  production 
shows any promise.
"3. All mat te rs  assoc ia ted  with the team opera t ions  including 
the  follow-up v i s i t s ,  the e d i t in g  and re -w r i t in g  . . .  of  the 
( f i e l d  rep o r t s )  and the design of th e  spec ia l  operat ion 
wherein the  team members wil l  search the  interview 
mater ia l  and the  ( f i e l d  r e p o r t s )  fo r  p a r t i c u l a r  concrete  
examples and problems r e l a t i n g  to the  specia l  program 
a re a s .  "
Palmieri  to  Kruzman 10/31/67, P a lm ie r i ' s  f i l e ,  NACCD Papers, LBJ Library .
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of  the f i e l d  teams i t  is  obvious tha t  the  r e d e f i n i t i o n  o f  Kruzman's 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  caused some a d m in is t r a t iv e  confus ion ,  a p re d ic tab le  
r e s u l t  given the  rap id  adjustment n eces s i ta ted  by the  changes in the 
commission's schedule  made sca rce ly  one month a f t e r  the new assignments 
were made.
7) Congressional Rela t ions
The p o l i t i c a l l y  experienced group of commissioners and sen io r  
s t a f f  d id  not need to be reminded t h a t  a major p a r t  of t h e i r  r e s p o n s ib i ­
l i t y  was to work with  Califano and the r e s t  of  the White House s t a f f  
to  p ro te c t  the i n t e r e s t s  o f  the  pres ident  in the s t r u g g le  with congress  
over con tro l  of na tional public  policy development in response to the 
c iv i l  d i so rd e r s  o f  1957. All b i l l s  and committee work remotely con­
cerned with  the a reas  f a l l i n g  under the  four teen  poin t mandate were 
c lo se ly  monitored and c o l l a t e d  with the  commission's  work. Such 
informat ion was reported to Ginsburg and the  White House. The commission 
wanted p a r t i c u l a r  a t t e n t i o n  to be paid to the McClellan Committee.
Henry B. (Boots) T a l i a f e r r o ,  J r .  held the  t i t l e  o f  Director  of  
Congressional Relations  and as such was o f f i c i a l l y  responsib le  fo r  
coord ina t ion  o f  the  various e f f o r t s  by the commission to work with (and 
aga ins t )  the  congress .  T a l i a f e r ro  was aware t h a t  c lose  coord ination 
of  commission-congressional r e l a t i o n s  was both impossible  and undes i r ­
ab le .  He was determined, however, to  define as broad an area of  r e ­
s p o n s i b i l i t y  as poss ib le  f o r  his  o f f i c e .  In defending his  recommenda­
t ions  fo r  the s i z e  o f  s t a f f  needed f o r  his department,  T a l ia fe r ro  
def ined fo r  Pa lmieri  his view of his  basic  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s :
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"1. To o b ta in  f o r  the  commission the r e s u l t s  o f  the  re levan t  
work done by the  Congress in the p a s t .
"2. To keep the  commission informed of  the  r e l e v a n t  work 
now being done by the Congress.
"3. To a s s i s t  th e  commission in making necessary  contac ts  
with the  Congress.
"4. To i n t e r p r e t  the  work o f  the.commission to  the  Congress 
and the  Congressional s t a f f . "
I t  was po in t  2 t h a t  took most o f  T a l i a f e r r o ' s  time. Closely working
with the  White House and key congresspersons he and his  s t a f f  were able
to keep the s t a f f  r e g u l a r l y  informed of the p re sen t  s t a t u s  o f  a l l  c iv i l
d i so rd e r  r e l a t e d  b i l l s  and the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  p o s i t io n  on them.^^®
The most important work done f u l f i l l i n g  the t h i r d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  was the
1 go
c lose  c on tac t  mainta ined with the McClellan Committee. T a l ia fe r ro  a lso  
worked with execu t ive  agencies on t h e i r  test imony before  the commission 
and congressional  committees and g e t t in g  in format ion  to them from the 
testimony o f  o th e r s .
Ginsburg expected each s t a f f  o f f i c e  to keep c lo se  t rack  of any 
congressional a c t i o n s  in the policy  areas  ass igned  to i t .  The repor ts  
o f  these  monitor ing a c t i v i t i e s  went to Ginsburg and T a l i a f e r ro  fo r  review 
and a c t io n ,  i f  necessa ry .  For in s tance ,  Miskovsky's o f f i c e  was given
^^^Memo, T a l i a f e r r o  to Palmieri  9 /5 /6 7 ,  Congressional Rela t ions ,  
NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library .
T^^e.g. in  an 8/31/67 memo to Ginsburg,  T a l i a f e r r o  explained t h a t  
the  a d m in i s t r a t i o n ' s  oppos i t ion  to the Equal Employment Opportunity Act 
(SB1545) was based on a perceived t h r e a t  i t s  cos t  posed to  the passage 
o f  the  poverty program package, then be fo re  th e  c o n g r e s s . Congressional 
R e la t ions ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library.
^ ^ ^ T a l i a f e r r o ' s  f u l f i l l m e n t  of  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i s  
d iscussed  in d e t a i l  pp. 407-412.
^^^e.g.  the  Small Business A dmin is t ra t ion  wanted to be a l e r t ed  r e ­
garding any tes timony r e l a t i n g  to i t s  agency concerns .  See memo, P h i l ip  
F. Zeidman to T a l i a f e r r o  10/26/67, Congressional R e la t io n s ,  NACCD Papers ,  
LBJ Library.
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spec ia l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  watching the McClellan Committee, the  House 
UnAmerican A c t i v i t i e s  Committee and congress ional a c t i v i t y  on gun 
con tro l
The quest ion of  the  amount of  informat ion the commission should
share  with congress was never f a r  from the  top o f  the  l i s t  o f  problems
172with  which Ginsburg and T a l i a f e r r o  had to  dea l .  P r ed i c t a b ly ,  members 
o f  congress from the  c i t i e s  and s t a t e s  which had exper ienced d i so rd e r s  
and had been v i s i t e d  by r e p r e s e n ta t i v e s  of  the commission were anxious 
to  have access to the  r e p o r t s  of  the  commission f i e l d  teams before  they 
were made publ ic .  T a l i a f e r r o ' s  o f f i c e  received these  congress iona l  
r e q u e s t s .  He r e s i s t e d  shar ing  the  r e p o r t s  un t i l  they had been r e f in e d  
and made ready f o r  p u b l i c a t i o n .  I f  the commission was fo rced  to give 
up the  "raw da ta" ,  T a l i a f e r r o  argued,  i t  should not be done u n t i l  the 
r e s o l u t i o n  of the  budget problem with c o n g r e s s . A s  m a t te r s  turned 
o u t  the budget c r i s i s  was reso lved  without recourse to such a c t i o n s .
The re p o r t s  were shared with congress ,  a f t e r  they had been c a r e f u l l y  
reviewed by the White House and the  concerned executive  depar tments /agencies .
See memo, Ginsburg to  Miskovsky, 10/9/67 and Miskovsky to 
T a l i a f e r r o ,  2/15/58. Congressional R e la t ions ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ 
Library .
1 72See the exchange o f  memos with Representa tive  Hebert  concerning 
the  na t iona l  guard d iscussed  pp. 306-309. For a d i scu ss io n  of  the 
shar ing  o f  informat ion with the  McClellan Committee see pp.  407-412.
173Memo, T a l i a f e r r o  to  Ginsburg and Palmieri 11 /1 /67 ,  Congressional 
R e la t io n s ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library .
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8) Public  Information
Alvin Spivak, D i rec to r  of Information,  saw the p ro te c t io n  of the 
commission's independence from congress and the  White House as one 
o f  h is  c h i e f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  He knew and understood the axiom which 
holds t h a t  contro l  of the flow of information i s  a major in g red ien t  in 
measuring p o l i t i c a l  power and independence. He a l so  was aware of  the 
a b i l i t y  of the  White House s t a f f  (he had covered the White House as 
a r e p o r t e r )  to  r e l e a s e  informat ion in ways designed to b e s t  serve the 
i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  p re s id en t .  Consequently he spen t  much of his time 
t ry i n g  to  prevent  or t r a c e  leaks  from the commission and heading-off  
White House e f f o r t s  to pre-empt or  inf luence  th e  commission by means of
r e l e a s in g  c o n f id e n t i a l  information common to  both .
By Washington s tanda rds ,  Spivak was o f  average  success in ac­
complishing these  goals .  Some of the  leaks  from the commission 
damaged i t s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  with the  congress and the  White House. A good
example is  the  leak which appeared in Newsweek in  ea r ly  October.
The a r t i c l e  mainta ined t h a t  the commission would recommend improved 
t r a i n i n g  fo r  the  p o l ice  and the nat ional  guard,  job t r a i n i n g  programs
more extens ive  than those proposed by the a d m in i s t r a t i o n ,  and dismiss
175conspiracy as an exp lana t ion  of the d i so rd e r s .  I t  seems th a t  some
 ̂^^Newsweek, October 2, 1957, p. 2.
1 7 5 This p a r t  of the s to ry  was not much o f  a r e v e l a t i o n  as the 
l e t t e r s  to the  pres ident  on these  matters  had been sen t  to the White 
House by Kerner and Lindsay on August 10 and October 7, re spec-
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members o f  the  commission o r  sen io r  s t a f f  (most l i k e l y  the l a t t e r )  
were anxious to implant in the  minds of the  p u b l ic ,  the  congress and 
the White House, the  commission's " f indings"  on the major charges given 
i t  by the  p re s id e n t .  In t h i s  game of  leaks  and counter - leaks  by the 
commissioners, s e n io r  s t a f f  members and the  White House, Spivak was a 
handicapped p a r t i c i p a n t .
Popper m ain ta ins  t h a t  the  public  r e l a t i o n s  e f f o r t s  of a p r e s i ­
dent ia l  adv isory  commission can be an important  tool in i t s  e f f o r t s  
to educate the  p u b l i c . H e  sees every commission having three  
oppor tu n i t i e s  f o r  engaging in t h i s  type of  public  education: during 
the public  h e a r in g s ,  through the i ssu ing  of public  r e p o r t s ,  and a t  the 
time o f  the  r e l e a s e  o f  the r e p o r t .  In a l l  t h r e e  areas  the  Kerner 
Commission rece ived  negat ive  p u b l i c i ty  which became counterproductive  
to i t s  e f f o r t s  a t  public  education.  The p u b l i c ' s  a t t e n t i o n  was d i rec ted  
as much or  more a t  the problems the commission had with the White House 
than a t  the  s u b j e c t  matte r of the  r e p o r t .  In the  end the White House 
won the public  r e l a t i o n s  s t ru g g le  and p o l i t i c a l l y  neu t ra l i z ed  the 
commission's pub l ic  r e l a t i o n s  e f f o r t s  a t  each o f  Popper 's  c r i t i c a l  three 
moments in the  l i f e  o f  an advisory  commission.
Spivak opposed most o f  the  s tud ies  done on the news media f o r  the
t i v e l y .  Knowledge of the  imminent p u b l ic a t ion  o f  the  Newsweek s to ry  
was p a r t i a l l y  r e sp o n s ib le  f o r  the ea r ly  October de l ive ry  of  the recom­
mendation on p o l i c e  t r a i n i n g .  The l a s t  con ten t ion  is  in te r e s t i n g  in 
l i g h t  o f  the f a c t  t h a t  Miskovsky was not employed by the commission 
un t i l  October 4. The source of  the  informat ion in the a r t i c l e  on the 
conspiracy i s su e  must have been FBI Direc tor Hoover's test imony before  
the commission.
1
Popper,  P r e s i d e n t ' s  Commissions, p. 36.
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commission by o u ts id e  c onsu l t an t s .  He was e s p e c i a l l y  opposed to the work 
done by the  Simulmatics Corporation as p a r t  o f  a c o n t r a c t  with consu l t an t  
Abraham Chayes o f  Harvard Univers ity .  The Simulmatics Corporation work, 
to  which Spivak o b je c ted ,  was used in Chapter XV, "The News Media and the 
Diso rders ,"  of  the  Report . I t  cons is ted  of  a con ten t  ana lys is  o f  the 
media coverage o f  the disorders  in the c i t i e s  experiencing  them. Spivak 
argued t h a t  the r e s u l t s  of the  s tu d ie s  were l i t t l e  b e t t e r  than common 
sense i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of  the newspaper and TV coverage of the  c iv i l  d i s ­
o rd e r s ;  he was chagr ined th a t  the  l im ited  funds of  the commission 
were used fo r  such shallow i n s ig h t s .  However, Spivak was a vigorous sup­
p o r t e r  and promoter o f  the commission's conference on the media.
Along with Miskovsky, Spivak worked very hard to open and maintain 
con tac ts  with a v a r i e t y  of persons in the black communities throughout 
the  na t ion .  He met with r ep re sen ta t iv e s  o f  the  b lack  press and helped 
arrange  (through Vice Pres ident Humphrey's o f f i c e )  meetings in Washington 
between black newspapers and high Washington o f f i c i a l s ,  including Johnson, 
a t  which th e  concerns of  each were d iscussed .  Spivak informed 
the  major black pub l i she rs  t h a t  his o f f i c e  would send them information
1 J7Q
from the work o f  the  commission which they wanted and needed.
His reasoning was t h a t  good open communication between the commission 
and the  black community through i t s  e thn ic  press was an e s s e n t i a l  in g re ­
d i e n t  in any formula fo r  d iso rde r  control  which would eventuate  from the
^^^See pp. 398-403 for f u r t h e r  d iscuss ion  o f  th i s  conference.
^^^Spivak's  l e t t e r  to a v a r i e ty  of  black p u b l i s h e r s ,  10/17/67, 
Off ice  of  Public Information,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library.
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commission's work. Because of  the general  r e s t r i c t i o n s  placed by Ginsburg 
on shar ing  commission work with ou ts ide  groups the materia l  passed on 
was not very s u b s ta n t iv e .  But the e f f o r t  was made, and the black press 
had a d i f f e r e n t  kind of access to the  commission and i t s  work than the 
o th e r  media.
9) Commissioner-Staff  Relations
Students  of  p re s id en t i a l  advisory commissions have found i t
d i f f i c u l t  to agree  on a common way to c h a r a c t e r i z e  commissioner-s ta ff
r e l a t i o n s .  Lipsky and Olson found r i o t  commissions to be inhe ren t ly
fragmentary,  a cond i t ion  which in e v i ta b ly  leads  to ser ious  commissioner-
s t a f f  t e n s i o n s ;  the re  i s  too l i t t l e  time and too g re a t  urgency to  get
the  job done ( the  Lipsky and Olson "commission problem") to develop a
179c r e a t iv e  process o f  s o c i a l i z a t i o n  and group norms. Popper and Drew 
in t h e i r  in v e s t ig a t i o n s  found commiss ioner-s ta f f  r e l a t i o n s  to be a c e rb ic ,
1 on
tense  and guarded; the s t a f f ,  most often  f e e l s  used and abused by the
commissioners whom they regard as cosmetic appendages to the important
work they  a lone  can do. Wolanin, on the  o th e r  hand, drawing on a much
more comprehensive body of  da ta ,  f inds  s ix  means by which these  seeming-
181ly  i n e v i t a b l e  commissioner-staff  tensions  have been reduced. F i r s t ,  
low l e v e l s  o f  commissioner-staff  c o n f l i c t s  e x i s t  because the two groups 
tend to  sh a re  the  same perspec tive  toward the  problem they have been
^^^Lipsky and Olson,  "Riot  Commission P o l i t i c s , "  p. 13.
1 80 Popper ,  P r e s i d e n t ' s  Commiss ion 's , p.  23.
1 81
Wolanin,  " P re s i d e n t i a l  Advisory Commissions," p. 234.
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c a l l e d  to ge the r  to  address .  Most s t a f f  members see  themselves not 
as ideo log ica l  p a r t i s a n s ,  but as agents o f  the  commission. Second, most 
p re s id e n t i a l  commissions have a long enough l i f e  span tha t  the perspec­
t iv e s  of the two groups converge as they share  the  common educat ional 
exper ience o f  the advisory  group; in general  Wolanin found the  commis­
s ioners  became more l i b e r a l  and the  s t a f f  members more moderate in 
r e ac t io n  to the commission exper ience.  T h i rd ,  in commissions with  wide 
mandates, demanding la rg e  support  s t a f f s ,  ( the  exception in the  ad­
m in i s t r a t i o n s  he s tud ied )  such as the Kerner Commission, p a r t i s a n  
c o n f l i c t s  over i s sues  held fo r  p a r t i s an  and /o r  ideological  reasons 
ex i s t ed  w i th in  the s t a f f .  Wolanin th inks t h i s  s t a f f  ideological  
plura l ism is  p o s i t iv e  in t h a t  i t  allows the  members of  the commission a 
v a r i e ty  of  viewpoints with  which to  agree o r  d i s ag ree .  Fourth,  com­
missioners  always have independent sources of  information and th e re fo re  
never fee l  t o t a l l y  dependent on the  s t a f f ;  l im i ted  dependency c rea te s  
only minor f r i c t i o n s .  Five ,  because the commission s t a f f  membership, 
as with commission membership, i s  always "balanced",  there is  very l i t t l e  
chance t h a t  the s t a f f  w i l l  be "stacked" a g a i n s t  the commissioners in 
any p o l i t i c a l l y  meaningful way. F in a l ly ,  Wolanin found the " n e u t r a l - 
servant-of- the-commission" ro le  to be the one most fr equen t ly  adopted 
by the executive  s t a f f  of  the  commissions he s tu d ie d .  Strong p a r t i s an  
members o f  the  s t a f f  were found, i f  a t  a l l ,  in the  middle and lower l ev e l s  
of the p ro fess iona l  s t a f f .  The leaders  o f  the s t a f f s  of the  groups 
Wolanin s tu d ie d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  were d i s i n c l i n e d  to a l low  a commissioner- 
s t a f f  s p l i t  to develop.
Examination of commissioner-s ta ff  r e l a t i o n s  on the Kerner Com-
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mission revea ls  t h e  presence  of some of Wolanin's tens ion  reduc t ion  fa c ­
to rs  and some of the  c o n f l i c t  pa t te rn s  recorded by the o ther  scho la rs .
The most important f a c t o r  in reducing tens ion  between s t a f f  members and 
commissioners during the l i f e  of  the  Kerner Commission was David Ginsburg. 
From the  beginning he was concerned to meet the needs of  a ll  the  commis­
s ioners .  He was p a r t i c u l a r l y  s e n s i t i v e  to what he knew to be a concern 
of some o f  the  Republican commissioners and s t a f f  members t h a t  he was too 
c l e a r ly  i d e n t i f i e d  with t h e  l ib e ra l  New-Deal wing o f  the  Democratic Party.  
He sought to be open to a l l  Republican concerns and to see t h a t  those 
expressed rece ived  an open and f a i r  hearing by the  commissioners and the  
members o f  the  s t a f f .  He a lso  took care  to r e c r u i t  sen ior  s t a f f  members 
with s t rong  Republican t i e s  (Nathan and Kruzman).
Commissioner anx ie ty  about express ions  of p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i s an sh ip  
was not d i r e c te d  s o le ly  a t  Ginsburg. General concern to avoid over-
zea lous ,  socia l  reform o r ie n te d  s t a f f  members was expressed and re -
182corded during the  f i r s t  meeting of the  commissioners. The exchange 
between the  commissioners a t  t h i s  meeting a l so  revealed c o n f l i c t s  
among themselves concerning the ro le  of the s t a f f ;  Thornton wanted an 
o b je c t iv e  group; Wilkins i n s i s t e d  t h a t  such a goal was impossible to 
achieve; Lindsay pushed hard fo r  a highly  p rofess iona l  s t a f f  r e c ru i te d  
from such placed as the  Harvard-MIT Urban Study Center.  With these  
commissioner concerns in mind, Ginsburg s e t  the development of  mutual 
confidence between t h e  commissioners and s t a f f  members as one o f  h is  
f i r s t  goa ls ;  by a l l  accounts  he accomplished i t  and deserved h is
^^^See memo, Bohn t o  Ca l ifano  7 /2 9 /6 7 ,  Commission on C iv i l
D is o rd e r s ,  C a l i f an o  3 ,  LBJ L ibrary .
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r e p u ta t io n  as a f a i r  and even-handed lead e r .
Another t ens ion  r e l i e v e r  was the  tenure  o f  the  commission and the 
adjustments  in the  s i z e  o f  the s t a f f  made during the s ix  month period.
As the s t a f f  grew sm al le r  and the commissioners became more s e l f - c o n f i ­
dent in t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  the two groups grew c l o s e r  together  in
t h e i r  d iagnos i s  and p re s c r ip t io n  fo r  the c iv i l  d i s o r d e r s .  The f i e l d
183t r i p s  in p a r t i c u l a r  speeded the j o i n t  s o c i a l i z a t i o n  process .  There 
developed from t h i s  process a broad consensus of  suppor t  in the commis­
sion and the  s t a f f  fo r  the  gains made in c iv i l  r i g h t s  by the Johnson
a d m in is t r a t io n  and fo r  the  goals of the Great Soc ie ty .
But t h i s  s o c i a l i z a t i o n  process was not s u f f i c i e n t  to el iminate  
the tens ions  found to  be endemic to o th e r  com m iss ioner-s ta f f  r e l a ­
t io n s h ip s .  While Ginsburg was successfu l  in a l l e v i a t i n g  some of  
the  tens ion  producing p ressu res ,  most could not be r e l i e v e d .  The
time and resources  problem, more than any o the r  v a r i a b l e  shaped
the f in a l  product of  the  commission and the process which produced 
i t .  The c l o s e r  they came to the da te  when some kind of  rep o r t  had to 
be produced, the  more estranged the two groups f e l t .  The non-executive 
members o f  the  s t a f f  f e l t  betrayed by the personnel and budget reductions 
and by the nega t ive  recep t ion  t h e i r  work was rece iv ing  by the sen ior
1 Acting on sugges tions  by Paden, the  s t a f f  "debriefed" 
indiv idual commissioners a f t e r  t h e i r  f i e l d  t r i p s .  This process allowed 
the members o f  the  s t a f f  to have a c l e a r e r  unders tanding o f  commissioner 
perceptions  o f  the problems underlying the d i so rd e r s  and thereby avoid 
d r a f t i n g  i n t e r p r e t i v e  sec t ions  of the  Report t h a t  would obviously be 
r e j e c te d  by a p a r t i c u l a r  commissioner. See memo Kruzman to Ginsburg and 
Palmieri  10/24/67, Kruzman F i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library .  See a lso  
Shallow "Social  S c i e n t i s t s  and Social Action,"  pp. 213-215.
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s t a f f  members and commissioners. In a d d i t io n ,  some members of  the  
s t a f f  were convinced t h a t  th e  White House had w r i t t e n  o f f  the commission 
because of  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  with the work o f  the s t a f f .  For t h e i r  p a r t ,  
the  commissioners were inc reas ing ly  convinced t h a t  the s t a f f  was attemp­
t ing  to  push them in to  a pos i t ion  of accepting and th e re fo re  having to 
defend a rep o r t  which would challenge the e x i s t in g  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  order 
to a f a r  g r e a te r  degree than the majori ty  o f  them d e s i r e d ;  the bottom 
l i n e  f o r  most o f  them was drawn under the f a c t  t h a t  i t  was they who 
had to take pub l ic  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  whatever the commission produced;
they c o n s t i t u t e d ,  they reasoned, the Kerner not the  Ginsburg 
184Commission. A c r i t i c a l  poin t  in s t a f f  commissioner r e l a t i o n s  was 
reached ea r ly  in 1968 and examination of McGrath's notes fo r  the  com­
missioner meetings o f  January 11-11 revea ls  the  ways in which the 
problem was r e so lv ed .  By t h i s  point  in t h e i r  work the commissioners had 
experienced the consequences of c u t t in g  the s iz e  o f  the  s t a f f ,  r ev i s ing
See Lipsky and Olson, "Riot Commission P o l i t i c s , "  p. 14, They 
note t h a t  s t a f f s  o f  r i o t  commissions r e p o r t  the  need to c r e a te  a sense 
of  urgency in o r d e r  to a id  in molding the commissioners in to  a u n i t  in 
which they th ink  of  themselves as a commission, not as indiv idua l  com­
miss ioners .  S t a f f  members they interviewed conveyed t h e i r  sense  of  the 
importance of such ac t ion  in  preparing the commissioners fo r  the  crucial  
l a t e  s tages  in t h e  l i f e  of the commission when stands must be taken on 
mat te rs  o f  public  policy .  In commenting on the Kerner Commission, Lipsky 
and Olson noted t h a t  the  s t a f f  used such th ings  as the  public  h ea r ings ,  
f i e l d  t r i p s  and a v a r i e ty  o f  scho la r ly  a r t i c l e s ,  such as Fogelson 's  on 
the McCone Commission, ("White on Black") to genera te  a sense o f  urgency 
among the commissioners, to "hold" them as a u n i t  u n t i l  such t ime as 
"hard" da ta  could  be produced by the various research  e f f o r t s .  As has 
been noted and impl ied throughout t h i s  study, the  Kerner Commissioners 
needed no such sense  of urgency forced on them. They were convinced 
from the  day o f  t h e i r  appointment of  th e  urgency of  t h e i r  t a s k ,  the 
need f o r  a u n i f i e d  commission i f  they were to f u l f i l l  t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  
•and o f  the  n e c e s s i t y  of  t h e i r  contro l  o f  the  s t a f f ' s  c o n t r ib u t io n  to 
t h e i r  e f f o r t s .
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t h e i r  work schedule  and were face to face  with the very Gainful 
r e a l i t y  o f  having to  produce a public  s ta t em e n t .  F u r th e r ,  they were 
becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y  aware t h a t  i f  they were to  maintain  the i n t e g r i t y  
o f  t h e i r  f i n d i n g s ,  the  publi shed r e p o r t  was going to be unacceptable  to 
t h e  p r e s id e n t  and to l a r g e  segments of  the  p opu la t ion .  I t  was in t h i s  
c o n te x t  t h a t  a m a jo r i ty  o f  the  commissioners f e l t  themselves being 
pushed by th e  s t a f f ,  and by some of  the  commissioners ,  to adopt unaccep ta ­
b le  p o s i t i o n s .  During the  two day meeting Gorman, Thornton, and McCulloch 
held  f a s t  to the  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  the commission should not make recommenda­
t i o n s  on any m a t te r s  not d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  to the  c i v i l  d i s o rd e r s .  They
r e s i s t e d  and r e sen te d  what they regarded as e f f o r t s  by the s t a f f  ( a id e d ,
\
they  thought ,  by Lindsay) to  push the  commission in to  support  o f  a wide 
v a r i e t y  o f  domestic  programs a t  the expense o f  expenditures  fo r  the  war 
in  Vietnam. These commissioners were anxious to  narrow the  r e p o r t  to the 
" rea l  world" o f  p o l i t i c s  fac ing  the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and not use i t  as a 
dev ice  f o r  s t i r r i n g  p ub l ic  debate over  proposed innovat ive  d i v i s i o n s  of 
s ca rce  pub l ic  r e so u rce s ;  under p re s su re ,  they r e l e n t e d  cons iderab ly  in
1 qc
t h e i r  o p p o s i t io n  to recommendations on housing and educa t ion .  The 
m a jo r i ty  o f  the  commissioners were adamant in r e j e c t i n g  what they thought 
to  be a s t a f f  e f f o r t  to a l i g n  them in suppor t  o f  the c i v i l  d i s o r d e r s .
During th e  meeting a sometimes heated debate between the 
commissioners developed over  inc lu s ion  o f  recommendations on housing and 
educa t ion .  Lindsay th re a ten e d  to w r i t e  a m ino r i ty  recommendation on 
housing i f  the  m a jo r i ty  d id  not agree  to inc lude  one in the f in a l  r e p o r t .  
McCulloch and Thornton jo in e d  Gorman in  r e s i s t i n g  a s ec t io n  on housing 
and educa t ion .  Jenk ins  s ided  with Lindsay, wanting to have a s ta tem en t  
in the  r e p o r t  c a l l i n g  f o r  a reduc tion  in defense  spending with the  
savings going to urban programs.
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Corman reac ted  so s t ro n g ly  to t h i s  perceived t h r e a t  t h a t  he wrote a
l e t t e r  to his  fe l low commissioners in which he expressed d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n
with the s t a f f  work and saw no need for following what  he described as
the rev o lu t io n a ry  e f f o r t s  on the p a r t  of some s t a f f  members to  overhaul
the  American system, beginning with the c i t i e s . T h i s  d e c la r a t io n
o f  commissioner independence was not confined to o p pos i t ion  to  pos i t ions
developed by the  " r a d ic a l "  s t a f f ,  but extended to t h a t  of  c o n su l t an t s ,
137who were conse rva t ive  by any d e f i n i t i o n  of the term.
In the midst  o f  the  s t r u g g le  between the two groups the executive  
s t a f f  was drawn more and more in to  the commissioner-White  House camp; 
they were forced to respond to t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  bring together 
the d i s p a r a te  pa r t s  of the  commission's work in to  a whole t h a t  would 
f i r s t  meet the commissioner 's  demands and hopefu lly  those  of the White 
House. I t  was they who f i l t e r e d  the information flow to the commission 
and implemented fo r  the commissioners many of the dec i s io n s  which so 
a l i e n a t e d  the  j u n i o r  s t a f f  members. They and the  commissioners each 
engaged in an i n t r i c a t e  process  of  a n t i c ip a t i n g  the  r e a c t io n  of  the 
group to whom they f e l t  r e sp o n s ib le  (the commissioners and the White 
House f o r  the  execu t ive  s t a f f  and the White House f o r  the commissioners) 
for  the  q u a l i t y  of the informat ion being assembled f o r  the Report . As
^^^Corman to  Commissioners,  1/13/68,  Ginsburg F i l e s ,  NACCD 
Papers,  LBJ Library .
1 0 7
e .g .  In a l e t t e r  to  economist James Tobin, r e f l e c t i n g  on the 
"very d i f f i c u l t  exerc ise"  he experienced in a t tem pt ing  to ge t  the com­
missioners to accep t  a d r a f t  of  the Report produced by c o n su l t an t  Anthony 
Downs, Palmieri  expressed concern over whether the commissioners would 
accept any basic  innova t ions .  L e t t e r ,  Palmieri  to Tobin 1/17/68 ,
Palmieri  F i l e s ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library.
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with  any resea rch  e f f o r t ,  cons iderab le  amounts of raw, u n in te rp re te d  
da ta  t o g e th e r  with many d r a f t s  of chap te rs  were l e f t  in the  f i l e s  r a th e r  
than  r i s k  a negat ive  re a c t io n  by the  s u p e r io r  body. Matt ick makes an 
im por tan t  observa t ion  about the  process of a n t i c i p a t i n g  the  re a c t io n  
o f  h igher a u th o r i t y :
I t  was the upper s t a f f  l ev e l s  who decided what m a te r ia ls  
would be allowed to surv ive  in the  f i n a l  d r a f t s  submitted 
to  the commission fo r  review, acceptance of r e j e c t i o n .
Whether the upper s t a f f  leve l s  were any more accu ra te  in 
t h e i r  pe rcep t ions  about the commission than the l a t t e r  
were about  the  P res iden t  and the  Congress is  a question 
t h a t  i s  unanswerable,  but the e n t i r e  process of a n t i c i p a t i o n  
and the  ex erc ise  of  r e s t r a in e d  s e n s i b i l i t i e s  unde r l ie s  the 
con se rv a t iv e  na ture  of  the  Repor t .
In sum, then,  by the way the commissioners and the  senior s t a f f  
handled the problem of commissioner-s ta ff  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  the commissioners 
achieved independence from the  s t a f f  and forced the w r i t in g  of the  repor t  
which while  more independent than the  White House d e s i r e d ,  was f i rm ly  
in the c e n t e r  of  the advisory commission t r a d i t i o n  - -  supportive  o f  the 
e s t a b l i s h e d  p o l i c i e s  and means of  policy-making.
10) Consultants
The c o n su l t an t s  most used bv the commission were exper ienced prac-
189t i o n e r s  in the  a r t  of  advis ing  high level Washington po l icy  makers.
They were persons who had been inst rumental  in the cons t ru c t io n  and
"'^^Hans W. Mattick,  "The Form and Content of Recent R io t s , "  Midway 
(Summer, 1968): 4.
189 For a l i s t  of a l l  persons and o rgan iza t ions  having some form 
o f  c o n su l t a n t  r e l a t i o n s h ip  with the commission, see Report pp. 302-304.
369
implementation of the Great Society programs, by serving as members, 
s t a f f  persons and/or c onsu l t an ts  to White House and/or agency task fo rces  
and commissions. Many had a lso  served congressional committees in s i m i l a r  
c a p a c i t i e s .  They were, in s h o r t ,  persons bear ing s t r i k i n g  resemblance 
to  the p r o f i l e  of  the commissioners and Ginsburg sketched above.
To be sure ,  each of the  consu l tan ts  had a technica l  e x p e r t i s e  to o f f e r  
the  commission, but the most important  resource  each brought to the t a sk
was exper ience in and knowledge o f  the commitment to the es tab l i shed
programs, p rocesses ,  and goals o f  the  New Deal t r a d i t i o n  and e s tab l i shm ent .  
They came to  the commission from the leading academic i n s t i t u t i o n s  
o f  the na t io n ,  p r iva te  th ink - tanks  and the  major Washington law 
fi rms.
The co n t r ib u t io n  o f  the consu l tan ts  was g re a t e s t  during the f i r s t  
weeks o f  the  commission's  ex is tence  and in  the period of ea r ly  1968, 
during the period immediately following th e  decis ion to i s sue  one r e p o r t .  
The l a t t e r  period wil l  be discussed  in the  context o f  the  uses made o f  
the  Social and Economic P a n e l . A t  t h i s  point  a b r i e f  examination of
the e a r ly  uses of these  ou ts ide  exper ts  i s  in order.
During the  f i r s t  weeks of  the commission's l i f e  Ginsburg and 
Palmieri  made t r i p s  to  Cambridge to d is cuss  the work of the commission 




192o u t l i n e  Ginsburg had prepared for the  commission's work. The p a r t i c i ­
pants in each of  these  meetings were persons a t  home in Washington and 
in  the policy-making environment of  the  Johnson ad m in is t r a t io n .  I t  i s  
i n t e r e s t i n g  to no te ,  however, t h a t  no p a r t i c ip a n t  o f f i c i a l l y  rep resen ted  
the  White House. In one sense ,  because of Ginburg's  presence,  t h e r e  was 
no need to have such a person p resen t ;  in another ,  the absence o f  a 
r e p r e s e n ta t i v e  from the White House tends  to confirm Wolanin's con ten t ion
t h a t  p r e s id e n t i a l  advisory commissions t r y  very hard to mainta in  a c e r t a in
103type o f  independence from the White House. "
Dror has descr ibed  ou ts ide  consu l tan ts  as the "new idea" people
194in the  policy-making mix. He sees them as the persons who i n j e c t  
innovation into the  otherwise e s tab l i shed  i n t e r e s t  bound system in which 
publ ic  po l icy  i s  made. D ro r ' s  gen e ra l iz a t io n  i s  not va l id  when measured 
a g a in s t  the  Kerner Commission experience and i s  of doubtful v a l i d i t y  
when compared to o th e r  advisory  commissions. Contrary to h i s  c o n ten t io n ,  
the  co n su l t an t s  working with the Kerner Commission were as bound as the
1 9?Present  a t  the 8/31/67 Washington meeting were: Anthony Downs 
(Real E s ta te  Research Corpora tion),  Don I. Wortman (Office of  Economic 
Opportunity) ,  John McKnight (Commission on Civil  Rights ,  Chicago),  Mitchell 
S v i r id o f f  (then the  Human Resources A dm in is t ra to r , New York C i ty ,  l a t e r  of 
the  Ford Foundat ion) ,  Carl Holman (Civ il  Rights Commission, Washington, 
D.C.),  Don Hess (Off ice  of Economic Opportunity),  David DeLo (S ystem etr ics ,  
Washington, D.C.),  James Tucker (Department o f  Labor),  Richard Nathan 
(then o f  the  Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n ,  l a t e r  o f  the commission s t a f f ) ,
William Welch (Vice P res iden t  Humphrey's s t a f f )  and Pa lm ier i ,  Kruzman and 
McCurdy (o f  the commission's s t a f f ) .
1 93Wolanin, "P re s id en t ia l  Advisory Commissions," pp. 158-159.
1 94Dror,  P o l i c y  Making Reexamined, p. 92.
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commissioners to th e  p o l i t i c a l  and e s ta b l i sh e d  i n t e r e s t s  of  the time.
Like the commissioners,  they and the s en io r  members of the s t a f f  saw 
the commission as a se rvan t  o f  the  adm in is t ra t io n  and thereby bound 
to  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t i e s .  Also,  l i k e  t h e i r  commission peers they 
desired to continue to serve  the  ad m in i s t r a t io n ,  a f a c t  a l so  circum­
s c r ib in g  the  amount of  po l icy  innovation p o s s ib le .  Fu r th e r ,  the 
commissioners and th e  sen io r  s t a f f  bought the time o f  these  consu l tan ts  
to ob ta in  in s ig h t s  in to  the  p o l i t i c a l l y  p o s s ib l e ,  no t  the novel.  In 
several  important ways a l l  consu l t an t s  served the advisory  commissions in 
the same way those commissions serve  the p r e s i d e n t . T h e y  are
p a r t i c u l a r l y  help fu l in mobil iz ing external  support  fo r  the commission 
196and i t s  r e p o r t .  They mobilize e l i t e s  who have been neglected in the 
commissioner and s t a f f  rec ru i tm ent  process ;  they take  on tasks  the 
commission cannot,  o r  is  unw il l ing ,  to do. In the  case  of the  Kerner 
Commission c o n t r a c t  consu l t an t s  took on the  job of doing a t t i t u d e  
re search  and the s tudy of  r i o t  a r r e s t e e s ,  the s t r u c t u r i n g  and develop­
ment of the media s tu d i e s  and the  media confe rence ,  the work of the .
197Social and Economic Panel ,  s t im u la t in g  " . . .  p r iv a t e  persons or groups 
to perform tasks  t h a t  t r a d i t i o n  or  l im i ted  resources  wil l  not permit the
^^^See Popper,  P r e s i d e n t ' s  Commissions, p 26 fo r  s im i la r  in s ig h t s .
1 96e .g .  the  use o f  re spec ted  academics from p r e s t i g io u s  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
was extremely help fu l in gaining support  o f  t h a t  community fo r  the Kerner 
r e p o r t .  See N eu s tad t ' s  o f f e r  o f  help from Tobin and Solow (see l e t t e r  to 
Ginsburg 10/25/67) I t  does not s t r a i n  his  argument to apply Chadwick F. 
A lger ' s  concept "ex terna l  bureaucra t"  to the ro le  played by consu l tan ts  
to advisory  commissions. See "The External Bureaucrat  in Foreign A ffa i r s "  
Adminis t ra t ive  Science Q u a r te r ly , VII,  (June 1962).
1 07
See below pp. 376-384.
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1 98government to undertake  i t s e l f . "  The P r iv a te  E n te rp r i s e  Panel a l so
199attempted to  perform t h i s  func t ion  fo r  the Kerner Commission.
They did those  techn ica l  tasks  f o r  which only the c o n su l t a n t  i n s t i t u ­
t i o n s  had the  s k i l l e d  personnel As with com m iss ioner-s ta f f  and
commissioner-White House r e l a t i o n s ,  those between the commission s t a f f  
and the c onsu l t an ts  were of ten  s t r a i n e d .  For in s t a n c e ,  the commission
personnel resen ted  the f a c t  t h a t  the major resea rch  and w r i t i n g  f o r  the
201commission was done by c o n su l t an t s .
Most o f  the Kerner commissioners and s t a f f  members interv iewed
for  t h i s  study agreed with Popper t h a t  the  general q u a l i t y  o f  the  consul-
202t a n t ' s  work was low and not worth the time and money inves ted  in i t .  
Etzioni  agrees  and r e f l e c t s  the f r u s t r a t i o n  o f  most o f  the  co n su l t an t s  
( p a r t i c u l a r l y  those who were academics) over the l i m i t a t i o n s  the "com­
mission problem" placed upon them. He blames t h a t  problem fo r  the  sub­
s tandard  performance of his fe llow social  s c i e n t i s t s  in doing research
203fo r  the  commission. Consultant work which was o f  high q u a l i t y  was pro­
duced too l a t e  to be o f 'any  use to the commission in i t s  d e l ib e r a t i o n s
1 qo
Alger,  "External Bureaucra t ,"  p. 78.
1 QQ
See pp. 384-387 fo r  a d iscuss ion  of  t h i s  panel .
^^^e .g .  The use of  the  RAND Corporation by the Kerner Commission t o  
study g u e r r i l l a  warfare .
PD]
See memo, Koskinen to Ginsburg,  P a lm ie r i ,  Kruzman 11/27/67,
Koskinen F i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ L ibrary ,  where the suggestion i s  made t h a t  
the  c o n su l t an t s  be l im i ted  to general review and recommendations and that  
they be excluded from research and w r i t ing  t a s k s .
202 Popper, P r e s i d e n t ' s  Commissions, pp. 24-25.
^^^Wall S t r e e t  Journa l ,  Ju ly  9, 1968.
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leading  to  th e  f i n a l  r e p o r t .  Schuman, himself  a c o n s u l t a n t ,  noted 
in h i s  te s timony b e fo re  the  House of  R ep resen ta t ives  subcommittee 
i n v e s t i g a t i n g  the  r o l e  o f  adv isory  committees in th e  fed e ra l  government 
t h a t  i t  was "almost  u n iv e r s a l l y  t r u e  o f  t h e i r  s t u d i e s ;  the l e s s  we paid 
the  b e t t e r  we g o t . "
In a more p o s i t i v e  va in ,  the  c o n su l t an t s  were extremely helpful 
to  the  sen io r  s t a f f  in  r e f in in g  the substance  and tone  of  th e  Report 
p r i o r  to  i t s  va r ious  p a r t s  being submitted to the commissioners.  Dra f t s  
o f  th e  proposed c h a p te r s  were submitted to a number o f  c o n s u l t a n t s ,  
d e l i b e r a t e l y  chosen to  r e p re se n t  a v a r i e t y  of viewpoints  on the s u b je c t  
m a t te r  under c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  The responses  received  from th e se  persons 
al lowed the s t a f f  to  determine and measure with some p r e c i s io n  what 
types  o f  recommendations would be a cc e p tab le  in th e  p ro fes s iona l  
community and by whom. When they put the  knowledge to g e th e r  with t h e i r  
unders tand ing  o f  th e  p o s i t io n s  o f  the  commissioners and the White House 
they  then were in a p o s i t i o n  to c r e a t e  a f in a l  v e r s io n  accep tab le  to 
the  l a t t e r  groups.  This process c o n t r ib u te d  to t h e  c o n se rv a t iv e  tone 
o f  the  Report .
An example i s  the  development o f  Chapters XI-X III ,  dea l ing  with 
oub l ie  s a f e ty .  Law and o rd e r ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  problems with th e  p o l i c e ,  
was a p o l i t i c a l l y  s e n s i t i v e  top ic  f o r  the commissioners,  as has been
^^^e.g .  R e p o r t , Supplemental S t u d i e s .
2^5 ̂ U.S. Congress,  House, Committee on Government Opera t ions .  
P r e s id e n t i a l  Advisory Committees. Hearings Before A Subcommittee of 
the  Government O p e ra t io n s , 91s t .  C o m . ,  2na S ess ion ,  May 26-27, 1970, 
p. 139.
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seen. Draf ts  o f  the  po l ice  chapters  were sen t  to a v a r i e ty  o f  knowledge­
able  persons f o r  comment. Most found i t  too c a u t io u s ,  not conveying 
enough o f  a sense o f  urgency. Henry S. Ruth, a member of  the  s t a f f  of  
the crime commission and Cornelius Cooper (Department o f  J u s t i c e )  
complained to Bower o f  the  conservative  tone o f  the d r a f t  on pol icy  and 
community r e l a t i o n s .  J .Q. Wilson, (Harvard U n iv e rs i ty ) ,  t r i e d  to
s t e e r  the  r e p o r t  away from crime and move i t  toward c o n s id e ra t io n  o f  the  
207d i s o r d e r s .  Jerome Skolnick,  in February was pleased to f ind  th a t  
the  l a t e  d r a f t  was skewed away from what he perceived to be the law and 
order  p o s i t io n  o f  the adm in is t ra t ion ;  Herman Schwartz (Univers i ty  of  
New York a t  Buffa lo  Law School) on the o ther  hand, was very concerned 
about the  co n se rva t ive  tone of the f ina l  d r a f t  i t  had too l i t t l e  sense 
o f  urgency, and no t  enough a t t e n t i o n  given to police  oppress ion ;  Alber t  
Reiss (U nive rs i ty  o f  Michigan) f a i l e d  to f ind  in the d r a f t  an app rec ia ­
t i o n  of what he regarded as the pos i t iv e  co n t r ib u t io n  the emerging 
black groups were making to  socia l  cohesion in  the urban black ghe ttos .  
The co n su l t an t s  th e r e f o r e  warned the  commission of  the  c r i t i c i s m s  the 
Report would re c e iv e  from the profess ional community ou ts ide  the  police  
es tab l i shm en t .  But the  commission had to deal with the  White House and 
the  po l ice  and, because of the p re s id e n t ' s  s trong views on the sub jec t  
which were shared by a small group of the commissioners, the  substance 
o f  th e se  chap te rs  did l i t t l e  more than r e s t a t e  the  concerns of the  crime
^ ^ ^ L e t te r ,  Ruth to Bower, 12/22/67, Copper to Bower 2 /21/67 , Public
Safe ty  F i l e s ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library. 
907
‘- ' ^ a e t t e r ,  Wil 
Papers ,  LBJ Library .
" ^ ^ L e t t ilson to Bower, 12/26/67, Public Safe ty  F i l e s ,  NACCD
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commission; a p o s i t i o n  designed to move the ad m in is t r a t io n  away 
from the s t a t u s  quo but not  so f a r  as to completely  es t range  the p o l ic e .  
Here aga in ,  i t  was the  p r e s i d e n t ’s p o s i t io n  on the  policy is sue  which 
s e t  the l i m i t s  f o r  the  recommendations of the commission.
11) Special  Panels and Conferences
Many o f  the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  of the commission were de lega ted  to 
ad hoc groups and events .  The commission c r e a te d  three  spec ia l  panels 
and two major conferences  to  a s s i s t  i t  in ga ther ing  and process ing  
informat ion i t  thought  could not be obta ined in any o ther  fash ion  and 
s t i l l  f u l f i l l  the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  mandate w i th in  the a l l o t t e d  t ime. A 
t h i r d  conference  was p ro jec ted  but not held.
The th re e  p lanning groups were the Social  and Economic Panel,  the 
P r iva te  E n t e r p r i s e  Panel and the Insurance Panel.  Special conferences  
were c a l l e d  to d i s cu s s  the  ro le  o f  the media in the c iv i l  d i so rd e r s  
and the t r a i n i n g  of  p o l i c e  and nat ional  guard to meet the chal lenge  
o f  d i s o r d e r s .  The conference proposed, but  not he ld ,  {the "MARC" 
Conference) was designed to be a meeting of  black m i l i t a n t  l eade rs  and 
commission personnel .
208a .  The Social  and Economic Panel
The most im por tan t  o f  the  planning groups to  the f in a l  r e p o r t  
was the Socia l  and Economic panel.  Three f a c t o r s  led to the forming
y  QQ
The members were: Karmic Gordon ( P re s id e n t ,  Brookings I n s t i t u ­
t io n ) ,  Anthony Downs (Senio r  Vice P re s id e n t ,  Systemetr ics  C orpora t ion) ,  
James Tobin (Yale U n iv e r s i t y ) ,  Louis Winnick (Ford Foundat ion),  Mitchell  
S v i r i d o f f  (formerly  with  Mayor L indsay 's  New York S t a f f ,  then with the 
Ford Foundation) and Richard Nathan (Commission S t a f f ) .
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o f  th i s  panel;  f i r s t ,  the dec is ion  to i s su e  a s in g le  repor t ;  second, 
the  conclusion reached by the  executive  s t a f f  t h a t  Shallow's research  
department was not  going to  produce an acceptable  r e p o r t ;  t h i r d ,  the 
need to f ind  a means fo r  in t e g r a t i n g  the  "shor t - te rm" recommendations 
o f  Nathan's o f f i c e  ( o r i g i n a l l y  prepared fo r  the  in te r im  repo r t )  and 
o th e r  s t a f f  research  e f f o r t s  into a d r a f t  o u t l i n e  of  the s ing le  rep o r t  
now scheduled fo r  p u b l ic a t io n  in March.
Ginsburg wanted t h i s  planning group to make recommendations which 
would, i f  adopted as na tional po l icy ,  achieve th ree  s p ec i f i c  goa ls ;  f i r s t  
to  open o p p o r tu n i t i e s  to urban Negros which were denied them by r a c ia l  
segrega t ion  and d i s c r im in a t io n ;  second, to  improve the  qua l i ty  of l i f e  
in e x i s t in g  Negro neighborhoods in l a r g e r  c i t i e s ;  t h i r d ,  to provide 
increased o p p o r tu n i t i e s  fo r  p o l i t i c a l  s e l f -d e te r m in a t io n  by Negro c i t i z e n s  
( p a r t i c u l a r l y  in government programs aimed a t  achieving the f i r s t  two 
o b j e c t i v e s ) T h e  panel met th ree  t imes (December 12,20, and 29, 1967).^^^ 
Anthony Downs, the  g roup 's  r appo r teu r ,  charged by the panel with pro­
ducing a paper fo r  the  commissioners and the members of the s t a f f  on 
socia l  and economic problems, produced th ree  rough working o u t l in e s  f o r  
the  second meeting,  the con ten t  of  which became the basis  for  the s o c i a l -  
economic recommendations of the commission's f in a l  r e p o r t .  In his 
December 20 working paper.  Downs a r t i c u l a t e d  the is sue  before the 
commission in terms, sugges tive  of  those  put f o r th  e a r l i e r  to the
^*^^Letter, Ginsburg to  John Garner 1 /3 /68 ,  Ginsburg F i l e s ,  NACCD 
Papers, LBJ Library,
^^^Memo, Ginsburg to  Commissioners 12/22/67, Ginsburg F i l e s ,  NACCD 
Papers,  LBJ Library.
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commission by Daniel P. Moynihan. Simply, Downs to ld  the  commission 
t h a t  the  fundamental ques t ion  i t  had to answer was whether to  d i r e c t  
i t s  social-economic recommendations s o l e l y  toward the  black urban com­
munity o r  toward the urban American under-c lass  in  genera l .  The 
dec is ion  was, he s a i d ,  e s s e n t i a l l y  p o l i t i c a l .  He posed i t  in t h i s  
manner:
In designing p o l i c i e s  to remedy low incomes, poor 
housing and o th e r  undes i rab le  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  among 
Negroes, the ques t ion  a r i s e s  concerning whether these 
p o l i c i e s  should be aimed a t  Negroes s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  
o r  a t  a l l  persons su f fe r in g  from s im i la r  d e p r iv a t io n s ,  
re g a rd le s s  of ra ce .
Downs saw f i v e  advantages to focusing program recommendations on Negro 
Americans. F i r s t ,  t h e r e  a re  fewer Negroes,  t h e r e f o r e ,  the  costs  would 
be cons iderab ly  l e s s .  Second, blacks s u f f e r  more from r a c i a l  d i s c r im ina ­
t io n  than from any o b je c t iv e  i n f e r i o r i t y  t r a i t s .  Third ,  i t  is  "morally
app ro p r ia te "  to focus on b lacks ,  as whi te  Americans are  the  major cause
213of  t h e i r  p re sen t  r e l a t i v e  dep r iv a t io n .  Four th ,  s in ce  th e  p resen t  c i v i l  
d i so rde rs  a r e  c lo s e ly  t i e d  to  rac ia l  i n j u s t i c e  focusing remedial
ZT^See p. 453.
Z l^see ,  Anthony Downs, "THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE OF WHETHER REMEDIAL 
POLICIES SHOULD FOCUS UPON NEGROES SPECIFICALLY," p. 1. This 16 page 
paper i s  a t t a ch ed  to  the  12/22/67 Memo Ginsburg to  the commissioners c i t e d  
in Footnote #210 of t h i s  chap te r .  Both a r e  in  Commission on Civil  
Disorders (1 ) ,  Cal ifano (3 ) ,  LBJ Library.
PI 1"Only in t h i s  manner can e x i s t in g  --  no t  j u s t  p a s t  - -  r a c ia l  d i s ­
c r im ina t ion  be o f f s e t .  This p r inc ip le  i s  not based upon 'compensation'  
f o r  p a s t  e v i l s ,  but c u r r e n t  ones r i g h t  now oppress ing  Negroes." I b i d . ,  
emphasis in  the o r i g i n a l .
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p o l i c i e s  on urban blacks would be he lpfu l in reducing the problem of 
f u t u r e  d i s o r d e r s . F i f t h ,  "Since p o l i c i e s  aimed a t  Negroes s p e c i f i ­
c a l l y  could be much lower sca le  than those  aimed a t  providing equal
remedy to general c o n d i t io n s ,  such p o l i c i e s  would be e a s i e r  to
215adm in is te r  and could be put in to  e f f e c t  much f a s t e r . "  The disadvantages
were equa l ly  formidable .  F i r s t ,  such a plan i f  ad jud ica ted  could
be ru led u n c o n s t i tu t io n a l  by the c o u r t s .  Second, by ignor ing
th e  m a jo r i ty  of the poor i t  could be regarded as u n ju s t  by them and
o th e r s .  Third ,  i f  whites a re  in f a c t  an t i -Negro ,  the  program could die
because o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  p o l i t i c a l  o p p o s i t io n .  Four th ,  such a program
could inc rease  white p re jud ice  because o f  perceived " f a v o r i t i s m ."  Last ,
the  o b je c t s  o f  such spec ia l  programs conceivably could o b je c t  to special
217trea tment  as d i sc r im ina to ry  and h u m i l ia t in g .  For Downs, t h i s  d e c i ­
s ion ,  because i t  i s  p o l i t i c a l  in n a tu re ,  must be made by the com­
m iss ioners ,  not the s t a f f .  The f a c t  t h a t  some of the  recommended s o c i a l - 
economic programs could be handled d i f f e r e n t l y  than o the rs  ("Housing 
remedies could be g e n e r a l ,  bu t educational ones r a c i a l l y  focused") did
214This p r in c ip le  can, o f  course ,  be seen as a foundation fo r  the 
white mcism theme of the  Summary o f  the  Report . I t  probably helped to 
e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  theme, but as wil'l be seen below, the  Ylv isaker Task Force 
r e p o r t ,  which Downs gave to the commission s t a f f ,  and the e f f o r t s  by 
Mayor Lindsay were more d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  to the adoption of t h a t  contro­
v e r s i a l  idea.
Zl^Downs, FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE, p. 2.
01 C
Downs noted here  t h a t  most of the  welfa re  and o th e r  programs 
aimed s p e c i f i c a l l y  a t  Negroes had dr ied  up.
ZT^Oowns, FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE, pp. 2 -3 .
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n o t  a l t e r  the  f a c t  t h a t  the  "po l icy  d ec is ion  remains a p o l i t i c a l
. ^ • t  Q       "  -  - -
one ."  Downs l a i d  o u t  f u r t h e r  im p l ica t io n s  fo r  the  commission i f  
i t  accepted his proposed focus fo r  the  socia l-economic program recom­
mendat ions.  He o f f e re d  four  p r i n c i p l e s  upon wnich programs fo r  urban 
b lacks  could be b u i l t .  F i r s t ,  such programs must be developed with 
t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  in mind t h a t  the  c o n d i t io n s  o f  ghetto  l i f e  form an 
e n t i r e  system of  d e p r iv a t io n  and f r u s t r a t i o n  lead ing to ind iv idua l  
a l i e n a t i o n  and must, t h e r e f o r e ,  aim a t  environmental as well as i n d i v i ­
dual change. Second, remedial recommendations must be pe rson,  no t  pro­
gram and agency c en te red ;  programs must f i t  ind iv idua l  needs not i n d i v i ­
d u a ls  in to  s l o t s .  Th i rd ,  whenever p o s s ib l e ,  program recommendations should 
resemble  the  G.I,  B i l l  model, which allowed the  indiv idual r e c i p i e n t  
t o  apply the  b e n e f i t s  o f  the  program to h im /h e rse l f .  Fourth,  a l l  
program recommendations should aim a t  removing disadvantaged persons 
from po s i t io n s  of d i r e c t  dependency upon publ ic  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  from 
p o s i t i o n s  o f  d i r e c t  adversary  c o n f ro n ta t io n  with  the  a u t h o r i t i e s  and
from i s o l a t i o n  from the  major components o f  the  m a jo r i t y ' s  s o c i a l - 
219economic system. In t h i s  fou r th  p r i n c i p l e  Downs came c l o s e s t  to 
ch a l l en g in g  the premises underlying the view of  p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y  held 
by most of the  commissioners and the  s en io r  s t a f f .  In his  t e x t  he 
e lab o ra te d  on t h i s  p o in t .  He c a l l e d  f o r  the  confer r ing  o f  c e r t a i n  
b e n e f i t s  upon in d iv id u a l s  as r i g h t s  to g e th e r  with an education program 
informing them about the c h a r a c t e r  of  those r i g n t s .  In ad d i t io n  he
ZTGlbid.,  p.  3.
219 Ibid. ,  p.  5.
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ca l led  fo r  some p a r t i c i p a n t  control  over programs. He proposed a s e r i e s  
of  ways to reduce socia l  and economic i s o la t io n  of urban blacks (e .g .  
the programs must make a serious e f f o r t  to ob ta in  a heterogeneous mix of  
haves and have-nots  and to s h i f t  as many persons as poss ib le  into  the 
f r ee  e n t e r p r i s e  system and thereby move them from the  welfare  sub­
c u l tu re  to the  dominant economic c u l tu r e . )  The remainder of Down’s 
paper was devoted to developing an ou t l ine  fo r  a new national  jobs 
pol icy .  His proposal here was e s s e n t i a l l y  an ex tens ion  o f  ex is t ing  
Great Socie ty  programs - -  federal  money s t im u la t ing  work programs in 
the p r iva te  and public  sphere with emphasis on young urban blacks, the 
p r iva te  e n t e r p r i s e  s e c to r  of  the economy and on development of economic 
resources w i th in  the black urban ghettos .
This expo s i t io n  o f  the Downs' paper i s  important fo r  three  reasons.
F i r s t ,  Downs was the most important consu l tan t  to the  commission and
the Social-Economic Panel was a major vehic le  f o r  h is  work. He served as
the s t a f f  member to the  panel, thereby doing most o f  the research and
w ri t ing  f o r  group. He served the whole commission in s im i la r  and
equal ly  important ways. He was present a t  the c ru c ia l  ear ly  meetings
of consu l tan ts  c a l l e d  by Ginsburg in August. A f te r  the collapse o f
the  in te r im  r e p o r t  schedule and the r e j e c t i o n  o f  the  major s t a f f
program resea rch  e f f o r t s ,  he more than any o th e r  non-commissioner,
dominated the  e f f o r t s  by the commission to develop a p o l i t i c a l l y
c red ib le  r e p o r t .  His paper focused the commission's a t t e n t io n  on
220urban blacks and the problems o f  employment. Downs made a p o l i t i c a l l y
2^^I t  has been noted before (pp. 234-235) t h a t  the re  was considerab le  
intracommission f i g h t in g  over the wisdom and p r a c t i c a l i t y  of proposing
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more s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r ib u t io n  when he shared the r e p o r t  o f  the
221Ylvisaker Task Force on C i t i e s  with Ginsburg and Pa lmier i .  Most of  
the  recommendations o f  t h a t  ta sk  force  found t h e i r  way in to  the  com-
222m iss io n ' s  r e p o r t  inc lud ing  the white racism and two s o c i e t i e s  themes. 
Second, the  paper presented a t  the  two December meetings conta ined the  
most d e t a i l e d  p re sen ta t io n  l a i d  before the commission o f  the  very provo­
c a t i v e  p o s i t io n  t h a t  the re  i s  a st rong l in k  between the Great Socie ty  
programs and the  d i s o rd e r s .  Down's argument was a l ready  known to the  
execu t ive  s t a f f .  In a September l e t t e r  to Pa lmier i ,  Downs made a plea
f o r  r e l a t i n g  government performance to the r i s in g  a s p i r a t i o n s  of  American
223Negroes and the d i s o rd e r s .  He a lso  spoke a g a in s t  recommending pro­
grammatic s o lu t io n s  which would be administered from ou ts id e  the  black 
community. He repeated  th e se  concerns in the paper presented  to the 
commissioners a t  the  two December meetings.  He noted,  t o o ,  t h a t  law and 
o rd e r ,  o f  a kind,  can be re s to re d  to the c i t i e s  without c o r re c t in g  the 
cond i t ions  which produced the  d iso rders  by making heavy expenditures  
f o r  more po l ice  personnel and equipment. To avoid t h i s  he t r i e d  to 
focus the  commission's a t t e n t i o n  on urban black Americans and program
social-economic programs in areas  o the r  than employment (housing and 
education being th e  two most hotly  contes ted  candidates  fo r  i n c lu s io n ) .  
Downs obviously  disagreed with those des i r ing  to  exclude from the  r e p o r t  
a reas  o f  concern no t  immediately r e l a t e d  to the  d i s o r d e r s .  But he did 
secure  a p lace in the  Report f o r  jobs and the p r iv a te  e n t e r p r i s e  system.
^^^See Lipsky and Olson, MSS, V, 14-15, f o r  a d i scuss ion  of t h i s  
s e r i e s  of events .
222 See the  d i scuss ion  of  the Ylvisaker t a sk  fo rce  r e p o r t  p. 
LBJ Library .
^ ^ ^ L e t t e r ,  Downs to  P a lm ie r i ,  9 /1 /6 7 ,  Pa lm ie r i  F i l e s ,  NACCD P apers ,
382
recommendations which had the po ten t ia l  of  meeting t h e i r  r i s i n g  a s p i r a ­
t io n s  and in which they could share .  Third and f i n a l l y ,  Down's work, 
as represen ted  in the above d iscuss ion  presented  the  executive  s t a f f  
and the  commissioners with the  a b l e s t  cha l lenge  to the  conventional 
l i b e r a l  wisdom i t  would rece ive .  His e f f o r t s  to t i e  toge ther  the Great 
Socie ty  programs and the  urban d i s o rd e r s ,  h is  consequent e f f o r t s  to 
r e f i n e  the problem of law and order and h i s  e f f o r t s  to endorse c i t i z e n  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in local  policy-making a f f e c t i n g  them, while hardly rad ica l  
in i n t e n t  or  c o n ten t ,  were innovative enough to cap tu re  the a t t e n t io n  
of  the  commissioners and the s t a f f .  I t  i s  equal ly  impor tant to note 
a t  t h i s  ju n c tu re  t h a t  the  White House's nega t ive  p ub l ic  reac t ion  to the  
socia l-economic recommendations of the  Repor t , which were not as innova­
t i v e  as Downs had recommended, was p r e d i c t a b l e  f o r  two reasons.  F i r s t ,  
the  White House s t a f f  had once before s e c r e t l y  r e j e c t e d  the recommenda­
t ions  o f  the  Ylvisaker  ta sk  force  and t h e i r  modified reappearance in 
the Kerner f i n a l  r e p o r t  were equally  unacceptable .  Second, the  White 
House had no i n t e n t io n  o f  moderating i t s  s tand  on th e  r e l a t i o n s h ip  of 
law and o rde r  to the  d i so rd e r s .  F in a l ly ,  the  White House was unwil l ing 
to change i t s  p o s i t io n  on community p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  the Great Socie ty  
programs. Johnson was adamant in his conv ic t ion  t h a t  a mistake had 
been made in  the  Community Action Program by not a l lowing lo c a l ly  e lec te d  
o f f i c i a l s  to have the  f i n a l  say on the  var ious  programs. He did not 
intend to al low t h a t  mistake to be made ag a in ,  d e s p i t e  the timid endorse­
ment of  community p a r t i c i p a t i o n  f i n a l l y  approved and adopted by the
commission. 2 2 4
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2 2 5b. P r iva te  Enterpr ise  Panel
This panel was e s ta b l i sh e d  broadly  to  " . . .  cons ider  the a p p ro p r i a t e
r o le  of the  p r o f i t  making f ree  e n t e r p r i s e  system In he lp ing to a l l e v i a t e
PPf)the  causes of  the  c i v i l  d i s o r d e r s . . . "  The panel gave s p e c i f i c  a t t e n ­
t io n  to developing tax  Incentives  and " . . .  comparable Ideas fo r  p r i v a t e  
sec to r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  coping with economic problems In areas  t h a t
have su f fe red  or a re  th rea tened  by c i v i l  d i s o r d e r s ,  as well as with
227the problem o f  migra t ion  from rura l  a r e a s . "  Ginsburg 's  In ten t ion  
In endorsing the  c r e a t io n  of the panel was to give I t  exclus ive  r e s p o n s l -
224 See R epor t , pp. 154-155.
225See R epor t , Appendix I ,  pp. 313-317, "Report to the Commission 
of the Advisory Panel on Pr iva te  E n t e r p r i s e . "  Members of  the panel were: 
Commissioner Thornton, Chairman, John Leland Atwood (P res iden t  and Chief 
Executive O f f i c e r ,  North American Rockwell C orpora t ion) ,  Martin R. Galnsburg 
(Senior Vice P r e s id e n t  and Chief Economist,  National In dus t r ia l  Conference 
Board), Walter E. Hoadley, Senior Vice P re s id e n t  and Chief Economist,
Bank of America),  Louis F. Polk, J r .  (Vice P res id en t ,  Finance,  I n t e r n a ­
t ional Development, General M i l l s ,  I n c . ) ,  Lawrence M. Stone (P ro fesso r  of  
Law, U n iv e r s i ty  o f  C a l i fo rn ia ,  Berkeley) .  William Smith,  Commissioner 
Thornton 's press  s e c r e t a r y ,  served as execu t ive  d i r e c t o r  of the pane l .  An 
undated and unsigned document t i t l e d  Proposed Members f o r  Thornton Committee 
was found In a f i l e  o f  the commission! The names of Polk and Hoadley 
appear on t h i s  l i s t  as does a recommendation fo r  a tax lawyer (which 
pos i t ion  Stone  f i l l e d ) .  The o the r  names mentioned were D.W. Brosnan 
(Southern R a i l ro a d ) ,  Dan Smith (Harvard U n ive rs i ty  and formerly A s s i s t a n t  
Secre ta ry  of th e  Treasury fo r  Taxation under P res iden t  Elsenhower),  and 
the  l a s t  names Austin (Coca-Cola) and Lundy (Executive Vice P res iden t  
Ford Motor Company) were handwrit ten a t  th e  bottom of  the  document. This 
proposal a l so  c a l l e d  f o r  "one o r  two academic world f i g u r e s . "  Ginsburg 
wanted Char les  Zwick to  serve on the panel , but the  BOB Direc tor p re fe r r e d  
to be a v a i l a b l e  to the group as a c o n su l t a n t .  See Tax Incent ives  f i l e ,
NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library.
226 Repor t , p. 313.
227 10/23 d r a f t  o f  telegram sen t  to nominees fo r  membership on the 
panel.  This Is  Id e n t i c a l  to the language in  press r e l e a s e  of 11/21/67,  
Pr ivate  E n t e r p r i s e  f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library.
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2 2 8b i l i t y  in th e se  areas  on beh a l f  of the  commission. But t h a t
was not to be. In the  rush o f  events in the  commission's l i f e  in 
December and January,  the p a n e l ' s  mandate was preempted by Down's Social  
and Economic Pane l . The concerns and recommendations of the  Thornton 
panel found t h e i r  way in to  the  f in a l  r e p o r t ,  but more because of  t h e i r  
endorsement by the Downs' panel than by the  work and in f luence  of 
Thornton and h is  co l leagues .  The commission's acceptance o f  the Social  
Economic Pane l ' s  work can be a t t r i b u t e d  simply to the  f a c t  t h a t  Down's 
work was f in ished  f i r s t .
The quest ion of  whether o r  not the commission should recommend the
es tab l i shm ent  of a na tional po l icy  of  tax incent ives  to bus iness  as a
means of  channeling p r iv a t e  c a p i t a l  in to  p a r t i c u l a r  kinds o f  urban
ghe t to  p ro je c t s  occupied most of  the  time of  the panel.  Various tax
in cen t iv e  proposals were e x ta n t  in the Congress and the execu t ive  branch;
commissioners Thornton and Harr is  were p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n t e r e s t e d  in sup-
229porting  such a s e t  o f  recommendations. Ginsburg's  p o l i t i c a l  
i n s t i n c t s  and his e x p e r t i s e  in the i n t r i c a c i e s  o f  the  na t iona l  budget,  
informed him o f  the  p o te n t ia l  fo r  s ta lemate  in the  p u r s u i t  o f  the to p ic .
2 2ASee memo, Ginsburg to  the commissioners,  10/30/67 in which he
noted t h a t  the  commission's formal hear ings  could not focus on tax in ­
cen t ive  problems because the Panel on Pr iva te  En te rp r ise  was to deal with 
i t .  Tax Incentive  f i l e ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library.
229Harr is  a l so  had a concern fo r  developing p o l i c i e s  which would
encourage a reversa l  of the  ru ra l -u rb an  migration which he thought to
be one f a c t o r  underlying the d i s o rd e r s .  He and Senator James B. Pearson 
of  Kansas were a t  t h a t  time co-sponsoring the "Rural Development Act" 
which contained tax incen t ive  provis ions  aimed a t  a t t r a c t i n g  job pro­
ducing c a p i t a l  to ru ra l  a reas  su f fe r in g  from immigration o f  t h e i r  work 
fo rce .  I t  was H a r r i s '  i n t e r e s t s  in both areas  which brought them in to  
the arena of the commission's concerns.
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He consequent ly  was w i l l in g  to turn  the mat te r  over to  Thornton
, , . , 2 3 0and h is  p a n e l .
The panel began i t s  work on December 5,  j u s t  p r io r  to the  dec is ion  
to s h i f t  to  one r e p o r t .  Thornton and Kerner had assured the p a n e l i s t s  
t h a t  t h e i r  commitment of time would be minimal,  the panel ' s  s t a f f  
would func t ion  in  the manner common to most p re s id en t i a l  advisory 
commissions, a method of opera t ion  in  sharp c o n t r a s t  with t h a t  o f  the 
commission i t s e l f .
The members of  the panel r a i s ed  the  i s s u e  of tax  incent ives  in the  
con tex t  o f  s ix  a reas  (job t r a in in g  and employment, housing, economic 
development, Negro en t rep reneursh ip ,  education and a t t i t u d e  change) in  
which they f e l t  p r iv a te  e n t e r p r i s e  could make a s ig n i fc an t  p o s i t i v e  con­
t r i b u t i o n  toward changing the socio-economic environment in which the 
d i so rd e r s  had developed. The l i m i t a t i o n  of  time forced them to give 
the  m ajor i ty  of  t h e i r  a t t e n t i o n  to the u rgen t  problem of p e r s i s t e n t ,  
hard-core  ru ra l  and urban unemployment. To enable the private  s e c to r  
to meet the  ch a l lenge ,  they recommended a scheme fo r  recru itment and 
employment of  such persons toge ther  with a plan fo r  pr iva te  investment 
in ru ra l  a re a s  and a j o i n t  b u s in e s s - l a b o r - c iv ic  organizat ion c lea r in g  
house fo r  exchanging experiences in dealing with the problems o f  the 
hard-core  unemployed. To finance t h e i r  scheme they ca l led  f o r  sub-
230Not be fo re ,  however, he had sought ou t  the names and p o s i t io n s  
on the is sue  o f  the persons in the execu t ive  branch most knowledgeable 
about  the  p o l i t i c a l  and economic im pl ica t ion  of the various tax in c en t iv e  
proposals then under co ns ide ra t ion .  He found most of  these exper ts  to  be 
a g a in s t  such plans .
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231s t a n t i a l  federa l  t a x  c r e d i t s  to  bus inesses  w i l l ing  to engage in i t .
A modified vers ion of  t h e i r  proposals appears in the t e x t  o f  the Report
232in Chapter XVII, "Recommendations fo r  National Action: Employment."
The employment recommendations found in Chapter XVII c a l l i n g  f o r  the  
use of  tax incen t ives  as a means of  a l l e v i a t i n g  hard-core  urban and 
ru ra l  unemployment r ep re sen ts  a considerable  adjustment of the recommenda­
t io n s  found in  Appendix J . The Chapter XVII recommendations were t a i l o r e d  
to meet the known r e s i s t a n c e  and support  cen te rs  in the  congress and the 
executive branch. For in s tance ,  Ta l ia fe r ro  reported to the commissioners 
t h a t  tax incen t ive  l e g i s l a t i o n  had l i t t l e  chance of passing the House 
o f  Representa tives  because of the opposit ion of the Ways and Means 
Committee Chairman Wilbur M i l l s ;  he was reported to be opposed to any 
tax incent ive  b i l l .  The s e n a te  was more favorably disposed toward 
such l e g i s l a t i o n :  The Harr is -Pearson  b i l l  had been f i l e d  and Senator
Robert Kennedy (D. New York) had f i l e d  a b i l l  t i t l e d  "The Urban Employment
233Opportunity Act" which c o n ta in ted  tax incen t ive  measures.  The 
Treasury Department,  through Stan ley  Surrey, in i t s  p r e -p u b l i c a t io n  r e ­
view of Chapter XVII, was g e nera l ly  disapproving of  the commission's 
proposals in the con tex t  of  e x i s t i n g  federa l  tax law.^^^ The Department 
o f  Labor, through Secre ta ry  Wir tz ,  favored d i r e c t  payments to companies
Report , p.  314.
ZS^ibid. ,  pp.  235-236.
SB 2088
^^^Letter,  Surrey to  Ginsburg,  2/13/68, "Tax Incentives"  f i l e ,  NACCD 
Papers,  LBJ Library .
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i f  such on the  job  t r a i n i n g  programs were to be expanded by federa l  
a c t i o n .  There was a l so  known oppos i t ion  in the Department of Labor 
to a l l  the programs fo r  t r a in in g  th e  hard-core  unemployed by bus iness ;  
they regarded them as f a i l u r e s ,  wasted e f f o r t s  a t  b e s t  and s t a l l i n g
o n e
e f f o r t s  by bus iness  a t  wors t .  The commission was a l so  aware t h a t  th e  
Ylvisaker task  fo r c e  had been negat ive  toward tax incen t ive  schemes as 
a means of  reducing unemployment. The commissioners knew, to o ,  t h a t  th e  
Kaiser and Douglas commissions shared t h i s  p o in t  of view. In sum, the  
commission c re a te d  the P r iva te  E n te rp r i se  Panel to guarantee  th a t  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  s t rong  poin t  o f  view of e s t a b l i s h e d  bus iness i n t e r e s t s  would 
be represen ted  in  the work and product of the  commission and th a t  a p a r t i ­
c u l a r l y  time consuming ta sk  would be taken on by a group o ther  than 
the  commission. I t  was c l e a r  to th e  leade rs  o f  the commission from th e  
beginning t h a t  recommendations fo r  inc reased  use of tax in cen t ives  to 
f inance  the p r iv a t e  s e c to r  job t r a i n i n g  programs would not su rv ive  the  
congress ional o r  execu t ive  branch policy-making process .  But the 
schemes were proposed because the i n t e r e s t s  pushing f o r  them were well 
e s t a b l i s h e d  and t h e i r  support  was needed f o r  the  o the r  commission 
recommendations.
^^ ^ L e t te r ,  Wirtz to Ginsburg, 2 /7 /57 ,  Tax Incent ives  f i l e ,  NACCD 
Papers,  LBJ L ibrary .
See the Department of Labor study on job t r a in in g  programs- 
a ten  page u n t i t l e d ,  unsigned, unaddressed document found in the 
Deoartment o f  Labor Subject  f i l e s .  Roll 54, LBJ Library .
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237c .  National Advisory Panel on Insurance in Rio t Affected Areas 
I t  can be argued t h a t  th e  P r iv a te  E n te rp r i se  Panel su f fe red  most 
i n  i t s  work from too  broad a mandate. I t s  members did no t  have t ime to get  
a proper f i x  on t h e i r  assignment; too many r a d i c a l l y  d iv e r se  components 
c o n s t i t u t e d  the p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  of the  economy to  allow f o r  the  panel 
t o  develop a coheren t  na t iona l  plan f o r  i t s  involvement in  ghetto 
development. No such problem faced the  White House and the commission 
when the dec is ion  was made to e s t a b l i s h  an adv iso ry  panel on ' in su ran ce .
The problems to be solved and the indus t ry  to be addressed were c l e a r l y  
i d e n t i f i a b l e .
For the  commissioners the  problems of  insurance  coverage were 
v i s i b l e  in the p rope r ty  damage in the r i o t - a f f e c t e d  c i t i e s  they v i s i t e d  
and in the te s t imony they received in the h ea r in g s .  They knew a s i g n i ­
f i c a n t  sum of  money was going to have to be produced i f  the  damage was 
to  be repa i red .  The f i e l d  t r i p s  revealed  t h a t  in some a reas  insurance 
was not a v a i l a b l e  to  ghetto  merchants and r e s i d e n t s  be fore  the  d i so rd e r s  
and in o ther  cases  t h a t  which was a v a i l a b le  e i t h e r  was withdrawn by the
companies o r  inc reased  in c o s t  beyond the c ap a c i ty  of the  insured to 
23ftpay. In the 1967 d i s o rd e r s  i t  became obvious to most t h a t  th r e e
2 1 7 The members of t h i s  panel were: Chairman, Richard J Hughes
(Governor o f  New J e r s e y ) ,  Vice Chairman, William W. Scranton (Former 
Governor of Pennsy lvan ia) ,  Frank L. F a r r e l l  ( P re s id e n t ,  L iber ty  Mutual 
Insurance Company), George S. Harris (P re s id e n t ,  Chicago Metropoli tan  
Mutual Assurance C o . ) ,  A. Addison Roberts ( P re s id e n t ,  Reliance Insurance 
Co.) ,  Walter E. Washington (Commissioner, D i s t r i c t  of Columbia), Frank 
M. Wozencraft ( A s s i s t a n t  Attorney General in  Charge of  Legal Counsel, 
Department of  Labor).  S tanford  6. Ross, a BOB s t a f f  member on White 
House assignment as  s t a f f  a s s i s t a n t  to Cal ifano was named by the White 
House to be the  execu t ive  d i r e c t o r  o f  the p a n e l .
^ ^ ^ S e e  R e p o r t ,  p p .  1 9 8 - 1 9 9 .
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major d e f i c i e n c i e s  ex i s t ed  in the  law and p r a c t i c e  of  the insurance
in d u s t ry  which th rea tened  to block the  flow o f  money needed to reb u i ld
the  ghetto  a reas .  F i r s t ,  most insurance p o l ic ie s  w r i t t en  p r io r  to and
inc luding  1967 conta ined  a contingency c lause providing f o r  voiding
the  c o n t r a c t  i f  the  proper ty  damage sus ta ined  by the insured was due
239to  an a c t  o f  i n s u r r e c t i o n .  Second, the Federal D isas te r  Act of  
1950 did not provide f o r  a id  to v ic tims o f  c iv i l  d i s o rd e r s .  Thi rd ,
the  insurance companies thought themselves to be handicapped by various
s t a t e  regu la t ions  which forced them to  s e t  t h e i r  r a t e s  in a p a r t i c u l a r
s t a t e  on the  bas is  of t h e i r  lo s se s  in t h a t  s t a t e .
The i n d u s t r y ' s  campaign to ge t  federal  government a id  in i t s  e f f o r t  
to  change public  p o l ic y  in i t s  favor was quickly mounted. A prominent 
indus t ry  journa l  noted l a t e  in Ju ly  t h a t  the d i so rd e r s :
. . .  prompted an indus t ry  meeting l a s t  Thursday, with an 
eye to d i scuss ions  with the federal  government. The com­
panies hope to  work with the government to devise  a program 
which wil l  a l low a r e a l i s t i c  approach to insurance coverage 
in r i o t  p o te n t i a l  a r e a s . . .  Because insurance r a t e  making, 
using the pas t  as a guide,  i s  designed only to produce a 
p r o f i t  from business  c u r r e n t ly  accepted,  the losses  of  l a s t
P'îQ
Governor Romney found his  a b i l i t y  to respond to the  D e t ro i t  
d i so rd e r  sever ly  l im i t e d  by these  c o n t ra c t  p rov is ions .  P res iden t  Johnson 
and Attorney General Clark were determined to ge t  from the governor an 
admission o f  h i s  i n a b i l i t y  to conta in  the d iso rders  (a de fac to  admission 
t h a t  a s t a t e  o f  Insurgency e x i s t ed )  before  they au thor ized  the  d i spa tch  
o f  federa l  troops to  a id  in the  r e s t o r a t i o n  of  o rd e r .  Romney had been 
advised by counsel t h a t  such a d e c la r a t io n  on his p a r t  would void most 
o f  the  insurance p o l i c i e s  in the d i so rd e r  a rea .  The dilemma v/as eased 
by a l a t e r  agreement by the  major insurance companies to honor t h e i r  
c o n t r a c t s ,  r eg a rd le ss  of the  insurgency c lause .  However, the  problem o f  
how many times t h i s  s o lu t io n  could o r  would be evoked remained f o r  
Michigan and na t iona l  p o l i t i c a l  and in d u s t r i a l  policy-makers.
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week wi l l  never be recovered.  Rates or coverage ,  o r  both ,  
will  have to change ifgCOmpanies are  to con t inue  to under­
wr i te  these  exposures.
The companies expressed concern t h a t  they would be l e f t  holding the 
f inanc ia l  bag fo r  the  soc ia l  and economic ca ta s t rophe  c rea ted  by the 
d i so rd e r s ,  which were,  according to the p o l ic ie s  they wrote ,  not covered 
and not in su rab le .  The ir  d i scuss ions  centered on the  f a c t  t h a t  the cos t  
o f  t h e i r  re insurance  c o n t r a c t s  were bound to r i s e  both because of the 
d iso rders  and because those r a t e s  were s e t  by fo re ign  companies,  p r in c i ­
pa l ly  Lloyds of  London. Aware of  t h i s  l a t t e r  concern ,  conversa tions
were c a r r i e d  on with Lloyds of  London by the insurance  panel s t a f f .
94]
Ross summarized the  company's p o s i t io n  in a September f i l e  memo.
Lloyds, he s a id ,  will  take the  American market as they f ind  i t .  They 
do not plan to i n t e r f e r e  with American public po l icy  m a t t e r s .  For th i s  
reason,  the  chairman o f  Lloyds choses not to come to the  United Sta tes to 
t a l k  with the  panel o r  i n t e r e s t e d  congressional committees.  The Lloyds' 
r e p re se n ta t iv e  a lso  imparted to  Ross t h a t  " . . .  some American companies 
had suggested to Lloyds t h a t  i t  take a pos i t ion  t h a t  i t  would not r e in ­
sure  a g a in s t  the  r i o t  r i s k  in i t s  t r e a t i e s  which were being renewed
9 4 9
as of January 1, 1968." Ross notes tha t  Lloyds r e p l i e d  t h a t  i t  would 
take no rad ica l  a c t i o n  although i t  would have to main ta in  f l e x i b i l i t y  
on the terms of  the  t r e a t i e s .  I t  would appear,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  being
“ *̂̂ 8est  Weekly, Ju ly  31 , 1967, p. 1.
?4i
Ross F i le  Memo 9 /29 /67 ,  Panel on Insurance in  Riot Affected 
Areas (1),  Robson-Ross P r ic ing  F i l es  33, LBJ Library .
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r e l i e v e d  o f  t h e  n e ce s s i ty  of  w r i t i n g  c o n t r a c t s  in ghetto areas  was
a high p r i o r i t y  goal fo r  some American insurance  companies d e sp i t e
s ta tements  to the contra ry .  Ross and his  co l leagues  also found t h a t
Lloyds regarded i t s  losses  on i t s  American re insurance  business  to be
unacceptable .  In 1954, the l a s t  year  f o r  which public  f igu res  were
a v a i l a b l e  in 1967, Lloyds repor ted  t h e i r  g r e a t e s t  losses  in some time.
They were more a t t r i b u t a b l e ,  however, to Hurricane Betsy than to the
d iso rde rs  in Watts. I t  seems t h a t  Lloyds'  concerns were based on
a s t r i c t  p r o f i t  and loss  pa t te rn ,  r e g a rd le s s  o f  what was insured.
Some American companies, on the o the r  hand, were concerned to
s t r i p  themselves of  a p a r t i c u l a r  type of l o s s ;  a lo ss  which according
to Lloyds'  f i g u r e s ,  was not g rea t  when compared to natural  d i s a s t e r
damages. I t  can be argued t h a t  these  companies found i t  p o l i t i c a l l y
e a s i e r  to drop t h e i r  ghetto property and business  con t rac ts  than those
w r i t t e n  f o r  n a tu ra l  d i s a s t e r s  because the  l a t t e r  covered a more d iv e r s e
243socio-economic (and the re fo re  p o l i t i c a l l y  e f f e c t i v e )  c l i e n t e l e .  H.J.  
Maidenberg in  an a r t i c l e  in the New York Times c i t e d  f ig u e re s ,  not 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  from those  in the  insurance  panel reco rds ,  which 
show the c i v i l  d iso rde rs  losses  to be r e l a t i v e l y  mi n o r . H e  found 
t h a t  the London re insurance  companies were tu rn ing  t h e i r  backs on the 
American companies t h a t  normally "parcel o u t  l a r g e  portions  o f  t h e i r
24*3Documentation on Lloyds losses  and f u r th e r  d iscuss ion  of i t s  
s i t u a t i o n  can be found in Panel on Insurance in  Riot Affected Areas 
(4),  Robson -  Ross Pr ic ing F i les  33, LBJ Library .
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r i s k s  to unde rw ri te rs  in B r i t a i n . "  This he s a id  was the reason f o r  the  
c a n c e l l a t i o n  of many p o l i c i e s  in r i o t  a reas .  He noted t h a t  the  r i o t  
lo s se s  fo r  American companies t o t a l e d  some S70 mil l ion a g a in s t  an 
income o f  $23 b i l l  ion.
Johnson and Cal ifano were aware o f  the problems in which th e  i n ­
surance companies and the s t a t e s  perceived themselves to be. Discussions  
on the insurance  problem were held in  the White House wi th in  days of  
the  D e t r o i t  d i s a s t e r .  Cal ifano s en t  a b r i e f in g  memo to Johnson on 
August 4 t e l l i n g  him how Governor Brown had worked with the insurance  
companies in Watts to insure  payment to policy holders.  He a l so  assured 
the  p re s id e n t  t h a t  the  major insurance companies in Michigan had agreed 
to cover the  lo s se s  in D e t ro i t ,  He noted ,  t o o ,  t h a t  he had i n s t r u c t e d  
the  Department o f  J u s t i c e  to examine t h i s  whole matter.  During the  
week preceeding the  w r i t ing  o f  t h i s  memo, Johnson had received  a l e t t e r  
from the Mew Je r sey  City Merchants Council urging passage of  SB 1484 
which would e s t a b l i s h  a small business  crime p ro tec t ion  insurance  corpora ­
t io n  designed to  provide insurance  f o r  merchants unable o therw ise  to 
247obta in  i t .  A month l a t e r ,  the New Jersey  Merchants Council s e n t  a 
telegram to the p re s id en t  " r e g r e t t i n g "  the lack  of  r e t a i l e r  r e p r e s e n t a ­
t io n  on the insurance  panel.  The wire  claimed th a t  merchants had su f fe red
For i t s  in te rn a l  purposes the  panel estimated t h a t  the  insured 
lo s ses  in the  d i s o rd e r s  were $100 m i l l i o n  and the  uninsured to  be between 
325-100 m i l l i o n .  Memo, Ginsburg to Commissioners, 9 /18/67, Insurance  
Panel,  Ginsburg F i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library .
^^^Memo, Cal ifano  to the  P r e s id e n t ,  HU2/Box 5 /F i le  7/30/67 - 8 /8 /67 ,  
LBJ Library .
'? (LI
Robert  A. Wright,  "Economists Look a t  Cost of R io t s , "  New York 
Times Ju ly  30, 1967.
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the  g r e a t e s t  lo sses  in the  d isorders  and th e r e f o r e  should have a voice
24Sin  the p a n e l ' s  d e c i s io n  making. F u r the r ,  many knowledgeable persons 
were express ing  t h e i r  concerns to  the  White House t h a t  the insurance 
companies would withdraw from the urban ghe t to  market.
The White House intended the  insurance  panel to opera te  in a 
semi-autonomous manner. The wedding o f  the  panel to  the Kerner Commis­
sion was a m at te r  o f  p o l i t i c a l  n e c e s s i ty ,  the  White House doubted t h a t  
congress would s tand f o r  the appointment o f  y e t  another  advisory comis­
sion designed to  deal with matters i t  too was in v e s t ig a t i n g .  As fa r  as 
the  Bureau o f  the  Budget was concerned the panel was a p a r t  of the Kerner 
Commission^^^ and Ginsburg arranged the  a d m in i s t r a t i v e  procedures in
such a manner t h a t  the  s t a f f  of the panel repo r ted  d i r e c t l y  to him as
950
well as to Governor Hughes and the  o th e r  panel members/" But the 
members of the panel and the White House s t a f f  t r e a t e d  the ex is tence  of 
the  insurance  group as i f  i t  were another  p r e s id e n t i a l  advisory commis­
s ion .  Hughes held h is  own press confe rences ,  without f i r s t  c o n s u l t i n g ' t h e
^^ ^ L e t t e r ,  Harry F. Salomon, P res iden t  to P res iden t  Johnson, August 24, 
1967. HU2/B0X 6 / F i l e  7/30/57 -  8 /8 /57 ,  LBJ Library .
^'^^See memo, Ross to Palmieri and William Cannon (BOB) 9/7/67.
Insurance Panel f i l e ,  NACCD Papers, LBJ L i b r a r y .
^^Slemo, Ginsburg to Palmieri 8 /19 /67 ,  Insurance Panel,  Ginsburg 
f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library.
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251commissioners about  t h e i r  con ten t ,  the  panel held i t s  own hear ings  and
conducted i t s  own in v e s t ig a t io n s  and issued  a s ep a ra te ly  published r e -
252por t  which was received  and highly p ra i s ed  by the p re s id en t .  The
panel e s t a b l i s h e d  an independent s e t  of r e l a t i o n s h i p s  with congress ,
which was conducting hearings on a v a r i e t y  of b i l l s  designed to meet
253the  in su rance  problems caused by the d i s o r d e r s .  The panel a l so
e s t a b l i s h e d  i t s e l f  in an independent c o n su l t an t  r o l e  by tu rn ing i t s
s t a f f  to the  ta sk  o f  working out an insurance  plan f o r  the D i s t r i c t  of
?54
Columbia which i t  hoped would be a model fo r  o th e r  c i t i e s . "
The panel s e t  f o r  i t s e l f  th ree  general  goals which i t  intended to 
achieve  before  i t s  December 12 te rm ina t ion  da te ;  1) to  endorse and 
recommend to the s t a t e s  the development of "Urban Area Plans";  ( these  
p lans ,  which were e s s e n t i a l l y  a local  insurance  pool crea ted  by indust ry  
and government cooperation,  had been successfu l  in  several  c i t i e s ,  most
251 Ginsburg kept the commissioners informed o f  the p a n e l ' s  a c t i o n s ,  
but no t  always before  they happened.
oco
The p a n e l ' s  r epo r t  was published under the  t i t l e  "Meeting the 
Insurance Needs o f  Our C i t ie s  (Government P r in t ing  Off ice ,  Washington,
DC 1958). A summary of t h a t  document can be found in the Repor t , Appendix 
H, "Basic  Findings and Recommendations of  the National Advisory Panel on 
Insurance in Riot-Affec ted Areas," pp. 305-312. In receiving  the p a n e l ' s  
r e p o r t ,  Johnson made no e f f o r t  to r e l a t e  i t s  work to th a t  of  the  Kerner 
Commission. See US P res iden t ,  Public Papers o f  th e  P re s id e n t s , Lyndon 
B. Johnson, 1968, pp. 77-78.
^^^The panel did not ca r ry  o u t  th i s  l i a i s o n  through T a l i a f e r r o ' s  
o f f i c e  bu t  th e re  was con tac t  with  t h e  commission in th i s  e f f o r t  because 
each o f  the  committees with which i t  worked most c lo se ly  had a commis­
s io n e r  as a member: Senate Banking-Brooke, Senate Small B u s in e s s -H ar r i s , 
House Small Business-Corman.
^^^See l e t t e r ,  Ross to  Walter Washington, 10/10/67, Insurance Panel 
f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library.
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notably Boston).  Z) to  r e in f o r c e  s t a t e  insurance commission e f f o r t s
255to r e s i s t  any company a ttempts  to cancel e x i s t i n g  i n n e r - c i t y  c o n t r a c t s ;
3) to  work with the  congress in developing crime insu rance  l e g i s l a ­
t io n  f o r  small b us inesses ;  4) the  c rea t ion  o f  a na t io n a l  insurance 
pool to handle lo s se s  incurred  in the c i v i l  d i so rd e r s  from Watts through 
1967. The i n t e n t  in t h i s  l a s t  goal was to leave the  problem of  the 
development o f  a na t iona l  " r i o t  insurance" po l icy  to the commission as 
one o f  i t s  long-term is sues  which i t  planned to tu rn  to a f t e r  is suing 
i t s  in te r im  r e p o r t .  Events, o f  course,  precluded such a plan.
Working in tandem with the  White House, independent of the commis­
sion except f o r  repo r t ing  purposes,  the panel had no d i f f i c u l t y  ach iev ­
ing these  goa ls ;  they had been endorsed by the a d m in i s t r a t io n  a t  the 
time they were being formulated by the panel and had found themselves in 
a number o f  Great  Socie ty  l e g i s l a t i v e  p roposa ls .  In the  one area where 
the panel encountered o b s tac le s  pursuing these  g o a l s ,  i t  functioned 
well in the e s t a b l i s h e d  t r a d i t i o n  of ad hoc advisory  bodies — i t  served 
to re c o n c i le  indus t ry  and adm in is t ra t ion  needs in a manner acceptable  
to both.  The p o s t - D e t r o i t  insurance c o n f l i c t  in to  which the panel 
was placed was waged between the  la rge  and small insurance  companies.
The la rg e  companies sought l e g i s l a t i o n  au thor iz ing  a na t iona l  insurance 
pool to g e th e r  with f e d e r a l l y  guaranteed c e i l i n g s  on lo s se s  due to c iv i l
OCf.
d iso rd e r s .  The small companies were opposed to  any federa l  r e in -
^^^See l e t t e r ,  Ross to S ta te  Insurance Commissioners 9/18/67,  
Insurance f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library.
^^°See R. Lewis. F i le  Memo 9/22/67, Insurance Panel f i l e s ,  NACCD 
Papers, LBJ Library .
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surance guarantee and sought fo r  themselves a tax defer ra l  plan in r e -
257turn  f o r  t h e i r  w r i t ing  con t rac ts  on i n n e r - c i t y  p ro p e r t i e s .  The 
m at te r  was f i n a l l y  and simply reso lved  by recommending both plans  in the  
panel and the commission's rep o r t s .  This "so lution"  allowed both groups 
to th ink  they had won something, f r ee d  the  adm in is t ra t ion  from having to 
bargain d i r e c t l y  with e i t h e r ,  and allowed the White House to pursue the  
program i t  wanted. The ad m in is t r a t io n  decided to endorse the p o s i t io n  
o f  the  l a rge  companies and incorpora ted  t h e i r  program in to  the omnibus 
Housing Act of  1968. The small insurance  company pos i t ion  was r e j e c t e d  
l a r g e l y  because of  the opposit ion in  the  Department of  the Treasury and 
the congress to any kind o f  tax d e f e r r a l  plan.
An examination of the  lobbying engaged in by the large  insurance  
companies to ge t  t h e i r  plan adopted,  and the way in which the panel 
and the White House worked toge ther  in developing the a d m in i s t r a t i o n ' s
new insurance policy reveals  an a lmost p e r f e c t  example of the workings
258of  Lowi's i n t e r e s t  group l i b e r a l i s m ;  i t  a lso  i l l u s t r a t e s  something
of  th e  ch a rac te r  of  e l i t e  ru le  in na t iona l  government during the
Johnson ad m in is t ra t ion .  F i r s t ,  the  l a rg e  companies dram at ica l ly  supported
the p r e s i d e n t ' s  c a l l  fo r  "high r i s k "  investment in ghetto areas  by pledging
259$1 b i l l i o n  fo r  such programs. The pledge was public ly  announced the
^^^See R. Lewis. F i l e  Memo 9 /23 /67 ,  Insurance Panel f i l e s ,  NACCD 
Papers,  LBJ Library.
‘■^^Lowi, End of L ibera li sm.
? 59 See US, P res iden t ,  Public Papers of the P res id en ts , Lyndon B. 
Johnson, 1967, pp. 829-830; U.S. P re s id e n t ,  Weekly Compilation o f  P r e s i ­
d e n t ia l  Documents 3, pp. 1282-1284; P res iden t ia l  Memoranda, Cater  4 ,
LBJ Library ,  fo r  a s e r i e s  of memos, beginning 9 /2 /67 , from Cater  to 
Johnson d e t a i l i n g  the events and s t r a t e g y  leading to the announcement of  
the pledge.
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day preceding the in surance  pane l ' s  announcement (September 14, 1967) of 
i t s  "Urban Area P lan ,"  a recommendation s t rong ly  supported by the la rge 
c o m p a n i e s . S e c o n d ,  the American Insurance Assoc ia t ion  presented the 
panel with a proposed fede ra l  re insurance  p lan ,  developed fo r  i t  by the
Department o f  Housing and Urban Development, which they regarded as a
2fi1
" p r e re q u i s i t e "  fo r  th e  "Urban Areas P lan ."  Their  proposal would have 
provided government guarantees  of lo sses  exceeding 4 percent  of any com­
pany's premium volume (on a company by company, s t a t e  by s t a t e  b a s i s ) .
This would, o f  course ,  avoid the ever r i s i n g  re in su rance  r a t e s  n e ce s s i t a ­
ted by having to deal with p r iva te  fo re ign  companies l i k e  Lloyds of London.
In sum, the  panel served the a d m in i s t r a t io n ,  and the dominant 
i n t e r e s t s  of  the  in d u s t ry  i t  was commissioned to s tudy .  Here, as with 
most o f  the Kerner Commission's work, e f f o r t  was expended to indemify 
damage r a th e r  than address  the  wrongs underlying the  problems a t  hand.
The immediate problem of  g e t t i n g  the pools c rea ted  to cover the losses 
in  the areas  h a rd es t  h i t  by the  d isorders  was accomplished. The panel 
did  not address  i t s e l f  to the  evidence t h a t  a p a r t  of  the  reason fo r  the 
physical  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of the  n a t io n ' s  i n n e r - c i t i e s  r e s t e d  on the re fusal  
o f  the insurance  companies to provide insurance coverage; t h a t  some of 
the  same companies t r i e d  to encourage the major i n t e r n a t i o n a l  re insu re rs  
to pr ice  them out o f  the  i n n e r - c i t y  market; f a i l i n g  t h a t ,  they attempted 
to get  the fede ra l  and s t a t e  governments to guarantee  a c e i l i n g  on t h e i r
^^^See memo, Levinson to  the P res iden t  9 /14 /67 ,  Commission of 
Civil Disorders (1 ) ,  Cal ifano  3, LBJ Library .
^^^See R. Lewis F i l e  Memo 9/22/67,  Insurance Panel f i l e s ,  NACCD 
Papers, LBJ L ibrary .
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losses  on such c o n t r a c t s . M i c h a e l  Harrington seemed to be d e s c r ib ­
ing th e  insurance-government r e l a t i o n s h ip  in  1957 when he observed 
t h a t  in  the United S ta te s  " . . .  j u s t i c e  is  not a sound business i n v e s t ­
ment.
d. The Media Conference 
The commission sponsored a conference on the media and the c i v i l  
d iso rde rs  a t  The Homestead, the execut ive  conference cen te r  of  the  
In te rn a t io n a l  Business Machine Corporation a t  Poughkeepsie, New York, 
on the week-end of  November 10-12, 1967. I n v i t ed  were the r e p re se n ta t iv e s  
of newspapers, magazines, TV and rad io  networks,  the Federal Communica­
t ions  Commission, the  I n te rn a t io n a l  A ssoc ia t ion  of the  Chiefs o f  Police
254Commissioners and various  members of  the commission s t a f f .
There were th ree  reasons underlying th e  c a l l i n g  o f  th i s  confe rence .  
F i r s t ,  the  p r e s i d e n t ,  in h is  mandate to the  commission asked: "What
e f f e c t s  did  th e  mass media have on the  r io ts?"^®^ The c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
quest ions  r a i s e d  by t h i s  question presented Ginsburg with one o f  h is  
most d i f f i c u l t  cha l lenges .  He decided to move very cau t ious ly  and 
t r e a t  the media c a r e f u l l y ,  with the  end in mind to fo rce  the press 
to a t t a c k  the  problem of  the  media and the d i so rd e r s  and not
^^^For Lowi's d iscuss ion  of the same type  of problem see End of 
L ibera l ism, p. 213.
Zo^New L e f t , p. 304.
^°^FCC re p r e s e n ta t i v e s  were Chairman, Nicholas Johnson and General 
Counsel Henry G e l le r .  Quinn Tamm, Executive Direc to r  represented  the lACP, 
The commissioners p re sen t  were Able, J en k in s ,  Kerner, Lindsay, Paden, 
Thornton and Wilkins.
^^^Repor t  p. 296.
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the  commission. The conference format ,  he thought ,  al lowed the commis­
s ion  to accomplish t h i s  and answer the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  ques t ion  in the  best  
way p o s s ib le .
Second, the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  question was being s e r io u s ly  ra ised  by 
a v a r i e ty  o f  informed groups and persons,  inc lud ing  a number of the 
commissioners;  the  debate  over the l i v e  t e l e v i s i o n  and rad io  coverage of 
the  d i s o rd e r s  in Watts p e r s i s t e d  in and o u ts ide  the  news media p ro fess ion ;  
th e  commissioners were aware t h a t  the 1967 planners  o f  the  meeting of the 
na t iona l  jou rna l i sm  f r a t e r n i t y  Sigma Delta Chi were rece iv in g  reques ts  from 
prominent members to have the su b jec t  d iscussed  a t  the  convention; the 
Journali sm School o f  Columbia U n ive rs i ty  conducted a conference in October 
on race  r e l a t i o n s  and the  m e d i a . G i n s b u r g  was aware of the concerns of  
some o f  the  commissioners (Paden, Thornton and Jenkins  in p a r t i c u l a r )  t h a t  
press coverage  played a p a r t  in aggravating  th e  d i s o r d e r s .  In sponsoring 
the  confe rence  the commissioners reac ted  as exper ienced l ib e ra l  
p o l icy  makers; one way o f  solving a press ing  publ ic  p o l ic y  issue when 
the  government and in t e r e s t e d  groups in  the p r iv a t e  s e c t o r  perceive a 
common problem i s  f o r  the  government to  bring the  e s t a b l i sh e d  i n t e r e s t s  
to g e th e r  be fo re  a publ ic  body (in  t h i s  case th e  commission). All 
p a r t i e s  then can share  t h e i r  poin ts  o f  view and can have a chance to 
f e e l  as i f  they have p a r t i c ip a te d  in the  dec is ions  lead ing  to a change 
in  the pub l ic  po l icy  and, most important in t h i s  t r a d i t i o n a l  scheme, 
t h e r e  wil l  be no su p r i s e s .  This normal modus operandi ran into cons i -
^^^October 17-18, 1967. Spivak sen t  Larry S t i l l ,  o f  his s t a f f ,  
to the confe rence .  See memo. S t i l l  to Spivak 10/20/57, Public Information 
f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library.
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d e rab le  r e s i s t a n c e  in the  case o f  the media conference.
Thi rd ,  Ginsburg and h is  s t a f f  were running in to  ser ious  problems 
with the group of  consu l tan ts  with whom they had contrac ted  to do the  
major resea rch  and wr i t ing  f o r  the proposed chapter  on the media in the  
f in a l  r e p o r t .  The major c o n t rac t  had been given to Abraham Chayes 
(Harvard School o f  Law) and the Simulmatics Corporation,  a research and 
consu l t ing  f i rm  with which he was a ssoc ia ted .  Chayes had proposed, 
and the commission had accepted ,  th a t  h i s  f i rm do an e lab o ra te  co n ten t  
a n a ly s i s  o f  media coverage o f  the d iso rde rs .  The f in a n c ia l  p l i g h t  o f  the  
commission fo rced  them to reduce th i s  plan to a r a th e r  simple d e s c r i p t i v e  
s t a t i s t i c a l  a n a ly s i s  o f  media coverage in f i f t e e n  s e le c ted  c i t i e s .  
Regardless o f  the  f in a n c ia l  problems, Ginsburg received from his s t a f f  
a number o f  complaints  about the q u a l i ty  o f  the  Chayes proposal and of  
th e  Simulmatics C orpora t ion ' s  work as the  p ro jec t  evolved. About the  
t ime of  the  media conference Spivak, the  designated l i a i s o n  o f f i c e r  
f o r  the  commission with Simulmatics,  expressed to Ginsburg ser ious  d i s ­
t r u s t  of the  company's w i l l ingness  to hones t ly  repo r t  the s t a t u s  of  i t s  
258work to him. A month l a t e r  he expressed the same concerns and added
to  them re s e r v a t io n s  about the research design being used; he thought
269the  data  c o l l e c t e d  by the  commission's f i e l d  teams was b e t t e r .
Simulmatics was a d iv i s io n  of the Real Es ta te  Corporation,
(David DeLo, Executive Direc tor)  a management planning and a na lys is  f i rm  
o f  which Anthony Downs was a board member. The work fo r  the  commission 
was done by Simulmatics '  Urban Studies Division (Sol Chabeles,  D i r e c to r ) .
^^^Memo, Spivak to Ginsburg, 11/16/67, Simulmatics f i l e ,  NACCD 
Papers,  LBJ Library ,
^^^Memo, Spivak to Ginsburg,  12/23/67, Simulmatics f i l e ,  NACCD 
Papers ,  LBJ L ibrary .
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Kruzman, too ,  thought the  commission's s t a f f  had a l ready  done as good
a resea rch  job  as Simulmatics and was s in g u la r ly  unimpressed with the
270company's opera t ion  a f t e r  a v i s i t  to  t h e i r  o f f i c e s .  Kruzman and 
Spivak were both concerned t h a t  the Chayes group was determined to
271produce a r e p o r t  which could be used as the  commission's f in a l  r e p o r t .  
These susp ic ions  and p r e d ic t io n s  of  t ro u b le  ahead, led Ginsburg to 
c o n s t r u c t  the  media conference as an a l t e r n a t i v e  means of  producing 
the  media chap te r  in answer to  the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  ques t ion .
The convening o f  the  conference was not a simple mat te r .  Two of
the  n a t i o n ' s  l a r g e s t  and most p re s t ig io u s  newspapers (The Washington
272Post and the  New York Times) balked a t  p a r t i c i p a t i n g .  Both refused 
to p a r t i c i p a t e ,  d e sp i t e  p e r s i s t e n t  e f f o r t s  by the commission to involve 
them. Ne i ther  was anxious to share  in what i t  regarded as a govern­
ment in v e s t ig a t i o n  of  the  news coverage o f  the d i so rd e r s .
The product o f  the  conference and the research o f  the  commission 
s t a f f  became the bas is  fo r  the  substance of  Chapter XV o f  the  Report; 
the  work of Simulmatics proved to be o f  l i t t l e  value to the  commission. 
The p r inc ipa l  top ics  d iscussed  a t  the  conference were l i v e  coverage of
^^^Memo, Kruzman to Ginsburg,  11/23/67, Simulmatics f i l e ,  NACCD 
Papers,  LBJ Library.
^^^Spivak to Ginsburg 12/23/67 and Kruzman to Ginsburg 10/11/67, 
Simulmatics f i l e ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library .
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The New York Times a l so  had refused to be a p a r t i c i p a n t  in the 
Columbia Univers i ty  confe rence  on race  r e l a t i o n s  and the  media. They 
did send a r e p o r t e r  to cover those meetings as a news even t .  Larry S t i l l  
i n t e rp re te d  the Times behavior as not wishing " . . .  to give an appearance 
of commitment to the  conference goals or sub jec t  i t s  ( the  Times') p o l ic ie s  
to c r i t i c i s m . "  Memo, S t i l l  to Spivak, 10/20/67, Spivak f i l e s ,  NACCD 
Papers, LBJ Library.
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d iso rd e r s  by th e  e l e c t r o n i c  news media (an agreement was reached th a t
such coverage i s  u sua l ly  u n d e s i r ab le ) ,  police-media r e l a t i o n s ,  the
coverage o f  "normal" ghe t to  l i f e ,  coverage of black concerns in the
273"white" press and the desegregat ion  of the jou rna l i sm  profess ion .
The value of t h i s  conference to the commission can be assessed  in
the following ways. F i r s t ,  i t  d id  provide a g re a t  deal of the substance
o f  the  media ch ap te r  o f  the  Repor t . I t  t h e re fo re  did  p ro tec t  the
commission in the  face  o f  the  Simulmatics C orpora t ion ' s  f a i l u r e  to pro-
274duce what had been expected o f  them. Second, the conference did 
provide a " n e u t r a l " forum in which the ques t ion  of  the  p res iden t  could 
be d iscussed  by media persons and r e p re se n ta t iv e s  o f  the ad m in is t ra t ion  ; 
the  conference was not c a l l e d  by the White House and the re  were no r e p r e ­
s e n ta t iv e s  o f  the  a d m in i s t r a t io n  present o th e r  than the members of  the 
commission and i t s  s t a f f .  However, the concerns of the Washington Post 
and the  New York Times seem, in r e t r o s p e c t ,  to  be l e g i t im a te .  The 
conference p a r t i c i p a n t s  were aware th a t  the  commissioners would make a 
r e p o r t  to the  White House, t h a t  t h e i r  ac t io n s  were not independent of 
the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s .  The media r e p re se n ta t iv e s  who did p a r t i c i p a t e  
e i t h e r  accepted the s i t u a t i o n  as proper,  o r  went along with i t  because 
they saw the c o s t  of n o n - p a r t i c ip a t io n  as being too high. Thi rd ,  the
^^^See Lipsky and Olson, MSS, V, pp. 36-38 f o r  a s im i la r  d i scuss ion  
of  th e  conference.
01A
The Simulmatics p ro je c t  was not a t o t a l  f a i l u r e .  Lipsky and 
Olson poin t o u t  t h a t  i t s  con ten t  analys is  did r e l i e v e  the press o f  the 
"devi l"  image i t  had been forced to car ry  by many, including some of the  
commissioners, who f e l t  the r h e t o r i c  of the  media encouraged those who 
p a r t i c ip a t e d  in  the d i s o r d e r s .  Lipsky and Olson, MSS, V, pp. 37-38.
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conference did s h i f t  the  burden o f  dea l ing  with the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  question
onto the media and provided a means f o r  reasonable  assurance  t h a t  the
commission would be immune from a t t a c k s  by the  press over  the content
of Chapter XV of  the  Report . Fu r th e r ,  the conference allowed Ginsburg
to show some members o f  the commission t h a t  he took t h e i r  concerns and
the p r e s id e n t ' s  about the press s e r io u s ly  and "had the  p ress  in" to
inform i t  of the s e r io u s  questions  being r a i s e d  about i t s  performance
in the d iso rde rs .  However, some o f  the commissioners were not completely
s a t i s f i e d  th a t  the conference had "put the press  in i t s  p la c e . "  As
l a t e  as the January 19 meeting of the  commission several  commissioners
were concerned t h a t  what they saw as an i n s ip id  content a n a ly s i s  done
by the Simulmatic people would be a l l  t h a t  would get  in to  the Repor t .
Commissioners Peden, Thornton and Able s t i l l  saw the news media as gu i l ty
in some way of causing some of  the d i s o r d e r s .  Jenkins wanted to be
c e r t a i n  th a t  the o th e r s  knew th a t  the  o rgan iza t ions  r e p re se n t in g  police
c h ie f s  and mayors had re c en t ly  expressed s i m i l a r  concerns .  Only Lindsay
objec ted  to what he described as p e r s i s t e n t  e f f o r t s  w i th in  the commission
275to put the media on the  rack.
e) The MARC Conference 
Milan Miskovsky was determined to c r e a t e  l in e s  of  communication 
between the commission and the  l e ad e rs  of the  emerging black  power 
and n a t i o n a l i s t  groups.  He reasoned t h a t  the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  ques t ion  con­
cern ing  conspiracy could not be answered nor could the  commissioners 
w r i t e  a comprehensive re p o r t  unless  such communication were opened and
27h
McGrath, Minute s,  1 /19 /58 .
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4. • j  276 s u s ta in e d .
He and h i s  s t a f f  developed a plan fo r  a conference on black 
m i l i t a n c y  fo r  th e  commission which deserves  mention in t h i s  d iscuss ion  
because i t  was the  only e f f o r t  by commission persons to develop anything 
exceeding conversa t ion  and depos i t ion  in te rv iew s  with persons r e p re ­
s e n t in g  " r a d i c a l "  black i n t e r e s t s .  Miskovsky vented some o f  h is  f r u s t r a ­
t i o n  over the  f a i l u r e  of the execu t ive  s t a f f  and the commissioners to 
suppor t  the  conference:
One o f  th e  plans we developed and you approved was the 
MARC Conference. We be l ieved  t h a t  i t  would r e s u l t  in 
a g rea t  deal  o f  va luable  in format ion  on the  is sue  of 
consp iracy .  Perhaps more impor tan t ,  the  conference 
would lead  to informat ion on the planning and programs 
o f  the Negro m i l i t a n t s  and t h e i r  o rg a n iz a t io n s .  With­
o u t  rehashing a l l  the d e t a i l s  and r e a so n s ,  I was forced 
t o  cancel those  plans and in a l l  honesty I^b e l iev e  the 
commission's  e f f o r t  su f fe red  as a r e s u l t .
The conference was planned by Miskovsky and the  MARC s t a f f  and 
had as i t s  primary o b jec t iv e  to " . . .  de termine those forms o f  black
o r g a n i z a t i o n s - - a s  well as ac tua l  programs—most e f f e c t i v e  fo r  achieving
278so c ia l  change under present c o n d i t i o n s . "  The conference was designed
Another d iscuss ion  of  Miskovsky's a c t i v i t i e s  in t h i s  area  can 
be found above, pp. 350-351. Much o f  the  d iscuss ion  which follows is  
based on Miskovsky's "Final Report  o f  the  Off ice  of  In v e s t ig a t i o n , "
March 25, 1968, Miskovsky f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library .
^^^Ib id .  MARC, (Metropolitan Applied Research Center) was a p r iv a te  
urban problems consu l t ing  agency d i r e c ted  by Dr. Kenneth Clark ,  an i n ­
f l u e n t i a l  w i tness  before  the commission hear ings  and an ongoing consu l tan t  
to  i t s  work.
^^^Memo, Susan Carey to Ginsburg and Miskovsky 12/9 /67 ,  "Re: MARC
Commission Sponsored Conference on Ghetto A c t iv i s t s  and T h e o r i s t s . "  
Miskovsky f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ L ibrary .
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to serve  the commission's  plans fo r  long-range program recommendations
which would have been p a r t  o f  the f ina l  r e p o r t  o r i g i n a l l y  planned
fo r  the  summer of  1958. The meeting was designed to l a s t  for two and one-
h a l f  days and was to have been held in New York sometime la te  in January
or  e a r ly  in February,  1968. There were to have been a l im i ted  number of
ind iv idua l  black m i l i t a n t  p a r t i c ip a n t s  ( f i f t e e n  to tw en ty ) , each of
whom would be a l e ad e r  o f  an e f f e c t iv e  local  a c t ion  program o r  a
279t h e o r i s t  o f  the  black movement. Hopefully,  a t  l e a s t  two members of 
the commission would be p resen t  fo r  the whole conference and a l im i ted  
number of  commissioners and MARC s t a f f  members would a l so  a t tend .  Kenneth 
Marshall (MARC) was s l a t e d  to c h a i r  the meetings.  Five topics  were to 
be d iscussed:  the  ro le  of violence in the black revo lu t ion ,  separa t ion
and in t e g r a t i o n  ( inc luding  discuss ions  of black contro l  of c i t i e s ) ,  
ghetto  economic development (including the ro le  of p r iv a te  e n t e r p r i s e ) ,  
government vs. s e l f - h e l p  and new c o a l i t io n s  f o r  socia l  change. They 
a lso  planned to  have the MARC s t a f f  do an independent f i e ld  a n a ly s i s  of 
the major e x i s t i n g  local j i c t ion  programs and share the r e s u l t s  with a l l  
the conference p a r t i c i p a n t s  and the commission. In addi t ion the commis­
sion s t a f f  would do a review o f  the re levan t  l i t e r a t u r e  on these  sub jec t s  
and provide  the  r e s u l t s  to the  p a r t i c ip a n t s  before  the beginning of 
the  conference.
279 For ac t i o n  program leaders  Carey had the following types o f  pe r ­
sons in mind: A lber t  Cleague, D e t ro i t  Social Change P ro jec t ;  Jesse
Jackson, Chicago Breadbasket Program; Jessey Gray, New York, a leade r  
in the  r e n t  s t r i k e  movement. In the category  of t h e o r i s t  she named the 
following as examples: Harold Cruse, David Belelon,  Nathan Wright,
Stokley Carmichael.
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The conference was a v ic tim of the dec is ion  to i s sue  one r e p o r t  
and o f  the  r e s i s t e n c e  of  some commissioners and s t a f f  members to any
plan to give the l e ade rsh ip  of  the  emerging black  groups a forum a t  the
280expense o f  the  commission (and by impl ica t ion  the  p re s id en t ) .  By 
not holding the  conference most of  the commissioners had only v icar ious  
co n tac t  with  the emerging th ink ing ,  i n t e r e s t s  and movements the pro­
posed meeting intended to expose. Throughout the  hearings e f f o r t s  were 
made to allow the commissioners to have access to a va r ie ty  of black 
th in k e r s ,  w r i t e r s  and le ad e rs .  But, the hear ings  were l imi ted  to those 
leade rs  who were known and s a fe .  During the f i e l d  t r i p s ,  only a few of 
the  commissioners were exposed to any po in t  o f  view o ther  than t h a t  the 
c i t y  o f f i c i a l s  des i red  them to hear.  The cance l l ing  of  the plans fo r  
the  MARC Conference ended the l a s t  oppor tun i ty  the  commission had f o r  
i n t e r j e c t i n g  non-es tabli shment black points  o f  view into the d e l ib e ra t io n s  
which produced the f i n a l  r e p o r t .
pOfj
See Miskovsky's lament about being blocked in his e f f o r t s  to 
have more con tac t  with these  groups and persons above pp. 350-351.
CHAPTER XI
THE COMMISSION AS POLITICAL ACTOR
A) With Congress: The McClellan Committee
Johnson expected the Kerner Commission'’tO'muffle the congress ional 
in v e s t ig a t i o n s  in to  the causes of  the  d i s o r d e r s .  Johnson and Cal i fano  
feared the in v e s t ig a t i o n s  would weaken t h e i r  l im i ted  chances o f  
g e t t in g  approval fo r  t h e i r  proposed 1968 domestic l e g i s l a t i o n  package.  
The congress ional i n v e s t ig a t i o n  about which the  White House was most 
worried and toward which i t  d i r e c t e d  the commission was t h a t  conducted 
by the  Senate Permanent I n v e s t ig a t in g  Sub-Committee of the Government 
Operations Committee ( the  McClellan Committee).^
Kerner,  Ginsburg and Cal ifano  saw the commission's r e l a t i o n s h i p
to the  committee to  be one o f  subversion guised as a coordinated
2
i n v e s t ig a t i v e  e f f o r t .  Commissioner Harris and Senator Edward Muskie 
of Maine (both members of the  committee) jo in e d  the other th re e  in 
car ry ing  out the  subversion; to g e th e r  they s k i l l f u l l y  used informat ion
^Hereaf te r  r e f e r r e d  to  as the  McClellan Committee.
2
I t  is  doubtful  t h a t  Senator  McClellan saw the r e l a t i o n s h i p  any 
d i f f e r e n t l y .
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on the d iso rde rs  obta ined by the  commission and possessed by the  White 
House to the committee 's  d isadvantage .
In th i s  s t r u g g le  they faced a formidable  adversary ,  Senator 
John McClellan o f  Arkansas, a s e n io r  southern Democrat, a s k i l l f u l  
in v e s t i g a t o r  and an experienced and successfu l  surv ivor  of many l e g i s l a ­
t iv e -e x e c u t iv e  b a t t l e s .  He was p e rsona l ly  convinced th a t  a conspiracy
3
lay  a t  the  root of  the  d i so rde rs  and s e t  ou t  to prove i t .
The McClellan Committee began i t s  hear ings  on August 8. In 
the  opening s ta tements  Senator H ar r i s  was the  only member of the 
committee to mention the  Kerner Commission. He s e t  a cooperative  tone 
by pledging the help o f  the  commission in the  work of the committee
4
and suggested t h a t  th e  two groups sh a re  witness  l i s t s  and t r a n s c r i p t s .  
McClellan's  s ta tement was not as c o o p e r a t iv e ;  he made no public  response 
to H a r r i s '  over tu res^  and, what in r e t r o s p e c t  appears to have been a 
d e l i b e r a t e  s l i g h t  o f  the  Kerner Commission, had the e n t i r e  record of
See memo, Vick French (an a id e  to  Senator Harris  and sometime mem­
ber of  the s t a f f  of  the  commission) to H a r r i s ,  10/27/57, Harr is  f i l e s ,  NACCD 
Papers LBJ L ibrary ,  in  which he r e l a t e s  the substance  of the b r i e f in g  
given to sena tors  and t h e i r  s t a f f s  by the s t a f f  of the committee 
immediately p r i o r  to  the  beginning o f  t h e i r  hear ings .
^In a memo to Kerner,  Harris t o l d  the chariman th a t  the committee 
would have a more l im i ted  focus than the commission and th a t  i t  would 
be in the  be s t  i n t e r e s t s  of  each group to coopera te  with the o th e r .
Memo, Harr is  to Kerner,  8 /2 /69 ,  Harr is  f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers, LBJ Library .
^In h is  re cen t  book, Harris says t h a t  the McClellan hear ings  were 
the  beginning o f  the  end of what had been a co rd ia l  r e l a t io n s h ip  between 
him and the chairman. "McClellan was t o t a l l y  convinced th a t  the  r i o t s  
had been the r e s u l t  o f  a massive consp i racy .  I was equally convinced 
t h a t  the causes were much deeper."  (Potomac Fever , p. 63). Late r 
McClellan eased Harr is  o f f  the Permanent I n v e s t ig a t in g  Sub-Committee 
and his  place as chairman o f  the  Sub-Committee on Government Research.
This f a l l i n g  ou t  of the  two sena tors  i s  a p a r t i a l  explanation fo r  H a r r i s '  
w i l l ingness  to p a r t i c i p a t e  in the subvers ion  o f  the  work of the  committee.
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Senator Abraham R i b i c o f f s  1965 hear ings  on urban problems included 
in the record  o f  the committee.^ The way the hear ings o f  the  committee 
were s t r u c t u r e d  removed any doubt Cal i fano  and the commission l e a d e r ­
sh ip  might have had about whether the  s ena to r  was going to supplement 
and suppor t  the  work of  the commission. Two o f  the committee 's  goals 
were to  i n v e s t ig a t e  whether employees and program p a r t i c i p a n t s  o f  the 
O ff ice  o f  Economic Opportunity were ins trumenta l  in s t a r t i n g  and sup­
po r t in g  the  d iso rde rs  and to focus on uncovering any criminal con­
s p i r a c i e s  underlying the d i s o rd e r s .  The s ena to r  was making i t  c l e a r  
t h a t  h i s  committee would do the work t h a t  he and some of  the o the r  
l e a d e r s  of  congress thought  the commission would not do.
The cooperation which the commission proposed was cosmetic ;  i t  
covered the commission's i n t e n t  to i n h i b i t  the  work o f  the committee. 
Ginsburg ,  fo r  ins tance ,  sen t  hear ing t r a n s c r i p t s  to the  committee,^ 
only a f t e r  they had been c a r e f u l l y  reviewed by the commission's  witnesses  
and th e  execut ive  s t a f f .  Ginsburg and Cal ifano  knew t h a t  the  testimony 
would be very d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  rece ived  by the committee. This sharing 
was a way of  g e t t in g  the  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  poin t  of  view on the d isorders  
b e fo re  those of  the committee who read the  t r a n s c r i p t s .  There was, too,  
w i l l i n g n e s s  to share ,  on a l im i t ed  and s e l f - s e r v i n g  b a s i s ,  some of 
the  f i e l d  t r i p  informat ion,  but only a f t e r  Kruzman and Nelson w e n t" . . .
° R ib ic o f f  chaired the  Sub-Committee on Executive Reorganization 
o f  th e  Committee on Government Opera t ions .  His sub-committee generated 
over 4,000 pages of test imony.  U.S. Congress,  Senate ,  Committee on 
Governmental Operations,  Riots and Disorders .  Hearings Before the 
Permanent Subcommittee on I n v e s t ig a t io n s  of the  Committee on Governmental 
Operat ions!  90th Cong. 1 s t  Sess.  (Nov. 1967-May, 1968) Part  I ,  p. 10.
^ L e t t e r ,  T a l i a f e r r o  to  McClellan 9 /1 2 / 6 7 ,  T a l i a f e r r o  f i l e s ,  NACCD
P a p e r s ,  LBJ L ib ra ry .
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over every word o f  the  f i e ld  team repor ts  before  shar ing  them with
O
the  McClellan committee." Some of the  sen io r  s t a f f  o f  the  commission 
met with McClellan in October to d iscuss  coopera t ion .  In rep o r t in g  on 
the  meeting to  the  o the r  members of the  s t a f f  T a l i a f e r r o  warned t h a t  the  
committee s t a f f  people  working in the f i e l d  were a very aggress ive  l o t  and
9
not to  be regarded as colleagues ,  but as compet i to rs .  Fur ther  a member of 
the  commission s t a f f  monitored the  public  sess ions  of the  committee ( th i s  
in add i t ion  to  Harr is  who personally  a t tended ,  o r  s e n t  a s t a f f  member 
to every meet ing).  The commission s t a f f  took the  informat ion obtained 
from the McClellan sessions  and compared i t  with  i t s  own and re leased  
to  the press  the  evidence of d i f f e r e n c e s ;  the commission was determined 
to  bes t  the  committee in describ ing and ca ta loguing  the  d i so rd e r s .
In t h i s  e f f o r t  to gain  and hold c r e d i b i l i t y  with the public  the 
commission had an advantage in th a t  i t s  hear ings  were s e c r e t .  I t  
re leased  only the information which served i t  b e s t .  The commission 
c l e a r l y  won the  pub l ic  r e l a t io n s  b a t t l e  with the  committee, a b a t t l e  
from which Popper says  the committee never r e c o v e r e d . E v e n  before  
the committee began hearing witnesses  in November the e f f o r t s  by the 
commission s t a f f  to  d i s c r e d i t  i t s  work had borne some f r u i t  in  the 
p ress .  The Assoc ia ted  Press ran a s to ry  on October 2 which sa id  t h a t  
the work of  the  committee to date  was skimpy. By the end of the 
month (October 30) a s tory  in the  Wall S t r e e t  Journal discounted
O
Memo, P a lm ie r i  to  Kruzman and Nelson 1 0 /6 /6 7 ,  T a l i a f e r r o  f i l e s ,
NACCD Papers ,  LBJ L ib ra ry .
^ S ta f f  Meeting Notes, 10/10/67, T a l i a f e r r o  f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ 
Library.
^^Popper P r e s i d e n t ' s  Commissions, pp. 35-38.
4 1 1
the  work o f  the  committee done to da te  saying the senators  were div ided 
and McClellan was r e t r e a t i n g  somewhat from his strong law and o rder  s tand. 
At a meeting o f  the  department heads of  the  commission the next 
week, T a l i a f e r r o  repor ted  "The McClellan hearings were ( s ic )  a source 
o f  disappointment to some members of  the  sub-committee because the 
record i t  was developing does not  s u b s t a n t i a t e  the point of view about 
the  r i o t s .  Also,  press  coverage i s  not c rea t ing  a national atmosphere 
to amplify McClellan 's  v i e w p o i n t . ^  There i s  evidence, too ,  t h a t  
Ginsburg shared  information exc lus ive ly  in the possession of the 
commission with  members of the ad m in is t r a t io n  before they t e s t i f i e d  
before the committee.  The i n t e n t  here was to give the witnesses b e t t e r  
(or a t  l e a s t  d i f f e r e n t )  information on the conspiracy issue than t h a t  
held by the  committee. A good example of  th i s  kind of ac t ion  was 
Ginsburg's  shar ing  of the  testimony o f  John McCone before the commission 
with Joseph W. Barr,  Under Secre tary  o f  the Treasury,  p r io r  to his 
testimony befo re  the  committee.
Enclosed is  a copy of the test imony of John McCone before 
the Commission on August 22. Since the hearing was in 
ex ecu t iv e  sess ion  and some of  the  testimony has been 
r e l e a s e d ,  I would apprec ia te  your keeping the t r a n s c r i p t  
and i t s  con ten ts  c o n f id e n t i a l .  I would also apprecia te  
i t  i f  you would not in d ica te  to thSgCongressional Committee 
t h a t  you have read our t r a n s c r i p t .
The e f f o r t s  of  Senators Harr is  and Muskie were the most t e l l i n g  
o f  the e f f o r t s  to subver t  the committee on behalf  of the commission.
^^Minutes of Department Heads Meeting, 11/13/67, T a l ia fe r ro  f i l e s ,  
NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library.
^ ^ L e t t e r ,  Ginsburg to Barr,  9 /18/67 , Ginsberg f i l e s ;  NACCD Papers ,  
LBJ L ibrary .
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Before the  committee held hear ings on th e  d i so rde rs  in p a r t i c u l a r  c i t i e s ,
Harris  would be b r i e f e d  by the commission f i e l d  team which had s tud ied
the a rea ;  he came to those hearings equipped with an exclus ive body
of  da ta .  F u r the r ,  he and Muskie in s t ru c ted  t h e i r  s t a f f s  to share
information in a manner t h a t  would allow them to build  a case a g a in s t
McClellan's  poin t  o f  view in the  committee hear ings .  The two s t a f f s
13a l so  worked to g e th e r  to develop a more " l i b e r a l "  witness l i s t .
Muskie used his con tac ts  with executive  depar tments/agencies  to get  
information useful to him and Harris in the committee hearings and he, 
in t u rn ,  sought executive  department/agency informat ion on the d i so rde rs  
from the commission in an " . . .  at tempt t o  balance the record during 
the McClellan h e a r i n g s " . G i n s b u r g  agreed to t h i s  plan and to ld  
T a l i a f e r ro  to  ob ta in  agency c learance  and ge t the  information Muskie 
requested to  him as quickly as poss ib le .
B) Within the Adminis tra tion
The commission's p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  wi th in  the adm in is t ra t ion  
was ch a rac te r iz ed  by a v a r i e ty  of  p a t te rn s  of se rv ice  and in d iv idua l ized  
survival  s t r a t e g i e s .  By October, Ginsburg and h is  colleagues knew 
th a t  the  a b i l i t y  o f  the  commission to  serve  out i t s  designated l i f e - s p a n  
depended on i t s  a b i l i t y  to serve  a wider v a r i e ty  of  p re s id en t i a l  needs 
than those l a i d  ou t  in  the executive  o rder  and the  other  publ ic  s t a t e ­
ments c re a t in g  i t .  The budget c r i s i s ,  which c r ipp led  a l l  pa r ts  o f  the
^^Memo, Marge Banner (Harris S t a f f )  to T a l ia fe r ro  9/20/57 , 
T a l i a fe r ro  f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library .
^^Memo, T a l i a f e r r o  to Ginsburg, Palmieri  and Scammon 8/16/67,  
T a l ia fe r ro  to Ginsburg 10/16/67, T a l i a f e r ro  f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ 
Library.
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Johnson a d m in i s t r a t i o n  in l a t e  1967, made th i s  r e a l i t y  very c l e a r .
I t  forced a l l  p a r t s  of  the a d m in i s t r a t io n  to compete fo r  d ec l in ing  
economic r e s o u rce s .  In such a s t ru g g le  f o r  su rv iva l  an ad hoc advisory  
group ope ra tes  a t  a d isadvan tage .  To su rv ive  i t  must j o in  se rv ice  
o f  p r e s i d e n t i a l  purpose with p o l i t i c a l  acumen; under Ginsburg 's  
l e a d e r s h ip  the  Kerner Commission showed co n s id e ra b le  s k i l l  in  develop­
ing and execu t ing  t h i s  type o f  s t r a t e g y .
Sec t ion  3 o f  Executive Order 11365 d i r e c t e d  the  va r ious  d e p a r t -  
mencs/agencies  o f  the  execu t ive  branch to coopera te  w i th in  the  l im i t s  
of  the law with  the  commission upon r e q u e s t  of i t s  chairman, i-ere, 
as always ,  Johnson t i g h t l y  in teg ra ted  the  c o n s t i t u e n t  pa r t s  of his 
advisory system;"^^ the p re s id e n t  expected them to share  informat ion  and 
coopera te ,  under guidance from the White House, in developing a 
coheren t  c i v i l  d i s o r d e r s  po l icy .  The commission was not the  only,  
o r  even the p r i n c i p a l ,  execu t ive  agency concerned with  the d i s o rd e r s .  
But i t  was the  most v i s i b l e  and as such was expected to draw a t t e n t i o n  
to the  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  e f f o r t s  to cope with  and c o r r e c t  the  condi t ions  
c rea ted  by the  d i s o r d e r s .
The arena of  commission ac t ion  was not u n l im i t ed ,  even with in  
those a reas  s taked  ou t  in the p r e s i d e n t i a l  mandate. Johnson wanted 
i n t e g r a t i o n ,  not independence,  in his advisory  system. Consequently 
he was c a r e fu l  no t  to  give exc lus ive  a u t h o r i t y  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
fo r  work on any p a r t  o r  par ts  of  the d i so rd e r s  to any one department/
^“'See c r a p te r  V, pp. 142-182, f o r  a d e t a i l e d  d i s c u s s io n  o f  Johnson 's  
e f f o r t s  to  i n t e g r a t e  the  various  p a r t s  o f  h is  a d v iso ry  system.
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a g e n c y J ^  Johnson 's  scheme of g ran t ing  overlapping a reas  of r e s p o n s i ­
b i l i t i e s  was s im i l a r  to t h a t  developed by P res iden t  Franklin  Roosevelt .  
Johnson 's ,  however, was designed more f o r  contro l  of the  policy  making 
process than fo r  the  development of  innova t ion .
Johnson involved himself  in the  workings of the system he 
devised to deal with  the d i s o r d e r s . H e  maintained h is  own l i n e s  of  
communication with the problems surrounding the d i s o rd e r s .  He c rea ted  
a c ab in e t  l eve l  group under the chairmanship of Vice P res id en t  Humphrey 
and charged i t  with keeping in touch with  the  e s tab l i sh ed  le ad e rsh ip  
o f  the  black community in the  na t io n .  One major group meeting was 
ar ranged  and numerous individual and small group meetings with b lack
1 g
le ad e rs  were held .  He sought and rece ived  advice from a v a r i e ty  of
There was one obvious excep t ion .  The FBI was given primary,  i f  
no t  e x c lu s iv e ,  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  the conspiracy i s su e .  
Others in  a d d i t io n  to the commission engaged in conspiracy i n v e s t i g a t i o n s ,  
bu t  Johnson r e l i e d  on the FBI r e p o r t s .
^^Those c l o s e s t  to him a t  the t ime agree  t h a t  the  p re s id en t  did 
no t  s a c r i f i c e  his r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  in domestic a f f a i r s  because o f  the 
war.  Ca l i fano  and others  say they did  not fee l  neglected  by Johnson 
during t h i s  h e c t i c  time.
18The meeting with black p u b l i s h e r s ,  discussed above, pp. 361-362. 
Considerable  debate was waged a t  the  h ig h e s t  leve ls  o f  the a d m in is t r a ­
t i o n  over i n v i t i n g  a l l  e s tab l i sh ed  black  le ad e rs  to a meeting a t  the 
White House with the  p res iden t  and o th e r  government o f f i c i a l s .  Vice 
P res id en t  Humphrey and his cab ine t  group supported the  idea.
McPherson, not ing the need to d r iv e  a wedge between the  e s t a b l i s h e d  and 
' r a d i c a l '  black l e ad e rs ,  supported the  idea .  Johnson u l t im a te ly  
r e j e c t e d  i t  as p o l i t i c a l l y  too r i s k y .  See the  memos in HU2 (5)
7/1 /67 - 7 /28 /67 ,  LBJ Library.
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19persons o u ts id e  the government in whom he had confidence.  F u r th e r ,  
Johnson wanted d i r e c t  communication wi th  the n a t io n ' s  mayors and 
proposed t h a t  he make a speech to the upcoming National League of 
C i t i e s  in which he would seek support  fo r  the  propos i t ion  t h a t  his
e x i s t i n g  and proposed domestic programs were the best  guard a g a in s t
20f u t u r e  d i so rd e r s .  The speech was no t  given, but the p re s iden t  did 
send a l e t t e r  to  the mayors o f  the n a t i o n ' s  major c i t i e s  o f fe r ing  
support  and po ten t ia l  he lp  and sen t  Humphrey to speak to  the meeting 
of the  National League of  C i t i e s .
Johnson 's  personal stamp on th e  c i v i l  d i so rde r  po l ic ie s  developed 
by h i s  adm in is t ra t ion  a l so  can be seen in  the handling of  the law and 
o rde r  i s su e .  All o f  Johnson 's  a c t io n s  d i r e c t e d  a t  co rrec t ing  the  d i s ­
orders  were tempered by his  conv ic t ion  t h a t  they were p r in c ip a l ly  the 
a c t s  of  c r im in a ls ,  malcontents and in g ra te s  and by his de termination 
t h a t  th e re  would be no "rewards" fo r  the  r i o t e r s .  There was no doubt 
in the  minds o f  those around Johnson about the depth of his commitment
1 QGeorge Reedy, former p r e s id e n t i a l  press  s ec re ta ry ,  in a l e t t e r  to 
Johnson da ted 7/25/67 repor ted  the  r e a c t i o n s  o f  some black s tudents  who 
p a r t i c i p a t e d  with him in the In ten s iv e  Studies  Program a t  Yale U n ive rs i ty .  
He t o l d  of  ex tens ive  support of the  b lack  movement and of  lack  of  f a i t h  
in the  white leade rsh ip .  HU2 7 /1 /67-7 /28 /67 ,  LBJ Library.
Pf)Key members of  h i s  s t a f f  (McPherson, Roche, Wood and C h r i s t i a n )  
opposed t h i s  plan.  They contended t h a t  the  mayors were more concerned 
about the d iso rde rs  than the Great S oc ie ty  programs and th a t  Johnson 
would be severe ly  c r i t i c i z e d  i f  he gave the speech he was proposing.
See Riots 3,  McPherson 3, LBJ Library .
21 L e t t e r ,  Johnson to Mayors 7 /29 /67 ,  Commission on Civil 
Disorders (2 ) ,  Califano 3, LBJ Library .
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to  t h i s  c o n v ic t io n ;  the  p o s i t io n  became an independent va r iab le  in a l l  
execut ive  branch c i v i l  d i so rd e r s  policy-making e f f o r t s .  While there  
i s  no doubt about Johnson 's  personal commitment to t h i s  p o s i t io n  on 
the  r i o t e r s ,  i t  can a lso  be sa id  t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y  d i c t a t e d  i t .
The law and o rde r  i s su e  was p o l i t i c a l l y  r i p e  in the  c o u n t ry ,  as the 
a t t i t u d e s  of  congresspersons  a t t e s t e d .  Johnson knew he could not
be s o f t  on th e  r i o t e r s  and expect to see h is  domest ic  program get
22through congress .  The development of  a po l icy  f o r  t rea tm en t  of the  
r i o t e r s  was no t  passed o f f  on the Kerner Commission; the  White House 
knew the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  mind on the matte r  and ac ted  a cco rd ing ly .  For 
in s ta n ce ,  the  White House had to make a d ec i s io n  about  the  form of the  
federa l  response  to  the d e s t r u c t i o n  in D e t r o i t .  Proposa ls  were made 
(mostly by the  Department o f  J u s t i c e )  to amend the  Federal  Disas te r  
Ass is tance  Act o f  1950 to inc lude  c i v i l  d i s o r d e r s .  Others suggested 
t h a t  the a id  be given through the  Small Business Admin is t ra t ion  (SEA) 
so th e  b e n e f i t s  could reach the  vic t ims o f  the  "crimes" r a t h e r  than the 
p e r p e t r a t o r s .  (This recommendation was made by Cyrus Vance the p r e s i -
23d e n t ' s  spec ia l  envoy to  D e t r o i t . )  The p re s id e n t  chose the SBA op t ion .  
Fur ther  evidence o f  Johnson 's  pu t t ing  h is  personal  stamp on a l l
See McPherson, A P o l i t i c a l  Education, pp.  377-383. See a lso  
Statements 48,  "Remarks, Kansas C i ty ,  M issour i ,  lACP, 9 /14 /67 ,"  LBJ 
Library .
2 3 See memo, Cal ifano to  the  P res iden t  8 /1 0 /6 7 ,  D e t r o i t  Chronology 
(1 ) ,  Cal ifano 3,  LBJ L ib ra ry .  See a lso  New York Times Ju ly  30, 1 :1 ,
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of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  responses to the  d i so rde rs  can be seen in the 
development and f i n a l  con ten t  o f  four major publ ic  s ta tements  he made
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ear ly  in 1968 . '  The p repara t ion  of the  1958 S ta te  of  the  Union 
25Message in th e  Johnson White House was a major production involving 
most of  the White House s t a f f ,  execut ive depar tments /agencies  and 
whomever e l s e  was thought could help.  Production began l a t e  in the  
winter with r e q u e s t s  f o r  suggest ions  going to v i r t u a l l y  every major 
o f f i c e  in the  ex ecu t iv e  branch. Many d r a f t s  o f  the  speech were made 
with the p re s id en t  having a s i g n i f i c a n t  hand in the  w r i t i n g  of  the l a s t  
two or  t h re e .  The 1967-68 p a t t e rn  f o r  w r i t ing  the  speech was typical 
of those which had been followed s ince  1954; the execu t ive  s t a f f  of 
the  Kerner Commission was among those s o l i c i t e d  f o r  id e a s .  Ginsburg 
sent a l i s t  of suggested federa l  i n i t i a t i v e s  to cope with the 
d i so rd e r s  which the  commission's work had developed. White House 
a ides  took the  sugges t ions ,  combined them with o the rs  f lowing 
from the  ta sk  fo r ce s  and recommended t h a t  the p re s id e n t  incorpora te  
these  sugges t ions  in  the  s t a t e  of the  union message and the  special  
messages to fo l low,  without wai ting f o r  the  commission's  recommendations
pfZ
to be made fo rm al ly  to him. This was an a t tempt  to avoid having 
to r e ly  too heav i ly  on th i r d  party  e f f o r t s  to ge t  his domestic program
24See Chapter 13, pp. 475-479, below, f o r  another  d iscuss ion  of these 
and o th e r  p ub l ic  s ta tements  made a t  t h i s  time by which Johnson s e t  the 
boundaries o f  his  domestic policy  program for 1968.
25U.S. P r e s id e n t s ,  Public Papers o f  the P r e s i d e n t s , Lyndon B.
Johnson, 1968, pp. 25-34.
^^Memo, Nimitz to Califano 12/27/67 and 1 /29/67 ,  Riots  - Riot 
Contro l ,  1968 (2 ) ,  Gaither 30, LBJ Library .
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27through the congress .  Fur ther ,  they recommended t h a t  the p re s id e n t
launch a d i r e c t  a t t a c k  on domestic problems using the resources
a v a i l a b l e  in th e  advisory  system and mount a leade rsh ip  campaign
by means of the  s t a t e  o f  the  union message and the specia l  messages.
Johnson adopted t h i s  s t r a t e g y .
In the  1968 S ta te  o f  the Union Message Johnson took recommenda-
28t io n s  from the  Kerner, Kaiser and Douglas Commissions, task  fo rce
re p o r t s  and sugges t ions  from o the r  sources and proposed the following
as  p a r t  of the  Great Socie ty  c o n t r ib u t io n s  to remedying the problems
which produced the  d i s o rd e r s .  F i r s t ,  a $2.1 b i l l i o n  manpower program
29designed to he lp  p r iv a t e  indus t ry  absorb 500,000 new jobs  by 1971.
Second, Johnson c a l l e d  f o r  the f u l l  funding o f  his Model C i t ie s  Program.
Third ,  he c a l l e d  f o r  the  c r e a t io n  of  s ix  m i l l i o n  new houses during the 
31nex t  ten y e a r s .  He a l so  c a l l ed  fo r  passage of  the Safe S t r e e t s  Act,  
a drug contro l  a c t ,  and a u th o r i z a t io n  to appo in t  one-hundred
^^McPherson, A P o l i t i c a l  Education, p. 361.
28Some o f  which would appear in a somewhat d i f f e r e n t  form in the 
f i n a l  repo r ts  o f  those bodies.
29U.S. P r e s id e n t s ,  Public Papers of  the  P r e s id e n t s , Lyndon B. 
Johnson, 1968, p. 28, fn ,  5.
3 ° l b i d . ,  p. 28.
^ T j b i d . ,  p. 29.
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32new FBI a g en ts .  During the  two month period between the S ta te  of  the
Union message and the  p u b l ic a t io n  of the  commission's r e p o r t ,  Johnson
continued t h i s  p a t t e r n ;  he sen t  th ree  spec ia l  messages to Congress giving
33substance to  these  p roposa ls .  The spec ia l  message "To Earn a Living; 
The Right o f  Every American" d e t a i l e d  Johnson's  $2.1 b i l l i o n  job 
s t im u la t ion  and occupational heal th  and s a f e ty  program; the  former of 
these  two was more c l e a r l y  aimed a t  c o r r e c t in g  what he saw as d i so rd e r  
c re a t in g  c o n d i t io n s  — id leness  induced by jo b le s sn e ss .  This message 
a l so  conta ined  proposals  fo r  two i n t e r r e l a t e d  programs: JOBS (Job 
Opportunit ies  in the  Business Sector) and NAB (National Assoc ia tion of  
Businessmen). JOBS was a program fo r  inducing p r iv a te  industry
34to employ and t r a i n  persons c l a s s i f i e d  as "hardcore" unemployed.
Unlike the proposa ls  developing a t  the  same time in the Kerner Commis­
sion and i t s  Panel on P r iva te  E n te rp r i se ,  Johnson suggested build ing
on e x is t in g  programs and ignored the option o f  g ran t ing  business tax
35c r e d i t s  f o r  engaging in the  program. The NAB, under the chairmanship
32 I b i d . ,  p. 30. Of these  recommendations only  the law and order  
type programs and req u es t s  were not included in the  f ina l  Kerner 
Commission r e p o r t .  I t  a l so  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  note a t  t h i s  po in t ,  t h a t  
members o f  the  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  in r e t r o s p e c t ,  sav/ these  recommendations 
as e f f o r t s  on the  p a r t  o f  the  p re s iden t  to pre-empt the  repo r ts  of his 
commissions, p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h a t  of  the  Kerner group. I t  was a lso  thought  
th a t  the  Kerner Commission, in t u rn ,  took the  p r e s id e n t ' s  recommendations 
and inc reased  them f o r  i t s  Repor t .
33U.S. P r e s id e n t ,  Public Papers of  the P r e s id e n t s , Lyndon B. 
Johnson, 1968, pp. 45-53.
34
I b i d . ,  pp. 48-50.
35
See pp. 384-388 above f o r  o t h e r  d i s c u s s io n  o f  t h i s  i s s u e .
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o f  Henry Ford II  was charged with the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of c rea t ing  
500,000 p r iv a te  s e c t o r  jobs  fo r  th e  unemployed w i th in  the next th re e  * 
years  and f o r  adv is ing  the  S e c re ta r ie s  o f  Labor and Commerce on 
implementation o f  the program. The announcement of the c rea t io n  o f  
the  NAB came a t  th e  same time Commissioner Thornton was attempting to 
begin the  work on his  P r iv a te  En te rp r i se  Panel (and complaining th a t  
the  commission was ignoring his  e f f o r t s ) .
"To Insure  the Public Safe ty"  conta ined a recommendation fo r  the 
enactment o f  a Federal Rio t Control Act of 1968. That endorsement 
ended a White House debate  in which some White House advisers  t r i e d  to 
ge t  Johnson to r e f r a i n  from giving such l e g i s l a t i o n  his  approval in 
favor o f  secur ing  support  fo r  the ac t  from the  commission. Refer ral  
to the commission, i t  was thought,  would in e v i t a b ly  slow some of  the 
congress iona l momentum which was bu i ld ing  f o r  enac t ing  such a b i l l .  
Johnson, on the o th e r  hand, f e l t  t h a t  the  d i s o rd e r s  were criminal in 
o r ig in  and he would not ge t  s i g n i f i c a n t  congress iona l  support  fo r  
his Great Soc ie ty  programs unless he convinced the solons of his 
toughness on crime. When i t  became obvious t h a t  a major i ty  of  the 
Kerner commissioners would not endorse such a b i l l ,  i t  was agreed in 
the White House t h a t  the crime message should inc lude  the p r e s id e n t ' s  
approval o f  i t ;  the  spec ia l  message and the p rov is ion  fo r  the  a n t i - r i o t  
b i l l ,  then ,  came a t  a t ime when the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  show o f  determinat ion 
on crime would gain  maximum p u b l i c i t y ;  t h a t  i s ,  before  the time when
As wil l  be seen in Chapter 13 t h i s  s e t  o f  recommendations a lso  
caused g rea t  f r u s t r a t i o n  in the commission and can be pointed to  as one 
f a c to r  in the g roup 's  w i l l ingness  to take the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  recommendations 
and double them.
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37the  commission's lack o f  endorsement of the b i l l  became known. 
Johnson's explanation fo r  preempting his commission was:
We await  t h e i r  r e p o r t  and recommendations. But th e re  
i s  no need to w a i t  before  pro tec ting  s o c i e ty  a g a in s t  
those who t e a r  i t  a p a r t  f o r  whatever t h e i r  purposes.
I propose the Federal Anti -R io t Act of 1968.
The l a s t  spec ia l  message presented to congress before  the
pub l ica t ion  of  the  Kerner Report , "The C r i s i s  o f  the  C i t i e s , "  drew
upon the work of severa l  advisory groups and depar tments /agencies .
I t s  proposals jo ined  the  guns and b u t te r  is sue  and represen ted  the
culmination o f  in te n se  debate within the a d m in i s t r a t io n  concerning
the  s ize  and d i r e c t i o n  of the next budget. Among the proposals in
the message, Johnson included S2.18 b i l l i o n  fo r  the  an t i -p o v e r ty
39program fo r  f i s c a l  1969, 52.34 b i l l i o n ,  over f i v e  y e a r s ,  fo r  r e ­
h a b i l i t a t i o n  of  old housing and new c o n s t ru c t io n ,^ ^  an a n t i - i n f l a t i o n
See memo, Nimitz to Califano 10/25/67 EX FI 4 10/13-19/67 - 
1/26/68 and Nimitz to  Cal ifano  1/29/68 Riots  and R io t  Control 1968 
(3) ,  Gai ther 30, LBJ Library.
38U.S. P r e s id e n t s ,  Public Papers of the P r e s i d e n t s , Lyndon B. 
Johnson, 1968, p. 191. The l a s t  pa r t  o f  t h i s  proposal c a l l s  fo r  s t a t e  
and loca l  a u t h o r i t i e s  to enact or s trengthen t h e i r  own a n t i - r i o t  laws 
and fo r  Congress a l so  to  pass the Federal Firearms B i l l :  See pp. 
191-192.
S ^ Ib id . ,  p.  250.
^ ^ I b i d . ,  p. 252. The Kaiser Commission (housing) made an inter im 
r e p o r t  on the same day t h i s  message was sen t  to congress .  I t  made 
re fe rence  to i t s  housing recommendations, but  put i t s  main focus on 
the p r e s id e n t ' s  program. See Kaiser Commission Press Release 2/22/68, 
Robson-Ross Pr ic ing  F i l e s ,  Housing (1),  Robson-Ross Pr ic ing  F i l e s ,
(1 ) ,  LBJ Library.
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i n f l a t i o n  tax  and f a i r  housing l e g i s l a t i o n .^ ^  This extremely ambitious 
package,  sen t  to congress one week before the p u b l ic a t io n  o f  the 
Kerner Report was, to soma in the adm in is t ra t ion ,  Johnson 's  most 
important Great Soc ie ty  proposal;  i t  was the f i r s t  comprehensive 
message on the  n a t i o n ' s  c i t i e s  given by a p re s id e n t ,  and i t  
c a l l e d  f o r  congress to d i r e c t  i t s  a t t e n t io n  to the  reco n s t ru c t io n  o f  
the  environment in  which the c i v i l  disorders  were bred.  The congress 
r e j e c t e d  the  reques ts  and continued to demand cu ts  in the domestic 
programs. Never theless ,  Johnson remained in con tro l  of domestic policy  
i n i t i a t i o n  and the  Kerner Commission heeded the message (the commis­
s ioners  were aware of  the  content of the message before  the p res iden t
sen t  i t  to congress) by present ing  a very genera l ,  a l b e i t  contro-
42v e r s i a l ,  s e t  o f  housing recommendations.
Johnson expected the  Kerner Commission to play two important ro le s  
w i th in  the  executive  branch, n e i th e r  o f  which was d e t a i l e d  in the public  
mandate he gave i t .  F i r s t ,  i t  vas a convenient publ ic  place to r e f e r  
the  many proposals f o r  executive  action  produced in the various u n i v e r s i ­
t i e s  and " th ink - tanks"  around the nation.  Second, the  commission was 
expected to examine those  involvements in the c i v i l  d iso rders  po l icy ­
making and execution which a t t r a c t e d  the most publ ic  a t t e n t io n  and/or 
congress ional a t t a ck .
The ex is tence  o f  the  commission provided the  adm in is t ra t ion  with 
a very convenient public  deposi tory  fo r  the many sugges tions  for ac t ion
4 T l b i d . ,  p.  253.
42 See p.  478-479,  f o r  a n o th e r  d i s c u s s io n  on t h i s  p o in t .
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and proposa ls  f o r  s tud ie s  which came to  the  White House. Many offered
43the  a d m in i s t r a t io n  l i t t l e  more than comic r e l i e f .  Others ,  however, 
were s e r io u s  proposals  made by persons gen e ra l ly  recognized as compe­
t e n t  to make them. A good example of th e  l a t t e r  can be found in the 
exchange o f  memos between James G a i the r ,  o f  the White House s t a f f ,
Warren C hr is topher  of  the Department o f  J u s t i c e  and David Ginsburg 
concerning s tu d ie s  f o r  prevention and c o n t ro l  of  r i o t s . T h e  White 
House r e f e r r e d  such proposals to Chris topher  " . . .  f o r  whatever ac t ion  
you deem a p p ro p r ia t e  in l i g h t  of the c u r r e n t  s i t u a t i o n  and the poss ib le  
passage of  the Crime Control B i l l . " ^ ^  C h r is tophe r ,  in t u rn ,  passed them 
on to th e  commission with the  expec ta t ion  t h a t  they would be merged 
with  o th e r  such proposals in to  the  commission's work and/o r  r e p o r t .
Many o f  the  o r i g i n a t o r s  of these  proposals  became p a r t  of  the commis­
s i o n ' s  adv isory  apparatus  ( c o n t r a c t  c o n s u l t a n t s )  and some became major 
c o n t r i b u t o r s  to the f ina l  r e p o r t . ^ ^  Regardless  o f  the outcome o f  the
43e . g . ,  the  United S ta te s  Embassy in  A u s t r a l i a  forwarded a sug­
g es t ion  from a ve teran  of the  B r i t i s h  s t ru g g le s  with  the Indian independ­
ence movement to  the  e f f e c t  t h a t  s i r e n s ,  capable  o f  producing sounds of  
high i n t e n s i t y  and q u a l i t y ,  such as those  used as a i r  r a id  warning s i g ­
nals  in World War I I ,  mounted on j e e p s ,  s e t  o f f  and t ranspor ted  through 
areas  in  which d i so rde rs  a re  o ccu r r ing ,  w i l l  so f r i g h t e n  the r i o t e r s  
t h a t  they w i l l  qu ickly  d isper se .
4^See R io t s ,  1967, Gaither 30, LBJ Library ,  the  s e r i e s  begins 
with G a i th e r  to  Chris topher ,  Ju ly  27, 1967.
^^Memo G ai ther  to Chris topher ,  J u l y  31, 1967, Ib id .
^ ^ e .g .  Ronald L. Goldfarb (a law p a r tn e r  o f  Stephen Kruzman of 
the  commission's  s t a f f )  conducted major resea rch  and w r i t ing  programs on 
cr imina l  j u s t i c e  system fo r  the commission a f t e r  having submitted some 
proposals  through the channels descr ibed  above. See memo, Gaither 
to  C hr is topher ,  Ju ly  27, 1967, Ib id .
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r e f e r r a l  of  such p roposa l s ,  the commission o f f e red  the  adm in is t ra t ion  
a public  p lace to  c o l l e c t  and organize  such mate ria l  and thereby give 
the White House time to decide how bes t  to use them.
The second r o l e  the  White House expected the  commission to f u l ­
f i l l  w i th in  the execu t ive  branch was to a id  in monitor ing the  work 
of  execu t ive  depar tment /agencies  r e l a t e d  to  c i v i l  d i s o rd e r s .  Hounding 
the depar tments /agencies  f o r  s p e c i f i c  policy-making plans and 
a c t i v i t i e s  i s  something an advisory  commission can do without  
incu r r ing  the  bad r e l a t i o n s  the  White House develops when i t  under­
takes to  do the  job .  The commission had a p a r t i c u l a r  area o f  re spons i ­
b i l i t y  ( c iv i l  d i so rd e r s )  and could be expected to need to g a th e r  informa­
tion on t h a t  matter.  F u r th e r ,  i t s  l i f e  was l i m i t e d ,  i t  was soon to  pass 
from the  scene; the  White House wanted to hound the  executive  branch 
about o th e r  m at te rs .  But th e re  was another  type o f  in v e s t ig a t i o n  
and informat ion ga th e r in g  w i th in  the  execu t ive  branch t h a t  Johnson 
wanted the  commission to ca r ry  o u t ;  watchdog of the  in v e s t ig a t i o n s  
o f  the  e x t e n t ,  i f  any, o f  the  involvement o f  fede ra l  employees and/or 
program p a r t i c ip a n t s  in the  d i s o rd e r s .^ ^  Cal ifano wanted the  commission 
to do some o f  t h i s  i n v e s t i g a t i v e  work as one means of heading-off
^^See the d i s cu s s io n  o f  th e  McClellan Committee above pp. 407-412 
fo r  a d d i t io n a l  i n s ig h t s  in to  t h i s  ro le .
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congress iona l  in v e s t ig a t i o n s .  C a l i f a n o ' s  problems with, the  Off ice  o f  
Economic Opportuni ty  (GEO) provide a good i l l u s t r a t i o n  of how he used 
the  commission in t h i s  area  of  work. From the onse t  of the  d iso rde rs  
charges  c i r c u l a t e d  th a t  persons in the  employ of  the  OEO, or r e c i ­
p ien ts  o f  OEO program money and/or b e n e f i t s  were a c t iv e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  
in them. These rumors endangered the passage o f  the 1967-68 OEO 
a p p r o p r i a t i o n  and th rea tened  the passage o f  the whole domestic l e g i s l a ­
t i v e  package. Califano and Gaither  asked the commission to en te r  in to  
the  i n v e s i g a t io n  of these  charges.  They wanted to preempt congres­
sional a c t i o n  and a plan by the OEO D irec to r  Sargent Shr iver to have
the i n v e s t i g a t i o n  done " in -house ."  The White House saw the commission
48as a more c r e d i b l e  i n v e s t ig a t i v e  body than the OEO. A d iscuss ion  of
the  success  o f  the  e f f o r t s  by the commission to debunk the charges a g a in s t
49the OEO can be found below.
The commission had to compete f o r  p o l i t i c a l  space in  the Johnson 
adv iso ry  system with th ree  types o f  groups ,  each of which was ass igned  
and /o r  assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  in c i v i l  d i so rd e r s  m at te rs :  formal
White House groups,  the White House s t a f f  group which was formed as
See memo, Gaither  to  Ginsburg 8 /8 /6 7 ,  Ginsburg f i l e s ,  NACCO Papers ,  
LBJ L ib ra ry .  "Shr iver f e e l s  t h a t  the  major o bs tac le s  to passage o f  the  
OEO b i l l  i s  the  charge t h a t  the  OEO people a re  involved in  the r i o t s .  
Sh r ive r  has recommended t h a t  the  Economic Opportunity Council (headed by 
Morrie Leibman) c a l l  an emergency ses s ion  to e s t a b l i s h  an executive  
committee to  i n v e s t ig a te  the charge.  Shr iver  be l ieves  t h a t  they w i l l  
f ind  n£ evidence  of OEO involvement - -  a f ind ing  which might be the  key 
to  passage o f  the b i l l .  Joe (Cali fano) f e e l s  t h a t  your commission (and 
not the  Economic Opportunity Council) ought to handle t h i s . . . "  (emphasis 
in  the o r i g i n a l ) .
49pp.  443-444.
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an independent c i v i l  d isorders  i n v e s t ig a t in g  body, and the cabinet 
departments.
The f i r s t  was an o f f i c i a l  group drawn to g e th e r  by Johnson 
in réponse to  the  sp e c i f i c  charac te r  of the  d i so rd e r s  and the federa l  
laws p e r ta in in g  to  them. This r i o t  contro l  group, opera ting from the 
White House, saw duty in each of the d i s o rd e r s .  I t s  du t ie s  did not 
overlap  the commission's  but much o f  what i t  d id  in the summer 
of  1967 had an e f f e c t  on the  work o f  the Kerner group. The group was 
composed of Johnson, the Attorney General C la rk ,  Direc tor  of the  
FBI Hoover, S e c re ta ry  o f  Defense McNamara, Cal i fano ,  McPherson 
and Cyrus Vance, who as the  p re s id e n t ' s  personal r e p re se n ta t iv e
to D e t r o i t  in th e  aftermath of the d i so rde rs  was added to the
50group in the summer of 1967. I t  was t h i s  group which aided the p r e s i ­
dent in formula t ing  and executing the  ac t ions  in response to the D e t ro i t  
d i so rd e r :  d e a l in g  with Governor Romney, d e c la r in g  an emergency, 
d ispatch ing  f ed e ra l  troops ,  d ra f t ing  the p r e s i d e n t ' s  speech to the 
na t ion ,  e t c .
Cal i fano ,  in  response to a p re s id e n t i a l  d i r e c t i v e ,  put his  s t a f f  
to work doing re sea rch  (drawing of legal  b r i e f s ,  l e g i s l a t i v e  re sea rch ,  
s tud ies  o f  agency programs, coordinating ta sk  force  and commission r e -
cn
McPherson, A P o l i t i c a l  Education pp. 359-350. McPherson a lso  
speaks o f  ano ther  person "a Washington lawyer" who aided Johnson in w r i t i n g  
the speech he gave in reac t ion  to the  D e t r io t  d i so rd e r .  There is  good 
reason to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  the  person was Supreme Court Associa te  J u s t i c e  
Abe P o r ta s ,  an o ld  f r iend  o f  the p r e s i d e n t ' s  and a t r u s t e d  f r iend  in 
time of t ro u b le .  See a lso  memo and documents, Califano to J u s t i c e  
Por tas ,  "Authori ty  Under Which the P res iden t  Acted in Sending Federal 
Troops t o  D e t r o i t , "  D e t ro i t  Chronology (1 ) ,  Cal ifano 6, LBJ Library .
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p o r t s ,  e t c . )  o f  the  d i so rd e r s  to enable the White House to a r r i v e  a t
judgements independent of  those  o f  the  commission. Fred Panzer was
51put  in charge of  t h i s  work.
The White House s t a f f  a lso  put before the p re s id e n t  novel in s igh ts
in to  the o r ig in s  o f  the  d i s o rd e r s  based upon s e l f -g e n e ra te d  sources of
in format ion .  McPherson, f o r  in s tance ,  cau t ious ly  but d i r e c t l y ,
r a i s e d  with Johnson the conv ic t ion  many shared t h a t  the  Great Society
52programs themselves might be a cause of the d i so rd e r s .
Another very important  source o f  information on the  d iso rde rs  for
Johnson and his c l o s e s t  a d v i se r s  was the v i s i t s  to  the  black urban
ghe t tos  by members of  the  White House s t a f f  during the f a l l  o f  1967
and winte r  of 1968. These v i s i t s  were a loosely  organized e f f o r t  to
secure  d i r e c t  and u n f i l t e r e d  information fo r  the  White House about the
53cond i t ions  which spawned the  d i so rde rs .  The re p o r t s  o f  these  v i s i t s
54were received in C a l i f a n o ' s  o f f i c e ,  compiled and sen t  to Johnson,
The re p o r t s  chal lenged seve ra l  o f  the  key premises upon which Johnson 
ac ted  in deal ing with the  d iso rde rs .  In genera l ,  they revealed  t h a t  
the  p re s iden t  was popular with urban black Americans and th a t  popular i ty
51 See Panzer papers ,  e sp e c ia l l y  boxes 12-14, LBJ Library .
^^Memo, McPherson to  LBJ 8/24/57 ,  Riots 2, McPherson 8 ,  LBJ 
Library .
53 McPherson desc r ibes  his ghetto v i s i t s ,  A P o l i t i c a l  Educat ion, 
p. 375. In his d i s c u s s io n  he notes t h a t  the b e s t  local  sources of informa- 
t io n  on the  condi t ions  c r e a t i n g  the disorders  came from the federa l  
bureaucracy r a th e r  than th e  local  mayors or  congresspersons.  This was 
a pos i t ion  th a t  Johnson d id  not share.
^^See Riots (1 and 2 ) ,  McPherson 8 and HU 2 /8 /9 /67  - 8 /15/67,
LBJ Library .
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was based on his c re a t io n  and implementation of  Great Society programs. 
Local public  o f f i c i a l s  were not near ly  so well l i k e d ;  Mayor Lindsay, 
an exception ,  got high marks fo r  h is  p e r s i s t e n t  e f f o r t s  to keep in 
touch with persons l i v in g  in the New York r a c i a l  ghe t tos .  The d i s e n ­
chantment with  pub l ic  o f f i c i a l s  extended to the  Kerner Commission 
which was f a u l t e d  f o r  not  having as members persons who "have a s t r e e t  
f o l l o w i n g . T h e  r e p o r t s ,  too ,  were v i r t u a l l y  unanimous in t h e i r  con­
demnation o f  housing condit ions  in the g h e t t o s ,  in urgently  recommend­
ing job programs and in condemnation of p o l i c e  p r a c t i c e s .  The informa­
t io n  which flowed to the p res iden t  from th e se  sou rces ,  complemented 
r a t h e r  than competed with t h a t  which he rece ived  from some of his  t a sk  
fo rce s  and from the  commission f i e l d  t r i p s .  The repor ts  from his  a id es  
were d i f f e r e n t  in t h a t  they came from persons upon whom Johnson was 
used to r e ly in g .  Unfortunately  f o r  the r e s id e n t s  o f  the black urban 
g h e t to s ,  Johnson r e j e c t e d  these  sources o f  informat ion and t h e i r  
messages to him and turned ins tead  to the more t r a d i t i o n a l  sources .
The r e l a t i o n s h i p s  with the cab ine t  departments were the most 
complex fo r  the commission. Johnson ass igned h is  cab ine t  o f f i c e r s  a 
v a r i e t y  of p a r t i c u l a r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  he expected them to ca r ry  ou t  
in cooperation  with the Kerner Commission and some exclusive tasks  
which c l e a r l y  placed them in compet it ion  i f  no t  c o n f l i c t  with i t .  
P r ed ic t a b ly ,  a l s o ,  c ab in e t  o f f i c e r s  sought to cap tu re  as much of  the  
work being ass igned on the  c iv i l  d i so rde rs  as po ss ib le  fo r  t h e i r
^^See, fo r  example, memo, Markham to  the  P res iden t ,  8 /29 /57 ,  
cover ing a memo dated 8/14/67 , Riots  (1) McPherson, LBJ Library.
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depar tments.
During th e  Johnson a d m in i s t r a t io n ,  the  Bureau o f  the Budget (BOB) 
supervised th e  stewardship o f  the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  programs by the 
various  p a r t s  o f  the  executive  branch. As such, i t  c a r r i e d  a 
major p a r t  of  the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  fo r  the  commission. The ro le  o f  the  
BOB in  the  budget c r i s i s  of the  commission has been discussed in 
Chapter IX. What remains to be desc r ibed  a re  the var ious  ways the 
Bureau o f  the  Budget cooperated with  the  work of the  commission.
Charles S c h u l tz ,  D i rec to r  of  BOB during the  most c ru c ia l  months of 
the  l i f e  of  th e  commission, took very s e r i o u s l y  the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  o rde r  
t h a t  a l l  execu t ive  depar tments/agencies  should cooperate  f u l l y  with 
the Kerner group. Schultz was pr ivy to  most of  the  program execu­
t i o n ,  planning and White House e v a lu a t io n s  o f  the o th e r  pa r ts  o f  the  
execut ive  branch and he shared with the  commission the informa­
t io n  he thought useful to them in the development of t h e i r  repo r t  
and in t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  with the  o th e r  groups. He, f o r  in s tan ce ,  
provided Ginsburg with copies of  memos concerning d i f f i c u l t i e s  the 
White House was having with the Department o f  Housing and Urban 
Development, inc lud ing  i t s  formation o f  the  J o i n t  Admin is tra tive
Task Force on Housing which was organized to make recommendations
56f o r  c o r r e c t in g  the d e f i c i en c ie s  in HDD's o p e ra t io n .  This kind o f  
information helped the commission ap p ra i se  the  p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t i e s  
wi th in  which i t  had to work. By October,  the  commission was beginning
See memo, Lawrence J .  Kirsch ( S t a f f  A s s i s t a n t  to the D irec to r  
o f  BOB) to Ginsburg S/22/67,  Ginsburg f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ 
Library .
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to  fee l  the consequences of the r e lu c tan c e  o f  many par ts  of  the  execu­
t i v e  branch to  cooperate  with i t .  Ginsburg p reva i led  upon Schultz
57to  in te rvene  so th e  work of the commission could proceed. Schultz
complied with th e  reques t  and began monitoring the compliance of
the  depar tments /agencies  with the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  d i r e c t i v e s  regarding
coopera t ion  with  the  commission. In a l l ,  th e  BOB was a p o s i t iv e
suppor t  f a c t o r  f o r  the commission w i th in  th e  adm in is t ra t ion .  The
bureau secured the  commission's budget ,  much o f  i t s  personnel and
monitored the  l ev e l  of  executive  branch coopera t ion .  I t  i s  doubtful
t h a t  the  commission could have survived in anything but name i f  i t
had no t  been f o r  the  a c t i v e  support  o f  Schul tz  and the  BOB.^^
Schul tz  and the BOB were given assignments which staked out an
independent r o l e  f o r  them in the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  c i v i l  d i so rde r
policy-making scheme. Early in 1968 the  White House began i t s  d e t a i l e d
planning fo r  the  a n t i c ip a t e d  summer d i s o r d e r s .  I t  was assumed t h a t
the  White House r i o t  control  group would be maintained to handle the
fe d e ra l  response  to  a major d i so rd e r  during the  time i t  was occur r ing .
Coordination o f  a l l  o th e r  federa l  responses  was were to be handled by th e
59BOB, under the  d i r e c t i o n  of the White House. The major departments/
^^Memo, Ginsburg to  Schultz  10 /3 /67 ,  Ginsburg f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers ,  
LBJ L ibrary .
^^The tone o f  the  memos between Schu l tz  and Ginsburg ind ica tes  
t h a t  a p o s i t i v e  personal f r i en d sh ip  played a considerable  p a r t  in 
f o s t e r i n g  the  good re la t io n s h ip s  between th e  two groups.
^^See memo, Nimetz to Cal ifano 2 /29 /68 ,  Riots and Riot Contro l ,  1968
(2 ) ,  G a i the r  30, LBJ Library ,  in which o v e ra l l  plans for t h i s  coord ina­
t i o n  a r e  d i s cu s sed ,  in the con tex t  o f  a change in the key personnel in 
the  BOB.
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ag en c ie s 'w e re  aware o f  the  subs tance o f  the Kerner Report a t  the  time 
t h e s e  p lans  were being formula ted ,  and i t s  recommendations were 
inco rp o ra ted  in the  p lanning a s  each saw f i t ,  bu t the  White House 
made no e f f o r t  to h i g h l i g h t  them in t h i s  contingency p lanning.
The c e n t r a l  r o l e  o f  the  Department of  J u s t i c e  in the  development 
and execut ion  of  c i v i l  d i s o r d e r  policy-making was a t t r i b u t a b l e  to  the  
l ega l  im p l ic a t io n s  o f  "normal" d i so rde r  a c t i v i t y ,  the  scope o f  the  
d e p a r tm en t ' s  s t a t u t o r y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and the  p re d i s p o s i t i o n  o f  the  
p r e s id e n t  and many key members of congress to th ink  a major cause of 
th e se  even ts  to be a criminal conspiracy .  The ex ten t  to which Johnson 
was w i l l i n g  to use the  Department of  J u s t i c e  in c o n t r o l l i n g  the  
" c r im in a l s "  can oe seen in McPherson's and G r a f f ' s  accounts o f  the  
p re s su re s  put on Attorney General Clark to prosecute  those whom 
Johnson f e l t  to be the  l e a d e r s  of  an i n t e r - s t a t e  criminal consp iracy  
to s t i m u l a t e  r i o t s  and in s u r r e c t i o n .^ ^  (Clark s u c c e s s fu l ly  r e s i s t e d  
t h e se  p re s su re s  on the  grounds of  lack o f  e v i d e n c e . S e c o n d ,  the 
c r imina l  d i v i s i o n  was given r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  monitoring the  n a t i o n ' s  
urban c e n t e r s  and r e p o r t i n g  through Ramsey Clark to the White House
°^McPherson, A P o l i t i c a l  Education, pp. 352-363, and G r a f f ,  The 
Tuesday C ab ine t , pp. 172-193.
° ‘l a t e r  the  Department o f  J u s t i c e  did go to t r i a l  with o t h e r  
-amous opponents of  a d m in i s t r a t io n  po l icy  ( e . g .  Coff in ,  Spook, Seal 
and the Chicago 7) .
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group developing the  contingency plans fo r  the  summer of 1968.^^
Not only  did Clark and some of  his top  aides r e s i s t  the pressure  
to c o n cen t ra te  a l l  the  a t t e n t i o n  of t h e i r  department on criminal 
a c t i v i t y  r e l a t e d  to the d i s o r d e r s ,  but they turned t h e i r  a t t e n t io n  to a 
v a r i e t y  of  s h o r t  term issues  they f e l t  to be important causes of the 
d i s o rd e r s .  The i r  p r inc ipa l  concern was the  po l ice .  Christopher in 
a speech a t  Rica I n s t i t u t e  c a l l e d  a t t e n t i o n  to the pa t te rns  o f  the 
d i so rd e r s  f o r  the  previous th ree  years in which police  ac t ion  was a
CO
s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r  in the o r ig in  of  the u n re s t .  Clark ,  a t  the 
Conference on Prevention and contro l  of  Civil  Disorders^^ designated 
1968 as the "year of  the policeman":
Memo, Fred M. Vinson, J r .  to Clark 10/20/67, Riots 1967,
Gaither  30, LBJ Library.  There were a lso  two task  forces  opera ting  
during the  l i f e  of  the  Kerner Commission with  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  r e l a t e d  
to c i v i l  d i s o r d e r s .  Both, had key Department of Ju s t i c e  personnel as 
members. Cla rk  chaired  the  1967 Civil Rights Task Force which repor ted  
to the White House in the l a t e  f a l l .  That task  fo rce  made 35 recommendations 
on publ ic  employment, urban problems, housing, lending prac t ices  and 
educa tion w i thou t  any mention of the  f a c t  t h a t  the Kerner Commission 
was charged to  work on the same problems a t  the same time (see  Gaither  
32/ 1967-68 C iv i l  Rights Task Force (2 ) ,  LBJ L ib ra ry . )  Fur ther ,  the 
1967 Task Force on Crime, Chaired by James Q. Wilson of Harvard (a 
commission c o n su l t an t )  with Warren Chris topher and Fred M. Vinson, J r .  
as members, made a recommendation to the White House fo r  inc luding crime 
prevention programs as p a r t  o f  HUD's gu ide l ines  fo r  c i t i e s  to qua l i fy  
fo r  a id  under the  Model C i t i e s  program. (See r e p o r t  of the 1967 Task ■
Force on Crime, LBJ Library) .
The address  was d e l ive red  on 11/2 /67. A copy i s  in the  
Public Safe ty  f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library .
^^The confe rence  was planned and co-sponsored by the commission 
and the  lACP as a t r a i n i n g  event fo r  local  po l ice  and p o l i t i c a l  leade rs  
in p rep a ra t io n  f o r  the  summer.
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The policeman i s  the  most important man in the 
United S ta te s  t h i s  y e a r .  He i s  the  man in the  
middle.  1968 i s  the  Year of t h e  Policeman. The 
policeman wil l  t e l l  more about the fu tu r e  of 
t h i s  country  than w i l l  any o ther  persongjn our 
so c ie ty  because t h i s  i s  a crucia l  year .
He i n s i s t e d  t h a t  po l ice  unpreparedness,  brought about  by poor p o l ic e -  
community r e l a t i o n s ,  was a major cause of the  previous  y e a r ' s  d i s o rd e r s .  
He a lso  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  most c i t i e s  lacked communication systems designed 
to  prevent the  spread o f  rumors during a d i s o r d e r .  Clark l a t e r  
aided the  commission in secur ing  help from the  Federal Communications 
Commission f o r  improving i n t r a - c i t y  emergency communication systems.
The Department of J u s t i c e  and the commission had a considerable  
amount of  in te rchange ,  most o f  i t  very p o s i t iv e  and coopera t ive .  The 
department aided the commission in d r a f t i n g  i t s  r u l e s ,  in th inking  
through the problems of i n t e r - s t a t e  compacts fo r  the  use of the 
na tiona l guard, providing a place where a l l  the  data  co l le c ted  on the 
d i so rde rs  could be s t o r e d , a n d  shar ing with the commission informa-
66 Memo, Chris topher to Ginsburg, 1/29/68, covering C l i f f  S e ss ion 's  
summary of C la rk ' s  remarks a t  the Conference on Prevention and Control 
o f  Civil Disorders ,  1 /20/68,  p. 1, Publ ic  Safe ty  f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ 
Li brary.
^®See l e t t e r  Spivak to Lee Lovinger (FCC), 10/30/67 ,  and Kerner to 
Rosel H. Hyde, Chairman o f  the  FCC, and Ramsey Cla rk ,  2 /7 /68 ,  in Public 
Safe ty  f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library.
^^L e t te r  Ginsburg to  Chris topher 12/26/67, Public Safety f i l e s ,  
NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library .
t i o n  about i t s  l e g i s l a t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s  r e l a t e d  to c i v i l  d i so rde rs
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There were t e n s io n s ,  too .  Those in the  department r e sp o n s ib le  fo r
69c i v i l  r i g h t s  mat te rs  never f e l t  comfortable  with  the commission.
The s t a f f  o f  the  Community Rela t ions  Div is ion  of th e  department in 
i t s  p re -p u b l ica t io n  review was sharp ly  c i r t i c a l  o f  t h e  proposed t e x t s ,  
noting a lack o f  urgency and ou trage  in th e  d r a f t s .  They urged 
the  commission to view the d i so rd e r s  in p o l i t i c a l  te rms;  they deplored 
the  commission's e f f o r t  to r e p a i r ,  r a t h e r  than d e s t r o y ,  the  n a t i o n ' s  
ghe t tos  and wanted the  commission to  speak f o r  more p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
by ghetto  r e s id e n t s  in the development o f  p r i o r i t i e s  f o r  local  
and nationa l a c t i o n . T h e  Off ice  o f  Law Enforcement Ass is tance  
o f  the Department chal lenged the work o f  the  commission in another  
way. Generally suppor t ive  o f  the p o l i c e ,  the LEA s t a f f  members 
r e s i s t e d  the commission's  movement, however small i t  was, toward 
a p os i t ion  which could be in t e r p r e t e d  as being "unduly c r i t i c a l ” 
o f  po l ice  p r a c t i c e s . T h e y  sought to r e f l e c t  p o l ice  a t t i t u d e s  
in finding f a u l t  with the  tone o f  the  d r a f t s  ( they c a l l e d  f o r  
more " t a c t " ) .  They ch a rac te r iz ed  the  police-community r e l a t i o n s  sec-
See l e t t e r ,  Edward I .  Se lig  to Bowers, 1 /18 /67 ,  Public Safety 
f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library ,  in  which the  depar tment 's  plans  to 
submit r e v i s io n s  o f  10 USC 15 ("Armed Forces Involvement in In su r re c t io n " )  
were sen t  to the  commission.
^^See memo, Nathan to Pa lm ier i ,  10 /20/67 , Palmier i  f i l e s ,  NACCD 
Papers,  LBJ Library.
^*^Letter, James H. Lane to P a lm ie r i ,  1 /1 /5 /6 7 ,  Palmieri f i l e s ,  NACCD 
Papers,  LBJ Library.
^^Memo, Chris topher  to  Ginsburg 1/29 covering a 1/24/68 re p o r t  from 
the LEA on the commission's d r a f t  ch ap te r s  to Chr is topher ,  Public Safety 
f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library.
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t ions  o f  t h e  d r a f t s  as naive and o b jec ted  to giving high, p r a i s e  to
72the  work o f  the  Atlanta  Police  Department. The ch a rac te r  o f  the  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the commission and the  FBI has been d iscussed  
a t  length  above in the d iscuss ions  of the  O ff ice  of In v e s t ig a t io n
and w i l l  be touched on again in  th e  c o n s id e r a t i o n  given the conspiracy
73issue  below. Suff ice  i t  to say here  t h a t  the  r e l a t i o n s h ip  was one 
of  p ro p r i e ty  and cau t ion ,  f a i t h f u l l y  adher ing  to  the p r e s i d e n t ' s  
d i r e c t i v e s  regarding the r e l a t i o n s h ip  and b e f i t t i n g  the  bureau 's  
r e p u ta t i o n .
The q u a l i t y  of  the r e l a t i o n s h ip  between the  commission and the  
Department of Labor was determined by two now f a m i l i a r  f a c t o r s :  
personal r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between the  p r in c ip a l  p o l i t i c a l  ac to rs  ( in  t h i s  
case Ginsburg and Secre ta ry  o f  Labor Wil la rd  Wirtz) and p r e s i d e n t i a l  
d i r e c t i v e .  Wirtz was personal ly  sup p o r t iv e  of  the commission and i t s  
work. Many of  the formal exchanges between Ginsburg and Wirtz a re  
covered by personal notes ,  with Wirtz o f f e r i n g  personal encouragement 
and advice fo r  the commission's e f f o r t s . W i r t z  was a l so  an e a r l y
72 In t h i s  c r i t i c i s m  they were r e f l e c t i n g  some o f  the r e se rv a t io n s  
f e l t  in th e  pol ice  community as a whole about the  work of the Chief Jenkins,
73pp. 446-450.
7^e .g .  In sending Ginsburg, by d i r e c t i v e  o f  the p re s id e n t ,  a copy 
o f  a document exp la ining the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  Urban Training Program,
Wirtz covered i t  with  a note the con ten t  of  which r e f e r s  to a d r a f t  
l e t t e r  prepared by h is  s t a f f  which would,  i f  s e n t ,  be from the commission 
to the  p re s id e n t  making recommendations f o r  Department of Labor a c t i o n s :
"You wi l l  r e c a l l  the  s to ry  of  the drummer who asked the  w a i t r e s s  in  the 
small town hotel  fo r  'two boiled eggs and a kind word. '  He got the  eggs,  
but had to  ask again fo r  the kind word. 'D o n ' t '  she s a id ,  ' e a t  the  
e g g s . . . " '  memo, Wirtz to  Ginsburg 8 /21 /67 ,  Ginsburg f i l e s ,  NACCD, LBJ 
Library.
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and e n t h u s i a s t i c  supporte r  of the commission's f i n a l  r e p o r t ,  a r i sk y  
p o l i t i c a l  s tan ce ,  a s  shal l  be seen.
At the  same time Johnson was appoin ting the Kerner Commission he 
was i n s t r u c t i n g  Wirtz to  conduct a study of a r r e s t e e s  in the D e t ro i t  
d i s o r d e r . T h e  study was done on a crash  b a s i s . T h e  data from the 
study were shared with the commission in A u g u s t , b u t  the  rep o r t  was
not made public  u n t i l  March 1, 1968, the  day on which the commission
78issued i t s  r e p o r t .  Commission p a r t i c ip a n t s  thought the  re le ase  o f
79t h i s  r e p o r t  was an attempt to diminish the  impact of  t h e i r  document.
The commission ran into p o l i t i c a l  t roub le  in handling the d e p a r t -
See D e t ro i t  Chronology (1),  Califano (5 ) ,  LBJ Library  fo r  a copy 
o f  the r ep o r t :  The D e t ro i t  Riot: A P r o f i l e  of  500 P r i s o n e r s . See a lso
Department of  Labor Subject  F i les  Roll 54,  LBJ L ibrary .
^^"Eleven days a f t e r  the outbreak (August 3,  1967) the  U.S. 
Department o f  Labor con t rac ted ,  under a u th o r iz a t io n  o f  the Manpower 
Development and Tra in ing  Act, with the  Behavior Research I n s t i t u t e  of  
D e t ro i t  to in t roduce  in to  an ongoing survey of  p r i s o n e r ' s  quest ions  
designed to  shed add i t io n a l  l i g h t  on t h e i r  employment s t a t u s  and indeb ted­
ness . . .  The survey was not based on a s c i e n t i f i c  sample.  I t  was 
conceived and conducted under extreme p ressu re .  The data were coded, 
processed and analyzed on August 5 and 6 :"  ("Preface"  The D e t ro i t  R i o t :
A P r o f i l e  o f  500 P r i s o n e r s .
77I t  appears t h a t  the department regarded the r e p o r t  as the prop­
e r ty  o f  the  commission. See memo, T a l i a f e r r o  to Ginsburg,  10/25/67,  and 
attachment,  Ginsburg f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library .
^^See Press Release 3 /1 /68,  Labor Department, Subjec t  F i l e s ,  Roll 
54, LBJ Library.
79There was no evidence found in d ic a t in g  t h a t  the  department acted 
on White House orders  in r e le as in g  th e  r e p o r t .  There i s  evidence,  how­
ever,  of some tens ion  between the s t a f f s  of the two agenc ies ;  those in 
the  department who worked on th i s  r e p o r t  were not happy with the 
commission's c o n t r a c t  with Fogelson to  do his study on D e t ro i t  a r r e s t e e s .  
See memo. Shallow to Kruzman, 10/19/67, Research Department f i l e s ,
NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library.
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80merit 's study of the  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  labor  t r a in in g  programs. This
was an in te r im  r e p o r t  of a two p a r t  review of s e lec ted  t r a in in g  programs
which Wirtz sen t  to the  commission on the  p r e s id e n t ' s  d i r e c t i v e .  The
r e p o r t  exonerated the  Great Socie ty  t r a in in g  programs from blame as a
causal f a c t o r  in  the  1967 d i so rde rs  and ca l led  f o r  g re a te r  use of  the
programs as a means o f  g e t t in g  l a r g e r  numbers of persons o f f  the  s t r e e t s
81and in to  ga infu l employment. Following W ir tz 's  sugges tion ,  a proposed 
t r a n s m i t t a l  l e t t e r  from the commission to  the p re s id en t ,  w r i t t en  in the 
depar tment,  endorsing the r e p o r t ' s  recommendations and suggest ions for  
enhancing them, was no t  s en t .  This neg lec t  and the  commission's inco r ­
pora t ion  of many o f  the  r e p o r t ' s  themes in to  i t s  f in a l  r e p o r t ,  wi thout 
s p e c i f i c  endorsement o f  the Great  Soc ie ty  t r a in in g  programs from which 
they  were taken ,  l a i d  the foundat ion f o r  much of  Johnson's public  
r e s i s t a n c e  to the Report .
The major e f f o r t  by the  White House to use the Department of Labor 
to take some a t t e n t i o n  away from the commission and congressional 
e f f o r t s  to expla in  the  d iso rde rs  occurred  on November 2,  1967 when the
Bureau of Labor S t a t i s t i c s  is sued  a r e p o r t  t i t l e d  "Social and Economic
82Conditions of  Negroes in the  United S t a t e s . "  In his statement  made
Memo, Wirtz to  Ginsburg,  8 /21 /67 ,  and l e t t e r ,  Wirtz to Kerner,  
8 /22/67 ( l e t t e r  and a ttachment,  undated,  Urban Training Programs. 
Report  I I  Use o f  Programs in Chicago, D e t ro i t ,  Los Angeles, Newark and 
Washington, D.C.),  Manpower Program f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ L ibrary .
G^Ibid . ,  p. 2.
82Bureau of  Labor S t a t i s t i c s ,  Report No. 332, Current Population 
S e r i e s .  P-23, No. 24, (Washington, D. C. :  U.S. Government P r in t ing  
O f f i c e ) ,  p. 97.
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a t  the  t ime o f  the  r e l e a s e  o f  the  s tudy ,  Johnson, in  a very c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
manner, sa id :
This r e p o r t . . .  backs up n e i th e r  o f  the  extreme pos i t ions  
t h a t  emerged in the  wake o f  the  summer d is tu rbances .  I t  
does not confirm the  diagnosis  of  bleakness and despa i r :  
t h a t  th e re  has been no recen t  progress  for Negroes in 
American and t h a t  violence  i s  th e r e f o r e  the log ica l  
remedy. I t  does not confirm the  oppos i te  view: the  
Negroes have been given "too much" . . .  Far from showing 
no p ro g res s ,  the  p ic tu r e  revealed i s  one of su b s tan t ia l  
p r o g r e s s . . .  In educa t ion ,  in occupat ions ,  in income, in 
housing, most Negroes have made progress  over the  past  
few years  . . .  Government helped by opening the doors of 
o p p o r tu n i ty  to b e t t e r  themselves - -  they will b e t t e r  
th e m s e lv e s . . .  Let us get  on with the  job.
This r e p o r t ,  obvious ly  aimed, in  p a r t ,  a t  s e t t in g  l i m i t s  of a c c e p ta b i ­
l i t y  f o r  the commission's  f ina l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of the  condi t ions  of  
black Americans, was not shared with the  commission p r io r  to p u b l i c a t i o n .
Nor were the da ta  t r a n sm i t te d  to  the commission even though they were
84a v a i l a b l e  to the  White House as ea r ly  as the  preceding August.
The i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s  o f  the commission with the  Department of  
Defense (DOD) e x is t ed  on th ree  l e v e l s .  F i r s t ,  the  p re s iden t  jo in e d  the  
commission and the  department when he in s t ru c te d  the  former to  i n v e s t i ­
gate and make recommendations on d i so rd e r  prevention which included 
" . . .  the  t r a i n i n g  of s t a t e  and local  law enforcement and na t iona l  guard
83U.S. P re s id e n t ,  Public Papers o f  the  P re s id e n t , Lyndon B. 
Johnson, 1967, pp. 980-981.
84The f i n a l  BLS r e p o r t  was a c t u a l l y  a compilation of two White 
House rep o r t s  based on the  BLS data  done f o r  the p re s iden t .
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personnel in d e a l in g  with po ten t ia l  o r  ac tua l  r i o t  s i t u a t i o n s a n d  
by d i r e c t i n g :
. . .  the  S e c re ta r y  of Defense to i s su e  new t r a in in g  standards 
f o r  r i o t  con t ro l  procedures immediately to the  National Guard 
u n i t s  ac ross  the  country .  Through the  Cont inental  Army 
Command, t h i s  expanded t r a in in g  w i l l  begin immediately.
The National Guard must have the a b i l i t y  to  respond e f f e c t i v e l y ,  
quickly  and a p p ro p r i a t e ly  in c ond i t ions  of  d i so rd e r  and 
v io lence .
The d e t a i l  o f  t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h ip  has been d iscussed  elsewhere in t h i s  
s tudy.
The second leve l  of  r e l a t io n s h ip s  with  the  DOD cons is ted  of  a 
common i n t e r e s t ,  determined by p r e s id e n t i a l  d i c t a t e ,  in securing and 
shar ing  i n t e l l i g e n c e  information on the  d i s o r d e r s .  The DOD became 
pub l ic ly  involved in the  c i v i l  d i s o rd e r -c o n sp i rac y  i s s u e  when the 
p re s id en t  ordered na t iona l  guard u n i t s  to  r i o t  duty and dispatched 
General Throckmorton and h is  command to  D e t r o i t .  The DOD cooperated 
with the  commission in  pursuing the  consp iracy  study by giving Miskovsky
and h is  s t a f f  access  to i t s  computer f i l e s  and f r ee  use o f  i t s
88computer system to  analyze da ta .  This coopera tion  with the  DOD
^^Executive Order 11365, Section 2,  Report  p. 295.
^^Report Appendix C, "Excerpts from P res iden t  Lyndon B. Johnson 's  
Address to  th e  Nation on Civil  D iso rde rs ,  Ju ly  27, 1967." p. 297.
^^See d i s c u s s io n  of the na tional guard in  Chapter 10, p p .304-311.
^^Memos, Miskovsky to  Ginsburg 11/17/67 and 12/12/67, Ginsburg 
f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library.
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presented the  commission s t a f f  with a se r io u s  problem, however.
The m i l i t a r y  an a ly s t s  involved in the  consp iracy  study repor ted  con­
cerns  about the possib le  outbreak of  g u e r r i l l a  w arfa re  and ser ious
r e s e rv a t io n s  about the a b i l i t y  o f  the n a t i o n ' s  p o l ice  and national
39guard system to contain any fu tu re  major d i s o r d e r s .  The concerns
being expressed by the m i l i t a r y  ana lys t s  exceeded those  the
commission s t a f f  was g e t t i n g  from the FBI and the  conclus ions  they
were reaching based on t h e i r  own resea rch .  The p e r s i s t e n c e  o f  the  DOD
in p ress ing  i t s  views of  the  o r ig in s  and c h a r a c t e r  of the d isorders
caused Ginsburg and Palmieri  to f e a r  the R epor t ' s  being skewed toward
90the m i l i t a r y  po in t  of  view. To counter t h i s  the  s en io r  s t a f f  d e l i ­
b e r a t e ly  s e t  ou t  to temper the depar tment 's  view on the d i so rd e r s .  For 
in s t a n c e ,  Ginsburg sought and received an i n v i t a t i o n  to speak to the 
DOD Manpower Breakfas t  ( to  which a l l  top persons deal ing  with manpower 
ques t ions  in the  DOD were in v i t e d )  and to the Army Policy Council ; to 
the former he spoke of  the  uses of  the  m i l i t a r y  in  c i v i l  d i so rde r  s i t u a ­
t io n s  and to  the  l a t t e r  about the  f ind ings  of  the  commission on the 
consp iracy  i s su e .  In these  types of  meetings the  s en io r  s t a f f  of the
89 Lipsky and Olson r e p o r t  an in te rv iew  with Robert Li 1 ley ( P r e s i ­
dent o f  the  New Jersey Bell Telephone Company and Chairman of the 
Governor 's  S e l e c t  Commission on Civil  D iso rd e r s ,  New Jersey)  in which he 
r e l a t e d  h is  exper ience when he " . . .  a t t ended a meeting in Washington 
where Army spokesmen admitted being worr ied t h a t  the  r i o t s  could not be 
con ta ined .  Although in r e t r o s p e c t  t h i s  pe rcep t ion  does not do c r e d i t  to 
Armed Forces i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  Li 1 ley  r e c a l l s  shuddering in recogni t ion  t h a t  
i f  the  Army was worried we should a l l  be w orr ied ,  fo r  th e re  i s  no fo rce  
to back up the  Army." MSS, I I I ,  p. 3.
^^See P a l m i e r i ' s  l e t t e r  to  Robert  H u tc h in s ,  9 / 1 8 / 5 7 ,  Palmieri
f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ L ib ra ry .
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commission t r i e d  to  move the s e n io r  level  m i l i t a r y  s t a f f  o f  the  DOD 
away from th ink ing  of  the  d i so rd e r s  as products o f  fo r ieg n  and/o r  domestic 
cr iminal c o n sp i r ac ie s .
The t h i r d  level  o f  co n tac t  between the commission and the  DOD 
was an extens ion o f  the  concerns j u s t  d iscussed. The commission attempted 
to d i r e c t  the m i l i t a r y ' s  a t t e n t i o n  toward taking  g re a t e r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
fo r  disadvantaged minor i ty  persons of  the  s o c ie ty  by a c t in g  as an employer 
o f  l a s t  r e s o r t  and as an ad junc t  to  federal  c i v i l i a n  job  t r a i n i n g  programs. 
To accomplish t h i s  the  commissioners f i r s t  wanted to  recommend to Johnson 
t h a t  t h e  department expand two of  i t s  e x i s t i n g  programs: P ro jec t  100,000
and P ro jec t  T r a n s i t i o n .^^ P r o jec t  100,000 was designed to admit young men 
who had below s tandard  physical  and mental t e s t  scores  in to  the armed forces  
a t  the  r a t e  o f  100,000 a y ea r .  Secre ta ry  of Defense McNamara supported the
program, but r e s i s t e d  the  idea of expanding i t  beyond the  140,000 men the
go
department had p ro jec ted  through the  end of  September 1968. He was not
c e r t a in  t h a t  the  armed fo rces  could accommodate a d d i t io n a l  numbers of  such
persons without s a c r i f i c i n g  performance s tandards .  He recommended t h a t  the
commission ask only t h a t  the  department "continue i t s  emphasis" on
the program and "cons ider  expansion;"  McNamara agreed with the  commission
t h a t  P ro jec t  T r a n s i t i o n , designed to t r a i n  and counsel servicemen
scheduled to r e t u r n  to c i v i l i a n  l i f e  about vocat ional  o p p o r tu n i t i e s ,
93should be expanded. In i t s  f i n a l  r e p o r t ,  the  commission adopted the
L ib ra ry .




McNamara to  G insburg ,  2 /1 0 / 6 8 ,  DOD f i l e ,  NACCD P a p e r s ,  LBJ
Ib id .
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94s e c r e t a r y ' s  p o s i t i o n  on both m a t t e r s .  There a re  two reasons f o r  the  
commission's  r a t h e r  easy acqu iescence  on these  program recommendations. 
F i r s t ,  McNamara t o ld  the  commission t h a t  of  the  140,000 mefr p ro jec ted  
to be in  the  program by September 1968, only f i f t y  thousand of  them 
would be Negro Americans and o f  t h o s e  only 37 p e rc en t  were from the 
a reas  o f  the  country  exper ienc ing  th e  most in ten se  d i s o r d e r s . S e c o n d ,  
t h e re  was a growing c o n v ic t io n  in  th e  commission and elsewhere  t h a t  the 
army was a l ready  too much a poor p e r s o n ' s  o rg a n iz a t io n  and, f u r t h e r ,  
was i l l  equipped to handle the  s o c i a l  w e l fa re  problems in  the  manner 
the  commission's o r i g i n a l  recommendations env is ioned .  The commissioners 
s e t t l e d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  f o r  endorsement o f  e x i s t i n g  DOD programs and 
recommendations which g e n t ly  d i r e c t e d  the  a t t e n t i o n  of  the  m i l i t a r y  to 
o th e r  poss ib le  causes  o f  the  d i s o r d e r s  than the c o n s p i r a t o r i a l  ones 
they were e n t e r t a i n i n g .
The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  commission and the  Department o f  
the  Treasury was much more narrowly def ined  than those  p rev ious ly  d i s ­
cussed; the  only ques t ion  here  was th e  use o f  t a x  in c e n t iv e s  as a 
means o f  encouraging employers in the  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  of the  economy to 
employ persons c l a s s i f i e d  as belonging  to the "hard -core"  unemployed. 
This has been d iscussed  a t  some l e n g th  above with the  work o f  the  
commission's  P r iv a t e  E n te rp r i s e  Pane l .
9 4
Repor t  p.  235.
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The r e l a t i o n s h ip s  between the  commission to the Department o f  Health
Education and Welfare (HEW) and Housing and Urban Development (HUD) were
d i f f e r e n t  from those described above because those departments were
in  deep p o l i t i c a l  t rouble  with the  White House and the  congress .  The
p re s id e n t  placed specia l  demands on the two departments in the  areas
o f  t h e i r  d e f i c i e n c i e s  and did not in d i c a t e  to  them or  the  commission
any p a r t i c u l a r  type of r e l a t i o n s h ip  he expected them to mainta in  beyond
the  e x p l i c i t  ones s e t  ou t  in the mandate.
Johnson, however, did d i r e c t  the  commission to give s p e c i f i c
a id  to  the  O ff ice  of Economic Opportunity (OEO) in  i t s  t ro u b le s  with
congress .  The agency's s t ru g g le  with  those who wished to t i e  i t s
98programs and employees to the  d i so rd e r s  i s  d iscussed  e lsewhere .
But a t t e n t i o n  should be c a l l e d  a t  t h i s  po in t  to the  f a c t  t h a t  th i s  
e f f o r t  to  he lp OEO is  a good example of the  uses to  which a p r e s i ­
dent can put a commission a f t e r  i t  has been appoin ted.  The work on
97 Responding to i t s  general d i s t r u s t  o f  HEW Secre ta ry  John Gardner 's  
a b i l i t y  to work with the congress on c iv i l  r i g h t s  m a t t e r s ,  the  White 
House decreed t h a t  the depar tment 's  c i v i l  r i g h t s  work be more c lo se ly  
coord ina ted  with  i t s  own; so c lo se ly  coord inated in f a c t  t h a t  Gardner 
was fo rced  to  send weekly repor ts  on the  depar tment 's  accomplishments, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  with  southern congresspersons , in  c i v i l  r i g h t s  lobbying 
which then were checked by Douglas Cater .  ( P re s id e n t i a l  Memoranda,
Ju ly  1967 (1) Cater  3, LBJ L ibrary) .  In August Johnson s en t  a formal 
l e t t e r  to  HUD Secre tary  Robert Weaver with a personal note a t t ached  de­
t a i l i n g  complaints  he was rece iv ing  from various  sources about the 
depa r tm en t ' s  handling o f  the  various  Great Soc ie ty  housing programs, 
Johnson to  Weaver 8/7/67,• HUD F i l e ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library .
QQ
See pp. 424-425, th e  f i l e  Riots (2) McPherson 8 ,  (Memo Herbert  
Kramer, OEO, to George C h r i s t i a n  9/6 /67)  and memo Cal ifano  to  Johnson 
7/27/67 in D e t r o i t  Chronology (2) Califano 6, LBJ Library and Lipsky and 
Olson, MSS, IV, p. 57.
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the  OEO took  va luab le  time away from the  major items on the  commis­
s i o n ' s  agenda, but i t  did respond in  a p o l i t i c a l l y  helpful way to  the 
immediate demands o f  the p re s id e n t ,  which i s ,  o f  course,  one of the 
major reasons p re s id en ts  appoin t advisory  commissions.
The a d m in i s t r a t iv e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  fo r  mainta ining these  r e l a t i o n ­
ships  and f u l f i l l i n g  the specia l  assignments f e l l  p r in c ip a l ly  on 
Ginsburg f o r  the  commission and Cal ifano  for the White House. Ginsburg 
knew from exper ience  t h a t  th e re  was no way to keep Johnson uninformed 
o r  to keep him from "meddling" with the commission when he saw the 
need to  do so. He knew t h a t  Kerner, Harris  and Thornton had r e g u la r ,  
d i r e c t  l i n e s  to the  p re s id en t .  By January he knew, too,  t h a t  Gorman 
had opened his  own channel to  the  Oval Off ice .  There were ,  a l s o ,  
the  o f f i c i a l  White House l i a i s o n  persons who s a t  in on a l l  the commission 
meetings.  There fore ,  two f a c t s  o f  commission p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  impressed 
themselves on Ginsburg: th e re  i s  no place to h ide ,  and the  commission
i s  the c r e a t u r e  and, th e re fo re ,  the  se rvan t  o f  the  p re s iden t .  To gain  the 
independence p o s s ib le  fo r  the  commission, Ginsburg chose to  be completely 
open with the  White House. There were no s u rp r i s e s  (d isappoin tments ,  
yes)  fo r  t h e  White House. They knew o f  the commission's work each s tep  
o f  the  way. I f  they had no t ,  i t  is  doubtful the  commission would have
been allowed to  surv ive  the budget c r i s i s  o f  December
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99 In l i g h t  o f  the obvious candor on the  p a r t  o f  the commission's 
executive  s t a f f  with the White House, i t  seems t h a t  Chairman Kerner was 
e i t h e r  unaware o f  the c lose  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t h a t  e x i s t ed  or was d e l ib e r a t e ly  
f a b r i c a t i n g  when he had the fo llowing exchange in a press conference:
"Q. Has the  White House p ressured  you to  tone down the repor t?
A. (Kerner) I have not.  I d o n ' t  know how the  White House could 
ask us to tone f t  down o r  up. They h a v en ' t  seen i t  nor has i t  
been discussed with  them.
Q. Weren' t  some o f  the s t a f f  recommendations discussed with 
the  p re s iden t  in the  middle o f  November?
A. Not to my knowledge they w e r e n ' t  and I am sure  tha t  I 
know of  a l l  d iscuss ions  t h a t  have been going on."
Press Conference 1/10/68,  Office Record,  Spivak f i l e ,  NACCD Papers,




The purpose of  t h i s  chap te r  i s  to  uncover and explain the  major 
obs tac les  which had to be overcome be fo re  the Kerner Commission could 
produce i t s  f ina l  r e p o r t .  The examination of the  charac te r  o f  th e se  
d isputes  and the manner o f  t h e i r  r e s o l u t i o n  re in fo rce s  a cen t ra l  conten t ion  
of  t h i s  study - before  anything e l s e  the  Kerner commissioners saw 
themselves as servants  of  the  p r e s id e n t  commissioned to  f u l f i l l  the  
im p l i c i t  as well as the  e x p l i c i t  purposes of t h e i r  appointer.
A unanimously supported f in a l  r e p o r t  was the  goal of Kerner,
Ginsburg and most of the  commissioners. Along with the great  majo r i ty
of p re s id e n t i a l  advisory  commissions they achieved the ob jec t iv e ,  but
not without considerab le  t roub le  over fou r  c lo se ly  re la ted  problems
which challenged the l e a d e r s h i p ' s  a b i l i t y  to hold the commission t o -  
1
ge th e r ;  f i r s t ,  the  mat te r  o f  a c r imina l  consp iracy; second, the  
"Summary" o f  the  f in a l  Report and i t s  themes o f  white racism and two 
r a c i a l l y  sepa ra t ing  s o c i e t i e s  in America; t h i r d ,  the ro le  o f  the  j u n i o r  
s t a f f  in the  commission's work, a t o p i c  which i s  best  discussed in the 
con tex t  of the  Harvest o f  Racism document and the  dismissal of l a rg e
^See Wolanin,  P r e s i d e n t i a l  Advisory  Commissions, p. 118.
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numbers o f  the  r e sea rch  and f i e l d  s t a f f ;  f o u r t h ,  th e  dec is ion  to i s sue  
only  one comprehensive r e p o r t  toge the r  with supplemental  s tu d ie s .
Each o f  these  problem a re a s  has been d iscussed  b e fo re ,  a t  varying 
l e n g th s ,  in  e a r l i e r  p a r t s  o f  t h i s  study. Some o f  t h i s  d iscuss ion  w i l l  
be rehearsed  again ,  b u t  in t h i s  ins tance  the  i n t e n t  i s  to draw o u t  
and exp la in  as many o f  th e  consequences flowing from the ac t ions  as 
p o s s ib le .
Unlike the  o th e r  th r e e  is sues  to be d i s cu s sed  in t h i s  s e c t io n ,
th e re  were no disagreements  among the commissioners and the  execu t ive
s t a f f  as to  the  n e c e s s i t y  o f  s e t t l i n g  the c o n sp i r acy  i s su e  f i r s t .  None
of  the  o th e r  ques t ions  o f  the  p re s id en t  could be answered p rope r ly ,
i t  was thought ,  un less  ques t ion  number t h r e e  i n  the  four teen  po in t
2
mandate were c l e a r l y  addressed .
The White House made i t  known to the  commissioners t h a t  the  
p re s id e n t  d id  no t  want any p re c ip i to u s  a c t i o n s  tak en ,  by any p a r t  of 
the  government on t h i s  issue.- He wanted a c t i o n  bu t  no t  u n t i l  he
3
could be in  c o n t ro l .  The commissioners f i r s t  tu rned  to  J .  Edgar 
Hoover fo r  informat ion and guidance before  s e t t i n g  t h e i r  s t a f f  to 
work on an independent s e t  o f  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . ^  The data  secured from 
these  sources  and t h a t  garnered from the f i e l d  t r i p s  forced a r e s o l u ­
t i o n  o f  the  conspiracy  ques t ion  e a r l i e r  than t h e  commissioners had
^Report  p. 295.
3
See Lipsky and Olson, MSS, IV, pp. 8-9 f o r  a s im i l a r  idea.
4As was the  p r a c t i c e ,  a summary of  h is  te s t im ony  t h a t  the re  was no 
evidence o f  an organized  conspiracy  was r e l e a s e d  to the p ress .
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planned; t h e i r  evidence c l e a r l y  pointed them away from the conspiracy 
exp lana t ion  o f  the  disorders and toward explana t ions  which included 
socio-economic f a c t o r s ,  po l ice  p r a c t i c e s  and even the  Great Soc ie ty
5
programs. A consensus developed among the  commissioners t h a t  the 
consp iracy  exp lana t ion  of the d i s o r d e r s  had to be repudia ted  i f  the  
o th e r  ex p lan a t io n s  they were developing were to have any c r e d i b i l i t y  
with  th e  p r e s id e n t  or the pu b l ic .^  So the  major p a r t  of the  commis­
s i o n e r ' s  t ime through November was spen t  in working through the e v i ­
dence b e fo re  them and re f in ing  t h e i r  unders tanding of  the conspiracy  
problem. Once the  commissioner consensus was reached,  Kerner and 
Ginsburg thought i t  wise to  make i t  pub l ic  before  the  pub l ica t ion  o f  the  
Report . Kerner,  in his press conference of  January 10, announced i t  
as one o f  the  f ind ings  which would be in the f in a l  document.^ Their  
conclus ion  i s  found in Chapter I I I ,  t h e  s h o r t e s t ,  but one of  the  most 
important  p a r t s  o f  the Report. There the  commission said:
On the  b a s i s  o f  a l l  the informat ion c o l l e c te d  the 
Commission concludes t h a t  the  urban d i so rd e r s  of  
the  summer o f  1967 were not caused by, nor were 
they the  consequence o f ,  any organized  plan or 
"consp i racy ."  S p e c i f i c a l ly ,  the  Commission has 
found no evidence tha t  a l l  o r  any of the d i so rde rs  
o r  the  inc idence  that  led to  them were planned
5
The one exception was the flow o f  in format ion from m i l i t a r y  i n ­
t e l l i g e n c e  sources  discussed above pp. 439-441.
^Howard Hubbard, "Five Long Hot Summers and How They Grew," The 
Pub! ic I n t e r e s t  12 (Summer, 1968):23,  Shallow, "Social S c i e n t i s t s  and 
Social A c t ion ,"  p. 209 and Johnson, The Vantage P o in t , p. 173, in 
r e t r o s p e c t ,  a l so  agreed with t h i s  p o in t .
^Press  Conference t r a n s c r i p t ,  Spivak o f f i c e  copy. Office o f  
In format ion ,  NACCD Papers, LBJ L ib rary .
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or directed by anygOrganization or group, international  
national or l o c a l .
The manner in which the  consp iracy issue was handled by Miskovsky
and Ginsburg allowed th e  commissioners to remain u n i ted  and avoided the
p o s s i b i l i t y  of  an i n c a p a c i t a t i n g  s t ru g g le  among themselves ,  with
g
congress ,  and the  p o l i c e  community over the  i s sue .  By t r e a t i n g  the 
conspiracy issue  f i r s t ,  and coming to t h e i r  conclusion r e l a t i v e l y  
e a r l y ,  they allowed themselves the  luxury of being able  to  remain 
pub l ic ly  a loo f  from th e  problem, gave themselves some precious time 
fo r  the o ther  departments to ge t  t h e i r  work organized and took from 
the  congress and the FBI the r i g h t  to speak a u t h o r i t a t i v e l y  on the  
i s s u e .  The na t iona l  a t t e n t i o n  given t h i s  par t  of t h e i r  work allowed 
the  public to d i r e c t  i t s  a t t e n t i o n  to o th e r  matters  r e l a t e d  to  the  
d i so rde rs .
The conspiracy  ques t ion  was the  most important external obs tac le
O
Report , p. 89,  Miskovsky's in v e s t ig a to r s  did  turn up evidence of  
some type o f  consp i racy .  At the  November 10 meeting,  Ginsburg repor ted  
t h a t  suspic ious  evidence obta ined  a t  a b lack  power meeting in Newark had 
been turned over to the  FBI. (McGrath, "Minutes," 11/10/57.)  The 
c o n t r a c t  re sea rchers  working on the  d is tu rbances  in  u n i v e r s i t i e s  a lso  
tu rned  up what they thought to  be evidence of an e f f o r t  a t  a national 
conspiracy.  (See Kerner 's  test imony,  the  Kennedy Hear ings,  p. 9 ) .  
Neither was regarded as s i g n i f i c a n t  enough to warrant a change in  the 
consensus s ta tement  which appeared in  the  Report. I t  i s  impor tant to  
remember too t h a t  the  commissioners kept t h e i r  in v e s t i g a t i o n  on th i s  
m a t te r  open u n t i l  the  l a s t  p o s s ib le  moment. The f i n a l  communication 
from Direc tor Hoover was dated February 27, 1968.
^See the  l e t t e r  from George Reedy, former p r e s id e n t i a l  press  
s ec re ta ry  to  Johnson, 8 /3 /6 7 ,  EX FG690, PR18, LBJ L ibrary ,  in 
which th i s  outcome was p red ic ted .
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which th e  commissioners had to c l ea r  on the  way to t h e i r  f ina l  r e p o r t .  
The b a t t l e  over the  "Summary" to the R e p o r t ^ was the most important 
o f  the in t e rn a l  c o n f l i c t s  which th rea tened  to  bar the  way to a unanimous 
statement to the  p re s id en t  and the na t ion .  The r e s o lu t io n  of th i s  
d ispute  decided f o r  the  Kerner Commission a m at te r  o f  c r i t i c a l  concern 
to a l l  adv iso ry  commissioners - wil l  th e re  be minor i ty  repo r ts?
The s t ru g g le  over shaping the commission's f i n a l  r e p o r t  was 
waged between two groups o f  commissioners; one was headed by Mayor 
Lindsay, and u su a l ly  cons is ted  of Kerner, H a r r i s ,  J enk ins ,  Brooke and 
Wilkins; the o th e r  formed around Represen ta t ive  Gorman and on most of 
the important i s sues  cons is ted  of McCulloch, Thornton, Paden and Abel. 
Each group used th e  t h r e a t  o f  a separa te  d i s s e n t in g  r e p o r t  as a 
weapon in  molding the  f in a l  repo r t  to t h e i r  l i k i n g .  The smal ler group 
usually  at tempted to  frame the Report in the  terms Gorman a r t i c u l a t e d  
in his January 13 l e t t e r  to  Kerner. They r e s i s t e d  what they saw as an 
a ttempt by the m a jo r i ty  to engage in an " . . .  ind i sc r im ina te  a t t a ck  on 
every problem of  American s o c i e ty . "  They sought,  on the o the r  hand,
" . . .  a ca re fu l  weighing of evidence from the  d i s o r d e r s ,  a development 
o f  understanding f o r  the  f r u s t r a t i o n s  and l i m i t a t i o n s  of  human beings 
in the c o n f l i c t s  and a jud ic ious  s e t t i n g  o f  program p r i o r i t i e s  th a t  
respond d i r e c t l y  to  the  immediate causes o f  the  r i o t s . "  The Gorman 
group sought to  g e t  commission endorsement of four themes in the f ina l  
r epo r t :  1) commitment to the  ru le  of law, 2) the d i so rd e r s  did not
c o n s t i t u t e  a c i v i l  war, 3) th e re  i s  no reason fo r  o f f i c i a l  complacency
^^R e p o r t , p. 1-13.
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d esp i te  the  r e l a t i v e l y  low leve l  of property  damage and loss  of l i f e
in the d i s o r d e r s ,  4) "The d iso rde rs  do not demonstrate the  urgent
need fo r  abandoning fundamental American p r i n c i p l e s . . . "  but r a th e r  the
need to bring Negroes in to  the mainstream o f  American l i f e " . ^ ^  Lindsay
was the l e ad e r  of a group d e s i r in g  a rep o r t  with a sense o f  urgency and
commitment to s i g n i f i c a n t  inc reases  in p r iv a te  and government a c t i v i t y
in the areas  o f  educa t ion ,  housing, employment and w e l fa re .  I t  was
Lindsay who produced the document which conta ined the  themes "white-
racism" and America a s  two r a c i a l l y  separa ted s o c i e t i e s  and th rea tened
to is sue  i t  p ub l ic ly  as an independent s ta tem ent .  Faced with Lindsay 's
ac t ion  the Corman group withdrew t h e i r  t h r e a t  to i s sue  a minori ty r e p o r t
and adopted h i s  as t h a t  o f  the  commission provided i t  was separa ted
from the body o f  the Repor t . They did so because they thought his
t h r e a t  c r e d ib l e  and because most of  the "Summary" did accura te ly
r e f l e c t  the con ten t  o f  the  r e p o r t .  They had no s t rong  ob jec t ion
to the theme o f  "white racism" being i d e n t i f i e d  as  the  cen t ra l  problem
12the commission uncovered in i t s  in v e s t ig a t io n s .  The "Summary" as 
adopted did n o t  ca l l  f o r  any reorganiza tion  of American soc ie ty  ( i t  con­
demned v io lence  and p ra ised  law and o rde r ) ;  i t  sought no change in the 
es tab l i shed  way o f  a t t a ck in g  the  public problems of  American so c ie ty ,  i t  
j u s t  c a l l ed  f o r  more o f  the  same. I t  did s t r e s s  urgency and a sense of 
c r i s i s  and h igh l igh ted  the  major recommendations of  the commission.
There was, in  s h o r t ,  in  the  "Summary", enough o f  what each group wanted
^ ^L et te r ,  Corman to Ginsburg,  11/13/68, Ginsburg f i l e s ,  NACCD 
Papers, LBJ Library .
12Lipsky and Olson, Commission P o l i t i c s , p. 13, and Popper, 
P re s id e n t ' s  Commissions, p. 33 fo r  s im i la r  conc lus ions .
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to allow them to  agree to  i t .
The e f f o r t s  to broaden the scope of  the  f in a l  r e p o r t  and to
frame the  "Summary" began a f t e r  the f i e l d  t r i p  to C inc inna t i .  Lindsay
and H a r r i s ,  in p a r t i c u l a r ,  came from t h a t  exper ience  s t r e s s in g  the
need f o r  a r e p o r t  which would make recommendations c a l l i n g  f o r
renovat ion and expansion o f  e x i s t in g  publ ic  and p r iv a t e  housing, jobs
and education  programs. Lindsay c a l l ed  f o r  a s trong sec t ion  on
13housing in  the  r e p o r t .  Soon a f t e r  the  f i r s t  of the  year  Lindsay was
urging h is  co l leagues  to express a sense of  urgency in the t e x t  of  the  
Report . I t  was during th e  same period t h a t  he f i r s t  l a i d  before the 
commission the  proposals  which were included in the "Summary".^^ The 
theme o f  whi te  racism f i r s t  surfaced in the con t rove rsa l  Harvest of 
Racism manuscrip t  ( to  be d iscussed immediately below); i t  a l so  appeared 
e a r ly  in the  d r a f t s  of  the  various forms o f  the  Report .
While the  theme of whi te  racism was e a s i l y  accepted by the com­
m iss ioners ,  a common d e f i n i t i o n  and an unders tanding o f  i t s  implica tions  
were not.  From the  o nse t  o f  t h e i r  work the  commissioners wrest led
^^McGrath, "Minutes," 11/1/68.
T ^ lb id . ,  1 /9 /68 .
1 6e .g .  Chambers to Birenbaum, 1 /23/68 ,  General Counsel f i l e s ,  NACCD 
Papers,  LBJ L ibrary .  The documentary evidence i s  conclusive th a t  the  
development o f  the  ideas  o f  the  "Summary" and the broadening of the  scope 
of  the Report were g rad u a l ly  and p e r s i s t e n t l y  pursued by Lindsay and h is  
group and were s u b je c t  to f u l l  debate wi th in  the  commission and the 
s t a f f .  The kind of  i n t r i g u e  engaged in to g e t  the "Summary" accepted by 
the commissioners desc r ibed  by Kopkind, "Black on White," cannot be sub­
s t a n t i a t e d  by the w r i t t e n  evidence,  o r  by the  in te rv iews conducted by 
the  au thor .
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with  c o n f l i c t i n g  explanations  o f  the causes of the d i so rd e r s .  The 
deba te s  over the  roo t  causes revolved around poverty and racism as 
e x p la n a t io n s .  The argument f o r  the  poverty explanation was put f o r t h  
most f o r c e f u l l y  to  the commissioners in formal and informal c o n tac t s  
by Daniel P. Moynihan. He i n s i s t e d  t h a t  the  d isorders  were c l a s s  
based — the r e s u l t s  of  the  a c t io n s  o f  members of  an unhappy underc lass  
which happens to be N e g r o . S e n a t o r  Harr is  was the most a r t i c u l a t e  
c h a l l e n g e r  o f  the  Moynihan t h e s i s .  For him, white racism was the 
r o o t  cause  o f  the  d i so rd e r s .  The McGrath notes of the commissioner 
meetings reveal t h a t  these  debates  consumed much of  the commissioner ' s  
t ime before  they f i n a l l y  were presented with and agreed to the language 
o f  the  in t r o d u c t io n  to the  "Summary". In the  January 19 meet ing,  in 
a d i s cu s s io n  of th e  s ec t ion  which even tu a l ly  became Chapter XVII o f  the 
Repor t , the  record  of the d iscuss ion  r e f l e c t s  the ch a rac te r  o f  t h i s  
debate  over the  causes of  the  d i s o rd e r s .  Corman and Thornton were 
w i l l i n g  to s ep a ra te  racism and poverty and s t r e s s  the former. Wilkins 
and Lindsay d isag reed ,  wanting to t i e  the  two toge ther  and made 
recommendations f o r  a v a r i e ty  of wide ranging social-economic programs 
which would i n h i b i t  racism and reduce the  level of poverty.  Corman in 
tu rn  wanted to  s t r e s s  t h a t  " . . .  a l o t  o f  whites l iv in g  on l e ss  than 
$3,000 a year  d i d n ' t  throw firebombs l a s t  summer. So need to s t r e s s  
racism. L e t ' s  a t t a c k  what ' s  wrong in our educational system, e t c . ,  
but no t  c a l l  f o r  d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  our educational system, e t c .  Poverty
^®See pp. 377-378 f o r  an o th e r  d i s c u s s i o n  of  Moynihan's p o s i t i o n .
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d o e s n ' t  cause r a c i s m . T h e  r e s o lu t io n  o f  t h i s  c o n f l i c t  was to use
the concept  white  racism in the "Summary" w i thou t  any at tempt to
d e f ine  i t  o r  to t i e  i t  to the d i scuss ion  and recommendations in the 
18body o f  the  t e x t .  The "Summary" with i t s  c o n t ro v e rs ia l  in t ro d u c t io n  
then became s a t i s f a c t o r y  to a l l  the  commissioners p rec i se ly  because 
i t  committed them to nothing with which any o f  them se r io u s ly  d i s ­
agreed;  by not ty ing  the  white -racism theme to  the t e x t  of the Report 
they could make t h e i r  po l icy  recommendations without  having to confron t
the  need f o r  changes in the form or  substance of the t r a d i t i o n a l
19i n s t i t u t i o n s  and programs they endorsed.  The in t roduc t ion  had the 
urgency Lindsay and h is  colleagues des i red  bu t  the remainder of the 
"Summary" and the  t e x t  o f  the Report did no t  advocate any t ransform at ion  
o f  the  ba s ic  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  the s o c i e ty ;  t h a t  pleased Corman and his  
group. Thus the  Report s e t  for th  a slogan (white-rac ism) as an 
exp lana t ion  f o r  the  cause o f  the d i so rd e r s  and a c a l l  fo r  more 
Great S oc ie ty  programs as the means of  preventing them from reoccur r ing .  
The Report  c a l l e d  f o r  white Americans to w i l l  a change in the socia l
^^McGrath, "Minutes," 1/19/68.
^^See Downs, "THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE", p. 2.
1 9The w hi te  racism theme of th e  "Summary" i s  a good i l l u s t r a t i o n  
o f  Whalen's obse rva t ion  about the r o l e  of " s t y l e "  in post-JFK Washing­
ton:  "In Kennedy-enchanted Washington, ' s t y l e '  was everything . . .
s t y l e  f o r  i t s  own sake.  The l in e  between image and substance d i sap ­
peared.  A th ing  well sa id  was a th ing  accomplished. What answer did 
the people r e c e iv e  when they asked what could they do fo r  t h e i r  country? 
None - -  the d e s i r ed  e f f e c t  had been achieved by asking the s t r i k i n g  
q u es t io n ."  (Richard J .  Whalen, Catch the  F a l l in g  P la y : A Republican's
Challenge to  His P a r ty . (Boston: Houghton M i f f l i n ,  1972): p. 108.
455
order to allow Negro Americans to  share  in the Great S o c ie ty .  There 
was no c a l l  f o r  changes in th e  s t r u c t u r e  and leade rsh ip  o f  the 
dominant i n s t i t u t i o n s .  The Kerner commissioners put a rad ica l  
sounding in t r o d u c t io n  before  what i s  b a s ic a l ly  an im p e r ia l ,  conservative  
document; imperial in  the  sense t h a t  i t  advocated an imposed, white 
s o lu t io n ,  to  the  problems o f  black urban c o n d i t io n s ,  complete with 
armed fo rces ,  a s o lu t io n  in which the  persons ta rg e te d  f o r  the help 
had l i t t l e  to say in  i t s  development; conserva t ive  in the  sense t h a t  the 
t e x t  of  the  Report e s s e n t i a l l y  reaff i rm s  and recommends s t r e n g th en ­
ing the e s t a b l i s h e d  i n t e r e s t s  and i n s t i t u t i o n s  of the s o c i e ty  ( e .g .  
most o f  the  recommendations advocate increasing amounts o f  public 
resources be ded ica ted  to the kinds of  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a g a i n s t  which the 
d isorders  had been d i r e c t e d ) .  In making t h i s  same p o in t  Kopkind 
sa id  o f  the Report , " I t  expresses  the  notion t h a t  s ince  the  c o n f l i c t s  
o f  black and white America a r e  non- ideo log ica l ,  no real  s h i f t s  of  
power are  needed to  c o r r e c t  them. The problems which were seen in the 
American c i t i e s  in the  summer of 1967 did not r e p re se n t  con t rad ic t io n s  
with in  the whole p o l i t i c a l  economy, but malfunctions o f  one or more in ­
s t i t u t i o n s .
A major s t im ulus  f o r  Representat ive  Gorman's f e a r  t h a t  the s t a f f  
was try ing to lead  the  commissioners toward a r e p o r t  which intended to 
challenge  the fundamental i n s t i t u t i o n s  of the soc ie ty  was a document 
w r i t t en  by Shallow's  o f f i c e  in  prepara tion f o r  the abo r ted ,  in te r im
?n
"White on B la c k , "  p. 2.
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r e p o r t , "  The Harvest  o f  Racism: The P o l i t i c a l  Meaning of Violence in
21the  Summer of 1967." "Harvest" (as the paper was known with in  the  com­
mission) was presented  to the commissioners seventeen days before  the  
dec i s io n  was made to reduce the s ize  of  the  s t a f f .  While the re  i s  no 
firm evidence l in k in g  the two events ,  the  controversy  caused by the 
paper d id  not m i t ig a te  any fee l ings  some o f  the  commissioners may have
had to  so lve  t h e i r  budget problems by j e t t i s o n i n g  persons regarded as
22l i a b i l i t i e s  to the  commission and the White House.
"Harvest" was e s s e n t i a l l y  a t h e o r e t i c a l  s ta tement about the d i s ­
o rders  w r i t t e n  from the  point of view of the  p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  b u i l t  on 
data c o l l e c t e d  by the  commissioners and the  s t a f f  f i e l d  teams during 
the  var ious  c i t y  v i s i t s .  I t s  authors  intended i t  to be a means of 
pu t t ing  before  the commission a v a r i e ty  o f  hypotheses for  c l a s s i f y in g  
and exp la in ing  the  d i so rd e r s .  At b e s t ,  th e  paper was intended to 
s t im u la te  ideas  and in s ig h ts  and to be of use in managing the vas t  
amount o f  data  the  commission was accumulating.  The authors planned 
to  r e tu r n  to  the  f i e l d  and gather add i t iona l  data  to s trengthen 
t h e i r  adm it ted ly  shaky f i r s t  s e t  o f  exp lana tory  c a te g o r i e s .
Dated 11/22/67 and found in Department o f  Research f i l e s ,  NACCD 
Papers ,  LBJ L ibrary .  See Shallow, "Social  S c i e n t i s t  and Social A c t ion ,"  
pp. 211-212, f o r  a d e sc r ip t io n  of the  manner in which the document was 
produced.
22 Skolnick,  "Violence Commission Violence ,"  and Kopkind, "White on 
Black," both th ink  the  two events are  i n e x t r i c a b l y  l inked. Their  reasons  
fo r  coming to t h a t  conclusion seem to be based s o le ly  on interviews 
with members o f  the  s t a f f  who were d ischarged .
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"Harvest" s t im u la ted  the  commissioners to  a f a r  g rea te r  degree 
than Shallow and h i s  colleagues  planned. Ginsburg had asked fo r  an 
exp lo ra to ry  document. But by the time the paper was given to him the 
needs of the  commissioners had sh i f t e d  d r a m a t ic a l ly ;  they were now 
seeking a r e p o r t  which,  a t  a minimum, not only c l a s s i f i e d  the d isorders  
bu t  demonstrated the  v a l i d i t y  of  the  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  scheme. Obviously, 
t h a t  was no t  the kind o f  paper the authors  o f  "Harvest" had in mind, 
and i t  i s  doubtful  t h a t  they o r  anyone could have produced such a 
document in the t ime a l l o t t e d .  The commissioners now wanted a l l  
g ene ra l iz a t io n s  about  the d iso rde rs  supported by "hard data" .
Ginsburg 's  demands on Shallow's  s t a f f  changed in  response 
to the developing c o n f l i c t  between the commissioners over the r e l a t i v e  
merits  of  the  racism and poverty  themes. Corman a t tacked  what he 
suspected to  be a s t a f f  a t tempt  to take from the  commission the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  fo r  th e  form and content of  the  in te r im  repor t  a
f u l l  month before  "Harvest" was turned over to the  commissioners. In
23a l e t t e r  to Ginsburg dated October 17, 1967, which the executive 
d i r e c to r  c i r c u l a t e d  to  members of the  s t a f f  Corman sa id :
The following comments a r e  designed to a s s i s t  the  s t a f f  
in the  p repa ra t ion  of a d r a f t  fo r  the commission's  con­
s i d e r a t i o n .  No fo reseeab le  ac t ion  or  combination of  a c t io n s ,  
e i t h e r  public  o r  p r iv a t e ,  can s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a l t e r  the ob­
j e c t i v e  f a c t s  o f  l i f e  in the Negro ghetto  be fo re  next summer.
23 "Attached i s  a remarkable l e t t e r  which m er i t s  the close  a t t e n ­
t io n  o f  every member, man o r  woman, on the commission s t a f f . "  Memo, 
Ginsburg to the s t a f f  10/17/67, Ginsburg f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers,  LBJ 
Library.
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One would hope, however, t h a t  the Commission's in te r im  r e ­
p o r t  can he lp  s e t  a new tone fo r  pub l ic  d i s c u s s io n  and per ­
c ep t io n  of c i v i l  d i s o r d e r s .  The Commission's r e p o r t  can 
help ease  t e n s i o n s  w i th in  the g h e t to s ,  thus  reducing the 
s e v e r i t y  o f  f u t u r e  d i s o r d e r s ,  and help  avoid  s e l f - d e f e a t i n g  
or  un-wise pub l ic  r e a c t io n  which might o the rw ise  be taken 
in the face  o f  new v io lence .  In a d d i t i o n ,  the  in te r im  r e p o r t  
must e s t a b l i s h  the  c r e d i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  Commission i t s e l f  in 
the  eyes o f  both  the  white  and Negro communities.  Without 
t h i s  c r e d i b i l i t y  the  f i n a l  r e p o r t  w i l l  be o f  l i t t l e  value 
. . .  ( i t )  must f u l l y  and f a i r l y  exp lo re  th e  causes  of  
Negro g r ievances  while re a s su r in g  t h e  e n t i r e  na t ion  
of our de te rm in a t io n  to maintain p u b l ic  o r d e r . . .
The Commission should make i t  a b s o lu t e ly  c l e a r  t h a t  
the  under ly ing  causes o f  our p r e s e n t  dilemma a re  the 
conscious and unconscious b a r r i e r s  t h a t  have prevented  
whites and Negroes from perceiv ing  each o t h e r  as human
beings of w o r t h . . .  t h e r e  i s  no doubt  t h a t  th e  Com­
mission has a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to recommend s t ep s  to 
improve enforcement of law and o r d e r .
On the b a s i s  of t h i s  l e t t e r ,  and the commissioner r e a c t io n s  to i t ,
Ginsburg became convinced t h a t  a s i g n i f i c a n t  m in o r i ty  o f  the  commissioners
was demanding a d r a f t  o f  the in te r im  r e p o r t  which more resembled a
25law yer 's  b r i e f  th an  a soc ia l  sc ience  document. Not only did "Harvest" 
f a i l  t h a t  t e s t ,  b u t ,  i f  adop ted ,  would c l e a r l y  have placed the commis­
s ione rs  in an a d v e r sa ry  p o s i t i o n  with th e  White House. As Lipsky points
o u t ,  acceptance o f  "H arves t" , o r  any v a r i a t i o n  on i t s  themes as  the  
in te r im  r e p o r t ,  would have fo rced  the commissioners in to  suppor t ing  three 
p r o p o s i t i o n s ,  no one o f  which was a cc e p tab le  to  a m a jo r i ty  of the  com-
Z^ibid.
?5
“ Lipsky,  "S o c ia l  S c i e n t i s t s  and t h e  R i o t  Commission,"  p. 76.
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missi’oners a t  the  t ime. F i r s t ,  po l ice  p r a c t i c e s  were major i n s t i g a t o r s  
o f  the  d i s o r d e r s ;  most o f  the commissioners came to accep t  t h i s  pro­
p o s i t io n  in January and February,  but very few were w i l l i n g  to  acknowledge 
i t  in November. Second, the  r i o t s  and c i v i l  d i so rd e r s  of 1967 were 
events of  p o s i t i v e  so c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  va lue ,  the  s o c i e t a l  b e n e f i t s  of  
which cannot be r e a l i z e d  un t i l  th e  demands o f  the p r o t e s t e r s  have been 
met. This po in t ,  more than the o th e r s ,  s e r io u s ly  f r ig h ten e d  Corman.
To accep t  i t  would no t  only  chal lenge  the c r e d i b i l i t y  of  the  commis­
sion and the p re sen t  a d m in i s t r a t i o n ,  but the whole p o l i t i c a l  system.
Third,  s p e c i f i c  po l icy  and l e g i s l a t i v e  needs flow from the f i r s t  two 
p ro p o s i t io n s ,  demanding t h a t  the  commission take s id es  on some very
Pf)p a r t i s a n  and c o n t ro v e r s i a l  pieces  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  pending before  congress.  
Faced with these  kinds o f  cho ices ,  Ginsburg and Kerner turned down 
"Harvest" and immediately turned the  a t t e n t i o n  of  the  commissioners to 
the  developing budget c r i s i s  and to the concurren t  problem of  changing 
the  t im e tab le  f o r  the  r e p o r t ( s ) .  In turn ing to the budget problem 
they were ab le  to  r i d  themselves o f  the focal poin t  o f  a considerable  
amount o f  commissioner d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n .
The fundamental reason f o r  the  reduction in the  s i z e  of  the s t a f f  
was economic; the  White House's b a t t l e  with the  congress  over the budget 
reached a c r i t i c a l  s t a t e  in the l a s t  two months of 1967 and a periphera l  
p a r t  of  the  a d m in i s t r a t i o n ,  such as an advisory  commission, was not
Z ^ I b i d . ,  p.  75.
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going to be una f fec ted  by i t .  In November the f inanc ia l  s i t u a ­
t i o n  became d espe ra te  f o r  the commission. I t  was faced with, two 
i r r e v e r s i b l e  f a c t s :  i t  would have no money a f t e r  the l a s t  day 
of th e  month and the  p re s iden t  had decided not to  include i t  in  his 
r eques t  f o r  supplemental appropr ia tions  from congress.  The f inan ­
c ia l  c r i s i s  was eased by Cal i fano 's  and S c h u l t z ' s  secur ing department/  
agency funds to see  the  commission through a sh o r t  period o f  time and 
by Ginsburg 's  a b i l i t y  to secure grants  from p r iv a te  foundat ion sources.
On December 9 ,  t h e  commission decided to a c c e l e r a t e  i t s  work and issue  one 
r e p o r t .  On December 10 i t  was announced t h a t  the  profess ional  s t a f f  would 
be redcued by twenty-n ine persons on December 30. Of t h e s e ,  approximately 
tw en ty -f ive  had been s l a t ed  for  te rmination around the f i r s t  of  the 
year .  An a d d i t io n a l  seventeen were cu t  from the s t a f f  on January 13.
In an undated memo Koskinen developed the following which d e t a i l s
27the number o f  s t a f f  persons employed before and a f t e r  the c u t :
Profess ional S t a f f C le r ica l
Before 12/31 97 75
A fte r  12/31 68 46
Remaining 1/13 51 34
Remaining 2/1 40 31
27See memo, Koskinen to Henry M. Jackson 11/17/67, Koskinen to Long 
Term Task Force Members 11/14/67, Koskinen to T a l ia fe r ro  1 /3 /6 7 ,  S t a f f  
Termination f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers, LBJ Library .
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There were f o r t y  p rofess iona l  s t a f f  persons s t i l l  employed on
March 8, 1968, twenty-two o f  whom were l a id - o f f  a t  the  end o f  t h a t  week.
By mid-April the  s t a f f  cons is ted  of  two profess ional s t a f f  persons
28and two s e c r e t a r i e s .  In h is  l e t t e r  of December 15 to those being 
te rminated,  Ginsburg gave the  following reasons f o r  the commissioner's  
a c t io n :
As you know, the  commission a t  i t s  meeting December 9 
decided no t  to publish an In terim Report and to f i l e  
i t s  Final Report as soon a f t e r  the f i r s t  of  the year  
as p oss ib le .  This decis ion  taken together with the 
budget problem which faces  every federa l  department 
and agency in Washington, has forced us to plan fo r  
a reduction in manpower a f t e r  the f i r s t  of the  y ea r .
Some o f  those  a f f e c t e d  by t h i s  ac t ion  took public  exception to  t h i s
explanation and charged the White House with order ing  a s t a f f  purge
30a f t e r  reading "Harves t . "  The evidence denies such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
of these  events .  No doubt thé  White House s t a f f  read "Harvest" and 
were a s  upset  with i t  as were Ginsburg,  Palmieri and the commissioners. 
But to order a purge and to cu t  the  commission's budget in r e t a l i a t i o n
28Memo, Ginsburg to Commissioners, March 8 ,  1968 Ginsburg f i l e s ,  
NACCD Papers, LBJ Library .
OQ
Found in  S t a f f  Terminations f i l e ,  NACCD Papers ,  LBJ Library .
^^See Sp ivak 's  account of a s t a f f  leak to the Washington S ta r  on 
December 12 Undated memo, Spivak to  Ginsburg in Sp ivak 's  f i l e ,  NACCD 
Papers, LBJ Library .  Also see memo, Spivak to  Ginsburg,  Kerner and 
Lindsay, 1 /9 /68,  in which he repor ts  t h a t  a former consu l t an t  to the 
commission, T.M. Tomlinson ( l i s t e d  in the Report as Tomlins, p. 304) 
made such a charge in a paper prepared fo r  p re sen ta t ion  a t  the  annual 
meeting o f  the American Academy f o r  the Advancement of  Science in 
December (26-31).  A commission s t a f f  member who a t tended  the meeting 
repor ted  th a t  Tomlinson did not  make the charge in  h is  ora l  p resen ta t ion  
of h is  paper.
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s t r a i n s  the  d i c t a t e s  of  reason. The White House had many o th e r  ways 
o f  handling a "run-away" commission and i t  did not need r i s k in g  publ ic  
c r i t i c i s m  over something t h a t  could be handled in another  manner. On 
the  c o n t r a ry ,  the  White House s t a f f  and Schultz  worked very hard to 
keep from c u t t i n g  the  commission's budget,  bu t o th e r  policy  issues  
took a h igher  place  on the a d m in i s t r a t i o n ' s  agenda. The timing 
o f  the budget and personnel dec is ions  was p o l i t i c a l l y  poor,  but the  
White House had no cho ice .  In the con tex t  of  the  p o l i t i c s  o f  t h a t  
year  the p o l i t i c a l  damage Johnson su f fe red  because of these  ac t ions  was 
smal l .  Money was found to  keep the commission in e x i s t en c e ;  whatever 
the  problems were with "Harvest ,"  the  execut ive  s t a f f  could handle 
them. From the  viewpoint of  the White House the  budget c r i s i s  had 
i t s  o r ig in s  in a l a r g e r  p o l i t i c a l  arena in which such m a t te r s  as the  
ex is tence  o f  "Harvest" played no p a r t .
Before leaving  t h i s  i s su e ,  however, i t  is  important to note
again t h a t  from the viewpoint of the  commission and the work i t  had
y e t  to do,  the  consequences o f  the  budget and personnel dec is ions  were
g re a t .  The f i r s t  c a s u a l ty  was the q u a l i t y  o f  the  Repor t 's  a n a ly s i s  of
the  d i so rde rs  in 1967; as Gary T. Marx, a Harvard s o c i o l o g i s t  a t  t h a t
t ime, and one o f  the  December c a s u l a t i e s ,  pointed out in a l e t t e r  to
the  New York Times, th e  commission ente red  a c ru c ia l  phase o f  i t s
31work with few soc ia l  s c i e n t i s t s  in i t s  employ. Some s o c ia l  s c i e n t i s t s  
were brought in to a s s i s t  the  s t a f f  in the l a s t  s tages  of  the  w r i t in g
31
New York Times, February  2,  46 :5 .
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o f  t h e  r e p o r t .  Hans Mat t ick  (U n ive rs i ty  o f  Chicago School o f  Law) , a 
c o n s u l t a n t  brought in  to  rework "Harvest" in to  an "accep tab le"  form 
observed:
. . .  very l i t t l e  g o t  in to  th e  a n a ly t i c a l  p a r t s  o f  the 
Report t h a t  could no t  be documented by def ined  d a ta ,  
e x p l i c i t  methodology, sworn tes t imony ,  a f f i d a v i t s ,  o r  
very  r e l i a b l e  sources  . . .  The m an ife s t  a sp e c t s  of  
c i v i l  d i s o r d e r s  were s e t  f o r t h  in g r e a t  d e t a i l  while 
t h e i r  l a t e n t  a sp e c t s  were 'Tei^atively n e g l e c t e d . . .
As a consequence severa l  i n t e r e s t i n g  a t tem pts  to 
formula te  a r i o t  topology, based on the  da ta  a v a i l a b l e  
to  the commission, simply d id  not su rv ive  the  d iv i s io n  
o f  labo r  and e d i t o r i a l  d e c i s io n  process t h a t  r e s u l t e d  
in the p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  the  R ep o r t .
Shallow commented abou t  the  lack  o f  r igorous  a n a l y s i s  o f  the  data 
th e  commission had compiled.  The f a i l u r e ,  in l a r g e  p a r t  caused 
by th e  d ec is ion  to  e l im in a t e  most o f  the  s o c ia l  s c i e n t i s t s  from 
th e  s t a f f ,  produced a product (Chapter I I ,  " P a t t e rn s  o f  Disorder" ) 
which:
was d ry ly  a t h e o r e t i c a l ; a p s e u d o - s t a t i s t i c a l  t a l l y i n g  o f  
events  and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  c i t i e s .  At b e s t  i t  was a 
layman's concep t ion  of  what a r e s p ec ta b le  s o c ia l  sc ience  
a n a ly s i s  should look l i k e  . . .  I t  sometimes touched on the  
major a n a l y t i c a l  themes s e t  f o r th  in the "Harves t" ,  e spe ­
c i a l l y  those s t r e s s i n g  the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  r i o t
32
Matt ick ,  "Form and Content o f  Recent R i o t s , "  p. 4.  His fo o tn o t e  
t h r e e  on the  same page c o n ta i n s ,  in p a r t ,  the  fo l low ing :  "Two o t h e r
such a t tempts  came to  th e  a u t h o r ' s  a t t e n t i o n .  One was prepared by 
Rober t  Shallow . . .  an e x c e l l e n t  paper e n t i t l e d  "Harvest  o f  Racism" 
which was prominently  stamped with  the cau t ionary  message,  'This  
document has been n e i t h e r  submitted to nor approved by the members of  
th e  commission . ' "
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p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  but i t  bent over backwards in obscur ing  o th e r s .  
We were d isappo in ted  t h a t  t h i s  s ec t io n  ducked the  cha l lenge  
of  g iv ing  meaning to  the  r i o t s ,  a meaning which we f e l t  
was i m p l i c i t  in  th e  da ta  developed by the  commission i t s e l f .  
By narrowly d e f in in g  even ts  i n to  c a te g o r ie s  and s t r e s s i n g  
the  q u a n t i t a t i v e  approach , s i g n i f i c a n t  f e a t u r e s  o f  soc ia l  
i n t e r a c t i o n  were l o s t  . . .  By reducing a l l  co n t ro l  t a c t i c s  
to f i v e  simple c a t e g o r i e s  and r e l a t i n g  each to  the  onse t  
and i n t e n s i t y  of  v io le n c e ,  the  a n a ly s i s  obscured ,  I b e l i e v e , . ,  
one o f  the  most im por tan t  f in d in g s  to come ou t  o f  the in ­
v e s t i g a t i o n s :  namely,  t h a t  t h e r e  are  severa l  d i s t i n c t
types  o f  d i s o r d e r s ;  t h a t  one type may (and probably  w i l l )  
evolve  in to  a n o th e r ;  and t h a t  a t a c t i c  a p p r o p r i a t e  to one 3̂ 
kind o f  d i s o rd e r  may be e n t i r e l y  in a p p ro p r i a t e  to  ano ther .
The second consequence was t h a t  the  commission surv ived  as an agent 
o f  the  p r e s i d e n t ,  s t i l l  ao le  to fu n c t io n  in a r e l a t i v e l y  independent 
way. The budget c r i s i s  and th e  s t a f f  reduc t ions  c r ip p l e d  the  com­
miss ion ,  bu t  did  no t  k i l l  i t .  I n te rn a l  a c t io n  by the  commission 
l e ad e r s  removed "Harvest" as  a bone o f  con ten t ion  and th e  personnel 
d i s m is sa l s  had the p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t  o f  removing from the  s t a f f  most o f  
th e  persons a t  whom Corman, Thornton and the  o th e r s  o f  the  "conserva t ive"  
group were d i r e c t i n g  t h e i r  wrath.  Consequently,  as o f  December 31, 
Ginsburg and Kerner s t i l l  had a chance to d e l i v e r  to  the  p re s id e n t  an 
unanimous r e p o r t  which would be " ac c ep tab le . "  B e f o re , th en ,  however, they 
had to  r e s o l v e  one a d d i t io n a l  major m a t te r  -  th e  i s s u e  o f  one r e p o r t  or 
two.
The d e c i s io n  to sh o r te n  the  l i f e  o f  the  commission and i s sue  
only  one r e p o r t  was taken a t  the  same meeting (December 9) as t h a t  to 
reduce th e  s i z e  of the s t a f f .  Like the  l a t t e r ,  i t  was made in response
“^ Sha l low ,  " S o c ia l  S c i e n t i s t s  and Soc ia l  A c t i o n , "  p. 212.
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to the  same economic and p o l i t i c a l  demands. Unlike the l a t t e r ,
however, the  dec i s ion  to  i s su e  one re p o r t  was executed in consu l t a t io n
with the White House.
The o r i g i n a l  d i r e c t i v e  to  i s sue  a r e p o r t  of  f indings of f a c t  no
l a t e r  than March 1, 1968 was contained in the p re s id en t ' s  execu t ive
34orde r  c r e a t in g  the  commission. Ginsburg and Kerner understood the  
p r e s i d e n t ' s  i n t e n t  in i s su ing  t h i s  d i r e c t i v e  to be,  f i r s t ,  to have 
a v a i l ab le  to the  n a t io n ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  the mayors and governors, a 
r e p o r t  answering the  four teen  point mandate f a r  enough in advance 
of  the summer o f  1968 to be helpful in preparing fo r  any d i s o rd e r s .
The second reason was Johnson 's  d e s i r e  to have a r e p o r t  before  the 
public  e a r ly  enough to be helpful to him in pushing his  1968 domestic 
program package through the congress.  The leadersh ip  of the  commission 
a l so  understood t h a t  the  f in a l  r e p o r t ,  due before Ju ly  29, 1968, 
was to con ta in  long-range po l icy  recommendations. Findings o f  f a c t  
f i r s t ,  then p o l icy  recommendations - t h a t  was the orig inal  scheme the 
commission expected to follow.
Senator Harr is  proposed a s e r i e s  of in te r im  repor ts .  He wanted 
to hold hear ings  and prepare  recommendations on th ree  topics f o r  public 
re le ase  in e a r l y  September: increased p o l ice  s a l a r i e s ,  r i o t  t r a i n i n g
for the  p o l ice  and na t iona l  guard,  police-community r e l a t i o n s .  His 
proposal got no support  in  the  commission o r  the White House but his
^^E xecu t ive  Order 11365, Sect ion 7,  R e p o r t , p.  296.
3 5 Memo, Ginsburg t o  Pa lm ier i  and Scammon 8 /1 9 / 6 7 ,  Ginsburg f i l e s ,
NACCD, LBJ L i b r a r y .
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o b je c t iv e  was p a r t i a l l y  accomplished by the commission's sending four
l e t t e r s  to  the  p re s id en t  and o the r  appropr ia te  o f f i c i a l s  containing
s p e c i f i c  publ ic  s a f e ty  ac t ion  recommendations.
There a l so  were disagreements among members o f  the s t a f f  about the
kind o f  r e p o r t  and when i t  should be issued. Concern was expressed by
some t h a t  c a re  must be taken not to rush in to  p r i n t ;  time must be
taken f i r s t  to  secure as much suppor ting  evidence as possib le  f o r  any
recommendations in order to "counter balance po ten t ia l  c r i t i c i s m  t h a t
the commission i s  e i t h e r  shooting from the hip or a c t i n g  out o f  pure ly
37p o l i t i c a l  motives ."  These kinds o f  d iscussions  cont inued to be held 
throughout the  f a l l ,  but  f a i l e d  to  have any s ig n i f i c a n c e  fo r  the 
commission's work u n t i l  November when the group was faced with rep lac ing  
one s e t  o f  plans f o r  i s su ing  a r e p o r t  with another .
The meetings between Ginsburg,  Califano and Schultz  in which the 
r e a l i t i e s  o f  the  budget c r i s i s  were l a i d  out revived these  d iscuss ions .  
The White House p re fe r red  th a t  the commission accept a budget cu t  in 
the form of  reducing i t s  l i f e  span and i t s  work expectancy; reducing 
the  s ize  o f  the  s t a f f  was a log ica l  extension of  t h i s  p o s i t io n .  Techni-
3fiSee Appendix J ,  Report , pp. 318-319 fo r  the t e x t s  of the  l e t t e r s .  
The top ics  were r i o t  t r a i n i n g  fo r  th e  nat ional  guard and the army, r e ­
cru itment o f  blacks in to  the armed forces  and the na t iona l  guard,  a 
recommendation fo r  a s e r i e s  of  p o l ice  t r a in in g  programs and problems 
of  police  rad io  communication in t imes of d iso rde rs .  Popper, P r e s id e n t ' s  
Commission, claims these  recommendations were the only  ones the p re s id en t  
adopted and t h a t  a number o f  the commissioners r e g r e t t e d  having sen t  
the l e t t e r s  because they allowed Johnson to appear to  have done some­
thing in response to  the  commission's work. As will  be noted s h o r t l y ,  
Popper's con ten t ion  is  overdrawn.
^^Memo, Koskenin to Pa lm ier i  8 /1 8 /6 7 ,  "RE: S t a f f  Meeting o f
8 /1 7 /6 7 " ,  Koskein f i l e s ,  NACCD P a p e r s ,  LBJ L ib ra ry .
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c a l l y ,  the dec is ion  was made a t  the  December 12 commissioner meet ing,  
but the re  i s  reason to  be l ieve  t h a t  the  commission l e a d e r s h ip ,  the  
White House and Schultz had reached an agreement some days b e fo re ,  and 
t h a t  a l l  the  necessary contingency d e t a i l s  had been worked ou t  by 
Ginsburg and c leared  with the White House. As noted above, Miskovsky, 
in his f i n a l  r e p o r t  to  the execu t ive  d i r e c t o r ,  reminds Ginsburg t h a t  
on December 6th he (Ginsburg) t o ld  him t h a t  the re  would be no in te r im
re p o r t  and t h a t  the two of  them d iscussed  the problems they a n t i c i p a t e d
38fol lowing such a dec i s ion .  McGrath's notes of the  commissioner meeting
o f  December 8 show t h a t  some d iscuss ion  was held on the one repor t - two
re p o r t  problem. (There is  no record in those  notes of any d i s cu s s io n
o f  the Ginsburg,  Cal ifano , Schultz  meet ings .)  In a p a t te rn  typ ica l
o f  a l l  t h e i r  decision-making, consensus was reached by the commissioners
on producing one re p o r t .  I t  was agreed Ginsburg would t e l l  the
press the  next morning t h a t  "We've expanded the  in te r im  r e p o r t  so t h e r e
w i l l  be some delay.  We c a n ' t  give a s p e c i f i c  date ( fo r  the p u b l i c a t io n  
39o f  the Repor t ) . " By the  morning, however, the press r e l e a s e  c l e a r l y  
said  t h a t  the  r e p o r t  would be published no l a t e r  than March 1.^^
Ginsburg c a l l e d  Califano a f t e r  the  press conference and the fo llowing 
was passed to  Johnson:
^^Miskovsky, "Final Report 3 /25 /68 ,"  Miskovsky f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers. 
LBJ Library .
^^McGrath, M inute s , 1 2 /8 /6 7 .
^^Pres s  r e l e a s e  dated  12/10 f o r  r e l e a s e  on 12/11,  Spivak  f i l e s ,
NACCD P apers ,  LBJ L ib ra ry .
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David Ginsburg j u s t  c a l l e d  to t e l l  me t h a t  the  Riot 
Commission voted unanimously today to c o n so l id a te  t h e i r  
work in to  one r e p o r t  t h a t  would be submitted in  l a t e  
December or l a t e  January.  They f e l t  t h a t  the  urgency 
o f  the  s i t u a t i o n  requ i red  t h a t  they r e p o r t  to you as 
promptly as p o ss ib le .
4?Johnson responded, "Tha t ' s  good and t e l l  him I a p p re c ia t e  t h a t . "
The next day Ginsburg sen t  a copy of  the  commission's  press r e l e a s e  
to the p re s iden t  with  a hand w r i t t e n  no te ,  "Dear Mr. P res iden t ,  This,
I hope, w i l l  be h e l p f u l .  R esp ec t fu l ly ,  David Ginsburg.
Thus the White House, whi le  not d i c t a t i n g  the s p e c i f i c s  to the 
commission, was a b l e  to bring about a s o lu t io n  to the  problems o f  the 
budget,  personnel and p u b l ic a t io n  o f  the  r e p o r t  in a manner which served i t s  
i n t e r e s t s  wel l .  From the p r e s i d e n t ' s  p e r s p e c t iv e ,  he was now in b e t t e r  
control  of  the commission and i t s  work; he had i t  on a s h o r t e r  l e a sh ,  
to use a f a v o r i t e  Johnson express ion .  The reasons f o r  the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  
p r iv i leged  p o s i t i o n ,  though q u i t e  obvious ,  a re  important to l i s t ,  
because they have been ignored o r  d iscussed  in the wrong context by 
o the r  s tudents  of  the  commission. F i r s t ,  and most obvious ,  o th e r  than 
the r e l a t i v e l y  small amount o f  money from p r iv a te  so u rces ,  the  White 
House had a firm g r i p  on the commission's  work through i t s  f inances .
Memo, Cal ifano  to the P re s id e n t ,  12 /9 /67,  EX PU 1, FG 690, 
11/31/63 -  2 /29/68 ,  LBJ Library .  Ginsburg obviously  misjudged how 
long i t  would take  him to ge t  unanimous agreement f o r  a r e p o r t .
^^Note a t t a ch e d  to 12/9/67 memo, dated 12/10/67 , EX PU 1, FG690, 
11/31/63-2/29/68, LBJ Library .
"^^12/10/67 memo is  a t tached  to a Cal ifano memo to the p re s id e n t ,  
12/11/67, EX PU 1, FG 690, 11 /31 /63-2 /29 /68 ,  LBJ Library .
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In January ,  fo r  i n s t a n c e ,  Kerner and Ginsburg went to Charles Schultz  
and Cal ifano  and asked f o r  an a d d i t io n a l  $162,000 f o r  the  work of the  
commission. Schul tz  thought  the  money could be found but before  doing 
so wanted to  be c e r t a i n  he knew what Johnson 's  p o l i t i c a l  o b j e c t iv e s  '  
were:
Of th e  a d d i t io n a l  $162,000, approximate ly  $88,000 i s  
needed to complete th e  e d i t in g  and p u b l i sh ing  o f  the 
Commission's r e p o r t  and the  e d i t i n g  and pub l i sh ing  of  a 
number of very v a lu ab le  surveys and re sea rch  f in d in g s .
I would ag ree  with  Kerner and Ginsburg t h a t  the se  funds 
are  needed - -  w i thou t  them, some ex tremely  useful mate ria l  
cannot be pu t  in to  u sab le  form.
The remaining $74,000 i s  to  keep in  being a small Commission 
s t a f f ,  from Apri l  15 (when the Commission's r e p o r t  w i l l  be 
issued)  to  August 1. The s t a f f  would be used to handle 
correspondence.  Congressional r e l a t i o n s ,  and i n q u i r i e s  from the  
p re s s ,  and w i l l  "work on informing the  pub l ic  about the 
r e p o r t . "
My major ques t ion  i s  whether o r  n o t  you want to keep the 
Commission in  being t c  handle th e se  e s s e n t i a l l y  public  
r e l a t i o n s  jobs  du r ing  th e  l a t e  Spr ing and Summer.
On the  one hand, i t  j u s t  might be useful to  have them in 
being i f  r i o t s  should break ou t  next  Summer. On the  o th e r  
hand, i f  t h e i r  r e p o r t  urges l a r g e ,  new programs which we 
cannot handle a t  th e  p re sen t  t im e ,  having a s t a f f  around 
promoting such p roposa ls  could give us t r o u b l e .  Governor 
Kerner wi l l  c a l l  me tomorrow f o r  an answer on t h i s .  Before 
answering him, I would l i k e  to know your wishes with  
r e s p e c t  to t h i s  b a s i c  ques t ion .
The d ec is ion  was made to  deny the  commission the  funds to s t a y  in 
ex is tence  through the  summer. L a te r ,  as sh a l l  be seen ,  th e r e  was 
some a g i t a t i o n  (mainly by Lindsay and H a r r i s )  f o r  recovening the
44
Memo, S c h u l t z  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  1 / 2 5 / 6 8 ,  EX, PU 1,  FG 690,
1 1 / 3 1 / 6 3 - 2 /2 9 /6 8 ,  LBJ L i b r a r y .
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commission; i t  was to avoid giving the commissioners the  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
o f  doing j u s t  t h a t  which d ic ta t ed  t h i s  dec is ion  on commission funding. 
Second, the re  was now l e s s  time fo r  the i n c ip i e n t  r e v o l t  o f  the  com­
mission " l i b e r a l s "  to  develop; t h i s  was a p o s s i b i l i t y  upon which Johnson 
was being kept cu r re n t .  Here, as with most advisory  commissions,
Lipsky and Olson's  "commission problem" became a f a c t o r  p o s i t iv e ly  
supporting commission dependence on p re s id e n t i a l  design .  Third ,  
because o f  the lack  of money and the  importance o f  the  "commission 
problem," the Kerner group was almost t o t a l l y  dependent on ad m in is t ra ­
t i v e  resources  f o r  f i l l i n g  in the  gaps o f  t h e i r  r e sea rch .  There would 
be no t ime, and probably no money, fo r  add i t iona l  f i e l d  research  [as 
planned);  nor would th e re  be time fo r  add i t iona l  h e a r i n g s n o w ,  
only d ep o s i t io n s ,  sworn and taken before  the  s t a f f  members, could be 
taken from persons who might have t e s t i f i e d  before  the  whole commission. 
The taking  of  d e p o s i t io n s  in  l i e u  of hear ings  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  im­
p o r ta n t  to the  con ten t  o f  the f i n a l  r e p o r t  when i t  is  remembered 
t h a t  t h i s  was the  primary means fo r  g e t t in g  testimony from the  leaders  
o f  the  non-es tab l i shed  black g r o u p s . F o u r t h ,  moving the one repo r t
45 In November a s t a f f  ta sk  force  had been c rea ted  " . . .  to develop 
a hear ing schedule compatible with the f i n a l  r e p o r t  concepts" composed 
o f  McCurdy (Chairman),  Downs, Koskinen, Chambers, Louise Sagalyn, 
and Kruzman (Minutes of the Department Heads 11/13/67,  NACCD Papers,
LBJ Library)
^ ^ I t  can be argued th a t  the  commissioners would not have heard 
such persons under any circumstances .  However, the  Lindsay-Harris  
experience in C in c in n a t i ,  the various  e f f o r t s  to ge t  these  leaders
before  the  commission, and/or th e  proposed MARC Conference might have had,
with more t ime, the  e f f e c t  on the  commissioners and Ginsburg o f  chang­
ing t h e i r  minds on the  i s su e .
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to a s  e a r ly  a d a te  as poss ib le  gave the  White House cons ide rab le  lead
time to d ec ide  how to use i t s  recommendations before  the  o n - s e t  of
47the  summer " r i o t  season."  Last ,  the  White House now had l e s s  chance 
o f  being "upstaged" by the  Repor t . The shortened time period meant 
t h a t  the commission would have to r e l y  more on a d m in i s t r a t i v e  sources 
thereby  making i t  more d i f f i c u l t  to  make recommendations o u ts id e  the 
realm o f  those  a l ready  e s t a b l i s h e d  o r  in the  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  policy  
mix. F u r th e r  the  shortened time frame forced the commission in to  
g iv ing  more a t t e n t i o n  to the  causes o f  the  d iso rders  and l e s s  t o .p o l i c y  
recommendations.
M at t ick ,  "The Form and Content o f  Recent R io t s , "  p. 3 ,  fn 2 ,  
claims an a d d i t i o n a l  b e n e f i t  fo r  th e  White House in re ce iv in g  an ea r ly  
r e p o r t .  Having i t  f in i sh e d  in the  w in te r  provided "a coo l ing  off"  
period be fo re  the  most in tense  p a r t  o f  the campaigning f o r  the p r e s i ­
d e n t i a l  nominations began.
CHAPTER XIII 
THE PRESIDENT AND THE KERNER COMMISSION REPORT
The dec is ion  to i s su e  a s in g le  r e p o r t  was well received by the 
White House — the commission rep o r t  was no t .  Johnson made " . . .  the  
d i f f i c u l t  dec is ion  not to respond d i r e c t l y  to  the call  fo r  major 
new programs"^ because he received a document which presented him w i th ,
1) recommendations fo r  e l ab o ra te  Great Soc ie ty- type  programs in many 
cases  with s p e c i f i c  goals (e .g .  housing) considerably more expensive 
than the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s ,  2) im p l i c i t  c r i t i c i s m  o f  h is  "guns and b u t t e r "  
po l icy ,  3) i n s u f f i c i e n t  words o f  p ra ise  fo r  the  Great Society e f f o r t s  to 
remedy the  condi t ions  which he thought to be the causes o f  the  d i s o r d e r s ,  
4) c r i t i c i s m  of  those s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  upon which he f e l t  
p o l i t i c a l l y  dependent.
The leade rs  of  the  commission, on the other hand, knew they 
had produced a document which was not completely acceptable  to any 
of  the  major publ ics  to  which i t  was addressed.  But they were 
convinced t h a t  they had w r i t t e n ,  as one of them put i t ,  "a document 
the p re s id en t  could run f o r  r e - e l e c t i o n  on ,"  broad and f l e x i b l e  enough to
^Johnson, The Vantage P o i n t , p. 451.
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allow him to  use i t s  recommendations as he saw f i t  in molding the  1968 Great 
Socie ty  program to meet his  r e - e l e c t i o n  needs.  Fu r th e r ,  they were convinced 
t h a t ,  i f  adopted,  the  recommendations would be an adequate beginning
2
to  meet the  needs o f  black Americans descr ibed  in Pa r t  II  of  the Report .
They knew, too ,  t h a t  any d i r e c t  endorsement o f  the  Great Socie ty or the  
p r e s i d e n t ' s  war po l icy  would s p l i t  the  commission; a majori ty  o f  the 
commissioners was in  favor o f  expansion o f  the  e x i s t i n g  domestic 
programs, opposed to  the war and uncomfortable with the leadersh ip  Johnson 
was giv ing to both.  The l e a d e r s h ip ,  in s h o r t ,  saw themselves salvaging 
what they could (which they thought was a g r e a t  dea l )  from a m a jor i ty  
of  t h e i r  co l leagues  which was ab le  but not q u i t e  w i l l in g  to push the 
a d m in i s t r a t io n ,  by means o f  the  Repor t , to the  log ica l  l im i t s  o f  i t s  
own domestic po l icy  program commitments, and by im p l ica t ion ,  to 
chal lenge  i t s  war p o l i c i e s .  To Johnson t h i s  meant t h a t  most of the  
commissioners were in agreement with his  most severe  l i b e r a l  c r i t i c s  
in congress .  The t ro u b le  fo r  him inhe ren t  in t h a t  a l l i a n c e  fo rced him 
to  tu rn  his  back on the commission's work.
But Johnson d id  not r e j e c t  the r e p o r t .  He chose to snub i t  
pub l ic ly  while  p r i v a t e l y  encouraging var ious  groups to read and implement 
as many of i t s  recommendations as p o ss ib le .  This s tance  allowed him to 
occupy ground of  h is  choosing, not one d i c t a t e d  by any e x p l i c i t  or  implied 
policy  pos i t ion  in the  Repor t , in a p o s i t io n  to  determine the p lace  and 
the  con ten t  of  the  debate over the commission's  recommendations. I t  was
^Chapte rs  V-IX, pp. 91-146,
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c l e a r  t h a t  he wanted to move h is  Great Soc ie ty  program in t h e  d i r e c t i o n  
th e  Report was poin ting but he wanted to  contro l  the  movement and he 
d id  not want to put himself  in a p o s i t io n  of  being open to charges o f  
r e c k le s s  spending. I f  he f e l l  v ic t im  to the  l a t t e r  charge,  he thought,  
he would permit  his domestic program to become hostage to a congress 
determined to  force  him to change h is  war po l icy .  To manipulate  the 
Kerner recommendations in the  manner he d e s i r ed  was not easy,  p a r t i c u ­
l a r l y  in l i g h t  of the  massive amount of p u b l i c i t y  the  p u b l ica t ion  
o f  the  Report  and h is  reac t ions  to i t  rece ived .  But he did accomplish 
two of  h is  goa ls :  the  i n i t i a t i o n  and d i r e c t i o n  of domestic po licy  
programs remained in  his hands and the  debate  over the Report and i t s  
recommendations took place in the  press  and the academy, no t  in the 
congress .  Given the o ther  p o l i t i c a l  p ressu res  Johnson was under a t  the
3
t im e ,  t h i s  was no small accomplishment.
3
I t  i s  well to  keep in  mind t h a t  the  p o l i t i c a l  p ressures  which 
developed in the n ine ty  day period before  Johnson announced h is  d e c i ­
s ion  not to  seek r e - e l e c t i o n .  In fo re ign  a f f a i r s ,  the s e iz u re  of  the 
i n t e l l i g e n c e  ship USS Pueblo and the l e t  Offensive of  the  North Vie tna­
mese, were,  o f  course,  two o f  th e  heav ie r  straws t h a t  broke the back of  
h i s  a d m in i s t r a t io n .  Perhaps most r e v e a l in g  of  the p o l i t i c a l  problems 
Johnson had was his  decline  in the  public  opinion p o l l s  during th i s  
pe r iod .  Approval of  his a b i l i t y  to handle the war f e l l  from 39 percen t  
t o  26 p e rcen t  and o f  his general  handling o f  the  presidency from 41 percent  
t o  36 p e rc en t ,  (s ee ,  George H. Gallup,  The Gallup Po l l :  Pub l ic  Opinion,
1935-1971 (New York: Random House, 1972),  Vol. 3, pp. 2099-2115). I t  is  
a l s o  im por tan t  to  note Kearns' o b se rva t ion  t h a t  the  same p o l l s  showed 
suppor t  f o r  Johnson’s p o l i c i e s ;  the  d e c l i n e  in public  suppor t  was pe r so n a l ,  
a problem o f  h is  c r e d i b i l i t y .  ( Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and t he American 
Dream, p. 336).  See a lso  Johnson, The Vantage P o i n t , pp. 532-533 f o r  
Johnson 's  r e f l e c t i o n  on the s e r i e s  of events  which began with the Pueblo 
i n c i d e n t ,  " . . .  the f i r s t  l in k  in a chain o f  events — o f  c r i s i s ,  t r agedy ,  
and d i s a p p o i n tm e n t . , . " ,  which l e f t  him f e e l i n g  t h a t  he was " . . .  l i v i n g  in 
a continuous nightmare."
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Johnson 's  response  to the Report was well thought ou t ,  t i g h t l y  
con t ro l led  by the White House and c lo se ly  in t e g ra t e d  with his domestic 
policy p lans .  The c lose  watch on the  commission maintained by Califano 
and the  execut ive  depar tments /agencies  was i n t e n s i f i e d  during the weeks 
following the  d e c i s io n  to is sue  one r e p o r t .  One reason fo r  the v ig i l  was 
t h a t  t h i s  period coincided  with t h a t  of  the  s t a t e  of  the  union message 
and Johnson’ s ,  now t r a d i t i o n a l ,  spec ia l  messages to congress;  Johnson 
and Cal ifano wanted to  avoid having domestic policy  recommendations 
reach congress independent o f  one o f  the  spec ia l  messages. But, Johnson 's  
primary concern in  monitoring the  commission was to be c e r t a in  t h a t  i t  
aided him in advancing the domestic p o l i c i e s  the White House was about to 
in troduce  to congress .  During the  almost n ine ty  days between the dec is ion  
to is sue  one r e p o r t  and the date of the f i n a l  r e p o r t ' s  p u b l ica t ion ,
Johnson made seven key public s ta tements  in which he ou t l ined  his 1968 
domestic programs, each of which had re levance  to  the work of the 
Kerner Commission. These speeches s e t  the  po l icy  boundaries beyond 
which he did not want any p a r t  o f  h is  a d m in i s t r a t io n  to venture 
and within  which he expected fu l l  support .
In h is  S ta t e  of the Union Message Johnson staked out the boundar­
i e s .  He requested a $2.1 b i l l i o n  manpower program (a 25 percent
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inc rease  over the  previous y e a r ' s  budget) ,  $1 b i l l i o n  fo r  the  Model 
C i t i e s  Program (an approximate $700 m i l l io n  inc rease  over the  congres­
s ional a p p ro p r i a t io n  fo r  the previous f i s c a l  year )  and $6 m i l l i o n  f o r  
f e d e r a l l y  financed  middle and low income housing u n i t s  ( to  be b u i l t  
over the nex t  ten y e a r s ) .  These programs were p a r t  o f  a t o t a l  p ro jec ted  
budget o u t l a y  of $186 b i l l i o n  which, i f  congress accepted the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  
tax  surcharge p roposa l ,  would produce a d e f i c i t  o f  $8 b i l l i o n  in Fiscal  
Year 1 9 6 9 ^
The f i r s t  spec ia l  message d i r e c t l y  concerned with the  Kerner Commis­
s i o n ' s  work was "To Earn a Living: The Right o f  Every American."^ Here 
Johnson o u t l in e d  a manpower proposal which included the announcement 
o f  the  JOBS and National A l l iance  of Businessmen programs.® Johnson 
regarded both of  th e se  proposals as cen t ra l  to h is  e f f o r t s  to remove 
one o f  the  major causes o f  the  d i so rd e r s :  lawlessness  generated  by
id l e n e s s .  He re in fo reced  his concern by making add i t iona l  s ta tements  
to a p p r o p r ia t e  members o f  congress and the  p re s s .^
Johnson 's  fo u r th  annual specia l  message to congress on c i v i l  
r i g h t s  condemned racism and affirmed the  commitment o f  the a d m in i s t r a ­
t io n  to p o l i c i e s  designed to achieve e q u a l i ty  of the  r a c e s .^  Johnson also
^U.S. P r e s id e n t ,  Public Papers of The P r e s i d e n t s , Lyndon B. 
Johnson, 1968, pp. 25-33.
®Ibid . ,  pp. 46-53.
®See pp. 419-420 fo r  another  d iscuss ion  of  th e se  programs.
^U.S. P r e s id e n t s ,  Public Papers o f  the  P r e s i d e n t s , Lyndon B. 
Johnson, 1968, pp. 53-54, 78-80.
® Ib i d . ,  pp. 55-62.
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proposed to s t rengthen  the federal  government 's  hand in guaranteeing the
r i g h t  o f  a l l  c i t i z e n s  to employment and housing.
On January 27th he formally received  the  r epo r t  o f  the  commission's 
9insurance  panel.  In a shor t  s ta tement  he d i rec ted  the Departments 
o f  Housing and Urban Development, Commerce, Treasury,  J u s t i c e ,  
the  Bureau o f  th e  Budget and the  Small Business Adminis tra tion to 
prepare  l e g i s l a t i o n  to implement th e  recommendations of the Hughes 
panel ? ^
In his 1968 budget message Johnson e x p l i c i t l y  e s t a b l i sh e d  his
domestic budget p r i o r i t i e s ,  conditioned by congressional  cooperation
in granting  his  request  fo r  passage of  the  surcharge tax.^^ Those programs
fo r  which he requested inc reases ,  which were a lso  under considera tion  by
the Kerner Commission a t  the  same t ime, were manpower t r a i n i n g ,  the
Model C i t i e s  Program and proposals fo r  c o r r e c t in g  the r i s i n g  crime r a te
(an i m p l i c i t  concern underlying most of the  commission's recommanda- 
1 2t i o n s ) .  These he cautiously  presented to  congress as a p a r t  of a 
policy  o f  s e l e c ted  expansion o f  e x i s t in g  programs " . . .  o r  the  inaugura­
t io n  of  new ones only as necessary to meet those urgent requirements
13whose f u l f i l l m e n t  we cannot de lay ."
^ I b i d . ,  pp. 77-78.
^^The l e g i s l a t i o n  which r e s u l t e d  was T i t l e  XI o f  the  Urban Property 
Pro tec t ion  and Reinsurance Act (PL 90-488, 82 S ta t .  476, 555).  The b i l l  
was signed by Johnson on August 1, 1968.
^^U.S. P res iden t ,  Public Papers of  the  P r e s id e n t s , Lyndon B. 
Johnson, 1968, pp.  83-112.
T ^ ib id . ,  p.  89.
T ^ l b i d . ,  p .  83.
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In h is  spec ia l  message on crime Johnson made c l e a r  h is  commitment
to reducing the t h r e a t  o f  criminal conspiracy as a f a c to r  in fu tu r e
d i s o r d e r s . T h e  t en th  recommendation in th i s  message was for "a fe lony
law aimed a t  those who cross  s t a t e  l i n e s  to i n c i t e  and take  p a r t  in 
15r i o t s . "  At the  t ime t h i s  message was given, Johnson was well aware 
t h a t  FBI D irec to r  Hoover had to ld  the  commission he found no conspiracy 
underlying the  1967 d i so rd e r s .  But he was a l so  aware t h a t  Senator 
McClel lan's  b e l i e f  in the  ex is tence  of a conspiracy  was widely shared 
by his  congress ional co l leagues .  Johnson knew too th a t  the commission 
was developing a nega t ive  p ic tu re  o f  the  ro le  o f  the po l ice  in the 
d i s o rd e r s .  He th e r e f o r e  s e t  out both to preempt the commission and 
c l e a r l y  to e s t a b l i s h  himself  as being tough on crime; he ca l led  fo r  
immediate a c t i o n :
. . .  th e re  i s  no need to wai t  ( f o r  the  Kerner Report) 
before  p ro te c t in g  soc ie ty  a g a in s t  those who would t e a r  
i t  a p a r t  f o r  whatever purpose.  I propose the Federal 
A n t i -R io t  Act o f  1968.
From the  po in t  o f  view of  h is  top domestic adv isers  the most 
important 1968 domestic program proposal was the  c i t i e s  message.
In i t  the  budgetary l i m i t s  were s e t  fo r  the  a d m in i s t r a t i o n ' s  urban 
program: $2.18 b i l l i o n  f o r  the War on Poverty,  $2.34 b i l l i o n  fo r
T ^ ib id . ,  pp. 183-196.
T ^ ib id . ,  p. 183.
^ ^ I b i d . ,  p. 191, emphasis in the  o r i g i n a l .  
^ ^ I b i d . ,  p. 248-263.
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the  f i r s t  f i v e  year s  o f  a ten year program f o r  the c o n s t r u c t io n  and
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  o f  2.35 m i l l i o n  housing u n i t s ,  $65 m i l l io n  f o r  the  r e n t
supplement program, $1 b i l l i o n  f o r  the  Model C i t i e s  Program, $230
m il l ion  f o r  urban mass t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  $20 m i l l ion  f o r  urban t r a i n i n g
and re s ea rc h ,  $55 m i l l i o n  f o r  planning f o r  o rd e r ly  urban growth
and $10 m i l l i o n  f o r  area-wide  urban incen t ive  g ra n t s .  The Kerner
Commission had an i n t e r e s t  in each o f  these  a r e a s .  Of equal importance
to the commission was Johnson 's  re fe rence  to an in te r im  r e p o r t  of  the
Kaiser Commission and the  f in a l  r e p o r t  of the insurance  pane l ,  but
18no mention o f  i t s  work. In r e t r o s p e c t  t h i s  omission can be seen as 
a word to  the  adv iso ry  panel t h a t  i t s  work had to be in l i n e  with the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  proposed domestic program f o r  the year  o r  be completely 
ignored by the  p re s id e n t .  The congress had s e t  the budgetary l i m i t s .
He then s e t  the  po l icy  l i m i t s  fo r  domestic programs; the b a t t l e  between 
the two was jo in e d  a t  t h a t  po in t ,  and as f a r  as Johnson was concerned 
the only choice the  commission had was to fo llow his  lead .
There can be l i t t l e  doubt t h a t  Johnson would have been more 
p o s i t i v e  toward th e  Report had i t  no t  been fo r  the p o l i t i c a l  r e s t r a i n t s  
on him. But he saw any endorsement o f  the Report as giving a id  to a l l  
his enemies in congress ,  l i b e r a l  and conserva t ive .  He th e re fo re  made 
the d ec is ion  to  snub the  Report in  public and p r iv a t e ly  to work to
T ^ l b i d . ,  p. 257.
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19secure  some of i t s  recommendations f o r  his domestic program.
To accomplish his goals  Johnson made c e r t a i n  his  l i n e s  of 
communication with the p ro ta g o n i s t s  in  the s t r u g g le  over the Report 
were kept c l e a r .  From Cal ifano he received a s teady flow of informa­
t io n  about intra-commiss ion developments obta ined from th e  formal 
and informal l i a i s o n  persons.  But Johnson did not re ly  only on 
formal channels o f  communication. He sought ou t  advice ,  counsel and 
informat ion from commissioners he t r u s t e d ,  and congresspersons whose 
suppor t  he would have to have for  his  programs. As the s t ru g g le  over a 
po s s ib le  minor ity  r e p o r t  and the proposed "Summary" developed 
Johnson 's  a ides  kept him informed of  each turn  o f  even ts .  Irv  Sprague, 
f o r  i n s ta n ce ,  sen t  to  Johnson Gorman's l e t t e r  o f  January 13 to  Kerner 
to g e th e r  with a no te  d e t a i l i n g  a c a l l  the congressman made to the  White 
House expressing concern about  " . . .  the  degree o f  l i a i s o n  between the 
White House and the  commission (and asking) . . .  i f  the commisssion is  
headed in the d i r e c t i o n  d e s i r ed  by the  p re s id e n t , "  and rep o r t in g  tha t
un less  the  d i r e c t i o n  was changed Thornton, Paden, McCulloch and he would
20i s su e  a minor i ty  r e p o r t .
19There were some elements o f  p re s id en t i a l  e l e c to r a l  p o l i t i c s  
involved in the d ec i s io n .  Johnson and his a id es  were u pse t  t h a t  
Lindsay had been a b le  to  gain  the leadersh ip  of the  commission.
Johnson d id  not want to endorse a r e p o r t  which could be tagged by the 
press  as "L indsay 's . "  See H a r r i s '  accounts o f  conversa t ions  with 
Johnson about Lindsay 's  r i s e  to dominance in the  commission. (H arr is ,  
Potomac Fever, pp. 110-113).
20Memo, Sprague to Barefoot Sanders (congress ional l i a i s o n  
o f f i c e r )  1/15/68. Gorman's l e t t e r  is  a t tached  to  a memo which has the 
fol lowing inscr ibed  on i t  "Seen by the Pres iden t  1 /17 /68 ."  EX FG 
690 (3 ) ,  WHGF, LBJ L ibrary .
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G insburg 's  r e g u la r  communications with Cal ifano included b r i e f in g s  
on these  m a t t e r s .  He provided a s tep - b y - s t e p  r e p o r t  o f  the  problems 
encountered in  the  development o f  each chap te r  and sen t  the f i n a l  d r a f t s  
o f  each to  Cal ifano immediately fol lowing t h e i r  approval by the  commis­
s ioner s .  Cal ifano  in turn  sent these  d r a f t s  to the  Bureau of  the 
Budget f o r  c o s t  e s t imates  and to members o f  his  s t a f f  to be read and 
c a r e f u l l y  summarized. I t  was during t h i s  period t h a t  the d r a f t s  of the
chapte rs  were s en t  to the  various  c ab in e t  members f o r  comment and
_  . . 21 cr i t i c i sm.
By the  l a s t  week in Febraury, the  con ten t  o f  the  Report and i t s
22recommendations were well known in Washington. Consequently Johnson 
became the  o b j e c t  o f  a shor t  but in tense  lobbying e f f o r t  by p a r t i s an s  
and opponents o f  the  document. The most e f f e c t i v e  of  the opponents 
were Congressman George Mahon and Commissioner Thornton. The major
21 In mid-February Ginsburg to ld  the  White House th a t  the  Report 
would be ready fo r  the p res iden t  on March 1 (with an agreed upon press  
embargo in  e f f e c t  u n t i l  March 3) and reques ted  a meeting between Johnson 
and the  commissioners on the morning o f  t h a t  day. Johnson c o n d i t i o n a l ly  
agreed to the  meeting,  " I f  Joe (Cali fano) has seen the  Report and says 
OK." (Wri tten  on a memo, Watson to the P res iden t  2/13/68 in which 
C a l i f a n o 's  proposal is  o u t l in e d . )  Following the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  i n s t r u c ­
t ions  Watson in s t r u c t e d  J.R. Jones,  Special  A ss i s t a n t  to the P r e s id e n t ,  
to "block ou t  a t ime fo r  th i s  group. Joe  Cal ifano is  to be back in 
touch with u s . "  ( ib id )  The meeting was not he ld .  As demonstrated 
below Johnson found the p o l i t i c a l  r i s k s  too g re a t .  (Copies o f  these  
memos were found in EX FG 690. A note a t  the  bottom o f  the top 
memo says "o r ig in a l  in P res iden t ia l  Handwriting F i l e . "  LBJ Library .
22See th e  2/21/68 memo to Ginsburg from Spivak (Spivak f i l e ,
NACCD Papers,  LBJ Library) d e t a i l i n g  the  planned coverage o f  the  Report 
by the va r ious  media following p u b l i c a t io n .  I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  the 
advanced commitment o f  time and p r i n t  space was p red ica ted  on knowledge 
of  the  co n ten t  o f  the  Report.
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p a r t i c ip a n t s  agree t h a t  these  two provided the  st imulus which moved
Johnson to his f in a l  p o s i t io n  regarding the Repor t . Mahon was not
a strong supporter o f  the Great Society or the  commission. Three
days following the appointment of the  commission, in an address to
the  House o f  Represen ta t ives ,  he s a id ,  " D isc ip l in e ,  s e l f - r e s p e c t  and
law and o rde r ,  enforced a t  the  local  level a re  very important . . .  the
more we have appropria ted  fo r  these  (socia l  welfare) programs the more 
23violence we have." Mahon was a l so  an adamant foe o f  the surcharge 
tax  proposal and e f f e c t i v e l y  used his  oppos i t ion  to i t  to c r ip p le  the 
Department o f  Health Education and Welfare (HEW) app rop r ia t ion  and forced
the  White House to reorgan ize  i t s  lobbying e f f o r t s  to achieve the passage
24o f  both. Mahon was c re d i t ed  with being the  primary reason fo r  the 
congressional cu t  o f  the  requests  fo r  the Teachers Corps and i n t e r n a ­
t iona l  education,  the  only  s i g n i f i c a n t  reduc t ions  in the HEW budget
25in 1967. I t  was, t h e r e f o r e ,  not promising f o r  those advocating a 
p re s iden t i a l  recep t ion  of the Report when Mahon, sometime during the 
l a s t  two weeks o f  February,  met with Johnson, and some of  his  key 
domestic ad v ise r s ,  and shared his convic t ion  t h a t  the  congress was in 
no mood to  accept the  Repor t . He sa id  t h a t  the  Report would f u r t h e r  
jeopard ize  the chances fo r  the passage of the  surcharge tax b i l l .
^ \ i p s k y  and Olson, MSS, IV, p. 5 
See Minutes o f  the Cabinet , The White House, 10/18/67, LBJ
Library.
25Memo, Cater to  the P res iden t ,  12/15/67, P res id en t ia l  Memoranda, 
12/67, Cater 4, LBJ Library .
Mahon was quoted,  immediately following the pub l ica t ion  o f  the 
Report , as saying t h a t  the surcharge was in t roub le  with congress and
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P r io r  to h is  meeting with Johnson, Mahon had met with  Thornton who to ld
the  congressman of  h i s  concerns over the handling o f  t a x a t io n  in the
r e p o r t  and h is  f e a r s  t h a t  the  commission's work would encourage fu tu r e  
27d i s o r d e r s .
By February 26 Johnson 's  mind was made up; e i t h e r  the commission
recommend ways by which i t s  program recommendations could be funded or
28he would be unable to  p ub l ic ly  support  i t .  A number o f  documents 
generated the  next t h r e e  days demonstrate t h a t  a d m in i s t r a t io n  sup­
po r te r s  o f  the  Report  worked hard to secure  Johnson 's  endorsement
29o f  the  document as w r i t t e n .  Ramsey Clark advocated a p rac t ica l
the  R epor t ' s  recommendations would need a 10-100 p e rc en t  surcharge to get  
r e s u l t s .  See New York Times March 2, 1:7.
27The Mahon-Thornton, Mahon-Johnson meetings were independently 
a t t e s t e d  to  by fou r  in te rv iew ees ,  two o f  whom were in a pos i t ion  to 
have f i r s t - h a n d  knowledge of  the  events.  Harr is  lays  the  to ta l  blame 
on Thornton. "One o f  the  commission members, Char les  "Tex" Thornton, 
who had fought the  m a jo r i ty  on almost every s i g n i f i c a n t  po in t  in the 
r e p o r t ,  got the  f a l s e  word to Johnson t h a t  i t  condoned and would tend to 
encourage r i o t s  and th e  commission had, in  e f f e c t ,  s e v e r ly  c r i t i c i z e d  
Johnson by f ind ing  t h a t  h is  progams were i n s u f f i c i e n t  to meet the pro­
blems. Although I'm sure  the p re s iden t  never read th e » r e p o r t ,  the  
White House canceled the  d e l iv e ry  ceremony." ( H a r r i s ,  Potomac Fever, p. 
113). Thornton did communicate d i r e c t l y  with the White House (see 
below) but h is  a c t i o n s  were not as important to Johnson 's  dec is ion  as 
those of  Mahon and those  o the r  leaders  o f  what John Herbers o f  the  New 
York Times c a l l e d  the  "congressional economic block" (March 2,  1 :7 ) .
28See Larry Temple to the  P res iden t ,  2 /26/69 , covering copy of 
Johnson's s ta tement  t h a t  the  commission must recommend ways o f  paying 
fo r  t h e i r  program recommendations. EX FG590, WHCF, LBJ Library.
29Clark had read the  e n t i r e  Report the  week-end before  i t s  an­
nounced p u b l ic a t io n  da te  and repor ted  to the p re s id e n t  through Larry 
Temple (Special  Counsel to  the P res iden t ) .
484
approach; the  p re s id en t  should a c c e p t  the  Report; the  commission knew 
what i t  was doing " . . .  i t  may be too  l a t e  to  do anything about them 
( th e  recommendations) . . .  In a d d i t i o n  . . .  ( the  recommendations are) 
known to  th e  p r e s s . C l a r k  a l so  examined the  pre liminary  Bureau o f  
the  Budget p ro jec t ions  of  the c o s t s  o f  the  commission's recommenda­
t io n s  and rep o r ted  t h a t  they were n o t  causing the BOB any g rea t  concern.  
In a d d i t i o n  he volunteered to t a l k  to  Kerner about the  BOB figures  when 
they  became f i n a l .  Johnson's  r e p ly  was c u r t  and emphatic.  He d i rec ted
Temple to t e l l  Califano t h a t  "some sugges t ion  must be in the repor t  on
31how to pay ( f o r  the  recommendations)." To avoid any misunderstanding 
Johnson a l so  had Temple prepare and send a memo to Califano expressing 
his  p o s i t io n :
I have been seeing on the wire  and hear ing on the  radio 
a l l  day long what the Commission on Civ il  Disorders is  
going to r e p o r t  to me. As you know, I would p re fe r  to 
r e c e iv e  t h a t  repo r t  before I h e a r  about  i t  from news 
media. Whatever the r e p o r t  recommends, I hope i t  
w i l l  a l so  conta in recommendations to  f inance  these  pro­
p o s a l s .  Anyone can recommend spending, but preparing 
methods to  fund the cos ts  of  new programs takes  more 
a b i l i t y .  I t  has been my exper ience  t h a t  spenders can 
always spend i f  they f ind l e n d e r s  to lend or taxpayers 
w i l l i n g  to  be taxed. So I hope those  who a re  preparing 
the  f in a l  r e p o r t  w i lU be  as imagina t ive  on taxing as 
they a r e  on spending.
Cal ifano responded th a t  he was meeting with  Kerner on February 27 to  go
3 ° I b i d .
31 Temple's  notes on the 2 /26/68 memo to the p re s iden t  in d ica t ing  
the substance  o f  h is  conversa tion wi th  Johnson.
^^Johnson to  Cal if ano  2 /26 /68  ( s e e  f o o t n o t e  #28, above) .
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over th e  BOB p r o j e c t i o n s  and to communicate the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  p o s i t i o n .
He a l s o  noted t h a t  the  Report "has v i r t u a l l y  no f ig u r e s  o f  c o s t  in  i t .  
But t h e r e  i s  a paragraph which says a l l  o f  the  recommendations 'depend 
on our w i l l  to  tax  o u rse lves .
On February 28, the  day fo l lowing  h is  meeting with Kerner and the 
day preceeding  the  planned meeting of  the  p r e s i d e n t  with  the commis­
s i o n e r s ,  Cali far.u submitted to Johnson a d e t a i l e d  summary of the Repor t , 
in c lud ing  a c u r so ry  comparison o f  the  commission 's  recommendations com­
pared with  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  p r o je c te d  domest ic  program, the  BOB 
es t im a te s  o f  the  c o s t s  of  the recommendations and some suggested 
o p t ions  f o r  a c t i o n  which the p re s id e n t  could t a k e .^ ^  Califano 
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  the  recommendations as s i m i l a r  to the  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s
" . . .  bu t  much more ambit ious and in some cases  u n r e a l i s t i c  in the 
35s h o r t - r u n . "  The BOB p ro je c t io n s  f o r  the  c o s t  o f  th e  recommendations 
over the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  Fisca l  Year 1958 budget l e v e l s  were:  $6 b i l l i o n
fo r  j o b s ,  $2 .3  b i l l i o n  fo r  educa t ion ,  $7-9 b i l l i o n  fo r  w e l fa re .  Mo 
c o s t  f i g u r e  was given fo r  the  housing recommendation.  "This (recom-
"5 ”5
" Temple to Johnson 2/26/63 (a d i f f e r e n t  memo than the 2/26/6d  note 
r e f e r r e d  to immediately above but found in the  same f i l e ) .
^^These documents can be found in EX FG 690 WHCF, LBJ Library  and 
a r e  dated  2 /2 8 /6 8 .  They c o n s i s t  o f  an one page handwri t ten  memo from 
Cal i fano  to Johnson, a s ix  page memo (c locked a t  9:20 p.m.) summarizing 
the  whole commission r e p o r t  ( inc lud ing  the  BOB e s t i m a t e s ) ,  a summary 
o f  the  pub l ic  r e l a t i o n s  opera t ion  p ro je c ted  by the  commission, recom­
mendations f o r  p r e s i d e n t i a l  a c t i o n ,  and a t h i r t e e n  page summary o f  
Chapters X-X7II (S ec t ion  I I I  "What Can Be Done). The "Summary" o f  the 
Report was n o t  a v a i l a b l e  to Cal ifano a t  t h a t  t ime.
^ C a l i fa n o  to  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  2 / 2 3 / 6 7 ,  p. 2.
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mendation) doubles the  program you announced l a s t  week and i s  t o t a l l y  
u n r e a l i s t i c . "  He a lso  reported  the commission's unwill ingness  to 
meet the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  demands t h a t  i t  produce a plan fo r  r a i s in g  revenue 
for  i t s  recommendations:
. . .  the  s t r o n g e s t  language t h a t  Kerner and Ginsburg were 
a b le  to ge t  was:
This a l t e r n a t i v e  w il l  require a  commitment to 
na t iona l  a c t i o n  . . .  compassionate,  massive and 
su s ta in e d ,  backed by the resources o f  the  most 
powerful and r i c h e s t  nat ion on th i s  e a r t h .  From 
every American i t  w i l l  require new a t t i t u d e s ,  
new unders tanding and above a l l  new w i l l .
The v i t a l  needs of the  nation must be met; 
hard choices  must be made, and, i f  necessary  
new taxes  enacted.
F in a l ly ,  Cal ifano repo r ted  the  lack of rea l  unanimity among the  com­
missioners:
. . .  t h e re  a re  two members who a t  hear t  have d i f f e r e n t  
views. Thornton b e l ieves  t h a t  i t  ( the  Report) is  much 
too ambitious and he will  probably say so a t  some poin t.  
Lindsay be l iev es  the  commission should have come out 
a g a in s t  the  Vietnam War because of the  resources  i t  is  
d ra in ing  away from the  c i t i e s ,  and w i l l  probably say 
t h i s  a t  some p o in t .
The s t a f f  recommendation to the  pres ident fo r  handl ing the  Report , 
contained in  the  February 28 memo, was two-pronged. F i r s t ,  
Johnson should i s su e  a public  statement i n  response  to  the o f f i c i a l
^®Ibid. ,  p. 3. 
3 7 l b i d . ,  p. 5.
3Blbid.
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t r ansm iss ion  of  the  Report by Kerner; second, "P r iva te ly  you give
(George) C h r i s t i an  and me approval to s t a r t  leaking the r e p o r t  to
diminish i t s  overa l l  impact, point  up i t s  enormous cos t  and the un-
39r e a l i s t i c  na tu re  of i t s  recommendations." In h is  note to the p r e s i ­
den t ,  Cal ifano discourages any thought of  c a l l i n g  the commission back 
in to  s e s s io n  to make recommendations fo r  funding the  p roposa ls ,  but he
did recommend th a t  Johnson meet pe rsona l ly  with the commission and r e -  
40ceive  i t s  r e p o r t .  On the  following day Califano sent Johnson the 
f i n a l  s t a f f  and BOB p re -pub l ica t ion  study o f  the  Repor t . T h e r e  
i s  no s u b s ta n t iv e  d i f f e r en ce  between t h i s  and the f i r s t  a n a ly s i s ;  the 
second con ta in s  a more d e ta i l ed  budget a n a ly s i s  than the f i r s t ,  
but the  t o t a l  d o l l a r  es timates  are  the same.
Ginsburg was aware of Johnson's movement away from formal 
acceptance o f  the Report . On February 28, the day before the scheduled 
meeting between the p re s id en t  and the commissioners,  he made a l a s t  
a t tempt  to  change Johnson 's  mind by t ry in g  to provide him with new 
informat ion .  Ginsburg was convinced t h a t  Johnson was misinformed on 
the  substance  of the  d iv is ion  within the  commission and on the cons­
p i racy  i s s u e .  To c o r r e c t  th i s  he sen t  a hand w r i t t e n  note to Cal ifano,
42attempting  to  p inpoin t  the d i f fe rences  among the commissioners.
39 I b i d . ,  p. 6. The usual form fo r  p re s id e n t i a l  approval or d i s a p ­
proval i s  found a t  the  bottom of the memo but th e re  is no ind ica t ion  o f  
p r e s id e n t i a l  ac t ion  th e re .
^^Memo, Califano to the Pres iden t ,  2/28.
^^G ai the r ,  Nimetz, Bohen and he did the work.
Memo, Ginsburg to Cal ifano  2 /2 8 /6 8 ,  EX FG 590, WHCF, LBJ L ib ra ry .
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Ginsburg noted Thornton 's  concern t h a t  the "Summary" Ignored the s e r ­
ious  danger inheren t  in o v e r - t a x a t io n ,  recorded t h a t  both Lindsay and 
McCulloch had o b je c t io n s  to  the  In t roduc t ion  and Chapter XVII ("Re­
commendations f o r  National Action") and inc luded a copy o f  J .  Edgar 
Hoover's l a s t  l e t t e r  on th e  conspiracy i s su e .  Ginsburg a lso  informed 
Califano t h a t  he was " . . .  c a l l i n g  Marvin (Watson) f o r  an appointment 
(personnal)  ( s i c )  with the  P res iden t .  He has been misinformed."
There i s  no record o f  such a meeting.  Nor i s  th e re  evidence t h a t  the  
p re s iden t  read the  memo. Ginsburg 's  e f f o r t s  f a i l e d .
The remainder o f  the  scenario  fo r  the p u b l ic a t io n  of the  Report 
i s  f a m i l i a r ;  somebody (o r  bodies) "leaked" th e  "Summary" to the 
Washington Post which publ ished i t .  That broke the  press  embargo and 
the  e labora te  plans Spivak had f o r  pub l ic iz in g  the Repor t . K e r n e r  
and Ginsburg re leased  the  remainder of the Report and Bantam Press met 
i t s  announced goal and publ ished i t  within tw enty-four  hours a f t e r  
receiv ing  the  manuscrip t .  As seen above th e r e  i s  no evidence t h a t  the  
p re s iden t  au thor ized  the  " leak";  however, the  f a c t  t h a t  the suggestion 
was made in w r i t in g  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  the p ra c t i c e  was common in the
I
41
Memo, Ginsburg to Cal i fano ,  2/28/68 .
^^Spivak sen t  Cal ifano two memos on t h i s  s u b je c t ,  February 21 
and 27, which d e t a i l e d  th e  multi-media coverage a rranged.  These 
memos were sen t  to the  White House. (Spivak f i l e s ,  NACCD Papers ,  
LBJ Library).
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45Johnson ad m in i s t r a t io n .  Regardless of the  source of  the  l e a k ,  the 
pub l ica t io n  of the  "Summary" be fo re  t h a t  o f  the  t e x t  did no t ,  as 
Cal ifano  had p re d ic ted ,  d iminish the overa l l  impact of  the  Repor t . On 
th e  c on t ra ry ,  having only  the  "Summary", detached from the r e s t  of  the 
Repor t , forced publ ic  a t t e n t i o n  on i t s  dramatic  themes of  white racism 
and the c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  of American so c ie ty  as d r i f t i n g  toward a 
North American vers ion  o f  a p a r th e id .  The media coverage of the  Report 
d e a l t  almost e x c lu s iv e ly  with th e se  themes. Johnson was unhappy th a t  
t h e  d iscuss ion  was so cen te red ,  but fo r  him t h a t  was p re fe ra b le  to 
having to defend th e  commission's  f a r - rang ing  and extremely expensive 
recommendations before  a h o s t i l e  congress and a s eve re ly  divided 
p u b l ic ;  f u r th e r  such a defense  would demand t h a t  he a d j u s t  h is  
c a r e f u l l y  l a id  o u t  domestic program to f i t  the recommendations of 
t h i s  advisory body; t h a t  was a p o s i t io n  in  which few p r e s i d e n t s ,  and 
c e r t a i n l y  not  Lyndon Johnson, would w i l l i n g ly  allow themselves to be 
placed.
Johnson was determined to maintain con tro l  o f  domestic policy
45Most of the  commissioners and s t a f f  members assumed t h a t  the 
White House was the  source o f  th e  leak .  One person p a r t i c u l a r l y  
knowledgeable in  such m a t te rs  r e c a l l e d  t h a t  c e r t a i n  of  the  s t a f f  
members r e leased  from th e  commission in December s in ce  had been 
r e spons ib le  for  a number of s t o r i e s  in the  press  based on leaks 
from the commission. Other evidence of  leaks  from the  commission 
i t s e l f  which can be pointed to ,  inc lude  the  Richard V a le r ian i  NBC radio  
news rep o r t  in January  o f  the  contents  of the d r a f t s  of  the  chapte rs  
to t h a t  date  and th e  s ta tement  by a s t a f f  member in an in te rv iew 
t h a t  syndicated columnis t  Carl Rowan had possess ion  of  a "leaked" 
copy of the "Summary".
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during the  l a s t  year  of  h is  term of  o f f i c e . H e  knew th a t  he had 
l im i t ed  p o l i t i c a l  resources  to c a l l  upon to  achieve th i s  goal;  he had 
very  l i t t l e  suppor t  from the le ad e rsh ip  o f  congress and he was pa in­
f u l l y  aware o f  h is  personal d ec l ine  in the public  opinion p o l l s .  
Kearns p e rc e p t iv e ly  desc r ibes  the  s i t u a t i o n  Johnson faced in ear ly  
1968:
Unhappiness about the  war and the  p r o t e s t o r s ,  the Blacks 
and the  b i g o t s ,  the young and t h e i r  c r i t i c s ,  a t tached 
themselves to the  man in the White House. Too much o u t ­
c ry ,  too many r i o t s ,  too many demonst ra t ions:  the nation
seemed in a s t a t e  o f  continual u n r e s t ,  and, as the people 
saw i t ,  the  P re s id e n t  — the man a t  t h e  n a t i o n ' s  cente r  
- -  was to blame.
For Johnson, to p u b l i c ly  embrace the  Report would be to run the r i s k  
o f  incu r r in g  a d d i t io n a l  blame; blame fo r  endorsing expansion of domestic 
programs a t  the  expense o f  the badly d e t e r i o r a t i n g  war in Vietnam. He 
could not bring  h imself  to  dest roy the d e l i c a t e  balance between his 
domestic and fo re ign  p o l i c i e s .  The Pueblo a f f a i r ,  the  Tet Offensive,  the  
in t e r n a t io n a l  monetary c r i s i s  and i t s  t h r e a t  to the d o l l a r ,  combined with 
the prospect  of  c i v i l  d iso rders  during the  coming summer were t h r e a t
In The Vantage Point  Johnson gives cons ide rab le  evidence to 
suppor t  h i s  c o n ten t io n  t h a t  his  announcement of March 31, 1968 had been 
c a r e f u l l y  worked ou t  over an ex tens ive  per iod  o f  t ime.  (See Chapter 
18 "A Beginning and an End, March 31, 1968," pp. 425-437.) Kearns,
Lyndon Johnson and the  American Dream, suppor ts  t h i s  basic con ten t ion ,  
but draws d i f f e r e n t  conclusions from i t .  (See Chapter 12, "The With­
drawal ,"  pp. 335-352.)  From these  sources i t  seems safe  to conclude t h a t  
by the  time the con troversy  over the  commission's r ep o r t  broke, Johnson 
had made up his  mind not  to seek r e - e l e c t i o n  in 1968.
4 ? l b i d . ,  p.  337.
491
enough; Johnson could not endorse recommendations which would doom
his design to  balance the  demands inherent  in t h i s  p o l i t i c a l  con text
to his and the  n a t i o n ' s  disadvantage.
Johnson r e p o r t s  h i s  response to the Kerner Report was taken
so le ly  because o f  the  nega t ive  e f f e c t  he saw i t  having on his overa l l
s t r a teg y  fo r  dea l ing  with the  in t rans igence  of the  economic leaders  
43o f  congress.
With the tax b i l l  hanging by such tender  th reads ,
I knew t h a t  any c a l l  f o r  increased spending would 
give my opponents the  excuse they sought to ca l l  
me a reck le s s  spender and k i l l  the tax  b i l l .  I f  
t h a t  happened, i t  could bring on an uncon t ro l lab le  
world monetary c r i s i s  o f  1931 proport ions  and con­
sequences.  I t  was a r i s k  we could not a f fo rd .
For Johnson, the f i n a n c ia l  c r i s i s ,  symbolized fo r  him by his  i n a b i l i t y  
to ge t  th e  congress to a c t  on his  tax surcharge proposa l ,  was one 
o f  th ree  major reasons fo r  his  decis ion not to seek r e - e l e c t i o n ;  the 
o the r  two being th e  war and the t h r e a t  of f u r t h e r  c i v i l  d i so rd e r s .
. . .  I wi l l  never  unders tand how the commission 
expected me to get  Congress to turn 180 degrees 
overn igh t  and ap p ro p r ia te  an add i t iona l  $30
^^See Johnson, The Vantage P o in t , pp. 172-173 and 450-451.
4 9 lb id . ,  p. 451.
50I b i d . ,  p. 426. Kearns agrees t h a t  the s ta lemate  on taxes was 
c ruc ia l  to  the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  dec is ion  not to seek r e - e l e c t i o n .  He saw 
" . . .  the deepest  f e a r s  o f  h is  generat ion r e f l e c t e d  in t h i s  s i tu a t io n  
. . .  the sp ec t re  o f  1929 haunted him da i ly  . . .  ( I f  he remained a 
cand ida te ,  he f e a r e d , )  the  Republicans in Congress would s t a l l  the 
su r tax ,  so they could  campaign in the f a l l  a g a in s t  'Johnson 's  i n f l a t i o n '  
as well as  Johnson 's  war . . .  withdrawing from the race was the only 
answer." (Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, p. 347.)
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b i l l i o n  f o r  the  same programs t h a t  i t  was de­
manding I c u t  $6 b i l l i o n . ^
Johnson m i s s t a t e s  somewhat the commission's i n t e n t  and jo in s  his 
adv isory  group in  a l i t a n y  of mutual blame assessment fo r  the lack of  
na t iona l  wi l l  to c o r r e c t  the problems underlying  the  d iso rders .  The 
Report i s  c l e a r  about how the money can be produced i f  the ad m in is t ra ­
t i o n  and the  n a t io n  have the will  to do so: "The major need i s  to
genera te  new w i l l  — the will to tax ourse lves  to the ex ten t  necessary
52to  meet the  v i t a l  needs of  the na t ion ."  Wil l  was the c ruc ia l  v a r ia b le
fo r  the  commissioners;  the  resources were a v a i l a b l e .  From Johnson's
pe rspec t ive  the  resources  could not be unlocked. He applauded the
commission's emphasis on the need to c re a te  a new national will  to meet
the problems produced by the d iso rders  but d id  not think i t  did enough 
54to  generate  i t .  What the commission said  on t h i s  point  was:
The Nation has subs tan t ia l  r e s o u r c e s . . .  to make 
a s t a r t  on reducing our c r i t i c a l  "socia l  d e f i c i t , "  
in s p i t e  o f  the  war, and in s p i t e  o f  c u r r e n t  budget 
requ irements .  The key fa c to r s  having a bear ing on 
our a b i l i t y  to pay fo r  the cos t  a re  the  g re a t  pro­
d u c t i v i t y  o f  the  American economy and a Federal r e ­
venue system t h a t  is  highly responsive to economic 
growth.
51 Johnson, The Vantage Po in t , p. 173.
5?
Repor t , p. 11.
53Johnson, The Vantage P o in t , p. 173.
54Repor t , p.  229. Also Downs and the Social  Economics Panel 
provided data  used by the commission in informing these conclusion 
about na t iona l  f in a n c i a l  re sources ,  see pp. 376-384.
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The commission c a lc u la te d  automatic revenue in c rease s  generated by 
economic growth to  be between $11 and $14 b i l l i o n  a year  and est imated 
t h a t  the  proposed surcharge " . . .  would add about $16 b i l l i o n  to the  f i s c a l  
dividend o f  about $28.5 b i l l i o n  over a 2 year  p e r i o d . I n  s h o r t ,  the  
commission a s se r ted  t h a t  the  money was a v a i l a b l e ,  even accounting fo r  
the  war, i f  a na t iona l  will  ex is ted  to  use i t  to  c o r r e c t  the 
circumstances which produced the d iso rde rs  of  1967. Clearly  the 
commission was saying t h a t  the  adm in is t ra t ion  was not o f f e r in g  the  
le ade rsh ip  necessary  to generate  the  necessary  w i l l . ^ ^  White House 
a ides  ignored the  i m p l i c i t  chal lenge of the  Report  and focused t h e i r  
a t t e n t i o n  on what they regarded as the commission's over ly  o p t im is t i c  
budget p ro jec t io n s :
The 1968 budget in d ic a te s  t h a t  the revenue growth from 
economic growth between 1968-1969 would be $11 1/2 ( s ic )  
b i l l i o n ,  inc luding  earmarked t r u s t  fund r e c e i p t s .  Only
^^Report , p. 230.
56 *I t  is  useful  to po in t  out some of  the  main options  fo r  handling
the  na t iona l  budget which th e  commissioners r e j e c t e d .  F i r s t ,  t h a t  they 
recommend t h a t  the new programs be phased in to  the federa l  budget over 
a three  year  period  to provide fo r  a d m in i s t r a t iv e  e f f i c i e n c y  and to  cush­
ion the blow caused by any m isca lcu la t ions  in the growth of  federa l  
revenues.  Second, t h a t  i t  recommend to the  a d m in i s t r a t io n  and congress 
t h a t  the  r a t e  a t  which the  federa l  d e f i c i t  i s  reduced be slowed to  take 
place  over four y ea r s  r a t h e r  than th r e e .  These op t ions  were presented 
in  Financial  R e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  for New and Expanded Ghetto Oriented Fed­
era l  Programs" by W. Lewis, J r .  1/12/68. (Financing Recommendation F i l e ,  
NACCD Papers) This document represents  the  c o s t  a n a ly s i s  o f  the commis­
s ion recommendations done by the Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n .  Lewis' c a l c u l a ­
t ions  produced a $30 b i l l i o n  f i r s t  year  c o s t  f i g u r e  with p ro jec t ions  of 
$2.4 b i l l i o n  added each succeeding year .  In ignoring these  recommenda­
t i o n s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in the face  of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  more conserva t ive  
es timates  of  the money to be rea l ized  by growth in the  economy, the  com­
missioners  chose to  d i r e c t l y  challenge the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  po licy  p r i o r i ­
t i e s ,  a l b e i t  in a somewhat oblique way. Johnson 's  a ides  had access to the  
Lewis study.
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about $9 1/2 ( s i c )  b i l l i o n  would be a v a i l a b l e  f o r  o th e r  
programs. The p r e s i d e n t ' s  surcharge  req u es t  was fo r  
a temporary t a x ,  expir ing June 30.yl969,  and producing 
$14 b i l l i o n  over i t s  e n t i r e  l i f e .
The White House s t a f f ,  in doing t h i s ,  was t ry in g  to follow the p r e s i ­
d e n t ' s  lead  and avoid  having him blocked in by the  commission's  pro­
j e c t i o n s  and recommendations. All the p r i n c i p a l s  were well aware 
o f  the d iv i s io n s  in  the  commission, the  cha l lenge  to the  p re s id e n t ' s  
guns and b u t t e r  p o l i c y ,  and of the compromises wrought by the commission 
le ad e rsh ip .  For h i s  p a r t ,  Johnson saw one o v e r r id in g  need — to p ro te c t  
his  program, h is  v i s io n  of the  Great Socie ty  in a peaceful world from 
the ravages o f  a congress too i n t e n t  upon the p u r s u i t s  of narrow regional 
i n t e r e s t s .  He had l e s s  than one year to serve  and he was determined 
to do every th ing  p o s s ib le  to salvage h i s  place in  h i s to r y  by leaving 
the  nation in good orde r .  As Kearns put i t ,  he wanted to be ce r ta in  
t h a t  " . . .  p o s t e r i t y  would see h is  abd ica t ion  as an a c t  of courage not 
cowardice . . .  Abdication was thus the l a s t  remaining way to  r e s to re  
c o n t r o l ,  to  tu rn  r o u t  in to  d ig n i ty ,  co l lap se  in to  o rd e r .
When th e  p re s id en ta l  appointment to  a commission ends the  
commissioners and members lose  the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and the 
legit imacy which goes with the  o f f i c e .  Their  r e tu rn  to the i n s t i t u t i o n s
57Comments on Chapter XVII, p. 15, 2 /28 /68 ,  memo, Cal ifano to 
Pres iden t ,  EX FG 690, WHCF, LBJ Library .  (See FN#34, t h i s  chap te r ) .
^^Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, p. 347.
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and p o s i t io n s  from which they came cons iderab ly  q u a l i f i e s  t h e i r
a b i l i t y ,  as a group, to  be p o l i t i c a l l y  e f f e c t i v e  advocates  o f  the  work
59they have done f o r  the  p re s iden t .  The p u b l ic a t io n  o f  i t s  r e p o r t  
r e l i e v e d  the  Kerner commissioners o f  t h e i r  mandated r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
to the p r e s i d e n t . H o w e v e r ,  the p u b l i c i t y  generated by the  Report 
gave i t  and i t s  au thors  more public  exposure than most p r e s id e n t i a l  
commissioners g e t .  Throughout the  p o s t -p u b l i c a t io n  period Johnson kept 
c lose  watch over the  ex-commissioners a c t i v i t i e s  and publ ic  s ta tements .
He did every th ing  p o s s ib le  to prevent them from o b ta in in g ,  as a group, 
any public  forum which might enable them to pursue po l icy  i n t e r e s t s  
co n t ra ry  to h i s .  In dea l ing  with the  media during the days immediately 
fol lowing the  p u b l i c a t io n  o f  the Report , the  commissioners,  to  the  
person, stood by t h e i r  work the  p r e s id e n t ,  a f f i rm ing  t h a t  t h e i r  
e f f o r t s  were in tended to help the p re s id en t ;  they had made t h e i r  
recommendations, they s a id ,  and they were c o n s i s t e n t  with  the  p r e s i d e n t ' s  
programs; what was needed now was f o r  the  congress to ac t .^ ^  In these 
in te rv iews the  commissioners moved e a s i l y  from p a r t i c i p a n t s  in the
59See Chapter 2 fo r  a more d e t a i l e d  d iscuss ion  o f  t h i s  problem.
^^Ginsburg s tayed on as the executive  d i r e c t o r  through the 
month o f  March when he was re l ieved  by T a l i a f e r r o  and a 
ske le ton  s t a f f ,  which was needed to  answer mail and oversee  the pub l ica­
t ion  o f  the supplemental  s tud ies  o f  the  commission which were pub l i sh ­
ed in Ju ly .
^^See two memos, and attached t r a n s c r i p t s ,  from Bob Fleming to 
the P res id en t  dated 3/3 and 3/4/68 giving h is  eva lua t ion  of the two 
n a t io n a l ly  t e l e v i s e d  in te rv iews with various  members o f  the commission 
( Issues  and Answers-ABC and Face the  Nation-CBS.) EX FG 690 LG/New York 
Ci ty ,  LBJ L ibrary .
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commission process to  advocates o f  i t s  product ;  they supported the 
p re s id en t  and t h e i r  r e p o r t  but a t tacked congress .  Late r however, 
as the  pressure  mounted on Johnson, Jwo o f  the  commissioners,  Lindsay 
and H arr i s ,  were bold enough to a ttempt to fo rce  him to c a l l  the 
commission in to  an emergency session designed to  a id  him in carry ing 
out the commission's  recommendations.^^ When th e  reques t  came to 
reconvene the commission Ginsburg a n t i c ip a te d  th e  p r e s i d e n t ' s  response.  
He immediately t o l d  Cal ifano t h a t  he had asked Kerner to "cool off"  
the p e t i t i o n s . J o h n s o n  made i t  c l e a r  to Kerner t h a t  the  commission
52Harris a t tempted  to  win some support  in the White House f o r  the 
Report by i n s t i g a t i n g  a study by Ta l ia fe r ro  d e t a i l i n g  with what he and 
most o f  the  commissioners thought were inaccurac ies  in the  press 
coverage o f  the R epor t :
"As you know, r e a c t io n  o f  the press to the Report has been 
highly  fav o rab le .  I have been puzzled,  however, by some 
press comments to the  e f f e c t  t h a t  the  Report  did not r e ­
cognize how much has been done in the r e c e n t  pas t  (dur ing 
Pres iden t  Johnson 's  adm in is t ra t ion  and by h is  leade rsh ip )  
to  a t t a c k  the  urban and rac ia l  problems which gave r i s e  to 
the r i o t s  of  1967.
In view of those  comments, I again went through the r e p o r t .
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  such commentators did not  read the book.
I have taken the  l i b e r t y  to l i s t  (1) some o f  the count less  
s p e c i f i c  r e fe ren ces  in the  repo r t  to p o l i c i e s  and programs 
proposed and advocated by Pres ident Johnson and enacted  and 
implemented during his  adm in is t ra t ion ,  and (.2) some o f  the 
many general re fe re n ce s  to leadersh ip  and progress during 
th i s  a d m in i s t r a t i o n . "
Memo, T a l ia fe r ro  to  Ginsburg,  "Subject:  Inaccuracy o f  Some Press Comments
on the  Report" 3 /11 /66 ,  EX FG 690, 2 /28/28-2 /13/68 ,  LBJ Library .  This 
memo was routed to  McPherson, Califano and G a i the r .  There is  no e v i ­
dence the p re s iden t  read i t .
^^New York Times April 11, 1968, 1:5 and April  25, 1:2 .
^^Memo, C a l i fan o  to  the  Pres id ent  4 / 1 0 / 6 8  and Kerner to Califano
4 / 2 5 / 6 8 ,  EX, FG 6 90 ,  LG/NY C i t y ,  LBJ Library.
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ended i t s  l i f e  on March 1 , 1968 and t h a t  he did no t  want the  group
meeting again under any circumstances which he d id  not reques t  or  
65approve.
Lindsay p e r s i s t e d  in being th e  most vocal commissioner 
c a l l i n g  fo r  support  and adoption o f  the  recommendations by the  p r e s i ­
dent and the congress.  Immediately a f t e r  the Report was published he 
ordered a l l  the top New York City o f f i c i a l s  to examine i t  and recom­
mend s t e p s  the c i t y  should take to implement i t s  f in d in g s .  In most of 
his pub l ic  s ta tements  made during t h i s  time he sa id  t h a t  the r a c ia l  
problems of  the nation a re  b e s t  d e a l t  with a t  the  na t iona l  l e v e l .
In June a t  the  U.S. Conference of Mayors meeting he a l l i e d  himself  
with Mayor Cavanagh of  D e t ro i t  in an unsuccessful  at tempt to secure  
the passage of  a r e so lu t io n  condemning Johnson's  "months of  i n a c t i v i t y "  
on the Report;^^ in l a t e  Ju ly ,  on the  anniversary  of the appointment of 
the commission, Lindsay leve led  another  b l a s t  a t  J o h n s o n . F i n a l l y ,  
he and Harr is  con t r ibu ted  to the  product ion o f  a book. One Year L a t e r , 
which catalogued t h e i r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  the consequences of Johnson's 
neg lec t  o f  the commission's recommendations.^^
65 See memo, Califano to Johnson 4/11/68 for  the  w r i t t en  record of 
these  conversa t ions .  EX FG 690, LG/NY City ,  LBJ Library .
^^New York Times March 2, 1 :5,
New York Times June 13, 30 :4 ,  Cavanagh never reconc i led  himself  
with Johnson a f t e r  the  events of  the  week of the D e t r o i t  d i so rd e r s  in 
which they both p a r t i c ip a t e d .
^^New York Times Ju ly  31, 24:8.
69Urban America, One Year L a t e r ; An Assessment o f  the  Nation 's  
Response to  the C r i s i s  Described by the National Advisory Commission on 
Civil  D iso rde rs , by Urban America and the  Urban C o a l i t io n .  (New York: 
Praeger ,  1969).
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The mayor and th e  sena to r  were the exceptions  however. The r e ­
mainder o f  the  commissioners re turned  to t h e i r  p ro fes s ions  where the 
n a t i o n ' s  urban c r i s i s  was not the only or  even the major is sue  fac ing 
them. Governor Kerner was much in demand as a speaker and a witness 
before  congressional  committees. His appointment to the  United S ta te s  
Eighth C i r c u i t  Court o f  Appeals cu t  s h o r t  h i s  a t tem pts  to  implement some 
o f  the  recommendations in h is  s t a t e .  Senator Brooke at tempted to secure  
the backing of the Republican congressional l e ad e r sh ip  f o r  l e g i s l a t i o n  to 
implement the  Repor t ' s  recommendations;^^ he a lso  proposed a nationa l com­
mission o f  c i t y  o f f i c i a l s  which would be charged with  the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
f o r  developing plans f o r  car ry ing  them out.  The l a t t e r  plan was endorsed 
by Mayor Ivan Allan o f  Atlanta  and the  two Republican leaders  in 
congress ,  House Minority Leader Gerald Ford and Senate Minority Leader 
Evere t t  Dirkson; former s t a f f  member Stephen Kruzman gave Brooke s i g n i ­
f i c a n t  he lp  in developing these  p ro jec t s  but the e f f o r t s  were f u t i l e ;  they 
lacked any s i g n i f i c a n t  support  from the D e m o c r a t s . C o r m a n  l imited  
h imself  to  endorsement of those pa r ts  of the Report which he had sup­
ported: help fo r  loca l  p o l ice  f o r c e s ,  jobs fo r  the  young and summer
72educat ion programs. Jenkins re tu rned  to Atlanta  and per fec ted  the 
changes he had begun in  h is  p o l ice  force  before  beginning serv ice
^^A t lan ta  C o n s t i t u t i o n , 3 /2 /68.
^ \ i p s k y  and Olson, Commission P o l i t i c s , p. 138. 
^^Atlanta  C o n s t i tu t io n ,  3 /2 /58.
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73on the commission. Jenkins supported Mayor A l l a n ' s  e f f o r t s  to 
appoin t  a c i t y  commission to see t h a t  every c i t y  department c a r r i e d  
ou t  the  Kerner recommendations a p p ro p r ia te  to i t .  McCulloch vigorously  
supported th e  white  racism theme, but backed-off  on proposing new 
l e g i s l a t i o n ,  i n s i s t i n g  th a t  most o f  the  R ep o r t ' s  recommendations were 
contained in  some b i l l  p resent ly  pending b e fo re  the congress.
Wilkins defended the  Report and adopted a p o s i t i o n  common among 
e s t a b l i s h e d  black  leade rs  a t  the t ime,  express ing  l i t t l e  concern 
fo r  psychoanalyzing white America, but g r e a t  concern fo r  c rea t ing  
jobs  fo r  b lacks .  Paden returned to  Kentucky to  mount an unsuccessful  
campaign f o r  the  United Sta tes  Senate .  The consensus opinion among 
her co l leagues  was t h a t  serv ice  on the commission was very d i f f i c u l t  
f o r  her ;  she had to c a r ry  the burden to a c o n se rv a t iv e  consti tuency  o f  
being p a r t i a l l y  re spons ib le  fo r  th e  Repor t . Abel was very q u ie t  about 
the  Report . Immediately preceding and fo llowing i t s  pub l ica t ion  he 
was deeply involved with  the White House in s e t t l i n g  the two hundred 
day copper s t r i k e  which helped to complicate  Johnson 's  economic problems. 
I t  i s  conceivable  t h a t  h is  des i re  to ge t  th e  be s t  se t t lem en t  poss ib le  
f o r  the s t r i k e r s  tempered his enthusiasm f o r  support ing a document the  
White House opposed. Thornton thought  the Report had embarrassed the 
p re s id en t  and o f fe red  to  be of s e r v ice  to th e  White House in i t s  e f f o r t s
73The reforms were f i r s t  recommended by the 1966 Atlanta  Commis­
s ion on Crime and Delinquency. Some of  the  recommendations from t h i s  
commission found t h e i r  way into th e  Report under  the  sponsorship of  
J enk ins ;  va r ious  reforms in police-community r e l a t i o n s ,  in teg ra ted  
p a t r o l s ,  youth p o l ic e  corps were some which were considered and adopted,
^ ^A t la n ta  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  March 2, 1968.
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75to c a l l  some of  the  recommendations in quest ion .  The White House 
did not pick up on his  o f f e r .
In sum, the  commissioners were handicaped by two f a c to r s  from 
forming any meaningful p o l i t i c a l  a l l i a n c e s  to enhance the  adoption of  
the  Repor t 's  recommendations. F i r s t ,  in r e tu rn in g  to t h e i r  own 
"co n s t i tu en c ie s"  th e  i s su e s  i d e n t i f i e d  by the  commission had to compete 
with those o f  high p r i o r i t y  to those  groups; as Abel and Paden found, 
fo r  many of  the commissioner 's  c o n s t i t u e n t s  the  recommendations 
of  the  Report had very low p r i o r i t y  items on t h e i r  public  pol icy  
agendas.  Only Lindsay, Wilkins and Jenkins had l a rg e  numbers of 
c o n s t i t u e n t s  to whom th e  Report was a very high p r i o r i t y  i tem. But 
a f t e r  leaving the  c o n f in e s  of the  p re s id e n t i a l  adv isory  commission, 
these  th ree  had very l i t t l e  in common which would br ing them to g e th e r  
to form any kind o f  meaningful p o l i t i c a l  c o a l i t i o n  able  to r e a l i z e  
some of  the recommendations. None of  the commissioners had as a 
majo r i ty  o f  h i s /h e r  c o n s t i tu en c y  the  black unde r -c la ss  f o r  the  r e l i e f  
o f  whom they had w r i t t e n  the  Repor t . Second, the  p re s id en t  showed 
a determined e f f o r t  to con t ro l  the  immediate policy-making environment 
in to  which the Report  was rece ived .  His suppor te rs  were ab le  to head-off  
the challenge of  Lindsay and Cavanagh a t  the  National Conference of  
Mayors and he was c e r t a i n  the  Democratic l e ad e rsh ip  in  the  congress 
was going to cons ider  o n ly  h is  domestic l e g i s l a t i o n  package, and 
1i t t l e  of  t h a t .
Memo, C a l i f an o  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  March 8 ,  1968,  in  which he
r e l a t e s  a G a i th e r -T h o rn to n  t e lep h o n e  c o n v e r s a t io n :  EX, FG 690,  WHCF,
LBJ L ib ra ry .
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Johnson 's  e f f o r t s  to con t ro l  responses  to the  Report w i th in  his  
a d m in i s t r a t i o n  were f r au g h t  with  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  P re s iden ts  have never 
found i t  easy to  keep a t i g h t  p o l i t i c a l  r e i n  on the members o f  t h e i r  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s .  This i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  of  r e l a t i o n s  between the 
p r e s id e n t  and members o f  h is  c a b in e t ;  under the b e s t  of cond i t ions  
p re s id e n t s  f in d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  br ing o rd e r  out of  the anarchy which 
i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of  the  p o l i t i c s  among and between the c a b in e t  barons 
o f  Washington. The co n d i t io n s  in which Johnson was working were 
not the  b e s t  fo r  main ta in ing  co n t ro l  over  the  re a c t io n s  to  the  Report 
by members o f  h is  a d m in i s t r a t i o n .  Two f a c t o r s  allowed the Johnson 
c a b i n e t  s e c r e t a r i e s  to s t r i k e  ou t  on t h e i r  own and develop a r e l a t i v e l y  
independent course  in r e a c t io n  to the R ep o r t . F i r s t ,  the  c ab in e t  de­
partments  most concerned with the substance  of the  Report had had a s i g n i ­
f i c a n t  hand in w r i t i n g  i t .  The commission le ad e rsh ip  had been ca re fu l  not 
to a llow the  s e c r e t a r i e s  to have veto power over the  recommendations, but 
they  a l so  had been carefu l  no t  to propose novel p r o g r a m s . T h e  
commissioners worked c lo s e ly  with  those who admin is te red  the Great 
Soc ie ty  and t a i l o r e d  t h e i r  recommendations to f i t  th e  needs,  s tandards  
and o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h e i r  cohor ts  in  the Johnson a d m in i s t r a t io n .  Those 
needs included suppor t  fo r  the major i n s t i t u t i o n a l  and p o l i t i c a l  
i n t e r e s t s  served  by th e  depar tments  and a ca re fu l  ba lanc ing o f  the
The housing recommendations were the  most se r ious  except ion  to 
t h i s  r u l e .  But i t  must be noted t h a t  th e  con troversy  was over the num­
ber o f  houses recommended, not over the po l icy .
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Report to  meet t h e  minimum p o l i t i c a l  demands of  c o n g r e s s . T h u s  there  
was ample reason f o r  Johnson to th ink  t h a t  some of  his cab ine t  
s e c r e t a r i e s  had a s take  in  the success of the recommendations of the 
commission and would seek to find ways to implement them independent 
of  his plans and wishes .  Second, the  announcement of  the  p re s id e n t ' s  
in ten t io n  not to seek r e - e l e c t i o n  l i b e r a t e d  the  c ab in e t  members.
Johnson obviously was aware t h a t  he would make his  announcement about not 
seeking r e - e l e c t i o n .  He knew, too ,  t h a t  h is  a c t ion  would lead to some
res igna t ions  before  January  and/or a hurr ied  e f f o r t  by some cab ine t
78o f f i c e r s  to  e s t a b l i s h  a personal record of accomplishment. Such 
a c t i v i t y  meant, f o r  some o f  the s e c r e t a r i e s ,  at tempts  a t  indepen­
dent a c t io n  to se rve  t h e i r  fu tu re  p lans .  Johnson was well aware of 
these  and o ther  p o l i t i c a l  l i a b i l i t i e s  of  lame duck adm in is t ra t ions  and 
was determined to  overcome them.
Johnson, as he always had when he was persona l ly  challenged, 
moved quick ly  and pu rp o se fu l ly  to keep as much contro l  as possib le  of 
his a d m in i s t r a t i o n ' s  r e a c t io n  to the R e p o r t . F i r s t ,  through the
See Lipsky and Olson, Commission P o l i t i c s , pp. 130-131, fo r  a 
s im i la r  d iscuss ion  of t h i s  problem, but one which lacks  apprecia t ion  of 
the commissioners'  s e n s i t i v i t y  to serve  these  p o l i t i c a l  needs of the 
p res iden t .
78At the t ime th e  commission repor ted  Johnson a l ready  had a new 
Secre ta ry  of Defense (C l i f f o r d  rep lac ing  McNamara), a new Secretary of 
Commerce (Smith rep lac in g  Trowbridge) and would, on March 22, nominate 
Wilbur Cohen to succeed John Gardner as the  Sec re ta ry  of  HEW.
^^See Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, p. 376 fo r  a 
d iscuss ion  o f  Johnson 's  l i f e - l o n g  d e s i r e  and a b i l i t y  to move f a s t e s t  
among the  competi tors  in a p a r t i c u l a r  p o l i t i c a l  environment to  seize  the 
advantaged p o s i t io n .
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Direc tor  o f  the  Bureau o f  the  Budget, he gave the c ab in e t  o f f ice r s  
th ree  d i r e c t i v e s :  1) i d e n t i f y  the pa r t s  of  the Kerner Report which pre ­
sen t ly  a re  p a r t  of  the a d m in i s t r a t io n ' s  programs and the  ways those programs 
can be improved by using the Repor t 's  recommendations. 2) id e n t i fy  those 
programs f o r  which the adm in is t ra t ion  has a l ready  requested  au th o r iza t io n s  
and/or ap p rop r ia t ions  fo r  congress and t r y  to ge t  them passed. 3) r e ­
examine a d m in i s t r a t io n  programs submitted by c ab in e t  o f f i c e r s  to the  White
80House, but  not  acted on, and recommend those  on which ac t io n  should be taken .  
The repo r ts  were produced fo r  the White House during the f i r s t  week of 
March. The r a p i d i t y  i s  not su rp r i s ing  when c o n s id e ra t io n  is  given to
the f a c t  t h a t  the  departments had reviewed th e  r e l e v a n t  chap ters  o f  the
81Report severa l  times before  i t s  p u b l ica t ion .
With th e se  repor ts  came evidence of  some cab ine t  r e s i s t a n c e  to  the 
p r e s id e n t ' s  response to  th e  Report . Ramsey Cla rk ,  as mentioned above, 
proposed a plan whereby the  pres iden t  could formal ly  accep t  the com­
m is s io n ' s  R epor t . He recommended th a t  the  p re s id en t  appoin t  a 
sub-cab ine t  level  ta sk  force  to analyze the  Report and recommend how i t  
could be implemented by the  federal  government. He sugges ted ,  too,  th a t  
Johnson recommend such task  forces fo r  the  c i t i e s  and s t a t e s .  Second, 
he proposed t h a t  "In accepting  the r e p o r t ,  you can p ra i s e  the  work and 
ded ica t ion  o f  the  commission members but you need not embrace a l l  o f
U.S. P res iden t ,  Publ ic  Papers of  the  P r e s i d e n t s , Lyndon B. 
Johnson, 1968, (Question 16),  p. 435; Johnson, The Vantage P o in t , p .  172; 
Minutes of  the  Cabinet Meeting 3/13/68, The White House, p . 7, LBJ 
Library.
Libra ry .
^^The r e p o r t s  a re  found in FG 690 ( 1 ) ,  2 / 2 8 / 6 8 - 3 /1 3 /6 8 ,  LBJ
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i t s  f ind ings  or recommendations. You can accept  i t  f o r  what i t  i s :
a searching and comprehensive s ta tem en t  o f  problems and goa ls .  You
can make any comments you deem a p p ro p r i a t e .  You can po in t  ou t  t h a t  the
task  now is to a sse ss  i t  and to determine how to t r a n s l a t e  i t  into
a c t i o n . "  '  The p re s id en t  ignored the  sugges tion.  Eleven days l a t e r ,
while giving a r e p o r t  to the  o ther  members of  the c ab in e t  on prepara t ions
f o r  the  "long hot summer o f  1953", Clark said  t h a t  some of the  f e d e r a l -
s t a t e  problems of the  previous  summer might be avoided in 19.68 because
mayors and police  c h i e f s  now were more w i l l in g  to say p o l i t i c a l l y  unac-
83cep tab le  th ings  than they were be fo re  the Kerner Commission sa id  them. 
Johnson ignored Clark and rea f f i rm ed  his  d i r e c t i v e  to the  D irec to r  of
the  Bureau of  the  Budget and his c a b in e t  members - the  Report should be
84read and recommendations made to him.
Late r Wilbur Cohen, Acting S e c re ta ry  of the Department o f  Health 
Education and Welfare,  presented  Johnson with a plan fo r  ty ing  the 
needed tax inc rease  to the  recommendations of the Kerner R epor t . He 
proposed to "earmark the  new tax by p lacing  a l l  revenue rece ived  from 
i t  in a special  T ru s t  Fund to be expended only for such purposes 
as Congress determined were to ca r ry  out the  recommendations in the 
R e p o r t . H e  proposed to name the new fund "The Domestic Peace and
82Memo fo r  the  P res id en t  "Re: Response to the  Report o f  the Kerner
Commission," 3 /2 /68 ,  EX, FG 690, (1 ) ,  2 /23/68-3/13/68 ,  WHCF, LBJ Library .
^^Minutes of the  Cabinet  Meeting 3/13/68, The White House, p. 9,
LBJ Library .
^ ^ I b i d . ,  p. 10.
° ^ L e t t e r ,  Cohen to th e  P r e s i d e n t ,  3 /1 8 /6 8 ,  FG 690 ( 1 ) ,  3 /1 4 /5 8 -6 /1 5 /6 8 ,
LBJ L ib ra ry .
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T r a n q u i l i t y  T rus t  Fund" and the  tax "The Domestic Peace Tax" and to 
levy i t  f o r  f i v e  y e a r s . ^ ^  A board o f  t r u s t e e s  would ad m in is te r  the  
fund and have a u t h o r i t y  to  borrow a g a in s t  the a n t i c ip a t e d  tax  revenues 
to  begin the  work of  implementing the recommendations, "Even i f  
congress d i d n ' t  adopt the  recommendations i t  would show t h a t  you have
0 7
taken the  l e a d e r s h ip  in meeting the domestic c r i s i s . "  Cohen soon 
got the  message t h a t  Johnson was not open to any v a r i a t io n s  o f  the 
p o s i t io n  he had adopted.  Four days a f t e r  his  formal nomination to  the 
senate  he p u b l i c ly  a t tacked  th e  Report ' s  white racism theme and
go
c r i t i c i z e d  i t  f o r  o v e r - s im p l i fy ing  the  c i v i l  d i s o rd e r  s i t u a t i o n .
Most i n t e r p r e t e r s  saw Cohen as speaking fo r  Johnson; Ginsburg d id ,  
and in a b l i s t e r i n g  l e t t e r  challenged the  s e c r e t a r y - d e s i g n a t e ' s  
comments:
You s a id  when we spoke t h a t  your remarks were taken ou t  o f  
co n tex t .  My reading o f  the  t r a n s c r i p t  suggests t h a t  the 
news s t o r i e s  were s t r i k i n g l y  accura te .
Your rep ly  i n d i c a t e s  l i t t l e  f a m i l i a r i t y  with the r e p o r t .
Do you r e a f i y  be l iev e  t h a t  th is  commission o f fe red  a slogan 
in response to  the v a s t  public questions  put to i t  by the 
p re s iden t?
I f  the  t r a n s c r i p t  d o e s n ' t  accura te ly  r e f l e c t  your views,
I do hope y o u ' l l  f ind  an opportuni ty  soon to c o r r e c t  the 
record .  In my view your remarks have h u r t  the  Report ,
He e s t im a ted  $40-$50 b i l l i o n  to be a v a i l a b le  fo r  use a t  the end 
o f  the  f i v e  year  pe r iod .  He d id  not in d ic a te  how those f i g u r e s  r e l a t e d  
to  Vietnam expenses.
07
Memo, Cohen to the  P r e s id e n t ,  3 /18/68 .
"^New York Times March 25,  43:3.
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the  members o f  the  commission and those a ssoc ia ted  with i t .
My guess i s  t h a t  i t  w i l l  a l so  hur t  you, your Department 
and the P res id en t  - -  because the t e x t  of  the  Report  makes 
c l e a r  t h a t  the  im p l ica t ions  of most o f  what you said  are  
untrue  and the  a t t r i b u t i o n s  to the commission misleading 
and wrong. Most impor tant,  i t  wil l  h u r t  and r e a c t  aga in s t  
the  people w e 're  a l l  t r y in g  to help.  No one who had read 
t h a t  Report andgwanted to  describe  i t ,  could have sa id  
what you sa id .
Cohen l a t e r  changed h is  public  pos i t ion  and accepted the white racism 
theme.
Willard Wirtz,  S ec re ta ry  o f  Labor, ended his response to the
Bureau of  the Budget d i r e c t i v e  by labe l ing  the  Report as "one of  the
h i s t o r i c  documents of  th e  N a t i o n . O n  the  same day the l e t t e r  to
D i rec to r  Zwick was s e n t ,  Wirtz gave a speech support ing the commission's
work, focusing most of  h i s  a t t e n t i o n  on the  tw o - so c ie t i e s  concept.
He supported the  idea o f  reforming individual  a t t i t u d e s  as a
92means o f  a t t a ck in g  the  causes o f  c i v i l  d i s o rd e r s .  On March 22 Wirtz
93went a s tep  f u r t h e r  and pub l ic ly  endorsed the  Repor t .
John Gardner, former HEW Secre ta ry ,  t r i e d  to l i n k  the National 
Assoc ia t ion  o f  Businessmen (NAB) program and the  Kerner Report by 
recommending t h a t  Johnson c a l l  key business l e a d e r s ,  including Henry 
Ford II  (Chairman o f  the  NAB), to the White House a t  the  time he
BQ
L e t t e r ,  Ginsburg to  Cohen 3/29/68, Reactions to the Report, NACCD 
Papers ,  LBJ Library .
90
Memo, Kruzman to Ginsburg 4 /2 /68 , Reactions to  the Report,  NACCD 
Papers,  LBJ Library.
^ \ e t t e r ,  Wirtz to Zwick, 3/14/68, Labor Department Subject  F i l e s ,
Roll 52.
92Department of  Labor Press Release. "Excerpts from the Remarks of 
L. Willard Wirtz Upon His Acceptance of the Sidney Hillman Meri tor ious Award 
Presented by the Sidney Hillman Foundation," Washington D.C. 3/13/68.
Labor Department, Subjec t  F i l e s ,  Roll 52.
93
Washington Pos t  3 /2 2 /6 8 .
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planned to  announce the head of the  new Urban A ffa i r s  I n s t i t u t e .  The
p re s id e n t  could then use the time to  "review pub l ic ly  the  BOB a n a ly s i s
94o f  the Kerner Commission Report ."  Gardner wanted the pres iden t
to  take advantage o f  the Repor t 's  emphasis on p r iv a te  i n i t a t i v e
and community ac t ion .  Douglas C a te r ,  in forwarding Garner 's  l e t t e r
to  Johnson, sided with the former Sec re ta ry  by adding, "I be lieve  t h a t
t h i s  would be a good opportunity  to respond to  th e  c r i t i c s  by showing
t h a t  you a re  tak ing  calm d e l i b e r a t e  a c t io n s  on c i t y  problems while
o th e r s  a re  s t r i k i n g  emotional po s tu re s .
At the  f i r s t  cabinet meeting following the pub l ica t ion  of the
Report Johnson c l e a r ly  s e t  out fo r  h i s  department s e c re ta r i e s  and
top aides  the  place the work the Kerner group occupied in his planning
fo r  the immediate fu tu re .  The agenda of  the  meeting did not mention
the  Repor t . T h e  Report was d iscussed  by Johnson fo r  seven minutes
fo llowing a twenty -f ive  minute d i s cu s s io n  of  the work of Leo Bebbe,
Executive Vice Chairman o f  the  National Assoc ia tion  of  Businessmen,
97who explained the functions  o f  the  NAB. Each o f  the s e c r e t a r i e s
94Memo, Cater to LBJ 3/22/68. The memo is the substance o f  Gardner 's  
phone c a l l  to  Cater ,  EX FG 690 (1 ) ,  3 /1 4 /68-6 /15 /68 ,  WHCF, LBJ Library .
95 Ib id .  On t h i s  memo Johnson granted Cater permission to prepare  
a scena r io  f o r  such a conference.  Johnson seems to have chosen the  press 
confe rence  o f  t h a t  day to make his  on ly  public  statements  about the  
Repor t . See below pp. 515-516.
9G"AGENDA, CABINET MEETING OF MARCH 1968: I .  VIETNAM BRIEFING
II  REPORT OF JOBS PROGRAM I I I  PREPARATIONS FOR THE LONG HOT SUMMER,"
THE CABINET MEETING OF MARCH 13, 1968 THE WHITE HOUSE, p. 1, LBJ L ibrary .
9 ? I b i d . ,  p. 5-6.
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was given a copy o f  the  NAB handbook fo r  review comment. Johnson to ld  
the  ga ther ing t h a t  James Gai ther  of  h i s  s t a f f  was a s s i s t i n g  in 
organiz ing the  a c t i v i t i e s  of the  NAB. To f u r t h e r  r e in fo r c e  the 
secondary na tu re  o f  the  Kerner Report in Johnson 's  p lans ,  George 
C h r i s t i a n ,  in  summarizing the  c a b in e t  meeting fo r  the press did not 
mention i t :
The main t h r u s t  a t  the  Cabinet meeting today was the 
p re sen ta t ion  by Mr. Leo Bebbe of the National A l l iance  gg 
o f  Businessmen on the  hard-core  unemployment job program.
Johnson 's  seven minutes o f  comments on the Report co n s i s ted  o f  a review of 
h is  d i r e c t i v e  to the Bureau o f  the Budget, the  budget c r i s i s  and an admoni­
t io n  t h a t  i t  was they,  th e  cab ine t  o f f i c e r s ,  who would have to defend any 
new budget reques t  before congress.  As p a r t  o f  his plan to break the 
s ta lem ate  over the budget,  he informed the c ab in e t  of a d i r e c t i v e  
he had given the  BOB to  look f o r  programs to  cu t  and d i r e c te d  each 
s e c r e t a r y  to :
. . .  take a hard look:
At new programs — l i k e  the Kerner recommendations - -  
analyzing t h e i r  f e a s i b i l i t y  and c o s t ;  and
At oppor tun i t ie s  f o r  reductions  i ruvour  present  budget — 
i f  Congress begins t o  c u t  us back.
98 "Transcr ip t ,  News Conference a t  the  White House with  George 
C h r i s t i an  and Leo Bebbe, the Executive Vice Chairman of  th e  National 
A l l iance  of Businessmen a t  1:20 p.m. EST, Wednesday, March 13, 1968" 
(Attached to the Minutes of March 13 Cabinet Meeting).  The remainder of 
the  meeting was taken-up by a r ep o r t  from General Earl Wheeler reviewing 
the  m i l i t a r y  s i t u a t i o n  a t  Khe Sanh and Attorney General C la rk ' s  r e p o r t  
on the p repara t ions  fo r  the  "Long Hot Summer" o f  1968.
S ^ I b id . ,  p. 8.
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He c losed  the d i s cu s s io n  of the Kerner Report with  the following s e t  of 
obse rva t ions :
.Our f in an c ia l  s i t u a t i o n  i s  most s e r io u s .  Chairman William 
McChesney Martin o f  th e  Federal Reserve Board has reported 
to  me th a t  fo u r  measures a re  a b s o lu t e ly  necessary :
1. Passage o f  th e  b i l l  to repeal the  gold cover
2. Curta i lment  o f  domestic expendi tu res
3. Passage o f  the  tax b i l l
4. Raising the  red iscoun t  r a t e . ^ ^ ^
Johnson's  design  to t a i l o r  the  r e a c t io n s  o f  his cab ine t  to  the 
Report  were reasonably su cc e ss fu l ;  as has been seen ,  several  of  them 
took personal s tands  support ing the commission bu t  none of  the agencies 
made e f f o r t s  to a t tem pt  to  change t h e i r  depar tm en t ' s  programs to meet 
the  recommendations o f  the  commission. Johnson was not quick enough, 
however, to harness h is  impulsive v ice  p r e s id e n t .  Humphrey i n s t i n c ­
t i v e l y  reacted favorab ly  to the Report and was ready to endorse i t  
when i t  was publi shed.  The White House was aware of  t h i s .  Johnson also 
knew t h a t  the Humphrey was planning to  leave  Washington on February 
29 f o r  a th ree  day t r i p  through F lo r id a ;  inc luded in the announced i t -
Ib id .  Johnson r e i t e r a t e d  the message about  the f inanc ia l  c r i s i s  
a t  the  next meeting o f  th e  c a b in e t ,  too ( the  f i r s t  following his  announce­
ment o f  March 31).  In th e  d iscourse  he expla ined the  f inanc ia l  c r i s i s  
to be one o f  the  reasons  he chose not to run a g a in ;  he could not p res ide ,  
he s a id ,  over the  necessa ry  $6 b i l l i o n  in expend i tu re  cu t s  i f  his 
opponents " . . .  ques t ion  my motives,  i f  I have to go running a l l  over 
the  country  with my s h i r t  t a i l  o u t . "  THE CABINET MINUTES OF APRIL 3, 
1968, THE WHITE HOUSE, p. 2,  LBJ Library.
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in e r a r y  was p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  a panel d i scuss ion  on c i v i l  r i g h t s  a t
F lo r ida  S t a t e  Univers ity  a t  Ta l lahassee  on March 1.  Johnson 's  aides
kept a c lo s e  watch on Humphrey's t r i p ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  the  Ta l lahassee
p a r t  o f  i t .  During the panel d i scuss ion  one of  the  p a r t i c i p a n t s  asked
Humphrey to  comment on the  Repor t . He urged a l l  Americans to read i t
and c a l l e d  i t  "probably the  most e x tens ive  and in t e n s iv e  study made on
our so c ia l  condi t ions  in r e c en t  y e a r s . W i t h  ty p ic a l  Humphrey
exuberance he went on to say t h a t  the Report poin ted  to  a need fo r
"a tremendous coordinated massive program of r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  and socia l  
102a c t i o n ; "  "a n a t io n ,"  he s a i d ,  " th a t  can put a man on th e  moon fo r  $30
b i l l i o n  can a f fo rd  to pay what i t  takes  to  put men on t h e i r  f e e t  in
t h i s  c o u n t r y . T h e  ten o r  o f  these  remarks was not well received in
th e  White House. His comments in F lo r ida  were v i r t u a l l y  ignored by the
news media because the White House had re leased  a more measured vers ion of
the  v ice  p r e s i d e n t ' s  Ta l lahassee  remarks prepared f o r  the press before  he
l e f t  on the  t r i p . ^ ^ ^  The comments in the  t e x t  were not as as p o s i t iv e
105toward th e  Report as those  he d e l ive red  in person. Several days l a t e r  
Humphrey spoke to the National Housing Conference.  By t h a t  time he had
^^^Tallahassee  Democrat March 2, 1968 Associated Press s to ry  by
Jim Parks .
^^^New York Times March 2,  1968, 15:2.
TÔibid.
^^^The New York Times ran the s to ry  on page 15.
^^^This account of these  events was given by more than one i n t e r ­
viewee. No copy of the s ta tem en t  re leased  by the White House was found 
in the  Johnson Library.
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been back in Washington long enough to  t a lk  with the White House and 
be to ld  t h e  message which th e  p re s id en t  p re ferred  f o r  him to  give to 
the pub l ic .  A r e p o r t  o f  t h i s  address was ca r r ied  on page one of  the 
New York Times with a head l ine  reading: "Humphrey Doubts Riot Panel
View: Says That Idea That U.S. Moves Toward Two S o c ie t ie s  Is Open 
To Chal lenge."^^^ Humphrey i s  recorded as saying t h a t  the  major 
basis  fo r  the cha l lenge  a re  the Johnson a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  Great Society 
programs. The s to ry  r e f e r s  to the  address as the " f i r s t  high level 
comment from the  A dm in is t ra t ion ."  Humphrey repeated the  substance 
of  h is  housing conference speech on March 24 before the  Tr iennial  
Convention o f  B'nai  B ' r i t h  W o m e n . B u t ,  as with many o ther  important 
matters  during the l a s t  year  of  the  Johnson a d m in i s t r a t i o n ,  Humphrey 
re turned to  his  o r i g i n a l ,  and fo r  him, most na tu ra l  p o s i t io n  on the 
Kerner Commission. Five days a f t e r  the  B'nai B ' r i t h  address ,  in a 
speech before  a meeting of t rade  u n io n i s t s ,  he at tempted to  " . . .
(c lear )  up some confus ion about his  views on the Repor t . " He to ld  his 
audience,  "I b e l iev e  th e  most important and p r inc ipa l  conclusions of 
the r e p o r t  are  r i g h t .  I commend the repo r t  to  you and thank the  
authors .
Johnson 's  r e a c t io n s  to  the Report were not a l l  taken in p r iv a te .  
While he did not fo rmally  re c e iv e  the work o f  the commission, he did 
not t o t a l l y  ignore  i t  in h i s  public  messages during t h i s  per iod .  The
^^^Byline,  John Berbers,  March 15, 1:7. 
lO^Facts on F i l e  Vol. 28, No 1436, p. 175. 
^^^New York Times March 29, 1 :5 .
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ways he used the  Report , the  few times he r e fe r red  to i t ,  a re  revea l ing
o f  the manner by which Johnson went about securing suppor t  f o r  his
economic p o l i c i e s  and domestic programs. He went fo r  help to those
lead e rs  o f  i n t e r e s t  groups who, in the  p a s t ,  had been useful to  him
in  bringing congress  and the  federa l  bureaucracy in to  l i n e  with  his
p lans .  As he had done throughout h is  c a r e e r ,  Johnson a t tempted  to
109convince those  leade rs  t h a t  h is  goals  were in t h e i r  i n t e r e s t .
He made four  d i r e c t  and e s s e n t i a l l y  p o s i t i v e  re ferences  to the  Report 
in public addresses  and news conferences during the month between the  
p ub l ica t io n  o f  the  Report and h i s  announcement of March 31.^^^ The 
th r e e  speeches were r e p r e s e n ta t i v e  of a l l  Johnson's e f f o r t s  to  build 
a consensus fo r  any policy  i n i t i a t i v e .  He c a r e fu l ly  chose a group 
whose specia l  i n t e r e s t s  and concerns p a ra l l e l ed  his  po l icy  goals and
109 Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the  American Dream, p. 374.
^^^During the  same period a very p o s i t iv e  speech support ing the  
Report was d ra f te d  by White House s t a f f  member Matthew Nimetz ("Draft  
3 /30/68, Nimetz" found in D raf t  Speeches, Gaither 33, LBJ L ib ra ry . )
There i s  no in d ic a t io n  fo r  whom the  speech was w r i t t e n .  There is 
no evidence t h a t  Johnson ordered the  speech w r i t t e n .  The t e x t  in ­
d ic a t e s  the speech was w r i t t e n  to  be given to a p o l i t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i ­
c a n t  audience;  i t  was a lso  designed to be c r i t i q u e  o f  the  a d m in is t r a ­
t i o n ' s  urban program by means o f  a d iscuss ion  of the Kerner Commission; i t  
a l so  explored and defended r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between the  commission and the  
p re s id en t .  I t  admits to new ques t ion ing  among American l i b e r a l s  
about the  f u tu r e  of  t h e i r  c o n t r ib u t io n  to American s o c i e ty ;  with 
the  exception of  housing, th e  e f f o r t s  of  Johnson had removed "the 
c l e a r  v i s i b l e  i n j u s t i c e s  o f  the  1950's and ear ly  1960 's . . . "  (p. 1 ) ,  
"however, the  f i g h t  f o r  human d i g n i t y ,  f o r  a s ing le  American com­
munity,  has not been won." ( I b i d ) .  I t  speaks p o s i t i v e l y  about the 
white racism theme, emphasizes the po in t  t h a t  the p r e s i d e n t ' s  
d i r e c t i v e  to the members of  the  ad m in is t ra t ion  to study the  Report 
"v;as no id l e  gesture"  (p. 11) and quotes approvingly Vice P r e s i ­
dent Humphrey's March 29th speech endorsing the Report . I t  i s  
conceivable  t h a t  Johnson 's speech o f  March 31 wrecked whatever plans 
were l a id  fo r  use o f  t h i s  t e x t .
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sought to  e n l i s t  i t s  support  in  moving th e  congress to a c t i o n .  In 
t h i s  con tex t  Johnson f e l t  a t  home, a l e a d e r  among l e a d e r s ,  working 
to  convince them t h a t  h i s  program was good f o r  them, t h e i r  i n t e r e s t  
and c o u n t r y . H i s  goal was to  achieve  support  f o r  his  plan to end the 
budget c r i s i s ,  to  honorably pursue and hope fu l ly  end the war, and to 
keep the  country  moving toward the Great Soc ie ty .  The problem here 
was t h a t  h is  s t y l e  o f  consensus build ing  among the  e s t a b l i sh e d  groups 
of  the s o c i e t y  did  no t  provide the l e a d e r s h ip  wanted by these  groups.
The e s ta b l i s h e d  p o l i t i c a l  e l i t e s  were c a l l i n g  f o r  new le ad e rsh ip ;  o thers  
were demanding t h a t  the  t r a d i t i o n a l  l e ad e rs  o f  the  var ious i n t e r e s t  e l i t e s ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  those concerned with urban and c i v i l  r i g h t s  a f f a i r s ,  i n ­
co rpo ra te  in t h e i r  ranks persons from th e  new " r a d ic a l "  groups. But 
Johnson, unable to choose between the war and the  Great Socie ty  was
incapable  o f  changing the formula of l e a d e r s h ip  t h a t  had worked
112so well s i n c e  the  New Deal.
The most important of  the  speeches Johnson made in which he
incorpora ted  re fe ren ces  to the Kerner Commission was to a meeting of
113savings and loan bankers .  The audience was gathered to d is cuss
how t h e i r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  could p a r t i c i p a t e  in the r ebu i ld ing  of
the n a t i o n ' s  i n n e r - c i t i e s .  In encouraging them to pursue t h i s  ob jec t ive
^Kearns,  Lyndon Johnson and The American Dream, p. 398.
TT^ i b i d . ,  374.
113 U.S. P r e s id e n t s ,  Public Papers o f  the  P r e s id e n t s , Lyndon B. 
Johnson, 1958, pp. 344-348.
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Johnson rehearsed  in d e t a i l  h is  c i t i e s  message and c lo se ly  t i ed  the  
Kerner Report to  i t ; ^ ^ ^  the commission's work, was a valuable  supple­
ment to  the  a d m in i s t r a t i o n ' s  program f o r  the  c i t i e s ;  i t  should be 
read by everyone; i t  should be c l e a r  from reading the  two documents 
what needs to be done; the  bankers should follow h i s  leadership
1 1 5
and g e t  i t  done. Next he held up the  Report to farm leaders  as 
being on a par with the  message he sen t  to  the  congress on the 
farmer and ru ra l  A m e r i c a . I n  s h o r t ,  Johnson was maintaining 
t h a t  the  Great  Socie ty  was i n d i v i s i b l e  and appealing to a l l  i n t e r e s t  
groups to r a l l y  to  h i s  e f f o r t s  to s t a b l i z e  the economy and get on 
with h is  e f f o r t s  to win both wars;
" . . .  j o i n  us in a to t a l  na tional e f f o r t  to win the war 
to  win the  peace and to complete the  job  t h a t  must be 
done here  a t  home. I ask you to j o i n  in a program of 
na t iona l  a u s t e r i t y  to in su re  t h a t  our economy w il l  prosper 
and t h a t  our f in a n c ia l  p o s i t i o n  w i l l  be sound.
The l a s t  group with whom Johnson attempted to  use the  Kerner Report
to r a l l y  support  fo r  him and his  programs was a group of ed i to rs  of
TT^ib id . ,  p. 345.
TT̂ibid.
TT^ib id . ,  pp. 406-413.
^ ^ ^ I b i d . ,  p.  410. Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, 
p. 339, quotes a d i f f e r e n t ,  more hawkish vers ion  of  t h i s  p a r t  of  the 
address .  The vers ion  published in the P r e s id e n t i a l  Papers does end 
with one r a t h e r  s t rong  statement aimed a t  h is  war c r i t i c s .
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black  pu b l ica t io n s .  Johnson f i r s t  praised the Report , inc luding
i t s  emphasis on white  rac ism,  then bemoaned the  f a c t  t h a t  "Congress
w on ' t  vote me the  $80 b i l l i o n  and th e re  is no po in t  in d i s i l l u s i o n i n g  
118and holding hope." There is  no o th e r  record o f  Johnson endorsing 
the  white racism theme. I t  appears t h a t  he did what was necessary 
to ge t  the support  o f  th e se  black leaders  fo r  h is  1968 domestic 
program.
In his  press conference of  March 22, Johnson was asked to respond
119to the c r i t i c i s m  t h a t  he had ignored the Repor t . Johnson r e p l i e d  
by reviewing his  o rders  to the  Bureau of the Budget and the general 
con ten t  of the c ab in e t  responses;  general p r a i s e  fo r  the  commission 
and i t s  work and r e p o r t s  o f  how departments a l ready  had, e i t h e r  
underway or in development,  programs s imila r  to those in the Repor t .
In speaking of  the housing recommendations, he said  t h a t  he would not 
oppose asking fo r  more from congress i f  he thought he could get  i t .  
Johnson 's comments to the press  were le ss  s p e c i f i c ,  l e s s  c a lcu la ted  to 
br ing pressure  on congress fo r  p a r t i c u l a r  p a r t s  of  h is  program than the 
speeches.  Having no con tro l  over the  "cons t i tuen ts"  of  the r e p o r te r s  
before him, Johnson chose to  speak in very general  te rms. The press  
repor ted  to  a l l  " l e a d e r s , "  f r i e n d s  and foes a l i k e ;  t h a t ,  fo r  Johnson, was 
an uncon t ro l lab le  audience.  He, th e re fo re ,  n e i th e r  endorsed or r e -
^^^New York Times March 29, 1:5 .  These comments a r e  not recorded 
in the appropr ia te  P r e s id e n t i a l  Papers volume.
^^^ü.S. P r e s id e n t s ,  Public Papers of the  P r e s i d e n t s , Lyndon B. 
Johnson, 1968, pp. 434-436.
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pudia ted h is  commission, but descr ibed the  ways in which i t  had been
120handled by the  ad m in is t r a t io n .
These ac t io n s  by Johnson a ttempting to control  the uses of the
Report and i t s  recommendations were viewed by many of the  advisers  as
121in c o n s i s t e n t ,  r e f l e c t i n g  no c l e a r  a d m in i s t r a t i v e  purpose. But t h a t  
was a mis take.  There was no inconsis tency  in Johnson's behavior.  He 
was responding to  what he saw as the demands o f  p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y .  In 
the f ace  o f  the  powerful challenges  to h is  a b i l i t y  to govern, he 
narrowed the  scope o f  his  concerns to those he regarded as e s sen t ia l  
to p o l i t i c a l  s u r v i v a l ,  to  those ac t ions  which h is  re f ined  p o l i t i c a l  
i n s t i n c t s  to ld  him were necessary i f  he was to build  a record during 
his l a s t  year  in  o f f i c e  by which h i s to ry  would judge him favorably.
He r e t r e a t e d  to the e s s e n t i a l s  of  his p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  which had served 
him and his genera t ion  of p o l i t i c a l  le ad e rs  so wel l ;  t i g h t  executive 
con tro l  of pub l ic  pol icy  is sues ,  the use of  governmental powers to 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e  the b e l i e f  t h a t  government e x i s t s  to serve the needs 
of  the  ord inary  c i t i z e n  and t h a t  rea l i sm ,  not idea l ism,  is  the basis  f o r  
achievement of the  two goals .  Johnson kept enough control  o f  the 
a d m in i s t r a t iv e  response to the Report to e f f e c t i v e l y  use i t  to garner 
congressional  and i n t e r e s t  group support  fo r  h is  programs and to block 
a l t e r n a t i v e  e f f o r t s  a t  domestic po l icy  making. This was a successful  
defense  from h i s  po in t  of  view. Lindsay 's  e f f o r t s  came to naught.
1 ?n See Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and The American Dream, p. 354-355 
fo r  a d i scu ss io n  of Johnson's  i n a b i l i t y  to deal with genera l ,  a b s t r a c t ,  
o r  unknown audiences.
^ ^ ^ I b i d . ,  p.  341, f o r  d i s c u s s io n  o f  t h i s  kind o f  s t a f f  a t t i t u d e .
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congress addressed the  commission's recommendations,  when a t  a l l ,  on
the a d m in i s t r a t i o n ' s  terms and he was ab le  to move the 1968 housing and
122c iv i l  r i g h t s  b i l l s  through the  congress and he got h is  tax  surcharge.
When he saw the t h r e a t  to h is  Great Socie ty  to be se r ious  and his time 
and space to a c t  l im i t e d ,  Johnson sought to  s t reng then  the i n s t i t u ­
t iona l  t i e s  between h is  adm in is t ra t ion  and the  major economic i n t e r e s t s  
o f  the country.  The e f f o r t s  to organize  the  fa rm ers ,  the unions,  the 
bankers and the lead ing  business i n t e r e s t s  in suppor t  of the Great 
Socie ty programs in  March o f  1968 was his  l a s t  e f f o r t  to give expression  
to his  b e l i e f  t h a t  government ex is t s  fo r  the  common person and th a t  those
who have been success fu l  in the soc ie ty  have an o b l ig a t io n  (a vested
123i n t e r e s t  and need) to  aid in  th is  e f f o r t .  I t  was here t h a t  Johnson 
thought the Kerner Report d id  him the most harm; i t  hindered his  e f f o r t s  
in  1968 to win th e  support  o f  the groups he thought  he needed i f  the 
Great Socie ty  were to surv ive  his tenure  in o f f i c e .  He saw the com­
miss ion 's  emphasis on white racism and the  d e s c r ip t i o n  of the soc ie ty  
d r i f t i n g  toward two r a c i a l l y  separa te  camps a l i e n a t i n g  the  leadersh ip  of 
the white community which had aided him in the pa s t  in moving the Great 
Society through congress .  The l ib e ra l  community which had held toge ther
122There was a dear p r ice  fo r  the  l a s t  two b i l l s .  The 
murder of  Dr. Martin  Luther King, J r .  was probably the  d i f f e r en c e  in 
securing the passage of  the c iv i l  r i g h t s  b i l l .  For the  surcharge ,  
Johnson had to ag ree  to a spending c e i l i n g  in f i s c a l  1969 which would 
r equ i re  cuts  of S6 b i l l i o n  in estimated 1969 expend i tu res .  To get the 
tax surcharge,  th e  p re s id en t  had to agree a l so  to l im i t a t i o n s  on federa l  
employment. See Congressional Quar te r ly ,  P o l i t i c s  In America, p. 72.
1 23Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and th e  American Dream, p.  373.
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through f i v e  a d m in is t r a t io n s  was being to rn  a p a r t  by in te rn a l  name
c a l l i n g .  "Tha t ' s  what I have been try ing to t e l l  you . . .  t h e re  a r e n ' t
t h a t  many o f  us t h a t  we can a f fo rd  to get  some o f  us a g a i n s t  the  r e s t
o f  us .  That kind o f  t a l k  . . .  only  hurts us when we t r y  to pass laws 
124fo r  the  Negroes." Johnson had l o s t  much (and sensed he would lose  
more) o f  the  t r a d i t i o n a l  Democratic l i b e r a l  community because of  his 
war e f f o r t s ;  he thought he could not a f fo rd  now to lo se  t h e i r  support  
fo r  h is  domestic programs. He had led the  t r a d i t i o n a l  l i b e r a l  community 
in s tanding a g a in s t  any reward f o r  the r i o t e r s  and now he l e t  i t  be 
known t h a t  he had no in t e n t io n  of supporting r h e t o r i c  which would f u r t h e r  
diminish the sl im p o s s i b i l i t y  he saw himself  having to salvage what he
1 pc
could of  h is  Great Soc ie ty .  Johnson's  appeal to  the es tab l ishment  
was to j o in  him in s t a b i l i z i n g  the  i n s t i t u t i o n s  which had served them 
a l l  so well f o r  the p a s t  t h i r t y  y e a r s .  He stood opposed to in corpora t ion  
in the es tab l ishment  of  any new le ad e rs ;  he did  not c a l l  f o r  socia l  
change but appealed to  h i s  t r a d i t i o n a l  a l l i e s  to j o i n  him in saving the 
e s ta b l i sh e d  social  o rd e r  fo r  the sake of the deserv ing poor and the 
a sp i r in g  Negroes of th e  country.  As Kearns n o tes ,  Johnson was well 
aware t h a t  the  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n t e r e s t s  of the  s o c i e t y  " . . .  had no
124McPherson, A P o l i t i c a l  Education , p. 376. Kearns a l so  has an 
account of  Johnson 's  d i s p l e a s u r e  with  the " in g r a t i t u d e "  o f  those he t r i e d  
to help:  b lack s ,  s tu d en t s  and the  poor. (Lyndon Johnson and The American
Dream, pp. 340-341.)  Wolanin, to o ,  records Johnson as la sh ing  out a t  the  
white-ra ism theme ("Why the  he ll  did  they say t h a t ? . " )  "P re s id en t ia l  Advi­
sory Commissions," pp. 376-378.
McPherson A P o l i t i c a l  Education, pp. 377-78 and 381-83 
desc r ibes  the  " l i b e r a l  dilemma" Johnson was in ,  in somewhat d i f f e r e n t  
fash ion .
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d e s i r e  to  t e a r  a p a r t  a s t r u c t u r e  they were now accustomed t o ,  had
conformed t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  t o ,  and under which,  moreover, they were
1doing b e t t e r  than b e fo re ."  What Johnson did  not see was th a t  
those  same l e ad e rs  in c reas ing ly  viewed him and h is  p o l ic ie s  as a 
t h r e a t  to  t h a t  s t a t u s  quo; they were beginning to  say t h a t  i t  was 
he and the  way he pursued his  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  were to blame f o r  the  
problems he was t ry in g  to e n l i s t  t h e i r  suppor t  to oppose. No 
doubt most o f  those  leaders  agreed with Johnson th a t  the i s sue  o f  the  
c i t i e s  was not one of  c la s s  c o n f l i c t  bu t o f  r e l a t i v e  d e p r iv a t io n .  They 
consequently ,  were w i l l ing  to j o i n  him and the  Kerner Commission in 
denying access  to the p o l i t i c a l  arena to those  "m i l i t an t"  le ad e rs  o f  the 
urban poor and blacks  — those who were c a l l i n g  fo r  basic  soc ia l  
change. But the  e s t a b l i sh e d  leade rs  did  not need Lyndon Johnson to 
accomplish t h a t  goal.
Johnson adhered to the e s t a b l i s h e d  canon of  the p o l i t i c a l  rea l i sm  
o f  h is  t ime;  in a period of  c r i s i s  one does not rush o f f  in p u r s u i t  
o f  novel,  no m a t te r  how noble ,  i d e a l s ,  fo resak ing  the a b i l i t y  to win 
something, no m at te r  how smal l .  Johnson intended to win something 
from every  p o l i t i c a l  b a t t l e  he en te red .  Thus h is  e f f o r t s  to  j e t t i s o n  
th e  commission, the  new leade rs  o f  th e  blacks and the poor, in an a ttempt  
to  win enough suppor t  from the  e s t a b l i s h e d  l e ad e rs  of the  so c ie ty  to  
see  the  war to  i t s  end and the  Great Soc ie ty  in  a pos i t ion  to l a s t  
beyond h i s  incumbency. What he could not comprehend was t h a t  the  l i b e r a l  
e s tab l i shm en t  he was a ttempting to r a l l y  fo r  one l a s t  hurrah was i t s e l f
12g
Kearns,  Lyndon Johnson and th e  American Dream, p. 388.
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in a s t a t e  o f  shock, preceding  c o l l a p s e .  His fe l low  l e a d e r s  blamed 
him. But the  f a u l t  ran through the  whole l e ad e r sh ip  e s t a b l i s h m e n t .
I t  was as a l i b e r a l  t h a t  P res id en t  Kennedy en te red  th e  Vietnam war 
and th e  l i b e r a l  Johnson pursued i t ;  f u r t h e r ,  i t  was as a l i b e r a l  
t h a t  Johnson pursued th e  Great Soc ie ty  even in the  face  o f  the  urban 
and s tu d en t  d i s o r d e r s .  He endeavored to save h is  war e f f o r t ,  the  
economy, and a few new programs, with the  l e ad e r sh ip  which had helped 
him in  the pas t .  The t ragedy ,  in the f u l l  sense o f  t h e  word, was 
t h a t  he did  not f u l l y  comprehend u n t i l  l a t e r  t h a t  i t  was those  e f f o r t s  
on h i s  p a r t  which condemned the Great S o c ie ty ,  th e  war and the  na t ion  
to t h e i r  f a t e  under Richard Nixon, the  " l a s t  g r e a t  l i b e r a l .
1 27Gerry W i l l i s ,  Nixon A gon is re s : The C r i s i s  o f  the  Self-Made Man
(New York: Mew American L ib ra ry ,  1970).  See a l so  Kearns, Lyndon 
Johnson and the  American Dream, pp. 286-287, f o r  ano ther  d i s c u s s io n  of 
Johnson 's  i n a b i l i t y  to  see h is  co n t ro l  o f  the l i b e r a l  e s tab l i shm en t  
c o l l a p se .
PART IV: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE AND THEORY
CHAPTER XIV 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The d iscuss ion  in Section I demonstrated th a t  from the a d m in is t r a t io n s  
of Theodore Roosevelt  through Richard Nixon p re s iden ts  have used ta sk  forces  
and advisory commissions to wrench from congress control  of the various  
executive depar tments/agencies  and o f  the  development and execut ion o f  
nat ional publ ic  po l icy .  These advisory groups were shown to  be c en t r a l  f a c ­
to rs  in the  development of the  pres idency as adm in is t ra t ive  and po l icy  sov­
ereign in American national p o l i t i c s . ^  The d iscuss ion  in Sections  II and I I I  
showed the e x ten t  to  which Lyndon Johnson per fec ted  t h i s  pa t te rn  o f  p re s id e n ­
t i a l  action to  enhance the goals of his  Great Socie ty .  By focusing a t t e n t i o n
The term "adm in is t ra t ive  sovereign" i s  t h a t  of  Peri E. Arnold,
"The Presidency and Reorganization: A Comparative Analysis of Six Cases,  
1905-1955," a paper  presented a t  the annual meeting of the American P o l i t i c a l  
Science A sso c ia t io n ,  Washington, D.C., 1979. In h is  study, Arnold adds 
valuable informat ion to  the ex i s t in g  l i t e r a t u r e  on p re s id e n t i a l  advisory 
commissions c rea ted  to a id  the p re s id en t  in reorganiz ing  the execu t ive  branch 
of  government. His d iscussion o f  the T a f t  Commission (1910-1912) is  p a r t i c u ­
l a r l y  h e lp fu l .  In i t  he shows how p re s id en t  Taf t  c a p i t a l i z e d  on the  municipal 
reform movement o f  the ear ly  years o f  t h i s  century to  increase  his power over 
the growing number of executive agencies .  "In the c i t i e s ,  the reformers had 
a ttacked the power of c i t y  councils  and c r e a te d  the strong mayor; in th e  case 
of the national government, the Commission sought to s u b s t a n t i a l l y  inc rease  
the P r e s id e n t ' s  control  over a d m in i s t r a t io n ,  ending the v i r tu a l  monopoly of 
power t h a t  congress ional  committees had developed over the agencies in the  
l a t e  19th c e n tu r y . "  (p. 7 . ) .
522
523
on the  p o l i t i c a l  purposes o f  the  p res iden t  and the response to  them by 
commissioners and t a sk  fo rce  members t h i s  s tudy has f i l l e d  a gap in the 
e x i s t i n g  l i t e r a t u r e  devoted to  ana lys is  o f  the  Johnson advisory system.
There remains the need to summarize the major conclusions  and im pl ica t ions  
which can be drawn from t h i s  s tudy .  Two se t s  of  genera l ized  conclusions 
about Johnson 's  use of temporary advisory groups w i l l  be d iscussed .  They 
w il l  be followed by s p e c i f i c  comments on some s a l i e n t  impl ica t ions  o f  the 
work of  the Kerner Commission.
F i r s t ,  Johnson 's  advisory groups were ins truments  o f  p re s id e n t i a l  
p o l ic y  making sovere ign ty .  By s k i l l f u l  use o f  his  t a sk  forces  and advisory 
commissions, Johnson funneled the c rea t ive  i n s ig h t s  and energ ies  of the 
n a t i o n ' s  po l icy  making e l i t e  in to  the White House where i t  was processed and 
submitted to  congress and the execut ive  depar tments /agencies  when i t  su i ted  
the  demands of the p r e s i d e n t ' s  p o l i t i c a l  agenda. In so doing Johnson main­
t a in e d  control  over the  informat ion needed by the o th e r  Washington p o l i t i c a l  
a c t o r s  i f  they were to  a f f e c t  any meaningful changes in national domestic 
p o l i c y ;  the pol icy  making agenda and the information necessary fo r  carry ing 
i t  ou t  were s ecu re ly  in the hands of the White House during the Johnson years ,  
Members o f  the task  fo rces  and commissions bent to the demands and needs 
of th e  p re s id en t  and then to  congress and those  o f  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t  group con­
s t i t u e n c i e s .
Second, Johnson 's  advisory groups were showcases in which the q u a l i ty  
o f  the  po licy  making leade rsh ip  of his adm in is t ra t io n  was d isp layed .  The 
membership of these  groups,  t h e i r  mandates and the ways in which they worked
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to  f u l f i l l  them combined to reveal much about the  persons re sponsib le  f o r  
the c rea t io n  o f  domestic public  p o l icy  a t  the  t ime .  But,  h e re ,  t o o ,  i t  
was the  p r e s id e n t  who was the most exposed in t h i s  p rocess ;  the  persons 
he s e l e c t e d ,  the  mandate he gave them, the  re sources  he made a v a i l a b le  to  
them, the  ways he delegated  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  revea ls  how Johnson went 
about o rgan iz ing  h is  advisory system, r ev ea l s  h i s  p o l icy  p r i o r i t i e s  and 
the re sources  he intended to use to meet them. Each of  these  conclusions  
will  be now d isp layed  in tu rn .
Johnson 's  advisory groups were s e rv an ts  o f  his p o l i t i c a l  needs and 
des igns .  They were appointed on h is  a u t h o r i t y  as c h ie f  execu t ive ;  he de­
s igned t h e i r  mandates and expected the  persons he appointed as White House 
l i a i s o n  with each o f  the groups to keep the  work of the  group with in  the  p r e ­
scr ibed  l i m i t s ;  he determined the e x t e n t  o f  the resources  (pe rsona l ,  
f i n a n c ia l  and t ime) they had av a i l ab le  to  them; his  continuing support  was
necessary  i f  they were to prosper .  Simply pu t ,  Johnson expected his
2
advisory  groups to serve him and hi-s purposes.  When they s t r a y e d ,  as he 
thought the  Kerner Commission had, Johnson was quick to  ignore t h e i r  work,  
the  u l t im a te  pena l ty  f o r  a p r e s id e n t i a l  a d v i s e r .  Nei ther  he nor the  members 
o f  the  commission and ta sk  forces saw t h i s  c lo se  adherence to p r e s id e n t i a l  
purpose as a q u a l i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  personal or i n t e r e s t  group independence.
2
See Lyons, "The Pres ident  and His Exper ts ,"  p. 144 fo r  an i n s i g h t f u l  
d iscuss ion  o f  t h i s  poin t  in the con tex t  o f  the work of  the  P r e s i d e n t ' s  Council 
of Economic Advisors.
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The conventional wisdom, which they a l l  s h a r ed ,  informed them th a t  in  
serving the needs o f  the p res iden t  they  b e s t  served  the i n t e r e s t s  
they were chosen to  rep resen t  on the advisory  groups; f u r t h e r ,  in 
most c a s e s ,  they were encouraged to be as c r e a t iv e  as p o s s ib le  in the  
work given them to do.
Johnson 's  advisory  groups were an important component in his  plan 
to  leave th e  p res idency as st rong an i n s t i t u t i o n  as he i n h e r i t e d ;  he 
wanted to s t r e n g th en  the o f f i c e  by i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g  the  p ra c t ic e  of  
p r e s id e n t i a l  dominance of  domestic po l icy  making. He appointed more adv isory  
groups than his p redecesso rs ,  he increased  th e  number of  members o f  each, 
increased t h e i r  length  of  se rv ice  and more c lo s e ly  t i e d  t h e i r  work to  his  
basic  s t r a t e g y  fo r  domestic po l icy  making than any of h is  p redecessors .  I t  
must be noted t h a t  these  developments were not e n t i r e l y  due to Johnson 's  
designs f o r  the  imperia l  presidency.  He was responding to  the needs o f  the 
t imes.  The d iscuss ion  in Section II should make i t  c l e a r  t h a t  more 
advisory groups were needed because the  problems Johnson was facing were 
more complex than those faced by his p redecesso rs .  He could not reasonably  
make h is  Great Soc ie ty  proposals without c a l l i n g  upon ever  g r e a te r  rep re ­
sen ta t io n  from the i n t e r e s t  groups making up the  pol icy  making e l i t e  o f  the  
na t io n .  As was shown in  Section II  and I I I ,  Johnson 's  w i l l ingness  to  accomo­
date  t h a t  demand had i t s  l i m i t s ,  a d e f ic ien c y  which was a s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r i ­
butor  to th e  weakening o f  the Great Socie ty  programs and the  co l lapse  o f  
h is  ad m in i s t r a t io n .
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The in c re a s in g ly  common phenomenon o f  the  "runaway" commission i s  
often  pos i ted  as an example of  the a b i l i t y  o f  p r e s i d e n t i a l l y  appointed 
commissions to develop and mainta in ,  when th e re  i s  a d e s i r e  and reason 
fo r  so doing, independence from the pres idency.  This study confirms the  
work done on o t h e r  p r e s id e n t i a l  advisory commissions t h a t  such vagrancy 
occurs when the p r e s id e n t  permits o r  encourages i t  and/or when the goals 
and o b je c t iv e s  o f  the  c h i e f  executive fo r  the  adv isory  group s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
change. Johnson l a r g e l y  avoided the problem o f  the  "runaway" commission 
by ex tens ive  use of  s e c r e t  ta sk  fo rce s ;  he encouraged them to be as inno­
va t ive  as p o s s ib le  and could accept o r  r e j e c t  t h e i r  work as i t  s u i ted  h is  
purposes.  However, he had a d i f f e r e n t  s e t  o f  problems with the public  com­
missions.  In most cases  his  mandate to them was so narrow t h a t  the re  was 
l i t t l e  chance f o r  a "runaway." But, as has been seen in the  cases o f  the  
Kerner and Kaiser commissions, Johnson took a c a l c u l a t e d  r i s k  in giving some 
very wide mandates which some used in a manner unacceptable  to  him. I t  was 
a known r i s k  and the  White House responded to  each prodigal in a p r e d i c t ­
able manner; the  r e p o r t s  o f  the commissions were ignored.  I t  i s  reasonable  
to assume t h a t  the  i s su e s  facing p re s id en ts  in the  immediate fu tu re  which w i l l  
n e c e s s i t a t e  the naming of  a commission w i l l  be o f  such a complex c h a r ac te r  
t h a t  they w i l l  demand very broad mandates which in  tu rn  w i l l  produce more 
commission independence.  Johnson 's  w i l l in g n ess  to  appoin t commissions f o r  
longer  periods  o f  time ind ica tes  he was w i l l i n g  to  accept a c e r ta in  amount 
o f  commission independence in re turn  f o r  innovat ive  policy  recommendations
527
and maintainence o f  po l icy  making dominance. By extending the l ives o f  his 
commissions he focused the a t t e n t io n  of the  r e l e v an t  po l icy  making e l i t e s  
on the White House for  longer periods  o f  time and increased  the p o s s i b i l i t y  
t h a t  they would coalesce in  t h e i r  recommendations f o r  na t iona l  act ion.
F ur the r ,  fay inc reas ing  t h e i r  length  of ex is tence  Johnson increased the pos­
s i b i l i t y  tha t  the commissions would encounter and expose to  publ ic  view new 
problems t a n g e n t i a l l y  r e l a t e d  to  those they were o r i g i n a l l y  created  to  add ress ;  
a useful i f  unintended by-product .  This l a t t e r  consequence o f  appointing 
commissions f o r  longer periods  of  time can become an e f f e c t i v e  tool fo r  
fu tu re  p re s iden ts  in t h e i r  at tempts  to educate the  pub l ic  about p a r t i c u la r  
s e t s  of extremely complex public po l icy  i s su e s ,  a process  almost exclus ive ly  
used fay the congressional in v e s t ig a t in g  committee in the p a s t .  Future p r e ­
s iden ts  might a l so  ponder the p ropos i t ion  th a t  p u b l ic  commissions extended 
over longer periods  of time may be able to o f f e r  important independent judge ­
ments on policy matters  which, while not re lev an t  to  the immediate p o l i t i c a l  
s i t u a t i o n ,  could provide substance fo r  fu tu re  debates  when the  problem again 
comes to  the a t t e n t i o n  of the p r e s id e n t .  The r i s k s ,  hdWever, for the p re ­
s iden t  in th i s  are  g rea t .  Regardless o f  the degree o f  pub l ic  independence a 
commission may o b ta in ,  i t s  repor t  and recommendations are  those o f  a p r e s id ­
e n t i a l  commission. No p re s id en t  has been able to  escape r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  
.the recommendations of h is  public commissions and h i s  response to them.
As has been seen, Johnson's  p o l i t i c a l  for tune  in 1968 was not enhanced by 
his treatment of  the Kerner Commission Report .
This study of Johnson 's  advisory groups has a l so  provided valuable 
in s ig h t  into h is  public policy  designs .  Of a l l  the  means ava i lab le  to  him
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f o r  ob ta in ing  pol icy  in format ion ,  the commission and t a sk  force  were 
those  with  which he f e l t  most comfortable .  In t h i s  a r e a ,  Johnson was an 
in nova to r ,  f ree  of the c o n s t r a i n t s  of  the  t r a d i t i o n s  o f  the o f f i c e .
Because the  work of  the commissions was r e l a t i v e l y  open and because docu­
menta tion of the  work of  both advisory groups i s  now e a s i l y  a v a i l a b l e  to  
s c h o la r s ,  much can be learned  about the c h a r a c t e r  and evolu t ion  o f  Johnson 's 
domestic policy designs .  The appointments to  membership, the  mandates given, 
the ways in which the mandates were f u l f i l l e d  with o r  without White House 
guidance,  the disagreements o r  agreements between the White House and the 
commissioners and the p r e s i d e n t ' s  r e ac t io n  to the r e p o r t s  are  a l l  useful 
in so lv ing  the mystery o f  p r e s id e n t i a l  po l icy  i n t e n t .  The examination 
of  the work of the Kerner Commission, fo r  in s t a n c e ,  has shown t h a t  Johnson 
was p r i n c i p a l l y  concerned to  use the  commission to  thwart  congress  in  i t s  
at tempts  to deal with the  urban d i so rd e r s  and to  communicate to  congress 
and the  nat ion th a t  he could be hard on the p e r p e t r a to r s  o f  the d i s ­
orders  while pursuing h is  Great Soc ie ty  programs fo r  the deserv ing poor.
This study of Johnson 's  advisory  groups a lso  has y ie lded  important 
in s ig h t s  in to  the q u a l i t y  of the po l icy  making leadersh ip  he o f f e r e d  the 
na t ion .  The members of the  task  fo rces  and commissions, and to a l e s s e r  
ex ten t  t h e i r  s t a f f s ,  were members of  the  n a t i o n ' s  power e l i t e .  They were 
p a r t  of  the American a r i s to c r a c y  o f  t a l e n t ,  money, and p o l i t i c a l  power; they 
were persons who were e q u a l ly  a t  home in government,  bus iness  and the  academy, 
They were chosen because of t h e i r  s t a t u r e  w i th in  the i n t e r e s t  groups most 
impor tant to Johnson and because they knew how to surv ive  and produce in the
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cauldron o f  na t iona l  p o l i t i c s .  While these  persons were not in c l in ed  toward 
accepting ra d ic a l  chal lenges  to  the e s t a b l i s h e d  p a t t e r n s  o f  p o l i t i c s ,  they 
did  o f f e r  the p r e s i d e n t ,  and to  a l e s s e r  ex ten t  the  congress and the n a t io n ,  
an add i t iona l  s e t  of  lenses  through which the p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y  of  the  
time could be seen .  They not only brought to the  p re s id en t  a w i l l ingness  to  
do a job f o r  him, but a l so  the concerns o f  bhe groups they rep resen ted - -a  
va luab le ,  but l im i t e d  because of i t s  exclus ive  c h a r a c t e r ,  resource f o r  the  
p re s id e n t .  Wolanin termed these persons the  "commission c l a s s . "  Etzioni 
c a l l e d  them members of the p r e s id e n t ' s  f i r e  b r ig a d e s .^  And one might c a l l  
them p o l i t i c a l  minute men, able c i t i z e n s  who pursue t h e i r  p r iva te  ca ree rs  
u n t i l  pub l ic  duty c a l l s  them. Regardless of the  d e s c r i p t i v e  metaphors ,  the 
evidence in t h i s  study supports  the conclusion t h a t  the  s e c u r i t y  o f  Johnson 's  
po l icy  making system and his adm in is t ra t io n  were s ev e re ly  th rea tened  by 
h is  i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  those s e lec ted  to serve  in h is  advisory  system only 
rep resen t  those na t iona l  i n t e r e s t s  which he recognized as l e g i t im a te .  They 
were Johnson 's  commission c l a s s ,  Johnson's f i r e  b r igade ,  Johnson's minute 
men. This exc lu s iona ry  p rac t ice  became p a r t i c u l a r l y  pronounced %hen 
Johnson began to sense t h a t  his pres idency was in se r io u s  t ro u b le .  On 
the  basis  of  the find ings  in t h i s  work, fu tu re  s tu d i e s  designed to measure 
the  systemic impact of the work of  p re s id e n t i a l  adv isory  groups w i l l  be 
we l l -adv ised  to  give ser ious  a t t e n t i o n  to  the consequences fo r  po l icy  
making and a d m in is t r a t io n  of the  exclusion ( sys tem at ic  o r  not)  from the
3
See G ra f f ,  Tuesday C ab ine t , p. 45 f o r  a s i m i l a r  d iscuss ion  concerning 
indiv idual p r e s i d e n t i a l  adv ise rs .
4
" P re s id e n t i a l  Advisory Commissions," pp. 181-132.
5
Amitai E t z io n i ,  Wall S t r e e t  J o u r n a l .
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p r e s i d e n t i a l  advisory counci l s  of groups claiming to  have a légit imât. ;  
i n t e r e s t  in the problems under cons id e ra t io n .
F in a l ly ,  t h i s  s tudy  o f  the Johnson temporary advisory groups y ie ld s  
va luab le  information about the manner in which his leadersh ip  e l i t e  
handled th e  problem of  domestic policy  making in a time of  severe  p o l i t i c a l  
c r i s i s .  Johnson's  r e a c t io n  to  the urban d iso rde rs  o f  1967, inc luding the 
appointment of the Kerner Commission, was c l e a r ly  an e f f o r t  to buy time and 
p r o t e c t  h i s  options fo r  ac t ion  ag a in s t  an in c reas ing ly  combative congress.  
Faced with  a po licy  i s sue  which th rea tened  him with unknown o r  ambiguous 
p o l i t i c a l  consequences,  Johnson did what was necessa ry ,  as dig h is  pre ­
decessors  in s im i la r  s i t u a t i o n s ;  Johnson 's i n i t i a l  reac t ion  to a major p o l i ­
t i c a l  c r i s i s  was one of process before subs tance .^  This is  not meant to 
imply t h a t  Johnson, or  any o the r  p re s iden t  faced with s im i la r  s i t u a t i o n s ,  
met the chal lenges  s o l e l y  with  ad m in is t ra t ive  process .  All p re s iden ts  use 
the  t ime-honored ad m in i s t r a t iv e  device of  at tempt ing to  buy t ime in the 
hope t h a t  the problem w il l  e a se ,  go away, develop in to  a more f a m i l i a r  and 
t h e r e f o r e  more manageable form or  a t t r a c t  to i t  persons with innovative ideas  
capable  o f  bringing i t  under p re s id en t i a l  management. By so doing, the p re ­
s id e n t  provides the t ime necessary  fo r  an advisory group to get  to work and 
allows the  r e s t  of the  p r e s id e n t i a l  advisory system and the concerned e l i t e  
pub l ics  to  r e f in e  a response to  the problem o r i g i n a l l y  presented or to  watch
See Lowi, End of Liberalism p. 97. Lowi i n s i s t s  t h a t  the  c h a r ac te r ­
i s t i c  American p o l i t i c a l  response to  c r i s i s  s i t u a t i o n s  is  process  ra the r  
than substance.  See a lso  Lipsky and Olson, MSS, IV. p.  22.
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i t  evolve in to  something new and hopefully something more manageable. The 
subs tan t ive  work of  th e  Johnson advisory groups was c lo s e ly  in teg ra ted  to 
his overa l l  po l icy  des igns .  But i t  is  a l s o  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e i r  r e p o r t s  were 
designed by the ta sk  fo rce  and commission members as much to  maintain them­
selves  with in  the po l icy  making e l i t e  as any o ther  p u b l i c  po l icy  purpose.
The advisory group members knew they were expected to  adapt  t h e i r  ideas 
and follow the  White House lead in t h e i r  work; they p r a c t i c e d  what Heydebrand 
c a l l s  "the (a d m in i s t r a t iv e )  a r t  o f  l a i s s e z  f a i r e in response to p r e s id e n t i a l  
d ic t a t e s  and t h e i r  sense  of  his  needs,  they  d i r e c ted  t h e i r  a t t e n t io n  toward 
the p o l i t i c a l  process and i n s t i t u t i o n s  in Washington needed fo r  developing
O
support  f o r  t h e i r  recommendations. I f  they f a i l e d  they knew they would not 
be in v i ted  to  t r y  aga in .  Consequently t h e i r  recommendations were always e i t h e r  
r e a l i z a b l e  o r  accep tab le  to  the p re s id en t .
In t e l l i n g  of h i s  own p o l i t i c a l  educa t ion ,  Harry McPherson speaks 
of the  need f o r  the would-be l i b e r a l  reformer to  choose between prophecy 
(the way th ings  ought to  be) and e f fe c t iv e n e s s  ( the  way th ings  must b e ) .^
This choice was a lso  before  those persons Johnson named to  membership on 
his task  fo rces  and commissions, e s p e c i a l l y  those who served  during the 
l a s t  months o f  h is  adm in is t ra t io n  such as the  Kerner Commissioners.
Johnson wanted e f f e c t iv e n e s s  from his  publ ic  commissions and task  forces  
and t o l e r a t e d  prophecy only from the s e c r e t  ta sk  f o r c e s .  This s tudy has 
shown the degree to which the Kerner Commissioners s e l e c t e d  between these
^Wolf Heydebrand, "Administration f o r  Social  Change." Publ ic  Adminis tra tion 
Review XXIV (December, 1970):165. ■
g
For a s im i la r  i n s i g h t  in to  p r e s id e n t i a l  behavior  drawn from another 
area of p ub l ic  policy  making see Michael H. Armacost,  The P o l i t i c s  o f  Weapon 
Innovation: The T h o r - Ju p i te r  Controversey, (New York: Columbia Univers i ty  
Press ,  1969),  p . 11.
Û
McPherson, A P o l i t i c a l  E duca tion , p .  31.
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op t ions .  Being success fu l  and widely exper ienced p o l i t i c a l  a c t o r s , 
t h e i r  i n s t i n c t s  d i r e c te d  them toward the  kind of  e f fe c t iv en e s s  which 
bes t  served the needs o f  the  pres ident  a t  t h a t  t im e.  But t h a t  same ex­
perience  to ld  them the re  i s  no absolu te  choice ;  t h a t  which i s  p rophe t ic  
in one context  i s  e f f e c t i v e  in another  and in some extremely complicated 
p o l i t i c a l  environments the options merge—to  be p rophe t ic  i s  to  be p o l i ­
t i c a l l y  e f f e c t i v e .  They saw t h e i r  recommendations as e f f e c t i v e ,  but knew 
the  p re s iden t  would see them as prophetic .  The most important f a c t  to remem­
ber in t h i s  con tex t  i s  t h a t  the p re s iden t  i s  the c r e a to r  of  the  independent 
v a r iab les  making up the  environment of the advisory groups e x i s t en ce :  
s i z e ,  budget,  t enu re  in o f f i c e  and general support  system. I t  i s  th e se  f a c ­
to r s  more than any o th e r s ,  as has been seen, which condit ion the  work product 
of the  group. By extending the l ives  and broadening the mandates o f  pub l ic  
advisory groups fu tu re  p re s iden ts  can inc rease  the  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e i r  
being exposed to  more p o l i t i c a l  s t imuli  over longer periods o f  t im e. Such 
a c t i v i t y  could accure  to the  p o l i t i c a l  b e n e f i t  o f  the p re s iden t  by p u b l i c ly  
id e n t i fy in g  him and his adm in is t ra t ion  with c r e a t iv e  publ ic  pol icy  le ad e r sh ip .  
A carefu l  use o f  public  advisory  groups,  coupled with a w i l l in g n e s s  to  take  
the r i s k s  in h e ren t  in such an ope ra t ion ,  could well provide pol icy  substance  
fo r  the kind o f  bold leadersh ip  which has been rewarded with pub l ic  support  
in the  pa s t .  I f  prophecy i s ,  as Burns implies ,  an e s s e n t i a l  i n g r e d i e n t  in 
the  h ighes t  form o f  l e a d e r s h ip ,  then i t  is  well fo r  p res iden ts  and scho la rs  
of the  o f f i c e  to  give considerable  a t t e n t io n  to the ways in which i t  can 
be and has been i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  in  the p re s id e n t i a l  advisory system.
^ % u rn s ,  L e a d e rsh ip ,  pp. 21-22.
533
These general conclusions  about the  p o l i t i c a l  im pl ica t ions  of  
Johnson 's  uses o f  temporary advisory groups can be applied  to  the  case  
study o f  the  Kerner Commission in order  t o  reveal impor tant t h e o r e t i ­
cal i n s i g h t s  fo r  the general  study of  th e  p res idency in  American p o l i t i c s .
The Kerner Commission was a re sponse ,  in p a r t ,  by the Johnson 
a d m in is t r a t io n  to  what i t  perceived to  be a challenge to i t s  a b i l i t y  to 
govern'. Each of the  commissioners chosen to  a id  in  meeting the  chal lenge 
was s e l e c t e d  for  h i s /h e r  a b i l i t i e s  to  r e p r e s e n t  a recognized cons t i tuency:  
the cong ress ,  the p o l i c e ,  major urban c e n t e r s ,  n a t iona l  b lack groups,  l a b o r ,  
business  were the more impor tan t .  None o f  the  commissioners o r  the sen ior  
s t a f f  appointees  in any d i r e c t  way rep resen ted  those  persons o r  groups most 
a f f e c t e d  immediately by the c i v i l  d i s o r d e r s - - t h e  r e s id e n t s  o f  the  urban 
black g h e t to s .  Fu r the r ,  i t  i s  c l e a r ,  as the  t e x t  o f  Section I I I  demonstra tes ,  
t h a t  c o n tac t  between the commissioners,  the  s e n io r  s t a f f  and r e p r e se n ta t iv e s  
of  persons a c tu a l ly  engaged in the  d i s o rd e r s  was kept a t  a minimum as a 
ma t te r  o f  commission and White House p o l i c y .  I t  has been maintained 
th roughout  t h i s  study t h a t  the  exc lus ive  c h a r a c t e r  of  the Kerner Commission 
was r e p re se n ta t i v e  o f  one o f  the  major problems underlying the  domestic 
turmoil  o f  the  1960' s ;  na t iona l  domestic public  p o l icy  was being made 
by groups un rep resen ta t ive  o f  p a r t s  o f  the  public  having a s i g n i f i c a n t  
vested  i n t e r e s t  in the  d i s o r d e r s ,  t h e i r  contro l  and the  e f f o r t s  developed 
to p reven t  t h e i r  reoccurrence .  The Kerner Commission was named to a id  
the p re s id e n t  in heading o f f  the  congress '  e f f o r t s  to lead the  na t iona l  
response to  the d i s tu r b a n c e s , developing  publ ic  po l icy  to end the c i v i l
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d iso rd e r s  and to  meet and c o r r e c t  the  c ond i t ions  which produced them; i t  
was to do th i s  w i thou t  any d i r e c t  involvement,  save t h a t  o f  testimony, 
and most of  t h a t  by d ep o s i t io n , -  of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of  th o se  groups and 
persons toward whom the  new p o l i c y  presumably was d i r e c t e d .  The examination 
of the  major p r e s i d e n t i a l  a d v i so ry  commissions of o th e r  ad m in is t r a t io n s  
conducted in the  f i r s t  t h r e e  c h a p te r s  confirms t h a t  t h i s  p a t t e r n  o f  
exclus ion was not l im i t ed  t o  Johnson o r  to  o the r  per iods  o f  domest ic  
c r i s i s .  V i r t u a l l y  without e x c e p t io n ,  membership on and tes t im ony  before 
p r e s i d e n t i a l  adv isory  commissions has been re served  f o r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  
those e s t a b l i s h e d  i n t e r e s t  groups whose a c t i v i t i e s  were a t  l e a s t  p a r t i a l l y  
r e sp o n s ib le  fo r  t h e  s e t  of s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  c i rcumstances  which 
caused the  p re s id e n t  to  c r e a t e  the  adv iso ry  bodies.  A major contemporary 
t h e o r e t i c a l  exp lana t ion  of  American p o l i t i c s  holds t h a t  th e  American p o l i t i c a l  
system i s  p o l y a r c h i c a l : a system of  government combining e l i t e  and m a jo r i ty
r u l e ,  v i t a l i z e d  by th e  idea l  o f  c i t i z e n  e q u a l i t y  and c o n s e n t . P o l y a r c h i e s  
a re  commonly placed on the  democrat ic  s id e  of a continuum s t r e t c h i n g  from 
autocracy  to  democracy. Rober t  Dahl main ta ins  t h a t  they can be d i s t in g u ish ed  
from autocracy ,  o r  hegemonic r u l e  fay e l i t e s ,  in th r e e  ways:
1. By the e x t e n t  to  which o p p o r t u n i t i e s  a re  a v a i l a b l e  t o  
o p pos i t ion  e l i t e s  t o  c o n te s t  th e  conduct o f  government.
2. The amount of  open c o n f l i c t  among p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s  and 
open compet it ion  f o r  the  suppor t  of n o n - l e a d e r s ,  p a r ­
t i c u l a r l y  by voting in  e l e c t i o n s .
^ 'See Robert  A. Dahl, Democracy in the  United S t a t e s :  Premise and
Performance, (Chicago: Rand McNally,  1973),  pp. 3-56.
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3. The pe r iod ic  occurrence  o f  local  and na t iona l  e l e c t i o n s
12contes ted by competing p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .
This study provides s u b s t a n t i a l  reasons fo r  not p lac ing  the  p o l i t i c a l  uses 
by p re s id en ts  of temporary advisory  groups very c lo se  to the  democratic pole 
on Dahl ' s  s c a l e .  I f  groups r e p re se n t in g  the i n t e r e s t s  o f  the  c i t i z e n s  de­
manding changes in the  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  the  values o f  the p o l i t i c a l  system are  
denied a voice in the advisory  groups ca l l ed  to a id  the p re s id e n t  in develop­
ing policy  to  meet the demand, then the  answer to the ques t ion  i m p l i c i t  in 
the  f i r s t  d i s t in g u i s h in g  c r i t e r i a  above becomes c l e a r :  p r e s i d e n t i a l  task
fo rces  and advisory commissions have most often  served hegemonic r a t h e r  than 
po lyarch ica l  ends.
Fur ther  Lowi has main ta ined  t h a t  the leadersh ip  e l i t e  o f  the  American 
p o l i t i c a l  system always a ttempts  to maintain a balance between the  r e q u i s i ­
t e s  f o r  soc ia l  order and the r e q u i s i t e s  fo r  social  change by in c reas in g ly  
expanding the  provinces of government. Each such expansion c r e a t e s  a c r i s i s
of  pub l ic  o rder  which in  turn  c r e a t e s  demands fo r  equally  s i g n i f i c a n t  expan-
13s ions  of i n t e r e s t  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  This study has shown t h a t  in naming the 
members o f  the  Kerner Commission, Johnson decided ag a in s t  y i e ld in g  to  the 
demands o f  new rep re sen ta t io n  in  h is  executive  policy  making counci l s  deal ing 
with  urban and c iv i l  r ig h t s  m a t t e r s .  He decided f o r  soc ia l  o r d e r ,  assuming 
t h a t  h is  Great Society programs had adequately  met and would cont inue to  meet 
any needs fo r  socia l  change e x ta n t  among the poor o f  the n a t io n .  The Johnson 
a d m in i s t r a t i o n ' s  subsequent c r i s i s  of public  au th o r i ty  became c r i t i c a l  when 
h is  presidency was in c a p a c i t a t e d  by the c o n f l i c t i n g  p ressu res  o f  demands fo r
^ ^ I b i d . ,  pp. 44-45.
^^Lowi, End of  Libera li sm,  pp. 93-94.
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expanded re p re se n ta t io n  in domestic policy  making by a v a r i e ty  o f  a l i e n a t e d  
i n t e r e s t  groups which r e jec ted  t h e i r  exclusion by jo in in g  in  c r e a t in g  p o l i ­
t i c a l  d i so rd e r  and by a Congress which was inc reas in g ly  r e s i s t a n t  to h i s  __
reques ts  fo r  expansion of the federa l  government's commitment to  his Great 
Socie ty  programs.
Lyndon Johnson used his system of s e c re t  ta sk  forces  and publ ic  
advisory commissions as policy  informat ion ga tekeepers ;  they admitted to  
the White House and congress only acceptable  policy informat ion and 
excluded t h a t  o r ig i n a t in g  in groups the p res iden t  did not recognize  as 
le g i t im a te .  These p rac t ice s  had a q u a l i t a t i v e  e f f e c t  on the  p o l i t i c a l  
system. A v a r i e t y  of  p a r t i c u l a r  systemic implica tions  of  the  gatekeeping  
a c t i v i t i e s  of th e  Kerner Commission were noted in Section I I I .  Note must 
now be taken of the  s a l i e n t  impl ica t ions  of evalua t ing  the democratic ch arac ­
t e r  of the work o f  the  commission.
In i t s  e f f o r t s  to serve the p o l i t i c a l  needs o f  the Johnson admin­
i s t r a t i o n  and what i t  perceived to  be the i n t e r e s t s  o f  black urban Americans,  
the  Kerner Commission e x p l i c i t l y  sought to condit ion the p o l i t i c a l  env i ron­
ment in which i t  was opera ting in four  ways. One consequence o f  each was 
exclusion of p a r t i c u l a r  groups and policy  i n t e r e s t s  from the na tiona l 
debate .  F u r th e r ,  contra ry  to the commissioners'  i n t e n t ,  each co n t r ib u te d  
to the demise o f  the adm in is t ra t ion  by cont r ibu t ing  to an unequal d i s ­
t r i b u t i o n  of  those  values of  the s o c i e ty  being contes ted  by those c i t i z e n s  
who supported the  d i so rd e r s ;  t h e i r  act ions  a l so  con t r ibu ted  to  a growing 
sense o f  i n j u s t i c e  in those persons who were disadvantaged by the d i s ­
t r i b u t i o n .
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F i r s t ,  the Report i n t e r p r e t e d  the  c iv i l  d isorders  as random, non- 
del i b e r a t e  a c t s ;  the commissioners,  toge ther  with the p re s id e n t ,  i n t e r ­
preted them as criminal ac ts  devoid o f  any p o l i t i c a l  i n t e n t  to  chal lenge 
the Great Soc ie ty .  I r o n i c a l l y  by denying p o l i t i c a l  design to those  
urban blacks who supported and p a r t i c i p a t e d  in the d i s o r d e r s ,  Johnson and 
his commission engaged in  t h a t  form of  s o c io - p o l i t i c a l  emasculation which 
black Americans had come to  be expected from the white r a c i s t  so c ie ty  
described in the "Summary" of the Repor t . Second, the  Report e x p l i c t l y  
endorsed the Great Soc ie ty  method o f  public  policy development and execu­
t ion  (though obviously not to the degree desired  by the  White House); i t  
i d e n t i f i e d  p o l i t i c a l  i n e q u a l i t i e s  but recommended t h a t  they be correc ted  
by the process which c rea ted  them—adapta t ion  to ,  r a t h e r  than reform or 
r e c o n s t i t u t io n  o f  the  s t a t u s  quo was i t s  stance .  Third ,  the  Report r e i n ­
forced the conventional wisdom of the day by not e x p l i c i t l y  r e l a t i n g  the war 
in Vietnam to the c i v i l  d iso rders  in the c i t i e s .  Some witnesses  before the 
commission made the connec t ion ,  but the  Report ignored the r e l a t i o n s h i p .
In doing so,  i t  doomed the l e a s t  advantaged of the s o c i e t y ,  many o f  whom 
were p a r t i c i p a n t s  in the  d i s o r d e r s ,  to  continue to pay most of  th e  human 
costs o f  the f a i l u r e s  o f  the  e s t a b l i s h e d  domestic and foreign p o l i c i e s .
Fourth,  the Report t i e d  i t s  recommendations to those s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  i t  found c o n t r ib u t in g  to  the d isorders :  1) insurance cover­
age in ghetto  a r e a s ,  2) p r iv a te  s e c t o r  employment, 3) community r e l a t io n s  
programs fo r  the p o l i c e ,  4) i n t e r - p o l i c e  department communications, 5) po l ice  
and national guard r i o t  contro l  t r a i n i n g  programs, 6) governmental i n t e r e s t  
in housing, 7) employment and educational serv ices  in ghetto  a reas .  All recom­
mendations in these  a reas  were adopted by the p r iv a te  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and the
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public  departments /agencies toward which they were recommended; t h i s  r e s u l t  
is  not s u rp r i s in g  when i t  i s  remembered t h a t  these  same i n s t i t u t i o n s  
had a major hand in w r i t ing  the recommendations; they were not l i k e l y  to 
w r i te  recommendations co n t ra ry  to t h e i r  percep t ions  o f  t h e i r  own i n t e r e s t s .
But i t  was those government agencies /depar tm ents  and the na t iona l  i n t e r e s t s  
they and the commissioners r ep resen ted  which stood to  gain most from the  
recommendations. Those toward whom the  recommendations were o s te n s iv e ly  
addressed were powerless before  and a f t e r  the  po l icy  making process  was s e t  
in motion because the recommendations were not in tended to enhance t h e i r  
p o l i t i c a l  power, but r a t h e r  t h a t  o f  those who wrote them. The recommendations 
were p red ic tab ly  conserva t ive  and, in sum, re in fo rced  the  dec is ion  making 
s t r u c tu r e s  and the p o l i t i c a l  values which were the major procedures o f  the  
c i v i l  d i so rd e r s .
The recommendations o f  the Kerner Commission were more d i r e c t e d  
toward broad socia l  change than those presented by any other p r e s id e n t i a l  
commission in t h i s  century .  Yet t h e r e  i s  a t r a g i c  q u a l i ty  to  i t s  work 
when i t  i s  noted th a t  in balance i t  produced more s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  p ro ­
blems than s o lu t io n s .  Lest  i t  be l o s t ,  an obvious concluding po in t  
needs to be made. The o f f i c i a l  r e a c t io n  to demands fo r  massive soc ia l  change 
in the  United S ta te s  by persons  who a re  members of the  "out" groups o f  the 
soc ie ty  is  to provide more, not l e s s  i n j u s t i c e .  P red ic tab ly ,  i t  seems, the  
"haves" wi l l  continue to have more and the "have-nots"  l e s s .
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